

ENGLISH SCHOOL-CLASSICS

BACON'S ESSAYS

STORR & GIBSON

LONGMANS & CO.

A. C. Waters

BACON'S ESSAYS

WITH

*INTRODUCTION, ANNOTATIONS, NOTES
AND INDEXES*

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
PREFACE	v
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE	ix
INTRODUCTION	xi
ESSAYS:	
I. OF TRUTH	1
II. OF DEATH	8
III. OF UNITY IN RELIGION	17
IV. OF REVENGE	26
V. OF ADVERSITY	31
VI. OF SIMULATION AND DISSIMULATION	38
VII. OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN	48
VIII. OF MARRIAGE AND SINGLE LIFE	53
IX. OF ENVY	61
X. OF LOVE	70
XI. OF GREAT PLACE	79
XII. OF BOLDNESS	87
XIII. OF GOODNESS AND GOODNESS OF NATURE	94
XIV. OF NOBILITY	102
XV. OF SEDITIONS AND TROUBLES	116
XVI. OF ATHEISM	130
XVII. OF SUPERSTITION	138
XVIII. OF TRAVEL	146
XIX. OF EMPIRE	155
XX. OF COUNSEL	170
XXI. OF DELAYS	181
XXII. OF CUNNING	188
XXIII. OF WISDOM FOR A MAN'S SELF	195
XXIV. OF INNOVATIONS	202
XXV. OF DISPATCH	212
XXVI. OF SEEMING WISE	218
XXVII. OF FRIENDSHIP	223
XXVIII. OF EXPENSE	237

ESSAY		PAGE
XXIX.	OF THE TRUE GREATNESS OF KINGDOMS AND ESTATES	243
XXX.	OF REGIMENT OF HEALTH	263
XXXI.	OF SUSPICION	269
XXXII.	OF DISCOURSE	274
XXXIII.	OF PLANTATIONS	285
XXXIV.	OF RICHES	295
XXXV.	OF PROPHECIES	305
XXXVI.	OF AMBITION	314
XXXVII.	OF MASQUES AND TRIUMPHS.	320
XXXVIII.	OF NATURE IN MEN	327
XXXIX.	OF CUSTOM AND EDUCATION	329
XL.	OF FORTUNE	339
XLI.	OF USURY	347
XLII.	OF YOUTH AND AGE	358
XLIII.	OF BEAUTY	360
XLIV.	OF DEFORMITY	367
XLV.	OF BUILDING	368
XLVI.	OF GARDENS	373
XLVII.	OF NEGOTIATING	393
XLVIII.	OF FOLLOWERS AND FRIENDS	395
XLIX.	OF SUITORS	400
L.	OF STUDIES	406
LI.	OF FACTION	411
LII.	OF CEREMONIES AND RESPECTS	420
LIII.	OF PRAISE	427
LIV.	OF VAIN-GLORY	429
LV.	OF HONOUR AND REPUTATION	431
LVI.	OF JUDICATURE	434
LVII.	OF ANGER	440
LVIII.	OF VICISSITUDE OF THINGS	443
OF FAME.	A FRAGMENT	450
NOTES		453
APPENDIX OF EXAMINATION PAPERS		545
INDEX I. ON THE TEXT, ANNOTATIONS, AND HINTS		553
INDEX II. ON THE NOTES		573

PREFACE.

HALLAM, in his *Introduction to the Literature of Europe*, thus concludes his remarks on Bacon's Essays: "They might be judiciously introduced, with a small number more, into a sound method of education, one that should make wisdom rather than mere knowledge its object, and might become a text-book of examination in our schools." This edition of the Essays is an attempt to carry out Hallam's suggestion with an important modification. Instead of additional essays by other authors, to each essay of Bacon's are appended a few hints and annotations, in which the different views of other authors are noted, and the defects in Bacon's treatment of the subject supplemented, especially where the advance in science or the altered circumstances of society have made Bacon's "counsels moral and political" either inaccurate or wholly inadequate. In these supplementary essays the editors have not even aimed at a complete or

exhaustive treatment ; they have avoided to the best of their ability all dogmatizing ; in discussing the many thorny points of morals and burning questions of politics raised by the Essays, they have confined themselves to the strictly historical method, and sought to furnish the student with facts and arguments on which to form his own judgment, not to formulate for him a creed. They hope that the book will be of service, not only as an aid to the more intelligent study of English literature, "one that should make wisdom rather than mere knowledge its object," a study which should prefer sense to style, things to words, but also as an assistance to the master in that most difficult task, the teaching of English composition. To set a boy to write an original essay is generally to demand bricks without furnishing straw. Experience has shown them that the only satisfactory way of teaching essay-writing at this stage is to supply the materials : thus only is it possible to exercise and test a boy's powers of selection and arrangement, of logical thought and accurate expression, of taste and judgment.

Dean Church, in his monograph on Bacon in *English Men of Letters*, remarks that Bacon refused to expand these "counsels" to the size which such essays used to swell to after his time. "Many people would have thanked him for doing so ; and some have thought it a good

book on which to hang their own reflections and illustrations." The Dean's satiric touch is all the more telling because it was not directly aimed, and no critic can be more sensible than the editors themselves of the contrast that the lucubrations of a modern annotator must present to Bacon's piercing wit and pregnant brevity. To urge that such a contrast may furnish matter for some useful lessons on style would be a dangerous plea, but the main object that inspired the task, to direct the attention of schoolboys and schoolgirls to the science of morals and politics, to tell them what wise men have thought on those things that come home to men's business and bosoms, and above all to make them think for themselves—this, perhaps, may be held a sufficient apology for adding to the words of Bacon.

This is the main object with which the edition has been composed, and it is hoped that it will prove a serviceable class-book for the sixth forms of public schools and high schools. But the editors venture to address themselves to "children of a larger growth," and trust that their lay sermons will find not fewer readers than Archbishop Whately's pastorals.

It remains to acknowledge obligations to previous editors. Mr. Aldis Wright, by his laborious and wonderfully accurate verification

of Bacon's quotations and allusions, has spared all subsequent editors an infinity of trouble. We must ask Mr. Wright to accept this general confession of indebtedness. Wherever else we have borrowed, the reference is given. Dr. Abbott's last contribution to Baconian literature only reached us as the last sheets were passing through the press, but we welcome it as confirming our general estimate of Bacon's character, and can heartily recommend it to the student as giving in a short compass a very complete analysis of Bacon's voluminous writings. To add another to the many lives of Bacon has been thought unnecessary, but a chronological table of events will prove handy for reference. The text followed is that of the third and latest author's edition of 1625, but the spelling and punctuation have been modernized.

F. S.

September, 1885.

In the second edition the text has been carefully revised, a few misprints corrected, and the punctuation in several places emended.

April, 1886.

FRANCIS BACON.

Born	Jan. 22, 1560-1
<i>Montaigne's Essays</i>	1560
<i>Shakespeare born</i>	1564
<i>Massacre of St. Bartholomew</i>	1572
Entered as fellow-commoner at Trinity College, Cam- bridge	1573
Admitted as "Ancient" at Gray's Inn	1576
In France with Sir Amyas Paulet	1577-8
Returns to England on death of his father, Sir Nicholas Bacon	March 20, 1578-9
Takes his seat as member for Melcombe Regis	Nov. 23, 1584
A Bencher of Gray's Inn	1586
<i>Execution of Mary Stuart</i>	1587
Granted reversion of the clerkship of the Council in the Star Chamber	1589
<i>Publication of the Faerie Queen</i>	1590
Speaks against the Government on the question of granting a subsidy, and falls into disgrace with Elizabeth	1593
<i>Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity published</i>	1594
<i>Jonson's Every Man in his Humour</i>	1596-8
First edition of <i>Ten Essays with Colours of Good and Evil</i> and <i>Meditationes Sacre</i>	1597
Execution of Essex	Feb. 25, 1601
Death of Elizabeth	March 24, 1603
<i>Florio's Translation of the Essays of Montaigne</i>	1603
Knighted by James I.	July 23, 1603

<i>Advancement of Learning</i> published	1605
<i>The Gunpowder Plot</i>	1605
Marriage to Alice Barnham	1606
Solicitor-General	June 25, 1607
<i>Plantation of Ulster</i>	1610
<i>Authorized Version of the Bible</i> published	1611
Second edition of the <i>Essays</i>	1612
Attorney-General	1613
Peacham sentenced for libel	1614
<i>Death of Shakespeare</i>	April 23, 1616
Lord Keeper	March 3, 1616-7
Lord High Chancellor	Jan. 4, 1617-8
Created Baron Verulam	1618
<i>Novum Organum</i> published	1620
Created Viscount St. Alban	Jan., 1621
Charged with bribery and pleads guilty	April, 1621
Publishes <i>Henry VII.</i>	1622
<i>New Atlantis</i>	1624
<i>Death of James</i>	March 27, 1625
Third edition of the <i>Essays</i>	1625
Death	April 9, 1626

INTRODUCTION.

Main Idea of Bacon's Philosophy.—In the history of science Bacon occupies a similar position to that of Luther in the history of theology. Both reformers saw a fair land of promise within their reach if the trammels of authority, conventionalism, and lifeless formulæ could be broken through. Both appealed to an earlier and purer tradition which had been obscured by the glosses of vain interpretations, and perverted by learned pride. The guiding principles of Bacon's philosophy are utility and progress. "The mind is the man and knowledge mind; a man is but what he knoweth."¹ "Knowledge is power,"² and by knowledge Bacon means not the mere accumulation of facts, but "the happy match between the mind of a man and the nature of things," the discovery of the laws and processes of Nature, which produces not only the contentment of the intellect, but the relief of man's estate. The end of human knowledge is the discovery of *forms* or laws of exist-

¹ *The Praise of Knowledge* (1592).

² "Nam et ipsa scientia potestas est."—*Meditationes Sacrae* (1597).

ence ; the end of human activity is invention, the generation of new natures.¹

Bacon's Antagonism to Antiquity.—From this standpoint Bacon emphasizes and exaggerates his antagonism to all preceding philosophies since the age of the early Greek physicists. He can see little to admire in Plato, though the Baconian *forms*, widely as they differ in conception, are a distinct development of the Platonic *ideas* ; he looks on Aristotle as an Ahriman, an evil genius, who misleads men from the way of truth, and fathers on Aristotle all the idle speculations of the schoolmen ; he is grossly unjust to his immediate predecessors and his contemporaries, ignoring or depreciating the labours of fellow-workers, such as Copernicus, Brahe, Galileo, Gilbert and Harvey. This attitude is partly to be explained by Bacon's overweening self-confidence, partly by his early training, which was confined to the barren book-learning of the Universities, partly by the engrossment of professional and political life, which left him scant leisure to keep abreast with the scientific advance even of his day. From Greek thought he was repelled as wandering further and further from the concrete world of sense and deserting physical research for metaphysical speculation. Probably, too, his knowledge of Plato and Aristotle was not at first hand, and he read Greek philosophy only by the pale reflection of Cicero and Seneca or through the distorting media of scholastic logic and mediæval theology. With the Romans, as a practical and progressive people who never lost sight of utility in

¹ Cf. Comte's "Savoir pour prévoir afin de pouvoir."

abstract thought, he has much in common. His dislike to Roman philosophy shows itself rather in his antagonism to Stoicism, which he regards as the precursor of Christian asceticism and monastic isolation. But historical imagination is of modern growth, and it would be unfair to condemn Bacon for failing to recognize the debt he owed to antiquity, and for turning his back on the past in his zeal to press forwards to the goal which (so at least he believed) was seen by him alone. Nor does it detract from his greatness that no law of nature is associated with his name, that no invention is called after him. We cannot indeed doubt that his philosophy would have gained in clearness and directness if he had been conversant with the observations and experiments of his contemporaries, but the prophet is but rarely a minute philosopher. Moses may not enter the promised land; Columbus discovers, but others plant the new continent; the bell-ringer, to use Bacon's own metaphor, calls others to church, but enters not himself.

The New Method.—What Bacon professed was to teach men how to use their understanding aright in the investigation of nature. The mind must follow, not anticipate nature; it must be passive and receptive rather than active and speculative. Phenomena must be patiently observed and stored up; this store of observations must be tabulated and reduced to order; hence we shall discover the sequences of nature, and ascend as by a ladder to higher and higher generalizations. Only by obeying nature can we conquer her.

Idols to be cast out.—But before we can observe to

good purpose the mind must be prepared ; else it is an uneven mirror which reflects phenomena according to the image of men's minds not of nature herself (*ex analogia hominis non mundi*). These distorted images, which Bacon calls *idols*, are (1) *idola tribus* or prejudices of the race, the inherent foibles of the human mind, as for example the tendency of men "to mark when they hit and never mark when they miss" (Essay 35) ; (2) *idola specus*, the idols of the cave, the special foibles of the individual, as when Bacon says of himself that he is inclined to observe differences and overlook resemblances ; (3) *idola fori*, the idols of the market-place, the false notions which have crept into men's minds from the intercourse of daily life, and are embodied in language, as when men follow fashion or custom, and accept what the world says as true. (4) *idola theatri*, the false notions of particular schools of thought. A philosophical system may cast a spell over men's minds like the illusion of the stage. Thus Bacon says that the philosophies of the later Greeks and especially of Aristotle have been like stage-plays, fictions fairer than truth (*Cogitata et visa*).

Baconian Induction.—Macaulay ridicules the vulgar notion that Bacon invented a new method of arriving at truth, called induction, and he characterizes as an absurdity only one degree less extravagant the generally accepted belief that Bacon was the first person who correctly analyzed the inductive method and explained its uses. Yet there can be no doubt that Bacon himself put forward this extravagant claim. In the *Novum Organum* (Aphorism 105), he says, "But in order to furnish this induction well and duly for its

work, very many things are to be provided *which have never yet entered the thoughts of any mortal man ;*" and though the work was not completed, the rest of the book is an attempt to provide these things. Are we, then, to hold with Macaulay that Bacon was altogether mistaken on this point, and that he attributed to his rules a value which did not belong to them? Generally we may say that though Bacon's method is too rigid and mechanical to be of much practical service, and though Macaulay is right in his contention that no inventions or discoveries are directly due to it, yet he is wrong in ignoring its enormous and wide-spreading indirect influence, its destructive influence as a death blow to the old method of induction *per enumerationem simplicem*, and its stimulative influence on organized observation and experiment.

The Baconian Method.—Induction is from sense perceptions and particulars (*e sensu et particularibus*) to propositions of increasing generality, not by simple enumeration of carelessly collected affirmative instances, but by successive applications of the test of negative instances until certainty is reached. The progress of knowledge is from particulars to lower axioms or generalizations, and from them to others of increasing generality. The lowest axioms are tentative and unconfirmed, the highest axioms are too abstract and general for use ; the solid living axioms (*axiomata media*) are between the two ; and from these we draw not only rules for discovery and invention in physics, but for the conduct of life and for politics. *Spes est una in inductione vera.* Bacon does not say what is to be the test of sufficiency, but assumes that

he has discovered a new method, a royal road to discovery by which absolute certainty is to be gained (*Novum Organum*, i. 22, ii. 105), and which will make nearly all men equally capable of attaining truth (*exæquat ingenia*). Laws of nature so discovered are to be applied by a deductive process, useless indeed for discovery, but valuable for the *inquisitio activa*.¹

Application of the Method to Scientific Investigation.
—Bacon assumes that all substances can be resolved into a finite number of elements or aggregation of certain simple qualities, and that when we have by analysis discovered these elements and qualities, we know the essence of the substance and could even produce it artificially. Thus, if we know all the qualities of gold (yellowness, ductility, etc.), we might transform a body into gold. This is what Bacon calls the *transformation of bodies*.

A subsidiary method of scientific investigation is, instead of regarding bodies as bundles or collections of simple natures, to observe a compound body as it is found in the ordinary course of nature in order to ascertain the process by which it is generated, and its hidden essence. Thus, for example, modern chemists know approximately the mode of arrangement of the particles of the albuminous, semi-fluid, colourless substance which envelops the yolk of an unboiled egg. This is Bacon's *latent configuration* (*latens schematismus*). If the egg is boiled the particles of the original substance are re-arranged. If the process from one arrangement to the other could be known, we should know what Bacon calls

¹ Comte's "induire pour deduire afin de construire."

the *latent process* (*latens processus*). As it is, we know the efficient and material causes of this change, but for real knowledge and its result, invention, it is necessary to know each sensible quality singly in the exact conditions which produce it. Then man will be able to make an egg or any other combination of sensible qualities.

Such investigations give us the concrete axioms which have to do with the material and efficient causes of particular bodies. By these we are enabled to transform a limited number of concrete bodies, but without certainty and only under certain rigorous and limited conditions. Besides, our means of experiment and observation are so restricted, that it is difficult to discover the true nature of concrete bodies. We must therefore widen our field and not be content with this partial inquiry, but must collect the concrete bodies, of which we have been studying the nature, into tables, so that one may throw light on another. By noticing where they agree or disagree we shall be able to arrive at certainty, and discover the true or formal cause of the different qualities of bodies; in Bacon's language, we must discover "forms."

Bacon's Forms.—The "form"¹ itself is described by Bacon in several ways. The form of any quality of concreté bodies is some fact or law convertible with that quality, *i.e.* where it exists the quality is present, and where the quality is present the form

¹ The word "form" is borrowed from the schoolmen with the loss of part of its meaning. Bacon says in the *Advancement*, "To me it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity, *usque ad aras*, and to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions."

must be likewise.¹ The "form," then, differs in nothing from the cause, only it is meant to express the ground of a permanent quality rather than of a sequence or change. According to Bacon's view of science primary qualities are the cause of the secondary; certain qualities of bodies are merely subjective and phenomenal, resulting necessarily from others which belong to substance as its essential qualities.² The investigation of these primary qualities is the work of science, and the method is inductive through the study of concrete bodies.

The method of discovering "forms" is somewhat as follows: To find the form of heat the investigator must collect (1) as many instances as possible where the phenomenon under investigation is present.³ (2) Then as many as possible like the first in most respects except in the presence of the given phenomenon.⁴ (3) The next step is to collect instances where the required phenomenon is present in a variably greater or less degree. The increase or decrease may be exhibited in one and the same object, or in different objects.⁵ If we attempt to solve the problem affirmatively, by a mere comparison based on likenesses, the mind will most probably be deceived by false

¹ *Natura alia quæ sit cum natura data convertibilis et tamen sit limitatio naturæ notioris instar generis veri*, i.e. heat is motion, but heat limits motion as a species does a genus.

² The "form" is to Bacon almost equivalent to the "law" or method of operation. Bacon, however, warns the philosopher against Platonic realism. The laws are not really existent, it cannot be said that "*forma dat esse*;" these are only to be grasped by the mind; nothing really exists except "*corpora individua edentia puros actus ex lege*."

³ *Tabulæ essentiæ et præsentia.*

⁴ *Tabulæ declinationis sive absentia in proximo.*

⁵ *Tabula graduum sive comparativa.*

appearances of things. True induction requires the use of a negative or exclusive method. The three tables must be used first to eliminate all that cannot be the "form." As examples of (1) we may instance hot-water, burning coal, red-hot iron, the sun; of (2) phosphorus, the moon; of (3) water at different degrees of temperature. By means of these tables we must apply a method of exclusion in the following way: (1) By our first set of tables we exclude all those natures not found in all cases where the nature under investigation is found; *e.g.* flame is not found in boiling water, therefore it is not the "form" of heat; (2) by the use of the second set we exclude individual natures found in substances where the given phenomenon is absent; *e.g.* phosphorus gives rays of light, but is cold; therefore light-giving is not the form of heat; (3) by the use of the third we exclude individual natures which increase as the given nature decreases, or *vice versâ*; *e.g.* water expands at 4° C., whether its temperature be increased or decreased; accordingly neither expansion nor contraction is the "form" of heat. After applying exclusives we get a residuum as the true form of the phenomenon.¹ This is the *vindemiatio prima*, the working rule which the intellect is allowed at once to frame without stopping to inquire whether the application of exclusives has been complete and final.²

¹ *Nov. Org.*, ii. 16: *Manebit forma affirmativa, solida et vera et bene terminata.*

² Dr. Abbott misunderstands Bacon's method, supposing that all the "*vindemiatio prima*" is not the result of an exclusive method. It is a result obtained from the tables of comparison without the helps, but it is still the result of an exclusive method.

This method is obviously rough and crude ; in some respects it is a repetition of the Socratic testing of popular definitions by negative instances ; it falls short of Aristotelian induction in ignoring the formative mind which sees the universal in the particular. At the same time it is no condemnation of a method to say that simple men have solved simple problems of life without the formal use of Bacon's rules, by the instinctive application of his principles. The merit of the system is that it applies to harder problems the methods used by ordinary intellects in every-day life, but it presupposes observation and experiment to a degree which makes it far higher than a semi-instinctive adaptation of means to ends. Bacon not only grasped, analyzed, and formulated the spirit of the Elizabethan age, but he was the first to conceive the philosophy of science. His method is a prophecy of modern physical science, which, in spite of the retrogressive influences of the Stuart period, was by the Baconian impulse firmly set upon its forward path. "We want to find," says Bacon, "a nature which is invariably absent from, or present with, the phenomenon under investigation, or increases with its increase, decreases with its decrease, or *vice versâ*." ¹ The last test is especially valuable in sciences where experiment is impossible, but the whole passage is an anticipation and a prophecy of the inductive methods perfected and formulated by J. S. Mill. Bacon undoubtedly deserved Macaulay's encomium, "He moved the intellects which have moved the world."

¹ *Nov. Org.*, ii. 15.

Solitary instances.—The difficulty presents itself, how can the philosopher be certain that he has excluded every cause except the real one, that he has applied every conceivable exclusive instance.¹ It is possible that the real cause may be concealed behind the apparent cause. Bacon is himself conscious of this, and proposes nine helps for the intellect. Only prerogative instances, however, are discussed, of which there are twenty-seven kinds. The most important is that of *solitary instances* where the presence or absence of the nature under investigation is the only common point between the different instances observed.² For example, “if we are inquiring into the nature of colours, prisms or crystals, which show colours not only in themselves, but externally on a wall, dews, etc., are solitary instances, for they have nothing in common with colours fixed in flowers, coloured stones, metals, woods, etc., except the colour. From which we easily gather that colour is nothing more than a modification of the image of light received upon the object, resulting in the former case from the different degrees of incidence, in the latter from the various natures and configurations of the body.”³ As the whole process is cumbrous, the intellect may dispense with the helps, and come to a provisional determination called *vindemiatio prima*, by the use of the three tables.

¹ Cf. *Encycl. Brit.*, article “Bacon,” “It is evident that if the tables were complete and the notions of the respective phenomena clear, the process of exclusion would be a mere mechanical counting out, and would infallibly lead to the detection of the form.”

² Mill's *Methods of Agreement and Difference*.

³ *Nov. Org.*, ii. 22.

Consideration of Forms belongs to Metaphysics.—The consideration of these forms belongs to metaphysics.¹ Though Bacon warns us against giving a substantial existence to “forms,” he conceives them as separable in idea from concrete bodies. He would restrict the word “cause” to that succession of phenomena which modern thought regards as the fundamental conception in science, and holds that the “form nature” is permanent and unchangeable. The keynote of the Baconian system is that the sensible qualities of bodies can be reduced to a limited number of simple elements. These ultimate resolutions are to be recombined into concrete bodies by mere mechanical juxtaposition. This highly general, highly abstract physical property becomes less and less like the scientific idea of cause, and the phenomenal nature is regarded as the never-varying manifestation of a permanent and inherent quality of matter. The “form” is “*ipsissima res*,” the “*natura naturans*,” the “*fons emanationis*.” In place of the universal concept, horse, man, metal, with which modern science is concerned, we get a highly abstract individualized first quality as the furthest limit of analysis.

Bacon holds that if science can (and it can) discover the forms of the different sensible qualities of gold, it can produce gold.² In this way he would

¹ “*Inquisitio formarum quæ sunt æternæ et immobiles constituit metaphysicam; inquisitio vero efficientis et materiæ et latentis processus et latentis schematismi quæ omnia cursum naturæ communem et ordinarium non leges fundamentales et æternas respiciunt constitunt physicam.*”—*Nov. Org.*, ii. 9. Metaphysics is merely a higher branch of physics.

² “*Primum intuetur corpus ut turmam sive conjugationem naturarum simplicium; ut in auro hæc conveniunt quod sit flavum, etc. . . . qui formas et modos novit superducendi flavi,*

hope to reconstruct nature, forgetting that causes combine chemically, and that to reconstruct, even if it were possible to reduce to simple natures, and in one day reproduce the work of a thousand years, we must also know the exact law of the combination of elements.¹ It must, however, be remembered that scientific apparatus was rudimentary in his time, and that he could only put objects side by side, where modern science can isolate for fresh experiment. For this "first philosophy" Bacon has the highest respect, and he constantly complains of specialism:—"neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon the level of that science and ascend not to a higher science." Baconian knowledge was essentially encyclopædic; modern science tends to specialization and minute division of labour.

Departure from the Exclusive Method and recourse to Analogy.—It is from this point that the weakness of the Baconian system clearly appears. Let us suppose that the "exclusive" method has analyzed a comparatively concrete nature like heat unto a particular kind of motion; metaphysics, he holds, should compare this with other kinds of motion as exhibited by the phenomena of generation, corruption, light, etc.²

ponderis, etc., videbit et curabit ut ista conjungi possint in aliquo corpore unde sequatur transformatio in aurum."—*Nov. Org.*, ii. 5. We are strangely reminded of the alchemists. Bacon subordinates "magic" to metaphysics, "*propter latas ejus vias et majus imperium in naturam.*"—*Nov. Org.*, ii. 9.

¹ Bacon may be called a mechanical physiologist.

² Bacon's "first philosophy" may be contrasted with the doctrine that the world has been evolved out of molecules floating in the cosmic æther. Mr. Spencer has formulated the

The unity, however, which Bacon produces is fanciful and analogical. In the want of a proper scientific method and accurate scientific appliances, Bacon falls back on the freest use of analogy. He speaks indeed of his mind as "versatile enough for that most important object, the recognition of similarities and at the same time steady and concentrated enough for the observation of subtle shades of difference;" but while he virtually ignored hypothesis, he was over-imaginative in the detection of resemblances. He is the poet as well as the prophet of science who is carried away by fanciful resemblances into a region of parables and mere illustrations. So he sees a unity between mathematics and jurisprudence in the axiom "if equals be added to unequals the wholes will be unequal;" and between morals and music in the truth that a discord ending immediately in a concord sets off the harmony. Probably he himself felt the weakness of his system when he suggested the existence of an "invisible, intangible spirit, which clothes tangible objects as with a garment," a suggestion adopted by modern spiritualists to fill up gaps in their system.¹

Bacon compared with Modern Science; Defects of his System.—If we compare Bacon's treatment of the method of science with that of modern times we shall see its defects. Modern science does not work as Bacon works; it would ridicule his painful gropings

law of evolution, and the doctrine of the "correlation of forces" points to the primitive unity of matter. Bacon leaves *en dernière analyse* a limited number of irreconcilable elements.

¹ Notably in a semi-serious novel by L. Oliphant, entitled *Altiora peto*.

as exemplified by the treatment of "motion" in the "*commentarius solutus*"; it regards all nature as in a constant flux, a continual stream of development, each phenomenon being the momentary consequent of a number of antecedents combining their effects chemically as well as mechanically, not the uniform manifestation of one underlying cause, a "*causa immanens*," with a real objective existence. The modern physicist, moreover, works through hypothesis, verified by observation and experiment. In his view no conception, no theory is final, but nature is ever widening upwards, new relations are constantly discovered, and instead of the isolation of "*corpora individua*" we are taught to look for the correlation of all forces. Bacon in another form revives the doctrine of actually existent "genera"; modern science deals with artificial classes constantly remodelled by new knowledge. Sensible objects are looked at as wholes, and no attempt is made to analyze each sensible quality into an isolated law of operation. Bacon held that sensible qualities are reducible to a number of simple natures which simply co-exist without blending their effects. He ignored mental initiative,¹ and deified method, forgetting that the scientific imagination is the point which divides genius from dull plodding.

¹ So he would have political facts collected for the use of politicians, and in his college one class collect instances from which philosophers are to draw their theories. This divorce of fact and theory, matter and mind, ended in the scepticism of Hume and provoked the critical synthesis of Kant. The *Hunt of Pan* is characteristic of the Baconian method; the "*experientia liberata*" is to take different directions, everywhere searching out natural phenomena like a hunter in pursuit of game.

It must be allowed that Bacon also disregarded development and looked at nature from a statical aspect. "Πάντα ῥεῖ," said Heraclitus; "forms are eternal and unchangeable," said Bacon.

Bacon's merit is that he insisted on the study of nature at first hand, that he improved and formulated the inductive method which had hitherto been defective and vague, and generally that he opened out the path for free inquiry which has and ever will be followed since his time. The defects of his system are that his method was too mechanical and artificial that it virtually ignored the problems of plurality of causes and the intermixture of effects, that it disregarded mental initiative and hypothesis, and that grasping at finality and over-analysis of nature, it was misled by analogy and ended in abstraction. Bacon did not clear up the ultimate nature of "forms," probably if pressed he would have had to adopt a modified atomism and to reduce sensible qualities to the configuration of particles. As he has left them they are to invention what the Aristotelian categories are to thought. It was nothing better than a dream to suppose that the world could be taken to pieces in thought, and then recombined in fact. Knowledge is power relatively to the thing known. To know gold is to know its physical properties, to know a telescope is to know how to make one.

Bacon behind the Scientific Knowledge of his Age.—Bacon was twitted by Harvey with writing philosophy like a lord chancellor, and failed to appreciate the great scientific discoveries of his times. He is unaware of Kepler's laws and Napier's logarithms;

his method of determining specific gravities is less scientific than that of Archimedes; he gravely sets to work to solve questions of leverage, which had long since been settled, and depreciates the value of applied mathematics, while he calls for a more scientific treatment of astronomy. He is, moreover, frequently the dupe of astrology, magic, and subtle humours. This list of ignorances might be largely increased. His defence may be made in his own words: "If any one call on me for *works*, and that presently, I tell him frankly, without any imposture at all, that for me—a man now old, of weak health, my hands full of civil business, entering without guide or light upon an argument of all others the most obscure—I hold it enough to have constructed the machine, though I may not succeed in setting it on work." Bacon takes his stand on his *method*, and on that alone. True to his principles, he separates fact and theory. He is the grand superintendent of science, who merely employs, formulates, and argues from facts collected by others, and so must be cited to appear in another court. His method, however, is defective because he deserts nature to spin cobwebs from his own mind, and his separation of the theorist from the experimentalist cannot be allowed.

Bacon's Theology.—Theology meets metaphysics on the ground of final causes, the argument from design, by which, from the accurate adjustment of means to ends in nature we infer a supreme mind. The existence of an intelligent creator is the sheet-anchor of the theologian, but the *ignis fatuus* of

the physicist. Bacon held that the systematic order of natural phenomena pointed irresistibly to a final point of unity. "I had rather believe all the fables in *legend* and the *Talmud* and the *Alcoran* than that this universal frame is without a mind."¹ The attitude of natural philosophy, however, to religion is negative. At best it allows that the existence of a Creator is the most rational hypothesis for explaining the facts of the world. Scientifically, the Deity is unknowable; if philosophy takes the place of religion, it must end in agnosticism; yet, negatively, it is "*certissima superstitionis medicina*" and "*religionis fidissima ancilla*." Though Bacon is apparently inconsistent, he really prefers atheism to superstition. The former leaves the mind a *tabula rasa*, and may only imply a suspension of belief; the latter is unscientific, cruel, and dangerous to the temporal power. As Bacon derives no positive doctrine from physical science, so he does not attempt to deduce religion from the moral government of the world, nor to investigate the Divine from the analogy of human nature. Bacon must not be blamed for not being a Broad Churchman, nor for insisting on the necessity of a positive theology drawn from the Bible. He is, however, sensible of the connection between religion and morality, and in the "*Advancement*"² writes, "And on this part [manners] I commend much the deducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the bread of

¹ Essay 16. See also Annotations and Hints on Essays 2, 3, 16, 17.

² *Advancement of Learning*, ii. xxv. 22.

life. But that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners, is the elevation and consent of the heart ; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation, Christian resolution and the like." The connection between religion and morality must be more than formal, it must be realized by the heart of man, and brought home by meditation and instruction in practical holiness. Virtue is the practical recognition of religion in the heart of man. This recognition, however, does not take the place of dogmatic theology.

The Bible the Fountain-head.—The truths of religion, when its general reasonableness is established by the analogy of the laws which govern the physical world, are apprehended through a glass correctly but darkly by faith. Faith "is grounded upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature." "The doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is not to be obtained but by inspiration and revelation from God."¹ Reason may be used to help human weakness to grasp religious truths by means of illustrations and analogies, and, further, "in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon."² So Christianity holds a middle place between the sceptical rationalizing of antiquity and the unreasoning dogmatism of Mahomedanism. "Inspiration," says Bacon, in almost Platonic phrase, "is imprinted upon the spirit of man, by an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first

¹ *Advancement of Learning*, ii. xxv. 3.

² *Ibid.*, ii. xxv. 5.

estate.”¹ How, then, does Bacon differ from his enemies the schoolmen? Simply by demanding that information about things spiritual should be drawn fresh from the fountain-head, the Bible, not from “convenient cisterns,” *i.e.* from cut and dried dogmatic systems, the work of men only. Scripture is not to be read as entirely soluble or final, and truths of natural philosophy are not to be sought therein. There is no meeting point between natural and revealed religion. Scripture is for all time, and to suit the mental states of all men, inspired by One who knew the future and the human heart. The best way to read Scripture is to collect positive Divinity “upon various texts of Scripture in brief observations;”² the interpretation being “solute and large,” rather than “methodical,” and avoiding “curious and unsafe” explanations. Bacon’s preference lies in the direction of allegorical and analogical treatment, as having more elasticity, and being more adaptable to the wants of each generation:—an important suggestion to those who would give only a literal interpretation to every word in the Bible, but not to be carried to the length of wresting words from the clear sense of the context to suit sectarian strife. The truths given by revelation are like “*placita juris*”; they must merely be applied without questioning the authority. If men would not search for the unrevealed, nor question the authoritative *placita* of religion, and at the same time would be careful as to the deductions drawn from religious truths, there would be less dissension and trouble in

¹ *Advancement of Learning*, ii. xxv. 3.

² *Ibid.*, ii. xxv. 18.

the Church. Where reason and revelation clash, the former must give way.

Reason, however, is allowed to examine the following points : (1) How far particular persons continue to be inspired ; (2) How far the Church is inspired ; (3) How far reason may be used ; (4) What parts of religion are fundamental ; (5) What parts are provisional, capable of perfection, and otherwise. There must be no compromise about (4), but the difficulties involved in (5) ought not to lead us to a breach of unity.

Bacon and Puritanism.—Bacon thus virtually accepted the principles of the Reformation as developed or explained by Puritanism. He saw in the simple formula, “search the Scriptures,” the best ground for unity, as well as the purest form of belief.¹ Partly through his mother’s teaching and his early associations, partly because he was convinced that Protestantism and Romanism were opposed forces as liberty and progress to despotism and superstition, Bacon, though never a bitter enemy of Spain, as Winwood and Raleigh were, dreaded the absorption of the temporal by the spiritual power. After the Gunpowder Plot, when the Romish Church grew more openly aggressive, he more and more became an advocate of severity towards recusants. In the earlier form of Essay 3 (*On Religion*, as its first title was), he protests very strongly against the errors of the Romish superstitions, whereas, in the letter to Elizabeth, in 1584, he

¹ Bacon was a great admirer of powerful preaching, and allows and respects “prophecy,” as it was called, as a moderate bishop might view genuine revivalism.

uses a singularly moderate tone. The conversion of his friend Toby Matthews to Romanism did not cause a breach of friendship, though it called forth a strong protest, ending with the words, "Good Mr. Toby, save yourself from perdition."

This attitude to Romanism corresponds to the strong dislike to superstition expressed in the Essay, while the weaker protest against atheism might reflect the views of one who considered that natural religion was negative and unsatisfying, and that the application of reason to the first principles of religion, whether based on the contemplation of nature or the study of the Bible, was a source of weakness and disunion. The unity that Bacon advocated was a compromise, and a compromise that even if accepted was at best an armed truce, not a peace. If on the one hand he over-estimated the dangers of Catholic aggression, on the other hand he failed to see that free inquiry, which is the very charter of Protestantism, must lead to disruption and cannot be long contained within the bounds of a State Church. Bacon's own method of interpreting Scripture would as little satisfy modern theologians as it would modern agnostics. While he maintains the divine origin of the Bible, his method of explanation by rationalization, analogy, and allegory to suit the exigencies of philosophy and prudence, does not further religious unity. He considers the Bible to be amenable to the same methods of explanation as the myths of pagan antiquity, and in the *Wisdom of the Ancients* occasionally attempts to harmonize revelation and mythology. He would not indeed reduce the story of Samson to a solar myth,

and would rather see in a solar myth the story of Samson, but he practically fails to treat the Bible either as a consistent whole, an inspired guide of conduct, or as a collection of historical documents, each of which must be critically tested. We find little in Bacon's writings which points to an appreciation of the thin line of faith and inspiration carried on in unbroken continuity through a variety of alien surroundings and in an age which had few points of contact with his own. Moreover, he fails to see the striking revolution worked by the new dispensation and the superiority of the New Testament as a universal code of morals.

Bacon soon found that he had to answer the question, who is to expound Scripture, the Church or the individual, by an unconditional acceptance of authority spiritual and secular in religion. This temporizing was necessary through Bacon's position at court and his keen sense of the value of an established church to national existence. The statesman of his time, so well described by Macaulay, was not a religious zealot. The political leaders of the Elizabethan age did not choose to run risks under Mary, but they were Protestants at heart, who finally identified themselves with Protestantism, while they refused to be dragged away by the disruptive forces of bigotry and sectarianism. Bacon was one of these statesmen, many-sided, quick-witted, able to believe as he wished, and ready to remove all obstacles to practical utility. He was scarcely even a reformer at heart, and, if he had been allowed by the adversaries of the Church, only wished to leave well alone. He held that the religion

of the day was not antagonistic to contemporary science, and was sufficient to satisfy all spiritual wants. The organization of the Church must be squared to work harmoniously with the temporal authority, and uniformity must be promoted by every possible means, though conformity in non-essentials need not be insisted on. Unity of doctrine is possible if men will not distort and misuse reason to pry into insoluble mysteries, and will accept the doctrines of the Church. Religious disputes set man against man and citizens against the government. A divided England meant an England at the mercy of her foes. So Bacon would allow the king, as defender of the faith and at the same time responsible for civil order, to repress dissent and secure unity by the moderate use of the temporal power, and indeed he allows State control in matters spiritual to an extent which logically would land him in Erastianism. He reproved the excesses of sectarians and their attacks on bishops, while the Anglicans or court section¹ of the Church were blamed for excessive conservatism and a narrow policy which would exclude not only many of their fellow-citizens, but also the branches of the reformed Church on the Continent. In reference to the struggle between the Puritans and the High Church party, which ended in the Hampton Court Conference, Bacon was all for compromise. He seems to have been too sanguine as to the possibility of a *modus vivendi* between the opposing parties, but he was not the man to exaggerate, like James, the

¹ See Bacon's Tract *On the Controversies of the Church*, and cf. Annotations and Hints on Essay 3.

importance of such trifles as the use of the title presbyter.¹ He would have reform not revolution, but was too much for toleration and wanting in zeal and enthusiasm; Bishop Andrews is a better example of the proper use of toleration.² Bacon's course is a new illustration of his excessive belief in management and a disinclination to look facts sternly in the face. He believed, as he wrote to Sir G. Villiers,³ that, though not absolutely *jure divino*, the English Church approached most nearly to its apostolic prototype and was sufficiently elastic to allow diversity in unity. He held that Church government varied according to differences of time and place,⁴ but with the proviso of "no bishop, no king;" the Established Church being most suitable to England and the monarchical form of government. He failed however to see that neither James's monarchy nor Laud's Church, with a few concessions in a latitudinarian direction, would satisfy the reason and conscience of the English people.

Bacon was neither a utilitarian in religion nor a man of fervent piety. We must compare him with men of the Burleigh or Raleigh type rather than with the religious enthusiast of the period or even moderate but sincere theologians like Andrews or Hooker. He was the active enemy of mediævalism, with which traditions and continuity of the Church were closely bound up, and the enthusiastic admirer of positive science as opposed to metaphysical speculations. At the same time Bacon was sanguine, compromising,

¹ Cf. Gardiner, *History of England*, vol. i.

² Gardiner, ii. 120.

³ *Works*, iii. 429.

⁴ *Life*, iii. 107.

judicial, ready to see resemblances and ignore difficulties, and, like the age in which he lived, not sensitively alive to the logic of consistency. Yet it would be most unjust to accuse him of insincerity or hypocrisy. The philosopher whose system leads logically to materialism may act and believe as a sincere Christian, and it is the worst form of *argumentum ad hominem* to throw stones against such because we can pick holes in their consistency. In Bacon's time science had almost freed itself from the persecution or patronage of religion, and was tolerated if not loved. It was obviously Bacon's object to avoid disagreement and rather to look for a neutral ground where science and religion could join hands. He would welcome the Reformation as bearing the same relation to religion as his own method did to science, and without going too deeply into the conclusions that might or ought to be drawn from its first principles, he regarded it as a system, which, without impugning the claims of science, offered a satisfactory explanation of religious phenomena. The weakness of such a position, if it be conscientiously taken and used, becomes its strength. Bacon, however, was too easy-going and sanguine. He knew nothing of those obstinate questionings¹ of first principles which assail the believer, and scarcely did justice to the destructive and critical spirit of Protestantism. The Church government associated with a strong State control which he advocated is not to be reconciled with even moderate liberty of

¹ Rémusat notices that Bacon in no part of his writings feels the force of the paradoxes and contradictions of religious principles.

conscience. Bacon effects no synthesis between liberty of thought and conscience and established authority ; he wavers between the dogmatic exposition of Scripture by trained theologians and a fanciful and metaphorical application of texts to suit the needs of philosophy and worldly business. He would search the Scriptures, but repress heterodoxy ; he gives the sword to the defender of the faith with one hand, while he deals out tolerance with the other ; he appreciates the value of powerful preaching, but limits the Church to a narrow and rigid unity and secular authority. Bacon's orthodoxy, though not hypocritical, was undoubtedly formal. It is one thing to be judicial and tolerant, another to want enthusiasm and to be satisfied with compromise as compromise. Bacon failed to see that the nation was passing through a critical period of religious as of political existence, and that the revolt from dogma could not be cured by homœopathic remedies. Though a Puritan by breeding and almost an adiaphorist by sentiment, his ideas on Church and State played into the hands of men like James and Laud. He proposed a concordat between free thought and theology, between the Established Church and Dissent, just as he thought to reconcile Elizabeth and Essex, James and the Commons, ignoring obstinate facts and circumventing difficulties instead of boldly facing them.

Christian Love.—The only practical aspect of religion which forms an integral part of Bacon's moral philosophy is charity. Love is the highest and most real of divine attributes, and, finding a reflex in the human heart, works moral miracles. "If a man is not of kin

to God by his spirit, he is a base ignoble creature,"¹ and "if a man's mind be truly influenced with charity it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrines of morality can do." "If a man set before himself the good of others and be truly inflamed with charity, it does work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrines of morality can do."²

*"In faith and hope the world will disagree,
But all mankind's concern is charity."*

In other respects, however, Bacon but dimly appreciates the connection of religion and morality. Of self-sacrifice and humility, of righteousness and judgment to come he has little to tell us. So too he is hardly conscious of the side-lights of religion, the many influences by which, apart from doctrinal teaching, the reality of things divine enters into the heart of man—

*"For while the tired waves vainly breaking,
Seem here no weary inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent, flooding in, the main.*

*"And not by eastern windows only,
When daylight comes, comes in the light,
In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly,
But westward, look, the land is bright."*³

The Essays non-religious.—How little influence religion had on Bacon's habitual mode of thought may be seen from the Essays which deal with avowedly religious subjects. In treating of death he can only say that "The contemplation of death as the wages of sin and passage to another world is holy and religious.

¹ Essay 16.

² *Advancement of Learning*, ii. 22.

³ A. H. Clough.

. . . Yet in religious meditations there is sometimes mixture of vanity and of superstition." So he goes back to the Roman empire and the Stoics, apparently unmindful of the momentous issues of death opened out by Christianity. The essay, however perfect of its kind, is after the manner of Seneca not of Pascal. In dealing with religious unity, the utilitarian side of agreement is emphasized rather than one Lord, one faith, one baptism. It is true that strife is condemned as displeasing to God, and subversive of peace and charity, but the condemnation is that of a Richelieu rather than of a St. Paul. The treatment of adversity is secular rather than religious ; unless religion holds a brief for adversity, it has a weak case against prosperity. The relation of charity to the Deity is fairly though coldly allowed ; but without the burning emotion of the Christian for God as Love. The condemnation of atheism is tentative and lukewarm, and might be compared by those who claim Bacon as a pious and devoted Christian with parts of "The Imitation of Christ" or the "*Religio Medici*." Superstition is attacked with greater vigour, but as much because it is the confusion of States as because it is a reproach of the Deity. The argument in Essay lviii. is characteristic of the way in which a great mind may assent to dogma without consenting. The treatment is almost fantastically capricious, wanting in enthusiasm, and wandering into generalities. "The true religion is built upon a rock ; the rest are tossed upon the waves of time." Heterodoxy is assumed to be an entire evil, though Bacon will allow that a cause of division is "when the holiness of the pro-

fessors of religion is decayed and full of scandal." "New sects," he tells us, "must flourish in stupid, ignorant, and barbarous times ; and are only strong if they are antinomian and licentious, antagonistic to authority, and holding out sensual enjoyment as the reward of their votaries. Sometimes, though rarely, they owe their existence to martyrdoms, which are miracles because they seem to exceed the strength of human nature." The same may be said of superlative holiness, another cause of sectarianism. It is certainly harder to live for religion than to die for it ; but "*vita plena exemplorum est.*" The instruments by which new sects are planted are generally eloquence and the sword, yet the best way to repress their rising is to reform abuses. Bacon evidently conceives religion as stationary. His type of heterodoxy is the vulgar conception of Mahommedanism, as the religion of warlike voluptuaries ; he hardly recognizes the power and reality of personal leadership, and ignores the mighty, though temporarily disruptive, forces at work in the English Church ; the protest not against the scandal of priests but against unreality and retrogression.

It is true that Bacon took refuge in prayer when human help failed, and that his writings abound in reverential allusions to things divine and quotations from the Bible. On the other hand it must be remembered that religion was in every man's mouth in his times, and that England was the land of the Bible. Bacon's quotations, explanations, and allusions are strangely like the use of Homer by Plato—allegorical, fantastical, and illustrative. There is nothing of the spirit of Latimer, Ridley, Hooker or George Herbert,

in his treatment of religious subjects. A Laodicean, rather than a utilitarian, he recognized the realm of faith as in some respects transcending reason, but failed to put life into his teaching by associating works with faith, by interweaving religion with life as a powerful inward influence strengthening morality and supplying a personal example of the highest self-sacrifice. More was wanted than peddling changes of detail in Church discipline and religious formulæ. The times required a man to lead as well as control Puritanism, with less bigotry and one-sidedness, but not less force of character than Cromwell. In that case, the reaction which followed would have been less violent and retrogressive. Bacon's toleration showed a fatal want of religious enthusiasm and imagination, in dangerous times, when the national character was passing through vital changes. At the last however, religion came vividly home to Bacon. The clouds clear away, and we seem to catch the fervour of one who feels and loves things divine; he hopes to profit men's souls, and would approach the Bible in the spirit of childlike faith; he speaks of Christian love in words which prove that the "new commandment" was as true and real to him as to St. Paul or St. Augustine. The prayer that he composed after his fall is a "hearse-like air," a penitential psalm.¹ He is not the first and will not be the last who has sacrificed his higher self to apparently paramount considerations, and in the end discovered that adversity carrieth the greater benediction. Yet Bacon was never crushed and contrite after his fall.

¹ For Addison's admiration of this prayer, see *Tatler*, 267.

We are reminded rather by his latest letters to the King of the voyagers in *Paracelsus*.

“The sad rhyme of the men who proudly clung
To their first fault and perished in their pride.”

Bacon's Biographers.—Bacon has been weighed in many balances, and notwithstanding all the light that has been thrown upon it by biographers, historians, and essayists, so complex and many-sided a nature cannot be fairly summed up and judged in any brief estimate. We can only attempt to indicate the extreme views between which the truth seems to us to lie, and furnish a *filum labyrinthi*, a clue to the mighty maze which was assuredly not without a plan. His first biographer, Rawley, paints him with the obsequious devotion of a humble dependent, but his admiration is disinterested and sincere, such as none but a kind-hearted master could have excited. Bacon is a hero to his own valet. In Mr. Montagu he has a blind panegyrist, and, as Mr. Spedding has shown, by no means an accurate one. Lord Macaulay takes his facts from Mr. Montagu, but by raising the lights and deepening the shadows he produces the wonderful *chiaroscuro* with which all are familiar. To Macaulay Bacon is the angel of science and the Belial of morality. Mr. Spedding, on the other hand, is as patient and as colourless as an etcher. He traces every line and lineament, sets down every fact, and explores every allusion, so that those who most differ from his inferences must draw their premisses from his great work, the worthy monument of a well-spent life. Mr. Spedding sees in Bacon a man whose nature was unselfish, whose objects were worthy and

patriotic, whose ways of dealing were in the main fair and open, and whose veracity (as this world goes) was of a very high order. The only defect he would allow is a want of that energy and impetuosity of purpose which belongs to the Luthers and the Cromwells, and a lack of confidence in his high calling as a philosopher, which allowed him to play a subordinate part and give up to his king and country what was meant for mankind. Dean Church's conception of Bacon is at bottom the same as Macaulay's, but it differs as a miniature differs from a sign board. "With all his greatness, his splendid genius, his magnificent ideas, his enthusiasm for truth, his passion to be the benefactor of his kind, with all the charm that made him loved by good and worthy friends, amiable, courteous, patient, delightful as a companion, ready to take any trouble,—there was in Bacon's 'self' a deep and fatal flaw. He was a pleaser of men. . . . He wanted in his dealings with men, that sincerity on which he insists so strongly in his dealings with nature and knowledge. And the ruin of a great life was the consequence." Lastly, Professor Gardiner has sought to reverse the general conception of Bacon as a great philosopher who would have been greater, both intellectually and morally, had he resisted the attraction of politics and the seduction of high place. According to Professor Gardiner Bacon was no less a prophet of political knowledge than a prophet of science. His failure as a politician was due not to the man, but to the age in which he was born. His was that bitterest of human woes, "to see many things, and to have power in none." "Bacon was too

great a man to play other than a second-rate part in the age in which he lived, and he struggled hard, to the detriment of his own character as well as of his fame, to avoid the inevitable consequence.”¹

Bacon's Real Character.—It would be presumptuous to compete with such artists, but we may attempt to point out some of the defects in their portraitures. Bacon is undoubtedly a complex character, *bonis malisque artibus mixtus*, as he himself would have phrased it, yet it is an error in psychology to explain seeming contradictions of his nature by separating the philosopher from the statesman, or even the intellectual from the moral life. He may have been, and we hold that he was, more fitted by nature for speculation than for active life ; but in both spheres we shall find the same qualities of mind. Again, there is a danger, from which we think Professor Gardiner has not escaped, lest in avoiding the “twy-form monster” of Macaulay, the biographer should give us “a king of shreds and patches,” a mosaic with blurred outlines and neutral tints. There is in Bacon’s multifarious life and writings, in the many parts that he played, in his weakness and humiliation no less than in his grandeur and triumph, a distinct personality, a unity of nature and temperament which underlies all the changes of development and chances of circumstance.

Whether he is attempting to guide nature by obeying her, and to reduce all sensible objects to the origin of law, or to manage men and their actions, to reconcile King and Commons, and to reform abuses without

¹ *Dictionary of National Biography*, “Bacon,” *ad fin.*

offending the powers that be, he might be said to be only too consistent. In both parts he shows the same virtues, unwearied patience and indomitable perseverance, keen observation and the lawyer's faculty of seizing the points of a case however intricate and voluminous, enthusiasm never cool and never overheated, which burnt to the end with the "dry light" of reason. And in both parts there are the same failings, though these failings are far more fatal to the politician than to the philosopher; an over-sanguine temperament, which blinded him to the difficulties of the tasks he set himself; a lordly magnificence and grandiosity (if we may coin the word) which made him careless of trifles and indifferent to details; a self-centred and unsympathetic nature, which prevented him from entering into the characters of his fellow councillors and judges, and from appreciating the scientific labours of his predecessors and contemporaries, or gathering round him a school of fellow-workers and disciples; and lastly, the want of that supreme faith of the religious or political martyr, the faith that believes in the final triumph of his cause, whether the individual perishes or prevails, that will not swerve an inch from the straight path or stoop to arts of policy or dissimulation.

Self-advancement, a means to the End.—The first aspiration of Bacon was to extend the sphere of man's power by extending knowledge. He had discovered, he thought, how to unlock the secrets of nature by a simple, complete, and fruitful method, which only required to be put in active operation to benefit mankind. But science needed the fostering care and

patronage of those high in office ; the philosopher must be powerful himself and have the ear of the great. Hence the prominent idea with Bacon is how to rise in the world, and mindful only of the goal, he views the problem of worldly success as a scientific problem in which various sets of facts are balanced as useful or otherwise. Morality is virtually suspended, and the irresistible call of a scientific mission outweighs all other aspects of life. In the *Advancement* he writes : " The most noble and effectual means to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate . . . is the electing, and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain . . . and, again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them." The difficulty is rather with the latter than the former part of this advice.

Bacon was no hypocrite ; he believed in a scientific millennium, and in himself as the prophet of science whose business it was to open to men the secrets of nature ; he was to be, he felt, not the follower, but the maker of principles. At the same time he deceived himself as to the connection between science and political power. His best work was done in retirement, when his thoughts were turned away from the fierce struggle for worldly advancement. Undoubtedly the paternal government of the day could alone have planted the new university which Bacon contemplated ; but he would have done more to advance science if, instead of projecting and scheming this royal road, he had himself set the example, and founded at Cambridge a school

of research, as, in a fit of despondency, he once threatened to do.

His Estimate of his own Powers.—No one can doubt that he felt the incompatibility of political life with his true career. In the "Proem" to a treatise on the *Interpretation of Nature*,¹ he writes, "Believing that I was born for the service of mankind, and regarding the care of the Commonwealth as a kind of common property, . . . I set myself to consider in what way mankind might be best served, and what service I was myself best fitted to perform. . . . Now . . . if a man should succeed . . . in kindling a light in nature, that man (I thought) would be the benefactor indeed of the human race, the propagator of man's empire over the universe, the champion of liberty, the conqueror and subduer of necessities. As for myself, I found that I was fitted for nothing so well as for the study of truth. . . . Nevertheless, because my birth and education had seasoned me in business of State, and because that I thought that a man's own country has some special claims upon him more than the rest of the world; and because I hoped that, if I rose to any place of honour in the State, I should have a larger command of industry and ability to help me in the work—for these reasons I applied myself to the arts of civil life . . . and I was not without hope that I might get something done for the good of men's souls. When I found, however, that my zeal was mistaken for ambition, and my life had already reached the turning-point, and my breaking health reminded me how ill I could afford to be

¹ Translated by Mr. Spedding.

so slow, and I reflected, moreover, that in leaving undone the good that could be done without the help and consent of others, I was by no means discharging the duty that lay upon me, I put those thoughts aside, and (in pursuance of my old determination) betook myself wholly to my work." Bacon acknowledges that he had exaggerated the value of the platform for good works, that his zeal was misconstrued into ambition by his contemporaries, and that the needs of science would be better served by comparative retirement. "His soul is a sojourner among strangers,"¹ he bitterly exclaims, as he is swept along by the current of public life. But he must not be canonized as a martyr because, like many others who have mistaken their vocation, he deplored the fatal fascination of office, and felt that he was abandoning his true position in the world. Bacon's attitude is not that of a patriot sacrificing himself to the stern call of duty, not even of one who is called, like Hamlet, to fulfil a great destiny for which he was unequal. He was conscious that he was *dépaycé*, and to some extent aware that he was the victim of self-deception. The motive at starting is easily explainable. He lived in an age when much of the best talent was absorbed by the public service, the traditions of his family pointed to such a career; and, apart from his personal ambition, he identified high office with power to extend the kingdom of man. We must conceive the official of the day as far-seeing,

¹ Mr. Gardiner argues (*Dict. Biog.*, "Bacon") that this is not to be taken too literally; our position is that Bacon knew that he was deceiving himself, and regretted his own weakness.

shrewd, moderately unscrupulous, and an instrument of absolutism as opposed to a free agent and originator of great policy. He had to suit his character to the needs of his sovereign, and in many cases to abandon his independence and self-respect. The claims of public service were thought to place a man *extra forum conscientię*, and if the State or monarch was satisfied, all was done. Granting the necessity of public life, there seems no reasonable doubt that Bacon could hardly in some cases have acted otherwise than he did. Once in office, the philosopher might easily become the courtier and crown lawyer, and the philanthropist lose sight of his end in the feverish race for power.

The mere fact, however, of a man being ill-placed is not an excuse for his failures if he has placed himself in a false position. It is but a palliation if, when he finds himself in a false position, he compromises with his conscience rather than quit it. Thomson's lines express the exact position of Bacon—

“Hapless in his choice
Unfit to stand the civil storms of state,
And through the smooth barbarity of courts,
With firm but pliant virtue, forward still
To urge his course ; him for the studious shade
Kind nature formed, deep, comprehensive, clear,
Exact and elegant.”¹

It may fairly be said that Bacon would have seemed alone worthy to rule if he had never ruled, and would have been happier and better in a private sphere where he would have met with no difficulties

¹ Thomson, *Seasons*, “Summer,” xv. 34.

which require indomitable firmness of will if greatness and goodness are to be united. He who takes all knowledge to be his province, must renounce the ambition of ruling and content himself with being a looker on. Not even to Bacon was it given to serve two masters. The regenerator of science from the platform of high-place treats the problem of life inductively. Though he does not generally avow the use of the experimental method in morality, still his treatment is empirical and utilitarian. He would experiment in life as in science, and solve difficulties both in morality and politics, rather as the opportunist than the man of principle. When we reduce his positive ethical doctrine to its lowest terms we find little more than a rough appeal to psychology with some generalizations from observation of conduct. Possibly, had his life been spared, or politics ceased to absorb him, he might have been more explicit, and carried his scientific conclusions into the moral world, or established on *à priori* grounds the law of human obligation; but he only leaves us a few superficial hints and at bottom a dualism of which he is unconscious. He frequently balances two sets of facts, advantages and disadvantages, easiness and difficulty, with impartial criticism, but apparent indifference to any principle at stake.¹

Summary of Bacon's Character.—Bacon's nature was cold and impassive. Like the great Napoleon he was *très peu aimant*, even in youth little disposed to form

¹ Cf. *Essays on Simulation, Revenge, Envy, Anger*, and cf. many of the *Antitheta*. Cf. Mandeville's famous "*private vices, public benefits*."

friendships, and wanting in sympathy with his fellows.¹ Except where science was concerned he was unemotional and unenthusiastic. A diffused philanthropy took the place of intense individual affection. At the same time Bacon had a weak and sensitive physique ; and though, like Raleigh, he toiled hugely and lived laborious days, yet he could neither scorn delights nor endure hardship. He shrank like a child from pain, and turned instinctively from any course of action that might involve unpopularity or disgrace. Such a temperament, quick-witted, plastic, sanguine and tolerant, would be disposed to treat the conduct of life as a non-moral problem to be solved by the reason inductively. A nature like Bacon's, as long as versatility and tolerance did not degenerate into indifference and time-serving, was most serviceable to the pioneer of the new learning who had to thread his way through the tangled overgrowths of prejudice and superstition.² But the temperament, which sees a royal road to the conduct of life, and hails victory at the first temporary success,³ is not the temperament of a prophet of righteousness. The conduct of life is a problem which needs, for a successful solution, knowledge, self-knowledge, and above all a purified will. Utilitarianism itself is giving up its standpoint and allows that, without some conception of the end of man as a responsible moral agent, morality is impossible. Bacon had a great facility for believing as he wished

¹ See Annotations and Hints on Essay 27, *Of Friendship*.

² Bacon was too versatile even in science ; the fault as well as the virtue of the scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was encyclopædism.

³ Cf. Annotations and Hints on Essay 40, *Of Fortune*.

and overlooking difficulties ; we must not be surprised if such a character, filled with enthusiasm for scientific progress, and satisfaction at the discovery of a new and better scientific method, failed to grasp many of the moral aspects of human life. The age in which Bacon lived was an essentially practical age, and practical utility was the main idea of Bacon's life. The moral standard of his contemporaries was in many respects low and sordid. The virtues of a feudal age had passed, and the virtues of a democratic age were yet in the germ. These considerations serve to account for much that is otherwise incomprehensible in Bacon's character. He sought to combine philosophy and politics, the active and speculative life ; to reconcile prerogative and privilege, statemanship and opportunism ; to effect a compromise between dogmatism and free inquiry, morality and worldly prudence.

Bacon had a truly imperial mind ;¹ vast schemes of scientific regeneration floated before his imagination ; to reform science was the first matter ; the rest would follow. Though he would derive knowledge from experience, the philosopher need not grope his way painfully from fact to fact ; he is the architect, the master builder, and to some extent *extra forum experientiæ*. In morality too the masters of those that know are not like the masses who climb slowly in

¹ Cf. Rémusat, *Bacon la vie*, p. 2. *Il est impossible de ne pas reconnaître une certaine grandeur dans Bacon.* Bacon impresses more by the dignity and grandeur of his language and general tone than by the actual results of his philosophy. He compels an involuntary homage which we must not analyze too closely.

their footsteps. The great man stands on a hill and sees from afar the law in the particular ; by the magic of his intellect he can find the principle in the fact or elsewhere, and may experiment on actions and their consequences, and lay down rules for success in life. The vulgar have not to rise to great place by the winding stair ; what is a bribe to the commoner is a *honorarium* to the lord. It need not be said that this is not really so, that as patient investigation makes the Darwins and Pasteurs, so “excellent groveling” in the trivial round of every-day life is the introduction to true moral perception.

Bacon not a Sensualist.—The charge of an undue love of the good things of this world has been brought against Bacon by both Macaulay and W. S. Landor. The latter in his *Imaginary Conversations*¹ represents Bacon as refusing, with a sorry apology, his best wine to Master Richard Hooker. Bacon undoubtedly liked ease and comfort, but not to excess ; his nature was cold and unsensual ; at the same time pomp, show, and repose were, he conceived, necessary for the high official, while the philosopher must not be disturbed by trifles nor stinted in the comforts of life, “*Satur est quum dicit Horatius ‘Evoe.’*” Dignity and self-respect required costly and comfortable surroundings, superiority to money troubles, the constant means for replenishment of the purse. Having once conceived worldly good to be a necessary means to advancement, Bacon was not the man to feel scruples at dubious methods of attainment ; the very clearness with which he saw the goodness of his end made him overlook

¹ *Lord Bacon and Richard Hooker.*

the morality of the means. Dickens, in his sketch of Harold Skimpole, has well illustrated how the mind can hide from itself the culpability of that conduct which takes and gives indiscriminately through an indifference to money and a desire for the things that money can provide. "I have persuaded men, and shall persuade them for ages," Landor makes Bacon say to Hooker, "I possess a wide range of thought unexplored by others, and first thrown upon me, with many enclosures of choice and abstruse knowledge. I have incited and instructed them to examine all subjects of useful and rational inquiry; few that occurred to me have I left untouched or untried: one, however, hath almost escaped me, and surely one worth the trouble—Francis Bacon."

Bacon and Montaigne.—Montaigne, the easy-going, well-bred French gentleman, consciously adapts himself to circumstances and floats along casually on the waves of life; never opposing the current, yet never substituting prudence for morality, he pours himself out, rather exaggerating than extenuating his foibles.

*"I love to pour out all myself, as plain
As downright Shippen, or as old Montaigne,
In them, as certain to be loved as seen,
The soul stood forth, nor kept a thought within."*

Bacon set forth on the voyage of life fired with hope and a noble goal in view. For a time he gallantly breasted the current, and never to the end did he wholly lose sight of his high calling. But, like Vergil's rower, he once and again rested on his oars and let himself be borne down by the stream of

current politics and commonplace ambitions. Yet even when he is deviating most from his ideals and lapsing into conventional morality, he never bates a jot of heart or hope, but persuades himself (and some of his biographers too), that he is the good man struggling with adversity, at worst tacking to make more way. Montaigne, on the other hand, sets out with no professions. He is simply the man of the world who happens to have read rather more than his neighbours, and has a hobby of his own for jotting down without reserve his whims and fancies, his thoughts and feelings and sentiments. He poses as an ordinary French gentleman, actuated by the same motives and holding the same code of morals as his fellows ; in reality he is a reformer in morals, in education, and in style, and one of the most original and remarkable of French men of letters. Both Bacon and Montaigne show themselves in their writings as they really are, but as in the one case we are not imposed upon by the Frenchman's irony and self-depreciation, so in the other we are not blinded by the glamour with which Bacon invested his own conduct and morals.

Bacon's Morality as exhibited in his Writings.—It remains to collect into a whole those passages of Bacon's writings which seem to have most distinctly a moral bearing, and examine how far he is in advance of previous and contemporary moralists and how far he falls short of our present moral standards.

Not a Systematic Writer on Ethical Subjects.—Fischer notices that Bacon is not one of those systematic thinkers who are rightly censured if in any

respects they abandon their principles. His intellect is discursive, encyclopædic, and superficial. The queen herself had noticed this when she said of the aspirant to high legal office, "He has a great wit and much learning, but in law showeth to the uttermost of his knowledge, and is not deep." It is peculiarly hard to speak of Bacon as an ethical writer, and the greatest care must be taken to separate casual remarks from fundamental convictions, stray hints in which he is only feeling his way from positive ethical doctrine, mere aspiration from actual rule of life.¹

The Subject is approached tentatively.—In the *Cogitata et Visa*² he holds that morality, like politics, can employ deduction, and that the first principles are generalizations from human opinion. Bacon did not mean that moral laws are conventional, not real ;

¹ Bacon was not a follower of Machiavelli, a systematic thinker who suggested to Bacon isolated thoughts, but who is opposed to the Baconian standpoint. Machiavelli, seeing religion and morality perverted and enlisted in the service of those who oppressed and wronged his countrymen, advised, with brutal straightforwardness, that his prince, whose model was Cæsar Borgia, should subordinate virtue to policy ; he would probably have argued that where virtue was harmful, it was perverted. Bacon, with a high moral ideal, has reluctantly to suspend morality as transcendental and unpractical. It is easy to see where the two touch, but the resemblance is accidental. Both looked at what men do rather than at what ought to be done, but from different aspects, and one as a theorist, the other as having no real theory. What they have in common is due to the fact that each was a keen observer, the servant of a prince, and a man of the world, superior to many of the narrow commonplaces of every-day morality.

² *Rem(syllogismum) esse . nimirum in doctrinis quae in opinionibus hominum positae sunt, velut moralibus et politicis utilem, et intellectui manum quamdam auxiliarem, rerum vero naturalium subtilitati et obscuritati imparem et incompetentem.*

but, failing to recognize the importance of mental initiative, and exaggerating that of induction, he could see no means of arriving at moral certainty. The rough empirical generalizations gained from the observation of moral and political phenomena are to be applied to life by the syllogism. Here he falls into his radical mistake of supposing that moral facts can be collected without a moral theory. Human character he would investigate as resulting from a certain mixture of passions and affections which may be worked upon by new causes varying with the individual.¹ Bacon does not attempt to argue to or from a physical basis of morality, nor does he attempt to bridge over the gulf between body and mind, but assumes the separate existence of each. His treatment is empirical on both sides, as he neither appeals to materialism nor moral law. Isolated remarks point to a physical resolution of mental states, as in the case of envy and love; on the other hand, he elsewhere recognizes the idea of duty, though vaguely and as something which dwells apart. At present the needs of physical science are pressing, the facts more palpable, leading to more immediate results, and admitting definite scientific treatment. So the systematic study of morality, which occupied the attention of Greek philosophy to the exclusion of physics, is virtually suspended with a number of provisional hints. Ethics becomes a subordinate branch of psychology, rather as the vestibule of history than a means to human perfection, or an empiric study of

¹ Bacon never urges ethical science to experiment on character as modern physicists have attempted or advised.

the arts useful for worldly success, necessitated by the exigencies of human life.

The Analysis of Virtue has to give way to the more absorbing questions of Physical Science.—We may suppose that as the philosopher wished to reduce nature to a unity, by a gradually ascending series of generalizations, so the moralist would have cleared up human conduct and found that the form of virtuous action consisted in the reference of all actions by the light of utility to moral law, itself a reflex of divine perfection. On the other hand, many fragmentary suggestions lead us to the material solution of the French encyclopædists who acknowledged Bacon as their master. It must, however, be allowed that Bacon himself was unconscious of inconsistency. As in physics, so in morality, the keynote is practical utility, and he virtually ignored the problem of reconciling duty with success in life. He preferred the Roman character to the Greek, as practical and subordinating all things to national progress, but failed to appreciate the stern rectitude which largely contributed to the acquirement of a perfect military discipline, as an important factor in national as well as individual life. Rome subordinated the individual to the State, and the individual was chastened to virtue, because virtue was necessary to the march of Roman civilization ; Bacon, too, subordinated the individual to the State, but not seeing clearly the meeting point between morality and policy, as he became involved in political life, the moral law became an ever-vanishing ideal. Greek thought is too ideal, abstract, and unpractical for Bacon ; he complains that Aristotle

and other writers on morality, "copy and describe the end of mankind, but pass over the means for arriving to virtue." ¹

Duty is either Civic or Domestic; Civic is the more Important.—Human nature is twofold, as each is a "total or substantive in himself" or a member of a greater body. Duty proper is concerned with advancing the good of society, and this is the object of moral obligation. Bacon is not in theory a utilitarian, but appeals to the consciousness of moral law to sanction the rule "Act so that your acting may increase the happiness of mankind." Here he is sound and practical. The weakness of his system is that to some extent he neglects the *sanction* for the moral law in emphasizing its practical value. Man must act so that his acting becomes the rule for others. Public duty is subdivided into duty as a citizen and duty in a man's more immediate sphere of action. Duty as a citizen is the higher. It may here be noticed that Bacon makes little attempt to interweave morality with government, except by an appeal to the divinity of kings. The monarch is *extra forum conscientiae*; but as representing infallible reason he governs by human law, as God does by the laws of nature; therefore extraordinary powers may be exercised by kings as

¹ *Advancement*, ii. xx. 1. Bacon is unfair to Aristotle, whose treatment is unmetaphysical, except in so far as Aristotle assumes the necessity of an end of human life. Aristotle bases ethics on psychology, shows its intimate connection with pleasure and pain, constantly appeals to experience, and asserts that his object is to *give rules for the implanting of virtuous habits*. He is far more practical than modern doctrinaires, who would train the mind without any appeal to the moral and religious imagination.

the creators of the laws by which they rule. Hobbes was more logical and practical; his school would rest prerogative on a contract, with the observance of which public duty is concerned. Divinely inspired Θέμιστες belong to the old world.

The Question What is Virtue? gives way to "cultura animi." Bacon an Optimist as to the Power of Education.—In passages where he comes near to realizing the existence and facts of moral law, he slides away from moral responsibility to *cultura animi*, and from education to success in life. The problem of education has much interest to him, as it stands closer to the methods of physical science. Bacon was a thorough optimist, holding in place of the doctrine of "original sin" that "the inclination to goodness is imprinted deeply in the nature of man." He also upheld the plasticity of human nature; there is, he thought, a see-saw between custom and nature;¹ nature is the result of custom, and when formed is easily changeable by custom. He grasped but faintly the value of the moral imagination as an educational and reformatory influence,² and underrated the difficulties of heredity and circumstances. The educationist must approach his subject psychologically, and must carefully study the individual character and affections.

The General Tone of the Essays and Advancement

¹ See the two Essays which deal with the subjects and the evenly balanced Antitheta.

² Yet in the *Advancement* a high ideal is recognized as "the most noble and effectual means to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and a good estate." The noble passage (*Adv.* Bk. ii. 22. 15), in which he sets forth this ideal, recalls Shakespeare's "To thine own self be true," etc.

is non-Moral, notwithstanding the High Moral Tone of Isolated Passages.—In some parts of the Essays the tone is high and worthy of the aspirations and promise of his entry into public life. In dealing with *Goodness and Goodness of Nature*, goodness is identified with the love for humanity guided by reason; it implies a complete sacrifice of self, admits of no excess, and is the crown of a virtuous and holy life. He definitely insists that “Men must be fully imbued with pious and moral knowledge before they can take part in politics;” and again, “Truth and goodness,” he writes, “are the end of man, and all virtue is most rewarded, and all wickedness most punished in itself. In the Essay on *Truth*, religious truth (grasped by faith) and scientific truth are elevated above “truth of civil business.” Of the last he says, “The mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make it work the better, but embaseth it.” In other words, absolute truthfulness is regarded as a counsel of perfection. In the Essay on *Simulation and Dissimulation* this is more apparent. Nakedness, that is, perfect transparency, is uncomely as well in mind as in body; and secrecy is an essential quality of a public man. But secrecy is hardly possible without some dissimulation or negative falsehood, and a little scope is allowed. Simulation, or positive lying, is only to be resorted to in great and rare matters. Openness is commended chiefly because it puts the opponent off his guard, is a sign of fearlessness, and commands confidence. In Essay 23 there is a selfish condemnation of selfishness which is compared to the bias of the bowl, turning the statesman aside to his

own petty interests; kings, however, may be selfish, as in seeking their own advantage they are seeking that of their subjects. The Essay on *Adversity*, though not religious, marks well and clearly the moral value of endurance, and contrasts favourably with the treatment of parallel subjects.

Generally, however, the tone of the Essays, and of a considerable part of the *Advancement*, is non-moral. The *Advancement* is the most ethical of Bacon's treatises, and displays most recognition of the idea of duty, while the Essays are intended to be hints for the architect of fortune; and there is in the latter a practical identification of goodness with success, and a disregard of moral responsibility. Instead of building upon the Platonic *ἰδεὰ ἀγαθῶν* or Aristotle's analysis of virtue into a mean state of the *feelings* regulated by reason and sanctioned by the idea of duty, Bacon rather takes us back to the sophists and "Man the measure of all things" of Protagoras. Sets of facts are balanced with impartial judgment and worldly sagacity; but the moral colouring is faintly noticed.

Bacon's Virtue rather Civic than Domestic.—Bacon thoroughly despised the *βίος μονούμενος*; with many of the instincts of a student, he had not the slightest leaning towards asceticism; but he failed to appreciate the value of domestic life, of which the development owes so much to Puritanism. Stoic self-sufficiency appears to him an empty vaunt. "No man," he writes,¹ "can add a cubit to his stature in this little model of a man's body; but in the great frame of

¹ Essay 29 *ad fin.*

commonwealths and kingdoms it is in the power of princes or estates to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms." It need hardly be said that individuals can add many cubits to their moral and intellectual growth.

Civic or Political Virtue must not be too Rigid.—Unfortunately political life has often to turn morality adrift. The rising to the platform for good deeds is by "the winding stair;" a man must side with factions, from which, when risen, he must shake himself free. Politicians are likened to knee timber, they must be pliant and crooked, apt dissimulators, if not positively deceitful, and generally not too virtuous; "a man must not show himself disarmed and exposed to scorn and injury by too much goodness and sweetness of nature." In this view of human conduct, Bacon leaves his usual optimism and comes near to Machiavelli's standpoint. Montaigne, too, holds that human nature is faulty, and that instruments must be suited to the material; he refuses, however, himself to leave the path of virtue, and will not identify himself with any course of action unworthy of a French gentleman; moreover, by standing aloof from all that is vicious, he virtually modifies his recognition of the necessity for vice. On the other hand, it is a fatal mistake for the great to hold themselves at a distance from public life. Bacon is more courageous; he was also a representative of the more modern and civilized methods of peaceful diplomacy; he speaks as a man of peace, a counsellor, who must tread cautiously in dangerous times, trusting to his keen intellect, with observant mind and eye, imitating the successes and profiting

by the mistakes of others. For the treatment of conduct, Bacon's mind was too subtle. Much apparently contrary to moral law is really the result of a conflict of obligations, where the highest motive should be boldly chosen; minute analysis often has a tendency to place such actions in a wrong light. Bacon's treatment of conduct ignores the simple doctrine "act to know"; he gives us the idea of one who is constantly and painfully appraising and balancing actions, where a less analytic and less subtle mind, would find little difficulty. He undoubtedly hoped, and perhaps believed, that the extension of the kingdom of man would be followed by moral purity, and he certainly insisted on the value of self-control, self-knowledge, and self-reliance. Public service essentially implies mastery of self, and Bacon's statesman has much in common with Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος*. The prime necessity was to clear the way, when most of the difficulties which beset morality would vanish. So the great man must provisionally cut the knot. When the great man has overcome the perversity of his material, morality and religion will walk securely.

Particular Essays examined.—In the Essay on *Great Place*, the moral and prudential aspects are fairly balanced. Great place is dangerous to the will, and often falls heavily and from a height. Greek philosophy utterly condemned despotism as the worst of evils for the possessor. Bacon sees some of the dangers, but would correct the errors and fortify the weaknesses of that absolutism which he held to be the best form of government. His optimism led him to believe that high position will develop all that is best in a

man ; it is a platform for good works, though it also gives license for evil, and "good thoughts, though God accept them, towards men are no better than good dreams."

The Essays on *Ambition*, *Riches*, *Faction*, *Suitors*, *Fortune*, mark clearly the transition from morality to prudence, as they deal more definitely with subjects relating to political success. Princes must be able to distinguish between honest and dishonest ambition, but the whole question turns on the consideration how far are the ambitious useful or dangerous to those in high place. The good or bad effects of ambition on the ambitious are hardly noticed. A similarly objective and prudential treatment runs through the Essay on *Vain-Glory*,¹ which is otherwise written on a lower level. *Riches* are necessary, yet a hindrance to virtue ; a man cannot enjoy great riches, only distribute them ; those men are not to be trusted who affect to despise them ; they are to be sought honestly, but the way to wealth is not honesty. Wealth must be bequeathed judiciously, and charities are not to be deferred until death. In this essay we can almost see the play of Bacon's mind as he wavers between morality and utility. *Faction* must be utilized for political purposes ; the prince may stand by and see dangerous forces weaken each other. In dealing with *Suits*, honesty is the best policy ; at the same time the guiding principle of action must be self-interest ; promote worthy suits, but mainly those which will benefit yourself. In noticing Bacon's treat-

¹ This Essay might be compared with Aristotle's treatment of the braggard (ἀλάζων).

ment of subjects like the present, it must be remembered that his morality is civic rather than domestic. At the same time public virtue should be based on private virtue; otherwise the virtue of a citizen is little more than passive obedience, while the statesman who is above vulgar morality and only to be judged by success will debase the moral currency, and refer all actions to utility.

The keynote of the Essay on *Fortune* is *sapiens fingit fortunam sibi*, though his virtues will be judiciously ascribed to Providence or Fortune. "There be not two more fortunate properties than to have *a little of the fool*, and not too much of the honest. Therefore extreme lovers of their country, or masters, were never fortunate." Isolated passages like this jar on our moral sense, but the sentiment is non-moral rather than immoral. The Essay on *Ceremonies and Respects* might be added to this group, which treats of the value of appearance from a temperate and judicious standpoint. In the treatment of *Nature, Custom, Youth, Old Age, Beauty and Deformity*, the suspension of the moral and religious aspects of the questions involved is remarkable. Virtuous habits can and are to be formed in youth; vices, like weeds, are to be eradicated. In most of these essays we find a too mechanical conception of virtue and vice, which leaves us the idea that it is as easy to implant the one as to uproot the other. Virtue implies the gradual and difficult enfranchisement of the will from the passions, in proportion as the idea of duty is realized. Youth is too impetuous, old age too dilatory. The former is more imaginative

and inventive, the latter more experienced and prudent. "But for the moral part, perhaps, youth will have the pre-eminence, as age hath for the politic. A certain Rabbin upon the text, "*Your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams,*" inferreth that young men are admitted nearer to God than old, because vision is a clearer revelation than a dream ; and certainly the more a man drinketh of the world the more it intoxicateth ; and age doth profit rather in the powers of understanding than in the will and affections." In the last passage the noble aspirations, beliefs, and enthusiasm of the young are inadequately expressed, while the calm contentment of the old and their readiness to die, when the work of life has been well done, are ignored. Contrast the treatment of the same theme by Mr. Browning in *Rabbi Ben Ezra*. Beauty of expression and demeanour is better than beauty of colour ; "Virtue is like a rich stone, best plain set," and is best in a body that hath rather dignity of presence than beauty of aspect. "Beauty is as summer fruits, which are easily to corrupt and cannot last." Deformity is the cause rather than the sign of a depraved mind ; the deformed have their revenge of nature. Bacon's treatment is cynical and unideal, nor does it represent the actual facts. Christian art has done much to familiarize us with the human form as a fair shrine for a fair soul. It has also emphasized the compensating presence of virtue and religion, in the 'maimed and halt.' At least it is true that bodily defects may spur to noble actions, or teach self-control and patience. In discussing the emotions (1) envy is unhesitatingly condemned as

a mark of a defective mind, body, or fortune, and as dangerous to the State. Bacon however passes quickly over the subjective side of envy, to enlarge upon its objective efforts. Envy is looked on rather as a source of danger from without, than as a canker to be eradicated from the heart. (2) Revenge may take the place of law when necessary, but is ignoble unless it is open. The best thing is to forgive our friends as well as our enemies when they offend; but not because resentment is unchristian, but because what is done cannot be undone, and it is giving ourselves trouble to no purpose. Nothing is said of the Christian duty of resentment which lies at the bottom of justice. Public revenge is generally more fortunate than private revenge. (3) Suspensions cloud the mind, lose friends, and check business. They should be remedied by fuller knowledge by seeing that there is no real ground of alarm. They must be carefully kept in check, though they are useful to put a man on his guard; for *homo homini est lupus*. A suspicion must only be acted upon as a motive to discover the weakness of others, and to strengthen ourselves. Men must "carry their anger with scorn rather than with fear, so that they may seem rather to be above the injury than below it." (4) Anger is harmful and a sign of weakness; it cannot be wholly repressed, but must be kept within due bounds. The tone of the Essay is a mixture of stoicism and utilitarianism, and though the possibility of rightful wrath is allowed, the value of it as a corrective to vice is ignored. It may be politic to make others angry, "For raising anger in another; it is done chiefly by choosing of

times, when men are frowardest and worst disposed, to incense them. Again (as was touched before) by gathering all that you can find out to aggravate the contempt." (5) In the same way boldness is considered instead of bravery, and in its political and utilitarian aspects rather than as the quality which may be turned to evil or good according to the training supplied and the ends to which it is directed.

In the Essays which deal with the private affections, those on *Children*,¹ *Love*, *Marriage* and *Friendship*, the prudential and non-moral treatment jars on us more forcibly. Children cause trouble and sorrow as well as joy, and keep men from the highest work. Their presence is most welcome to the founders of a noble house. Marriage turns a man's thoughts from posterity to his immediate surroundings. Married men make the best subjects and soldiers. They have given hostages to fortune, and are more amenable to restraint and more cautious in their actions. Love is a physical weakness, better for the stage than life, often ridiculous, and a great flatterer. The Essay concludes with a passage which exactly shows Bacon's own mind. "There is in man's nature a secret inclination and motion towards love of others, which, if it be not spent upon some one or a few, doth naturally spread itself towards many, and maketh men become humane and charitable, as it is seen sometimes in friars." Bacon prefers love in solution to nuptial love which maketh mankind; or friendly love which perfecteth it. The treatment of

¹ These and parallel subjects have been excellently treated in Hamerton's *Human Intercourse*. Macmillan, 1884.

friendship is also cold and utilitarian. Bacon was not one of those who found a substitute for marriage and family ties in the close union of thought and feeling which is implied in the relation of true friendship. The aspects of friendship which strike Bacon most forcibly are that it gives us the means of unburdening our hearts and of receiving and giving counsel, the latter being desirable because the expression of thought in conversation with friends produces habits of clearness. Friendship also allows us to extend and assert ourselves in a life which is a replica of our own. "Men have their time and die many times in desire of some things which they principally take to heart; the bestowing of a child, the finishing of a work, or the like. If a man have a true friend, he may rest almost secure that the care of those things will continue after him. So that a man hath, as it were, two lives in his desires. A man hath a body, and that body is confined to a place; but where friendship is, all offices of life are, as it were, granted to him and his deputy. For he may exercise them by a friend. How many things are there, which a man cannot with any face or comeliness say of himself! A man can scarce allege his own merits with modesty, much less extol them; a man cannot sometimes stoop to supplicate or beg. But all these things are graceful in a friend's mouth, which are blushing in a man's own." In the Essay on *Followers and Friends*, he writes, "There is little friendship in the world, and least of all between equals, which was wont to be magnified. That that is, is between superior and inferior, whose fortunes may comprehend the one the other." No-

thing is said in the above-mentioned essays of the purification of the emotions by the sacrifice of self implied in the domestic virtues. The Baconian reader is more interested with *Discourse, Expense, Health, Building, Gardens, and Suitors*, than with the cultivation of the inner life ; Bacon's morality is civic rather than domestic, for the good of humanity rather than for the inner development of the individual. Other Essays are written from a lower level. In the *causerie* about "Discourse" Bacon inserts the dubious advice, "If you dissemble sometimes your knowledge of that you are thought to know, you shall be thought, another time, to know that you know not." In the Essay on *Seeming Wise* the dangerous effects of hypocrisy to hypocrites are absolutely passed over. They are not to be employed as servants where they are more harmful than folly itself. In the Essay on *Cunning*, after exposing, perhaps too knowingly, the tricks of the cunning, Bacon condemns them as dangerous to the State and foolish ; *prudens advertit ad gressus suos, stultus divertit ad dolos*, it is better to sell sound wares, than deck them out for the market. There is no antagonism to cunning as immoral, and we seem to feel that if cunning were not impolitic, it would be justifiable. "The cunning are fitter for practice than for counsel, and they are good but in their own alley, turn them to new men and they have lost their aim." In the Essay on *Vain-Glory* he writes, "There are great effects of cross lies. . . . Lies are sufficient to breed opinion and opinion brings on substance." So a man may disseminate a *false fame* that politic ends may be obtained more smoothly. It

is better to say with Montaigne that evil is necessary in the world, but that we will have none of it. It is certainly dangerous, calmly to appraise the relative value of deceit and truth and to admit each in so far as prudence demands, and though the ultimate conclusion may be that honesty is the best policy, to hold that there is so much folly and vice in human nature as to necessitate to some extent the employment of base means. Bacon's weapons for worldly warfare are opportunism, adroit management, and shrewd observation. The fragmentary notes on the *Colours of Good and Evil* are further illustrations of the cold logical method applied to moral questions by Bacon. In some cases the good and the useful are absolutely identified; in others the several advantages of virtue and fortune, self-help and bounty, merit and reputation are coldly analyzed and balanced one against the other. Where virtue is triumphant, it carries the day rather because of its external advantages than its internal sanction. Virtue is put on its defence and, though eventually victorious, the impression that remains on the reader is that a little more virtue might be vice, a little less vice, virtue.

Bacon as a Writer.—Bacon, we have seen, can hardly make good his claim to be the founder of inductive science, as he has been loosely designated by the popular voice. His fame as a writer rests on a surer basis, and he might, with more show of reason, be styled the father of modern English prose. There are, it is true, other prose works of his predecessors or contemporaries which are still current literature, and not only are consulted by the student or antiquarian,

but appeal to the cultivated reader by the felicity of their language and the rhythm of their periods. Sidney's *Arcadia* is the germ of that poetical prose which finds its culmination in Ruskin's *Modern Painters*, and his *Defense of Poesie* is the beginning of modern criticism. More's *Utopia* is a philosophical romance which doubtless suggested to Bacon his *New Atlantis*, but the English version is not More's, but the work of a certain Ralph Robinson. Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* is the first monument of a sustained philosophical work written in stately, musical, yet clear and simple prose. Yet Bacon, as a writer, did something more than Sidney, More, or Hooker, and his influence on English prose was wider and deeper than that of any Elizabethan writer. He has left us not only political romances, philosophical treatises, histories, and State papers, all of them admirable in their kind, but what is more important he has shown how the English language is an instrument of varied powers that, in the hands of an adept, can be tuned to any key and interpret every phase of thought and feeling. Like Dante, he can boast that language is his servant, not his master; that he makes it say the thing he will, that and nothing less or more. Like Macaulay, his first aim is to be understood, and though (unlike Macaulay's) his matter is at times abstruse and hard to comprehend, yet an involved period, or an ambiguous phrase is as rare in the *Advancement of Learning* as in the *History of England*. The marvel is that Bacon, who was not wont to hide his light under a bushel, was only half-conscious of his attainments, or at least regarded his success as a writer of English

prose as a transient and secondary title to fame. "These modern languages," he writes, "will at one time or another play the bank-rowte with books." He half regrets the time he has lost in catering to the English public, and aspires to live as a citizen of the world by his Latin writings, and by the translation of his English writings into Latin. Would he be flattered or grieved to learn that for one reader of the *Novum Organum* there are a thousand of the *Essays*, and that this solitary student most probably peruses it in an English translation?

The Essays a New Experiment in English Literature.

—From what has been said it is obvious that the *Essays* alone can give but a one-sided and inadequate notion of Bacon's style. This will be even more apparent when we consider how they were written, and what was their scope and intention. The title itself was borrowed from Montaigne, whose work preceded the earliest edition of ten *Essays*, 1597, by seventeen years. "Essays" was a much more unpretending title in Bacon's days than it is now. It conveyed much the same shade of meaning as the French *ébauche*, a rough sketch, a first attempt, jottings, or "dispersed meditations," as Bacon himself paraphrases the word. In his dedication to Prince Henry he speaks of them as "brief notes set down rather significantly than curiously," *i.e.* rather as hints than an elaborate exposition. Again, in his dedication to his brother Anthony, he calls them "fragments of his conceits," and compares them to the new halfpence—very small coins, but solid silver. The *Essays*, at least the original ten, are indeed nothing more than they profess to be—notes of

life and conduct loosely strung together, with no attempt at periodic structure or graces of style. Bacon is in fact supplying what, in the *Advancement of Learning*, is noted as a deficiency in literature. "I wish," he says, "the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used, supplying authorities and examples by reference."

Turn for example to the Essay on *Cunning*, and examine its construction. It starts with a popular definition of cunning. This definition suggests some points of distinction between cunning and wisdom. Then follow instances of cunning, strung together without any attempt at logical order, drawn mostly from the author's personal experience, with one or two from the Old Testament and Tacitus interspersed. These form the bulk of the Essay, and when Bacon has "unwinded his bottom"—spun his yarn, as we should phrase it—he falls back into the dominant key, the distinction between cunning and wisdom, and ends off with a verse from the Proverbs. No definite conclusion is reached, and we are left uncertain whether Bacon approves or disapproves of cunning. And this hesitancy, this deliberative attitude, this balancing of pros and cons is perhaps the most characteristic feature of the Essays, characteristic both of the style and of the man.

Another feature which is common both to the method and the manner of the Essays is their homeliness. "They handle those things in which both men's lives and their pens are most conversant." "They come

home to men's businesses and bosoms." Descending from his "specular mount," the philosopher of the *Novum Organum* strolls with us to the market-place, conducts us over his great house and stately gardens, lets us peep into his study and points out his favourite authors, entertains us with reminiscences of court and council chambers, and unfolds the secrets of statescraft and the windings and doubles of diplomatists and placemen; he gives us hints on travel, hints on bargaining, hints on physicking ourselves; he advises us (though his advice on those deeper matters is superficial and commonplace) about marriage and education of children, the religious conduct of life, and the fear of facing death. Yet it may be noted in passing that, in spite of the familiarity of manner and the practical common-sense of the Essays, their range in one direction is very limited, and they deal only with a small fraction of humanity. Throughout, life is regarded from the standing-point of the author—of the courtier, the high official, the man of wealth and position—and the conduct and feelings of the masses are considered only as they affect him. To return to the style of the Essays, Bacon was attempting a novel experiment in literature, "not vulgar, but of a nature whereof a man shall find much in experience, little in books," and he therefore eschews all bookish phrases and elaboration of sentences. In submitting the proofs to his friends he asks them to mark whatsoever shall not seem current in the style. In so doing he was carrying out the reforms advocated in his *Advancement of Learning*, correcting "that first distemper of learning when men study words and not method, hunt more

after choiceness of the phrase, and the round and clear composition of the sentence, the sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration with tropes of figures, than after life of invention or depth of judgment."

Characteristics of the Essays as Literary Compositions.—To decide how far Bacon succeeded in his new experiment, let us analyze the Essays under the different heads which go to make up style.

1. *The Vocabulary.*—Next to Shakespeare, Bacon has perhaps the largest range of words of any English writer. Though "a full man," his reading was mainly confined to the Latin classics, including the Vulgate, and for his vocabulary he is little indebted to previous English writers. His stock of words was mainly gathered from the council chamber, the law courts, the House of Commons, or picked up in the familiar intercourse of daily life. He had a singularly retentive memory, nor was he content to trust to that alone, but, like Charles Reade, jotted down in his *Promus of Formularies and Elegancies* or common-place book every phrase or word that struck him in reading or conversation as likely to serve his turn. Saxon words predominate, and we may pick whole sentences with scarce a foreign word: "What is truth? said *jesting* Pilate, and would not wait for an answer." "For if thou dost not, it is a *debt* will soon be paid, when thou art gone." "But let it rather be said, when he sits in place, he is another man." Yet on the other hand, Bacon is not careful to avoid the polysyllables in "-osity" and "-ation," words like "aculeate," "meliority," "defatigation," still have a foreign look

about them, and occasionally he transfers a word bodily from the Latin or Roman languages ; more rarely still he coins a new word.

2. *The Syntax*.—Dean Church has well described the “brief rapid sentences that come down like the stroke of a great hammer.” Connective particles are rare and these mostly co-ordinative. The construction is often loose, clause being linked to clause, with here a parenthesis and there a quotation interspersed, like a child’s string of bird’s-eggs. Yet we are conscious all the while that this is artless art, not carelessness or confusion of thought. Take for example the following period, if period it can be called, from the fifth Essay, which we will quote with the original punctuation :—“And the Poets, indeed, have been busy with it ; For it is, in effect, the thing, which is figured in that Strange Fiction of the ancient Poets, which seemeth not to be without mystery ; Nay, and to have some approach, to the State of a Christian : That Hercules when he went to unbind Prometheus (by whom Human Nature is represented) sailed the length of the great Ocean, in an Earthen Pot, or Pitcher : Lively describing Christian Resolution ; that saileth, in the frail Bark of the Flesh, through the Waves of the World.”

Note the casual *it’s* in the first two clauses ; the *for* introducing an illustration ; the participle *describing*, a puzzle to the grammarian to decide what word it qualifies, though there can be no ambiguity about the sense. A reference to the verbal index will supply instances of ambiguous relatives, sense constructions, and mixed constructions.

3. *Brevity*.—We have already noted the terseness of style. There is never a superfluous epithet. The logical connections are left for the reader to supply. No modern and no ancient writer, except Aristotle, has contrived to put so much meaning in so small a space. Take as an example the Essay on *Studies*, or the last sentence of Essay 54: "Glorious men are the scorn of wise men, the admiration of fools, the idols of parasites, and the slaves of their own vaunts." Let the reader attempt to paraphrase such a passage, to express the same thoughts in different words, omitting nothing, and the comparative prolixity of his version will bring home to him the marvellous condensation of Bacon's style. The Essays are a sort of literary pemmican.

4. *Clearness*.—Yet this brevity is never (as is the case with Tacitus, and to some extent with Aristotle, who served as Bacon's models), counterbalanced by obscurity. The language is as clear and limpid as the thought. He avoids all technical and philosophical terms, and converses with us as a plain English gentleman. The most epigrammatic and sententious of writers, he rarely, if ever, sacrifices sense or clearness for the sake of a sentence or an epigram.

5. *Wit*.—If we follow Aristotle's definition, and define wit as the perception of incongruity flashing upon us when unaccompanied by pain, while wisdom is the intuition of the hidden harmonies of nature, the wit of the Essays is even more striking than their wisdom. Everywhere Bacon detects similarities, for every topic he has a pat illustration, like a clever lawyer he can always quote a case in point; in philo-

sophy, in science, in morals, in natural history, he detects endless analogies ; we are dazzled and delighted by the mutual reflections and refractions. Sometimes the wit is a mere play on words—"by pain men come to greater pains ;" sometimes it is a fanciful image or metaphor, an ingenious combination of incongruous words :—those that want friends are "cannibals of their own hearts" ; to think to command the end and yet not endure the means is "the solecism of power ;" the pursuit of fortune is "sabbathless" ; money is like "muck." More often it consists in an apt illustration or apposite anecdote—learning is both the lark that soars and sings, and the hawk that soars and swoops ; to write down your opinion, even if you reject it wholly, is better than not to write at all, "as ashes are more generative than dust ;" God delights to hide His works in order to have them found out, "like the innocent play of children." Under the head of wit, in the older sense of wit, we may class those frequent phrases, many of which have passed into household words—"Revenge is a sort of wild justice ;" "Riches are the baggage of virtue ;" "He that hath wife and children hath given hostages to fortune ;" "Education is an early custom ;" "Custom is the principal magistrate of man's life."

6. *Poetic Imagination*.—That Bacon possessed an exuberant fancy the above instances, which might be indefinitely multiplied, are sufficient proof. And no one who reads the *Essays* with care can fail to see that he was gifted also with a wonderful reproductive imagination. The house he builds is a real house ; we could make a plan of his gardens. Even

abstractions like envy, ambition, vain-glory, deformity, are animated by his touch, and move before us as living characters. Whether he can be credited with the higher quality of creative imagination is a more doubtful question. Certain critics on the strength of a casual allusion,¹ which has not been satisfactorily explained, and some remarkable coincidences of thought and language,² which are partly due to chance,

¹ In a letter of Bacon's to Sir John Davis, where he speaks of himself as a concealed poet.

² Dr. Theobald has furnished me with a large number of parallel passages, from which I select the following :—

1. "He that is only real had need have exceeding great parts of virtue, as the stone had need to be rich that is set without foil."—*Essay* lii. 1.

"And like bright metal on a sullen ground,
My reformation, glittering over my fault,
Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes
Than that which hath no foil to set it off."

1 Henry IV., i. 2, 236.

2. "The tyranny of custom."—*Essay* xxxix. 26.

"The tyrant custom."

Othello, i. 3, 230.

3. "Deformed persons are commonly even with nature ; for as nature hath done ill with them, so do they by nature, . . . and so they have their revenge of nature."—*Essay* xlv. 1.

"Cheated of feature by dissembling nature

And therefore since I cannot prove a lover
I am determined to prove a villain."

Richard III., i. 1, 19, 28.

And compare 3 *Henry VI.* iii. 2, for Richard's character.

4. "Tell a lie and find a truth."—*Essay* vi. 10, 3.

"Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth."

Hamlet, ii. 1, 63.

5. "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested."—*Essay* i. 23.

"Capital crimes, chewed, swallowed, and digested."

2 Henry V., ii. 2, 55.

partly to borrowings from common sources, and possibly in part to direct imitation, have sought to put

6. "False and corrupt servants, which set a bias upon their bowl of their own petty ends and envies, to the overthrow of their nature's great and important affairs."—*Essay* xxiii. 30.

"Commodity, the bias of the world."

King John, ii. 1, 574.

(Compare the whole speech of the Bastard).

7. "Suspensions that the mind itself gathers are but buzzes; but suspicions that are artificially nourished . . . have stings."—*Essay* xxxi. 30.

"For though they cannot greatly sting to hurt,
Yet look to have their buzz to offend thine ears."

3 *Henry VI.*, ii. 6, 94

Compare also *Henry VIII.*, iii. 2, 55.

8. "He that plots to be the only figure among cyphers is the decay of an whole age."—*Essay* xxxvi. 67.

"O, pardon! since a crooked figure may
Attest in little place a million,
And let us, ciphers to this great accompt,
On your imaginary forces work."

Henry V., prolog., 16.

9. "Some procure to themselves to be surprised at such times, as it is like the party that they work upon will suddenly come upon them, and be found with a letter in their hand," etc.—*Essay* xxii. 71.

Compare *King Lear*, i. 2. Enter Edmund with a letter, and note the use he makes of it.

10. "It is the wisdom of crocodiles that shed tears when they would devour."—*Essay* xxiii. 48.

"Gloucester's show

Beguiles him, as the mournful crocodile
With sorrow snares relenting passengers."

2 *Henry VI.*, iii. 1, 227.

We may add another remarkable coincidence of words from Bacon's advice to *Queen Elizabeth*. He is arguing against the policy of leaving the Papists half content, half discontent, "For no man loves one the better for giving him a bastinado with a little cudgel." Compare *King John*, ii. 1, 463.

"He gives the bastinado with his tongue,
Our ears are cudgelled."

Bacon on the same poetic level as Shakespeare, and even to suggest that he is the "concealed poet" of *Lear* and *Hamlet* of the *Merry Wives*, and *As You Like It*. Internal evidence would suffice to explode this wild theory. There is hardly a trace in Bacon of that transfusing and transforming imagination which creates a new heaven and a new earth, which reveals the elemental secrets of things, and thrills us with a shock of surprise and delight as a new revelation. It may be thought unreasonable to look for such a quality in prose essays, and its absence here may seem no disproof of Bacon possessing it. The answer to this objection is double. First the proof lies with the other side; secondly, prose is the opposite of metre not of poetry, and a poet's prose will be still "of imagination all compact:" witness the prose speeches of *Hamlet* ("I have of late, but wherefore I know not, lost all my mirth"); and of the *Merchant of Venice* ("I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes?"). There is more of poetry in Browne's *Hydriotaphia* than in Bacon's collected works. Yet of poetry in all but the strictest and highest sense of the word Bacon is full. Sometimes it is seen in an apt simile or a felicitous phrase, such as Pope might have envied; sometimes (though not in the *Essays*) in stately rhetoric, which rises and falls in sonorous periods; sometimes in the rhythmical cadence of a sentence which clings to the memory like a snatch of song; now and then in a touch of true pathos. Here is an instance of happy metaphor which comes near poetry: "Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the

poles of truth." Here is another where the quiet rhythmic cadence chimes in with an undertone of melancholy which is rare in Bacon: "But little do men perceive what solitude is, and how far it extendeth; for a crowd is not company, and faces are but a gallery of pictures, and talk but a tinkling cymbal where there is no love."

7. *Quotations.*—Bacon's richness of quotations will strike a modern reader as marvellous, but it is beggared by other works of the time, notably by Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*. The revival of learning was like the discovery of a new world, and the first discoverers took a childish delight in parading their newly found treasure. Bacon's range of study would seem to a modern student narrow, and his chaplain Rawley tells us that though he read much, and that with great judgment, he was no plodder upon books. Yet no man ever turned to such account what he read. His favourite authors, after the Bible, which he quotes on every page, were the Latin classics. Tacitus, Cicero, and Livy are his favourites among prose writers, Vergil and Ovid among the poets. Next to these come the Fathers, then Machiavelli and Montaigne. With Greek he is not nearly so conversant as with Latin, and a Greek quotation is as rare in Bacon as in the House of Commons. The New Testament he generally quotes from the Vulgate, and Aristotle in the Latin Version; Plutarch he probably read in North's translation, as did Shakespeare. It is strange that in all his voluminous writings there does not occur a single certain reference to Shakespeare. Chaucer, Spenser, and English writers generally share the same

contemptuous silence. Bacon, as we have seen, looked on modern languages much as did a classical headmaster of the last generation, and his native literature appeared to him insular, provincial, unworthy to be read or quoted by a cosmopolitan philosopher, writing for all ages and all nations.

Bacon's Variety of Styles.—We have no room left to dilate on Bacon's differences of style in relation to the different kinds of composition and the period of his life at which they were written. For an able *précis* and appreciation of his works we must refer the reader to Dr. Abbott's last volume. But we should leave a false impression of Bacon as a writer without a bare record of the fact that the *Essays* represent only one of Bacon's many styles, and can give no notions of Bacon's chief literary distinction, his Protean versatility, the mercurial sensitiveness (if we may so express it) of his style which records the various phases of thought, the various circumstances of each composition. We may aptly transfer to Bacon's style what he says of behaviour. "Behaviour," he tells us, "seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained for exercise or motion."

In conclusion we may quote the magnificent peroration to the first part of the *Advancement of Learning*. It will not only serve as an example of Bacon's grand style, which is the high-water mark of ornate English

prose, equalled but not surpassed by Taylor's *Liberty of Prophesying*, Milton's *Areopagitica*, and Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, but it is an image of Bacon's higher self—the immortal part that survives all mortal blurs and stains—of the passionate lover of wisdom, the patient student of nature, the friend and benefactor of mankind.

“Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me (*si nunquam fallit imago*), as far as a man can judge of his own work not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments; which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which communiceth books to men of all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in civil business, as the states of Grecia did, in respect of their popularity,

and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of their monarchy ; the present disposition of these times at this instant to peace ; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences ; the perfection of your Majesty's learning, which as a phoenix may call whole vollies of wits to follow you ; and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more and more to disclose truth ; I cannot but be raised to this persuasion that this third period of time will far surpass that of the Grecian and Roman learning : only if men will know their own strength, and their own weakness both ; and take, one from the other, light of invention, and not fire of contradiction ; and esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament ; and employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient and patient request, *Verbera, sed audi* ; let men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful (though it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off. Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of all men's labours and peregrinations."

BACON'S ESSAYS

I. Of Truth.

WHAT is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Certainly there be that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief, affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting. And, though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discouraging wits which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labour which men take in finding out of truth; nor again, that, when it is found, it imposeth upon men's thoughts, that doth bring lies in favour; but a natural, though corrupt love of the lie itself. One of the later school of the Grecians examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies, where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant, but for the lie's sake. But I cannot tell: this same truth is a naked and open daylight, that doth not shew the masques, and mummeries, and triumphs of the world, half so stately and daintily as

candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that sheweth best by day ; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that
 25 sheweth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of
 30 a number of, men poor shrunk things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves? One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy "*vinum dæmonum*," because it filleth the imagination, and yet it is but with a shadow of a lie. But it is
 35 not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in and setteth in it, that doth the hurt, such as we spake of before. But howsoever these things are thus, in men's depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself,
 40 teacheth that the inquiry of truth (which is the love-making, or wooing of it), the knowledge of truth (which is the presence of it), and the belief of truth (which is the enjoying of it), is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God, in the
 45 works of the days, was the light of the sense, the last was the light of reason, and His Sabbath work, ever since, is the illumination of His Spirit. First He breathed light upon the face of the matter, or Chaos; then He breathed light into the face of man ; and still
 50 He breatheth and inspireth light into the face of His chosen. The poet that beautified the sect, that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well : "*It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to*

See the first of the Poem

see ships tossed upon the sea ; a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures thereof, below ; but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth" (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), "*and to see the errors and wanderings, and mists, and tempests, in the vale below ;*" so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

To pass from theological and philosophical truth to the truth of civil business, it will be acknowledged, even by those that practise it not, that clear and round dealing is the honour of man's nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it ; for these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent, which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet. There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame as to be found false and perfidious. And therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace, and such an odious charge—saith he : "*If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much as to say that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards men ;*" for a lie faces God, and shrinks from man. Surely the wickedness of falsehood and breach of faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed as in that it shall be the last peal to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men : it being foretold, that

when Christ cometh, *he shall not find faith upon the earth.*

The "*Antitheta*" corresponding to this essay, are given under Knowledge, Contemplation. They do not refer to *truthfulness*, but only to *truth* of (physical) facts. Bacon puts politics in the scale against philosophy.

For.

1. No pleasures are in accordance with nature save those which never breed satiety.

2. No prospect is so fair as to look down on the errors of others.

3. How blessed it is to have the orbit of the mind concentric with the orbit of the universe!

4. All perverted passions are but so many false notions; goodness and truth are identical.

Against.

1. Contemplation is a specious sloth.

2. Good thoughts are little better than good dreams.

3. God cares for the world; your care should be for your country.

4. The statesman also sows the seed of thought.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. "Truth" is used by Bacon in two senses: (1) objective or external truth, the conformity of notions or statements to things; (2) subjective or internal truth, the honesty or integrity of persons. The discovery of "Truth" implies (externally) experience and method, with a free range of thought, and (internally) mental energy and truthfulness. The mind of the inquirer must be resolute, and actuated by the desire to increase the good of himself and others by setting forth things *as they are*. Now, in Bacon's time, not only was experience meagre and method faulty, but scientific inquiry was hampered by the jealous fears of the Church and the ruler. With the greatest mental energy and honest desire to know

and say the truth, seekers after truth were, like Galileo, checked in their first efforts. But the mind was also hampered by prejudices and fears. Bacon supposed that he had discovered a royal road to the "Interpretation of Nature," if men would only clear their minds of "idols." He thoroughly saw the mental difficulties of science, but only of science, not of morality. The discovery of scientific *Truth* was the burning question of the day, and men's minds were turned away from the moral aspect of the question. It requires little proof that the external side comes most prominently forward in science. Experience and method only come by long pursuit of facts. A mind cleared of its "idols" may make little advancement in *Truth* without the proper material. Scientific *Truthfulness* does not necessarily imply *Truth*. Still scientific *Truthfulness* was especially important when a charlatan could flourish undetected.

ii. But, now that science is fairly launched on her course, we speak less of *Truth* and *Truthfulness* in the discovery of Natural Laws than in the dealings of everyday life. Here the internal side, *Truthfulness* is all in all. Newton and James Watt are not called *Truthful* for their scientific discoveries, though the seeker after *Truth* cannot be other than *Truthful*. A scientific impostor is soon discovered. Scientific *Untruthfulness* is between a man and the world, and is rather foolish than culpable. The same prejudices and interests sway the mind in science as in the words and deeds of everyday life, but if we want a definition of *Truthfulness* we must go to morality. *Truth* is the perfect correspondence between thoughts and things, *Truthfulness* the *habit* of using such knowledge. Knowledge is not virtue in morality.

iii. The essence of *Truthfulness* involves the presence of the absolute law of right, it is strongly associated with justice, and might be defined as "justice to ourselves for the sake of others." It is that state of mind which makes for righteousness, and implies a strong sense of personal dignity or responsibility. It is high in the scale, if there be a scale, of virtue. "It endues a man's purposes with something of immutability."¹ In morality, the objective

¹ Hare, *Guesses at Truth*.

side is almost a vanishing point. Mr. Chadband's¹ illustrations of moral truth are comically ridiculous. There would be no motive of concealment in his examples except the physical one of an inherited instinct to lie, as is the case with negroes. Truthfulness is a virtue of a high nature, and is rather self-regarding (in the highest sense of the word) than altruistic. The more advanced the individual or nation is, the more likely each is to be truthful. Moral courage covers much the same ground. Fearlessness is undoubtedly an element of truthfulness. But the sphere of moral courage is more limited.

iv. It is impossible to have such a virtue in excess ; ὁρθὴν ἀλήθεια ἀεί. Scientifically there may be a virtue of economy or reserve. Strong meat must not be given to babes. But deception must never be practised. Even the dictum "always speak the truth, but the truth must not always be spoken," can only be accepted with a reservation. *Suppressio veri* must never be tainted with *suggestio falsi*.² But no one can be too truthful. (Is propagandism a duty?) White lies, pious frauds, are to be condemned ; the moral sense will get blunted if truthfulness is even consciously neglected. Are we obliged to give a madman information which will lead to crime? There is really no difficulty ; if two virtues clash, choose the higher. Casuistry supposes that the necessity for *truth* varies with circumstances, that there are degrees of *truth* ; and the Romish Church professes to legislate when, where, and how to speak the truth. Casuistry is wrong in laying down hard and fast rules, as it is in legislating about what must be left to the individual.³ Diplomacy tampers with truth. The English, who are most truthful, are least diplomatic of Europeans, and Europeans are far more truthful than Asiatics. In politics Bacon shows a distinct want of truthfulness. In commerce sharpness is valued above all other qualities. *Homo homini vulpes*.

v. In the sciences the difficulties of *finding the truth* and *being truthful* vary. In history both are difficult, because history deals with non-exact matter, and is con-

¹ Dickens, *Bleak House*.

² See *Essay* on "Simulation and Dissimulation."

³ Casuistry has been in disrepute since Pascal's attack.

nected with the emotions and prejudices. It is hard to keep the dry light of reason free from bias. In history the intellectual and emotional factors are both important. Morality and science meet in history. The difficulties incident to the discovery of truth are (1) prejudice; (2) interest; (3) laziness; (4) want of method; (5) tendency to rest on authority; (6) colouring of the judgment by the emotions; (7) haste; (8) tendency to accept any discovery as final; (9) reaction. So our difficulties are rather mental. We have plenty of facts, and good method, but often fail through the above difficulties, though these are not exactly moral. Scientific truthfulness is between man and the world. Untruthfulness brings failure. Moral truthfulness is between man and his conscience. Still here is the link between philosophy and morality, and herein all truth implies a state of the will. But as science becomes more exact, and the difficulties are less bound up with our moral nature, we speak more of *truth* than of *truthfulness*. Truthfulness is paramount in morality, where the facts are easy of solution, and the difficulty only exists in the will.

vi. Truthfulness is a Teutonic and pre-eminently an English virtue. Carlyle is the prophet of "downrightness" and hatred of shams. He forgets that truth is a matter of degree, and that sensitiveness and physical weakness conceivably alter cases. Many philosophers have gone so far as to object to poetry, painting, fiction, and the drama as tampering with sacred truth. An Englishman is always in a state of antagonism to possible humbug. Madame de Staël¹ said that, "Napoleon hated the English because they had found out how to combine success with honesty." So Englishmen confound straightforwardness and consistency (a logical virtue) with truthfulness. Consistency is valuable as pointing to strength of will, but may soon become obstinacy. Our political and scientific judgments should be often provisional, though our moral decisions require stability. In fact we confuse morality and science. Straightforwardness is not always a virtue, only pointing to a certain amount of courage, often to want of sensitiveness. Inferior natures plume themselves on their straightforwardness. M. Arnold constantly

¹ Emerson, *Essays on England*.

preaches against English one-sidedness, or want of lucidity. We make up our minds too quickly and then allow no change. So our attitude to science is often defective. Truth is considered to be a stronghold to be won and held without moving an inch. Still we English do not take a wrong road because it lies across pretty country—" *malo cum Platone errare quam cum istis vera sentire.*" Emotionalism is as fatal to truth as conservative obstinacy. An Englishman is *addictus jurare in verba magistri*; he avoids eclecticism and hates trimming in politics. (It must be allowed that the trimmer may be apathetic and his principles destructive of party government. Eclecticism often leads nowhere and often points to a want of enthusiasm.) There may be untruthfulness in deeds as well as words.

vii. Truth in religion, apart from revelation, is a growth. We learn the doctrine by doing the will of God. The untrue in art is the unnatural. "Life,"¹ says a great writer, "has two ecstatic movements, one when the spirit catches sight of truth, the other when it recognizes a kindred spirit." All truth finds a unity in truthfulness, the earnest, unwavering searcher after truth will follow truth in thought, word, and deed. Bacon lays too little stress on moral truthfulness. His morality is prudential, the morality of the sensible man of the world. He does not understand the sinfulness of sin as sin. The antitheta do not touch moral truthfulness.

II. Of Death.

MEN fear death as children fear to go in the dark; and as that natural fear in children is increased with tales, so is the other. Certainly, the contemplation of death, as the wages of sin and passage to another world, is holy and religious; but the fear of it, as a ^{tribute} due unto nature, is weak. Yet in religious meditations there is sometimes

¹ *Guesses at Truth.*

mixture of vanity and of superstition. You shall read in some of the friars' books of mortification, that a man should think with himself what the pain is, if he have 10 but his finger's end pressed, or tortured, and thereby imagine what the pains of death are when the whole body is corrupted and dissolved; when many times death passeth with less pain than the torture of a limb; for the most vital parts are not the quickest of sense. 15 And by him that spake only as a philosopher and natural man, it was well said: *Pompa mortis magis terret, quam mors ipsa.* Groans and convulsions and a discoloured face, and friends weeping, and blacks, and obsequies, and the like, show death terrible. 20

It is worthy the observing, that there is no passion in the mind of man so weak, but it mates and masters the fear of death; and therefore death is no such terrible enemy when a man hath so many attendants about him that can win the combat of him. Revenge 25 triumphs over death; love slights it; honour aspireth to it; grief flieth to it; fear pre-occupateth it; nay, we read, after Otho the emperor had slain himself, pity (which is the tenderest of affections) provoked many to die out of mere compassion to their sovereign, 30 and as the truest sort of followers. Nay, Seneca adds, niceness and satiety: "*Cogita quam diu eadam feceris; mori velle, non tantum fortis, aut miser, sed etiam fastidiosus potest.*" 45 A man would die, though he were neither valiant nor miserable, only upon a weariness to 35 do the same thing so oft over and over. It is no less worthy to observe how little alteration in good spirits the approaches of death make; for they appear to be the same men till the last instant. Augustus Cæsar

40 died in a compliment : "*Livia, conjugii nostri memor, vive et vale*"—Tiberius in dissimulation, as Tacitus saith of him : "*Jam Tiberium vires et corpus, non dissimulatio, deserebant*"—Vespasian in a jest : "*Ut puto*
 45 *Deus fio*"—Galba with a sentence : "*Feri, si ex re sit populi Romani,*" holding forth his neck—Septimius Severus in despatch : "*Adeste, si quid mihi restat agendum*"—and the like. Certainly the Stoics bestowed too much cost upon death, and by their great preparations made it appear more fearful: Better
 50 saith he : "*Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponat naturæ.*" It is as natural to die as to be born ; and to a little infant, perhaps, the one is as painful as the other. He that dies in an earnest pursuit, is like one that is wounded in hot blood, who, for the
 55 time, scarce feels the hurt ; and therefore a mind fixed and bent upon somewhat that is good, doth avert the dolours of death. But, above all, believe it, the sweetest canticle is : "*Nunc dimittis*" when a man hath obtained worthy ends and expectations. Death
 60 hath this also, that it openeth the gate to good fame, and extinguisheth envy :—" *Extinctus amabitur idem.*"

ANTITHETA ON DEATH.

For.

1. There is no human passion so weak and contemptible, that it may not easily be so heightened as to overcome the fear of death.

Against.

1. "In all things, even in virtue, a long race is more conducive to success than a short one."

2. It is only in a long life that time is afforded us to complete anything, to learn anything thoroughly, or to reform oneself.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

[Consult Spectator, *Essay*, 133. Montaigne, *Essay*, 19. Tennyson, *In Memoriam* xxxi. to xxxvi. Tennyson, Poems, *The Two Voices*. Browning, *Dramatis Personæ*, *Prospice*. Lecky, *History European Morals*, ch. ii. *History of Rationalism*, ch. iv., part i. Carlyle, *Essays*, "Death of Goethe," "Goethe's Works." Johnson, *Rambler*, *Essays* 54, 71, 78. Bacon, *Introductory Address to The History of Life and Death*. Cicero, *De Senectute*, Lucretius, bk. iii. Plato, *Apology*, *Crito*, and the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*.]

i. Historically, the physical side of the question comes first. Death is feared as positively painful, and as being a cessation of vital activities. From this point of view, a lower nature fears death less than a more sensitive organism, the young more than the old.

ii. Looking at death as a distant prospect, it may be mastered by other emotions, because the immediate influences us more than the remote, the concentrated more than the diffused, and the purely physical more than the mixed emotion.

iii. The highly cultured and sensitive Greek, with no distinct ideas on immortality, and with the keenest enjoyment of living, shrunk from death. The bravery of the Spartans was the almost mechanical result of discipline. The Greeks never felt the "stern joy that warriors feel" in a death on the battle-field. The future was unknown and the present certain. "Better be a serf on earth than a king among the dead," says Ulysses in Homer. No one would endure the "ills of life," moralises the nurse in the Hippolytus of Euripides, "if it were not that the future is unknown."

iv. The question occupied the attention of Socrates, who opposed the fear of death as groundless. His position was eminently practical though tentative and hypothetical. Either death is the end of all things or the beginning of a better life. In either case it is not to be feared. The pain of dying is light. *Pompa mortis magis terret quam mors ipsa*. Even for the bad a future state might only be a purification from evil. The doctrine that pain was no evil was developed by the Socratic schools

of philosophy, and at the same time the world was growing more material and less congenial to philosophy.

v. Plato strongly maintained the immortality of the soul, and approached the question of death from the point of view that life was but a "forgetting" of real existence, which the philosopher could best, as things were, contemplate away from the chains of the body. The best natures, after death, soared upwards to the region of real existence, while the more sensual and carnal passed through other phases of being more suitable to their natures. There were three main theories of the immortality of the soul in ancient times, transmigration, metempsychosis, and absorption (pantheism). [The arguments for the doctrine, apart from revelation, are : (1) The simplicity, and indestructibility of the soul (Plato). (2) The analogical "Can a man live except he die?" (St. Paul, Corinthians, and Bp. Butler's *Analogy*). (3) It is a widespread¹ and growing idea. (4) Without such a doctrine we can have no idea of Divine justice. (5) It is inconsistent with human dignity that it should be otherwise].

vi. Aristotle touches on the question from the practical standpoint of ethical philosophy. Death, is "*ultima linea rerum*."² It must be *deliberately* met for some *great object*, but otherwise not rashly encountered. Aristotle seems to have rejected personal immortality in favour of the doctrine of absorption. If death means the loss of personal identity, it is better to learn how to live, than how to die. Death is not an evil, but life is preferable. Greek philosophy was rarely religious, and concerned with the present rather than the future.

vii. Fearlessness about death belongs rather to the Roman world through the influence of patriotism, drill,

¹ This may be said of many of the greatest minds of antiquity, and most nations have certainly had some shadowy views on "animism," but it is doubtful whether the Jews received, until the time of the "Maccabees," any such doctrine. Cf. "There is no work, nor device, nor wisdom, nor knowledge in the grave whither thou goest" (Ecclesiastes).

² In the *Ethics* he accepts the popular view of death as the end of all things. Elsewhere he compares it to the sailor stepping from a boat, the sailor being the soul.

sense of personal dignity and military spirit. The Stoic and Epicurean philosophies preached that death was no evil. The Stoic belief in immortality was vague and shadowy, and not sufficiently strong to be a motive. The Epicureans rejected the doctrine of a life beyond the grave. Death was neither feared as a punishment for sin,¹ nor welcomed as the door to a higher life.

viii. Pagan philosophy looked at death from the point of view of the perfectibility of human nature. Charon's boat and the fables of poetry need not cause uneasiness, nor the shadowy existence of the spirit after death. Man *could* perfect himself on earth by philosophy, and would, when perfect, be ready to depart like a *conviva satur*. Death is the last and grandest scene of a grand life. *Omnis vita commentatio est mortis*.² There is no idea of human corruption and infinite sinfulness.

ix. But though human nature is not corrupt, in the degraded Roman world circumstances were too strong for virtue. The Stoic philosopher was not even allowed to be indifferent, to live in peaceful and inactive retirement. The spirit, besides being clogged by its body, was cramped and held back by circumstances. Death sets the spirit free. If man cannot fulfil the highest law of his being, let him seek death. So the Stoic defended and then recommended suicide. (Futurity was certainly not a motive to the Stoic.)

x. We cannot doubt that the pagan world regarded with the gravest awe "the entrance into a future about which the reason is perfectly silent and the imagination uncontrolled," but the general feeling of antiquity was not one of horror at death. (Lessing in his monograph "*Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet*" opposes the then universally received view that death was represented by a skeleton in ancient art. Death, he proves, is represented by a winged youth, twin brother of sleep, "*consanguineus*

¹ *Lex non poena mors*. As Rochefoucauld writes, "Men are content to die because they cannot help it."

² All life is a preparation for death, not (as Bacon and Lecky [*History European Morals*, i. 202] explain) man must always be preparing to die, *i.e.* thinking of death. Hence there is no opposition between the Stoic maxim and Spinoza's, "There is no subject on which the sage will think less than on death."

leti sopor." (Cf. II. xiv. 231, xvi. 682.) Many, like Lucretius, refused to admit immortality. To others death only led to absorption, or to a shadowy existence, too unreal and unknown to weigh against such a certainty as the end of pain or of perfect life. The mass still looked only to the physical aspect. Death was inevitable, often painful, often the end of trouble.

xi. But with Christianity all was changed. We now get (1) a formulated doctrine of personal immortality, (2) a theory of human corruption and the penal character of death.

xii. Not only is death painful in itself, as the last and bitterest struggle of matter to daunt and subdue the soul, but, after death, the body is delivered over to the tormentors to be maimed and racked in proportion to its corruption.

xiii. This future suffering is necessary even for the best. Pain alone can purge our carnal nature. For the bad the terrors of the future defy description. The only hope is in the Church. The flesh must be mortified by asceticism, and the offerings and intercessions of the Church sought.

xiv. One good side of this constant dwelling on death and its horrors¹ is seen in the effect on the Stoic theory of suicide. The "ushering oneself out of life" is as sinful as it is foolish.

xv. Even when conscience had asserted her sway over authority, and Puritanism had brought the individual face to face with his Maker, the horrors of death were still insisted on as a powerful motive to the will and incentive to right action.

xvi. Collecting all the factors contributed by history to our idea of death, the fear of death is resolvable into—

(i.) Dread at the extinction of life's activities, pleasures, hopes, interests.

(ii.) Especially if life's work is only half finished.

(iii.) Dread of positive pain in dissolution; we all hope for *euthanasia*.

(iv.) Dread at the thought of punishment for sin.

¹ Death is personified as a skeleton, a grim satire on all human success. Death's revels are depicted by pen and pencil, no without a strong vein of humour, as Holbein's "Dance of Death." Cf. Burns' "Death and Dr. Hornbook."

(v.) Dread of the unknown.

(vi.) *Pompa mortis magis terret quam mors ipsa*. Reflex dread from the horrors with which death is invested.

xvii. As Bacon well says, the fear of death can be mastered by a strong (present) emotion. The statistics of suicide are instructive on this point. Nations have committed suicide wholesale, as the Peruvians and Mexicans, under Spanish persecutions.

xviii. Death in the midst of life is most painful, with work half done, with fame still dim, and perhaps the wants of family unprovided for. Cf. the antitheta; life in any case is often too short for its work.

xix. Christianity has only in part removed the natural sting of death. As Vauvenargues remarks, peace of mind is often a matter of digestion. John Bunyan makes Mr. Badman die quietly. Lessing unfairly says that "revelation has made death the king of terrors." Superstition has done so in times past.

xx. To all it must be a journey to the unknown, "a transition out of visible Time into invisible Eternity."¹ The survivors feel that in every case the dead man is "a palpable revelation of the mystery of wonder and depth and fear" which underlies all life. Men at once begin to ask how has he lived? What relation has the "fifth act of the tragedy" to the other four?

xxi. Most poets have spoken their thoughts on death. *Shelley* writes—

"First our pleasures die and then
Our hopes, and then our fears,—and when
These are dead, the debt is due;
Dust claims dust—and we die too."

Coleridge writes his own epigram, thus—

"Quae linguam aut nihil, aut nihili, aut vix sunt mea—sordes
Do morti :—reddo cetera, Christe, tibi."

*Tennyson*² often hesitates between annihilation and hope.

"The head and mighty paramount of truth
Immortal life in never-fading worlds."

¹ Carlyle, *Essays*, vol. iii. p. 113 (sm. 8vo edition).

² See references given above to "In Memoriam," and "The Two Voices."

and—

“The simple senses crown'd his head
 ‘Omega ! thou art Lord,’ they said,
 ‘We find no motion in the dead. ”

Schiller, upholding the classical idea of death, says—

“Damals trat kein grässliches Gerippe
 Vor das Bett des Sterbenden : ein Kuss
 Nahm das leichte Leben von der Lippe,
 Seine Fackel senkt ein Genius.”

Shakespeare (*Measure for Measure*, iii. i. 119) makes Claudio speak of the fear of death as the fear of all that is most horrible, and Hamlet (iii. i. 56, *et seqq.*) insists that *fear* of the unknown alone keeps men from leaving life, as in *Macbeth* it keeps them from crime (*Macbeth* i. vii. 1, *et seqq.*).

Wordsworth has a curious passage, which Coleridge strongly criticises (*Biog. Lit. Ch.* xxii).

“To whom the grave
 Is but a lonely bed without the sense or sight
 Of day or the warm light,
 A place of thought where we in waiting lie.”

[Dr. Abbott writes :¹ “As for the hopes and fears of a second life, they are as completely absent from these pages as they are from the Pentateuch. Even the sceptical, philosophic Hamlet cannot talk of death without the thought of the dreams that may come after it ; but of all such thoughts and all their influence on mankind, Bacon has no more to say than that the contemplation of death as a passage to another existence is holy and religious. After this preliminary tribute to convention, Bacon passes into himself again, and has nothing to utter on death that might not have been written by Plutarch, or Seneca, or even Pliny.”² We must, however, remember that Bacon regards the question as religious, and therefore outside the province of philosophy.]

¹ Bacon's *Essays*, Introduction, cli.

² Compare the address to the “present age and posterity” before the *History of Life and Death*.

III. Of Unity in Religion.

RELIGION being the chief band of human society, it is a happy thing when itself is well contained within the true band of unity. The quarrels and divisions about religion were evils unknown to the heathen. The reason was, because the religion of the 5 heathen consisted rather in rites and ceremonies than in any constant belief. For you may imagine what kind of faith theirs was, when the chief doctors and fathers of their church were the poets. But the true God hath this attribute that he is a jealous God ; and 10 therefore his worship and religion will endure no mixture nor partner. We shall therefore speak a few words concerning the Unity of the Church ; what are the Fruits thereof ; what the Bounds ; and what the Means.

The Fruits of Unity (next unto the well-pleasing of 15 God which is all in all) are two ; the one towards those that are without the Church, the other towards those that are within. For the former ; it is certain, that heresies and schisms are of all others the greatest scandals, yea, more than corruption of manners. For 20 as in the natural body a wound or solution of continuity is worse than a corrupt humour, so in the spiritual. So that nothing doth so much keep men out of the Church, and drive men out of the Church, as breach of unity. And, therefore, whensoever it 25 cometh to that pass that one saith, *Ecce in deserto*, another saith, *Ecce in penetralibus*,—that is, when some men seek Christ in the conventicles of heretics, and others in an outward face of a Church—that voice

30 had need continually to sound in men's ears, *Nolite exire*. The Doctor of the Gentiles (the propriety of whose vocation drew him to have a special care of those without) saith, *If an heathen come in, and hear you speak with several tongues, will he not say that you are mad?* And certainly it is little better when atheists and profane persons do hear of so many discordant and contrary opinions in religion; it doth avert them from the Church, and maketh them *to sit down in the chair of the scorers*. It is but a light thing to be 40 *vouched* in so serious a matter, but yet it expresseth well the deformity; there is a Master of scoffing, that in his catalogue of books of a feigned library, sets down this title of a book, *The Morris Dance of Heretics*. For, indeed, every sect of them have a diverse posture, 45 or cringe, by themselves; which cannot but move derision in worldlings and depraved politics, who are apt to contemn holy things.

As for the Fruit towards those that are within, it is peace, which containeth infinite blessings. It estab- 50 lisheth faith; it kindleth charity; the outward peace of the Church distilleth into peace of conscience, and it turneth the labours of writing and reading controversies into treaties of mortification and devotion.

Concerning the Bounds of Unity, the true placing 55 of them importeth exceedingly. There appear to be two extremes; for to certain zelants all speech of pacification is odious. *Is it peace, Fehu? What hast thou to do with peace? turn thee behind me.* Peace is not the matter, but following and party. Contrariwise, 60 certain Laodiceans and lukewarm persons think they may accommodate points of religion by middle ways,

the lukewarm

and taking part of both, and witty reconcilements, as if they would make an arbitrement between God and man. Both these extremes are to be avoided; which will be done if the league of Christians, penned by our 65 Saviour Himself, were in the two cross clauses thereof soundly and plainly expounded: *He that is not with us is against us*; and again, *He that is not against us is with us*; that is, if the points fundamental and of 417 substance in religion, were truly discerned and distinguished from points not ^{about} merely of faith, but of opinion, order, or good intention. This is a thing may seem to many a matter trivial, and done already; but if it were done less partially, it would be embraced more generally. *most impartially* 75

Of this I may give only this advice, according to my small model. Men ought to take heed of rending God's Church by two kinds of controversies. The one is, when the matter of the point controverted is too small and light, not worth the heat and strife 80 about it, kindled only by contradiction. For, as it is noted by one of the fathers, *Christ's coat indeed had no seam but the Church's vesture was of divers colours*; whereupon he saith, *In veste varietas sit, scissura non sit*; they be two things, Unity and Uniformity. The 85 other is, when the matter of the point controverted is great, but it is driven to an over-great subtilty and obscurity, so that it becometh a thing rather ingenious than substantial. A man that is of judgment and understanding shall sometimes hear ignorant men 90 differ, and know well within himself that those which so differ mean one thing, and yet they themselves would never agree. And if it come so to pass in that distance

of judgment which is between man and man, shall we
 95 ~~not~~ think that God above, that knows the heart, doth
 not discern that frail men, in some of their contra-
 dictions, intend the same thing, and accepteth of both?
 The nature of such controversies is excellently ex-
 pressed by St. Paul in the warning and precept that
 100 he giveth concerning the same, "*Devita profanas vocum
 novitates et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiæ.*" Men
 create oppositions which are not, and put them into
 new terms so fixed as, ^{that} whereas the meaning ought to
 govern the term, the term in effect governeth the
 105 meaning. There be also two false Peaces, or Unities,
 the one, when the peace is grounded, but upon an
 implicit ignorance (for all colours will agree in the
 dark); the other when it is pieced up upon a direct
 admission of contraries in fundamental points. For
 110 truth and falsehood in such things are like the iron
 and clay in the toes of Nebuchadnezzar's image: they
 may cleave but they will not incorporate.

Concerning the Means of procuring Unity, men
 must beware, that in the procuring or ^{feint} muniting of
 115 religious unity, they do not dissolve and deface the
 laws of charity and of human society. There be two
 swords amongst Christians, the spiritual and the tem-
 poral, and both have their due office and place in the
 maintenance of religion. But we may not take up
 120 the third sword, which is Mahomet's sword, or like
 unto it—that is, to propagate religion by wars, or by
 sanguinary persecutions to force consciences (except
 it be in cases of overt scandal, blasphemy, or inter-
 45 mixture of practice against the state), much less to
 125 nourish seditions, to authorize conspiracies and re-

bellions, to put the sword into the people's hands, and the like, tending to the subversion of all government, which is the ordinance of God. For this is but to dash the first table against the second; and so to consider men as Christians, as we forget that they are men. Lucretius the poet, when he beheld the act of Agamemnon, that could endure the sacrificing of his own daughter, exclaimed—

“Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.”

“Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.”

What would he have said, if he had known of the massacre in France, or the powder treason of England? He would have been seven times more Epicure and atheist than he was. For as the temporal sword is to be drawn with great circumspection in cases of religion, so it is a thing monstrous to put it into the hands of the common people. Let that be left to the Anabaptists and other furies. It was a great blasphemy when the devil said, *I will ascend and be like the Highest*; but it is greater blasphemy to personate God, and bring Him in saying, *I will descend and be like the prince of darkness*. And what is it better, to make the cause of religion to descend to the cruel and execrable actions of murdering princes, butchery of people, and subversion of states and governments? Surely this is to bring down the Holy Ghost, instead of the likeness of a dove, in the shape of a vulture or raven; and to set out of the bark of a Christian Church a flag of a bark of pirates and assassins. Therefore it is most necessary that the Church by doctrine and decree, princes by their sword, and all learnings—both Christian and moral—as by their Mercury rod, do damn

and send to hell for ever those ^{leads} facts and opinions tending to the support of the same, as hath been already in good part done. Surely in councils concerning religion, that counsel of the Apostle would be
 160 prefixed, *Ira hominis non implet justitiam Dei*. And it was a notable observation of a wise father and no less ingenuously confessed, that *those which held and persuaded pressure of consciences, were commonly in-*
 165 teressed therein themselves for their own ends.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Before the spread of the doctrines of the Reformation in England, Sir T. More, the apostle of the new learning, had strongly advocated religious unity and a common worship. The theology of Sir T. More was not the theology of the Reformation, but rather aimed at a continuance in the old lines with a stringent removal of abuses and superstitions. Political circumstances threw reform into other directions, and the doctrines of the Reformation were adopted as the basis of the national Church. These doctrines had been extended or changed by the Marian exiles in Germany and Switzerland, the fathers of Puritanism.

ii. The new Protestantism was quietly and surely taking root in England, and was essentially connected with the united and vigorous national life of the Elizabethan age. Fresh attempts and outbursts of Catholic zeal were as dangerous as they were dreaded. The activity of the Jesuits was great, and the Test Act vigorously applied. On the whole there was a steady increase of the religious tone of the people, with a strong bias towards Puritanism, the religion of the Bible. England was becoming great as a Protestant nation ; the necessity of religious cohesion was felt by the leading statesmen of the time, and, above all, England was to identify herself with Protestantism by her foreign policy,—to withstand a vigorous and aggressive Rome, by union with the reformed Churches on the Continent.

iii. Yet there are alarming signs of disintegration. (i.) Anglicanism of king and court. (ii.) Rise of Capuchins. (iii.) Loyola and the Jesuits. (iv.) Recatholization of S. Germany, Brabant, and Flanders. (iv.) Much Catholic reaction elsewhere, *e.g.* Pilgrimage of Grace, Gunpowder Plot. (v.) Rise of Presbyterians. (vi.) Rise of Separatists.

iv. Bacon, who was a far-sighted politician, insists on the necessity of unity and therefore of compromise. In religion *faith* is paramount. The first principles are to be found in the Bible. There is no room for differences based on reason. A divided religion makes a divided people. (Bacon virtually ignores natural religion) Besides, the disputes of religion are for the most part subtle, petty, and unnecessary. It is a waste of time to devote the investigations of reason to theological instead of scientific truth. Unity is possible if men will not leave the ship of the Church and enter into the sphere of reason.

v. Unity seemed most possible from the Puritan standpoint. Bacon's religious views tended to Puritanism and the Bible as against Anglicanism and tradition. His mind was not essentially a religious mind. To him religion, as to Gibbon's magistrate, was useful. Bacon rather accepted than believed the doctrines of religion. "He is loyal to it, believing its reality and its power," but as an orthodox churchman, courtier, statesman. He felt strongly the danger from Romanism. The nation had only just escaped from the influence of Papacy. Unity seemed more possible then than it does now. The points at issue he held to be points of uniformity, and it would be childish to sacrifice unity to uniformity. He would advocate moderate repression in some cases, and had no hesitation in supposing that unity is no very deep problem. The reformed Church seemed capable of providing such a unity from its constitution and principles.

vi. In discussing the question, it is well to remember that metaphysical disquisitions on the unity of the Divine Nature and operations, or the unity of truth, even if they point to the existence of a unity, have little practical force. There have been different attempts to solve the problem.

(a) The unity of religion is to be found in a Catholic Church, with (1) an infallible head directly inspired, the

legitimate successor of the Apostles ; as man the Pope may err, not as spiritual head of the Church ; (2) an unbroken line of tradition ; (3) the sanction of universality.¹ Of these (1) is the stumbling-block of the old Catholics ; (2) is hard to reconcile with facts and development ; (3) universal consent is practically impossible. This solution may generally be called the application of authority to religion. Can such a unity be reconciled with the Protestant standpoint of individual responsibility and private inquiry ?

(β) The Puritan solution is "search the scriptures." Believe and understand. There is a wonderful unity in the Bible, which may be found by careful and prayerful perusal. But—

"Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque,
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua."

Gnostics, Anabaptists, Calvinists, Freewillists, and many others, who differ materially in doctrine, all profess to draw their conclusions directly from the Bible. Without some bond of unity externally applied, the attitude of Puritanism leads to disintegration. Cf. the condition of religion in America.

(γ) That the real unity of religion is to be found in the mind of the righteous. Fix the mind's eye on the Eternal and His law as manifested in the moral government of the world. Do God's will and knowledge of God will follow. The performance of duty will throw light on higher laws ; truth leads to righteousness, righteousness to godliness. He who lives for and in God will know God. So perfect faith, the "intuitive cognition" of things unseen, is at last reached. Man does not see, he feels. This theory is too vague and individual to serve as a guide to religious unity. Religion would be relative to the nature of each man, religious doctrine and teaching virtually impossible. Morality is closely connected with religion ; it may lead man to look for a higher sanction, but hardly discloses the nature of things divine.

(δ) The political solution insists on the necessity of, and benefits derivable from, unity, and seeks to bring unity

¹ The "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*" of St. Vincent de Lérin.

ab extra, by connecting the Church with the State and upholding it by State authority. The Church defers to the State in some points of doctrine, and the State acts as a circumscribing and protective force. Certain lines are drawn to which religious practice must conform, the rest is left to the Church. But a State establishment implies repression and test acts. Bacon would allow moderate persecution, but persecution must be brutal and thorough to be successful, as that of Rome, France, Spain. Persecution rarely obtains its object unless through methods which all governments would shrink from using, even if it were possible to use them. The terrorism of the Inquisition, the persecutions of the Huguenots, the Vaudois, etc., did their work too well. The persecution of the Roman emperors was in many cases half hearted. (The tendency of State interference is to sacrifice unity to uniformity.) Another difficulty arises when Church and State are brought into conflict. It is difficult to reconcile the *dicta* of utility and conscience without a suicidal compromise. Again, the hold of the Church on the individual should be spiritual rather than material. This solution belongs to the past, and in many points is identical with Bacon's own view.

vii. On the whole, unity seems to be the dream rather than the possession of the Church. Revelation, tradition, authority, reasonableness will each go some way towards gaining it. But a certain amount of individuality is essential to religion. Bacon thought that there was a royal road to theological, as to physical truth. Theology can scarcely become an exact science. It is the sphere of faith, the "knowledge" of things unseen. So it necessarily becomes relative to the individual. There are great truths where all belief unites, but within these truths there must be latitude for diversity. Otherwise unity seems scarcely to be obtained without the almost impossible conditions of (1) an infallible head of the Church, (2) a strong government with vigorous persecution of heterodoxy, (3) a *modus vivendi* between Church and State, (4) a submissive and unthinking people. The true law of all "being" is diversity in unity.

IV. Of Revenge.

REVENGE is a kind of wild ^{a weed} justice, which the more man's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out. For as for the first wrong, it does but offend the law; but the revenge of that wrong putteth
 5 the law out of office. Certainly, in taking revenge, a man is but even with his enemy, but in passing it over, he is superior; for it is a prince's part to pardon: and Salomon, I am sure, saith, "*It is the glory of a man to pass by an offence.*"

10 That which is past is gone and irrevocable, and wise men have enough to do with things present and to come; therefore they do but trifle with themselves, that labour in past matters. There is no man doth a wrong for the wrong's sake, but thereby to purchase
 15 himself profit, or pleasure, or honour or the like; therefore why should I be angry with a man for loving himself better than me? And if any man should do
 20 wrong, merely out of ill-nature, why, yet it is but like the thorn or briar, which prick and scratch, because they can do no other.

The most tolerable sort of revenge is for those wrongs which there is no law to remedy: but then, let a man take heed the revenge be such as there is no law to punish; else a man's enemy is still before-
 25 hand, and it is two for one.

Some, when they take revenge, are desirous the party should know whence it cometh. This is the
 46 more generous. For the delight seemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt, as in making the party repent.

But base and crafty cowards are like the arrow that 30
flieth in the dark.

Cosmus, Duke of Florence, had a desperate saying
against perfidious or neglecting friends, as if those
wrongs were unpardonable : "*You shall read,*" saith he,
"*that we are commanded to forgive our enemies ; but you 35*
never read that we are commanded to forgive our friends."
But yet the spirit of Job was in a better tune : "*Shall*
we," saith he, "*take good at God's hands, and not be*
content to take evil also ?" And so of friends in a pro-
portion. This is certain, that a man that studieth 40
revenge keeps his own wounds green, which otherwise
would heal and do well. Public revenges are for the
most part fortunate ; as that for the death of Cæsar ;
for the death of Pertinax ; for the death of Henry the
Third of France ; and many more. But in private 45
revenges it is not so. Nay rather, vindictive persons
live the life of witches, who, as they are mischievous,
so end they unfortunate.

ANTITHETA ON REVENGE.

For.

1. Private revenge is wild
justice.

2. He who returns vio-
lence for violence, offends
against the law only, not
against the individual.

3. Private vengeance in-
spires a wholesome fear, as
the laws too often slumber.

Against.

1. He who has com-
mitted an injury has made
a beginning of evil ; he
who returns it has taken
away all limit from it.

2. The more natural re-
venge is to man, the more
it should be repressed.

3. He who is ready in
returning an injury, has
perhaps been anticipated
by his enemy in time but
not in intention.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Bain says of revenge, "Revenge or deliberate anger is implied in the need of retaliation to satisfy the feelings of the offended person." It may be analyzed into (1) reflex action, the instinctive tendency of the irritant pain to set up nervous action, just as children strike an offending chair ; (2) love of power—we feel inferior until we are revenged ; (3) fear of further injury ; (4) sensuous pleasure in looking on the sufferings of others ; (5) instinctive feeling that justice must be done, that the wrong-doer should be punished. The utilitarians make revenge an example of an apparently wrong¹ impulse becoming the basis of right action. It is perhaps more correct to say that it is an example of an instinct, in itself neither good nor bad, which, controlled by reason, may become virtuous, but which, unchecked, is vicious.

ii. In a rude age it is possibly the only justice, and even after the beginning of law, when the means of repression were limited, punishment was left to the individual. "Revenge was the one bulwark against social anarchy." Where the individual could not revenge himself (as in murder) the family could do so. Certainly the assessment of wrong by the family or tribe was more impersonal, but the standpoint of the punishment was still retribution. This is the age of blood feuds,¹ when cities of refuge were allowed as a check to the retaliation of the individual.

iii. Under the reign of law, revenge was no longer left to the injured, but early codes were revengeful and based on the idea of an eye for an eye. Consult the Mosaic and Draconian codes, and the Twelve Tables. Code law is an advance, but at first based on the measure of individual feeling. As the reign of law became established the legal idea triumphed over private feeling. Law is impersonal, revenge personal. Revenge may be absolutely unjust, being relative to the "exacting disposition" of the injured. Law looks to the actual wrong done, and further to the good of the community and of the wrong-doer. Law is

¹ Utilitarianism will not allow a natural instinct of justice. See Lecky, *History of European Morals*, and Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*, pp. 261-267.

prospective and deterrent, revenge primarily retrospective (but cf. i.). Law eliminates the natural feeling, and works by reason, morality, and utility.

iv. The sphere of law is at first limited, and it can give only partial satisfaction to the injured party. Revenge, says utilitarianism, has done more good in the world than submission to wrong. It is here that philosophy advises the control of all passions as contrary to man's true nature. If the passions are not mastered they will become masters. But the passions cannot be mastered without religion. Christianity preaching forgiveness puts its veto on revenge. The self-regarding morality of paganism is overshadowed by the gospel of humility. The Christian type is perfect sacrifice of self.

v. In the middle ages the working of law was often suspended, and revenge was recognized as a sort of irregular auxiliary. Even in modern times it has been allowed, under the form of duelling, to deal with injuries left untouched by law, and to vindicate offended honour. Bacon, like his peaceable master, was strongly opposed to duelling. He speaks with much feeling on the subject in a letter to the Lord Viscount Villiers.¹ "The king," he writes, "shed tears to think that not one of his attendance but might be dead within twenty-four hours by the duel." To the letter are appended some proposed regulations for the repressing of duels, the chief punishment, however, being banishment from the king's presence. Duelling had become common in the sixteenth century (Hallam attributes this to the wearing of swords). In 1566 Charles IX. put forth his celebrated edict, drawn up by the Chancellor de l'Hôpital, "which served as the basis of the successive ordinances of the following kings." Montaigne says, "Put three Frenchmen together on the plains of Libya, and they will not be a month in company without scratching one another's eyes out."² In 1609 a court of honour was established to sanction duelling, and the evil, which could not be repressed, was kept within due bounds for a short time; but the custom again grew to excessive lengths, and in Bacon's time the seconds were

¹ Letter clxvii.

² See the article on "duelling" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1877.

compelled by honour to take part in the contests. How fairly and sensibly¹ Bacon wished to deal with the question may be seen from his "Charge touching duels, upon an information in the Star Chamber against Priest and Wright." Granted that many injuries had to be left to private justice, and that revenge often pointed to a fine sensibility to wrong and recognition of justice ; still (1) it is always dangerous to supersede law—private vengeance goes too far, and has no idea of the golden mean ; (2) duelling is absurd, the injured man may be killed, the good swordsman may transgress at pleasure (cf. the duel in Thackeray's *Esmond*) ; (3) duelling grew out of the old judicial contests, when it was believed that "God would show the right." Besides, the ancient contests were between the wrong-doer and an impersonal champion ; (4) public opinion and social disgrace more forcibly repress wrong ; (5) modern duelling is a palpable *reductio ad absurdum* of the custom.

vi. "Noble revenge" is, of course, another name for forgiveness. It, however, fulfils some of the conditions of revenge (see i.). "Mollify thy heart," says Richter, "by painting out the sufferings of thy enemy ; think of him as of one spiritually sick who deserves sympathy." This is a valuable ethical doctrine, but at present an ideal. It is questionable whether the mere desire for prevention of crime would in many cases be sufficient to set the law in motion against an offender. There is often a further need of a positive feeling of resentment either for our own injuries, or, sympathetically, for those of others. Law takes the punishment out of the hand of the individual, yet this does not imply that the law would move without the individual feeling. Again, criminal law negatively sanctions revenge by allowing extenuating circumstances to influence the assessment of the injury. In some cases wounded feelings are the measure of the penalty. Still, in the main, law is for the *prevention of crime* and the *good of society*, and as the conception of the public good is more fully recognized, revenge fades away. Early communities dealt with offences concretely. The abstract idea of society was not fully grasped, and

¹ Dr. Abbott can only see Machiavellian motives in Bacon's strictures on duelling.

hence it was harder to eliminate the factor of individual feeling.

vii. "Valour," says Montaigne, "stops when it sees its enemy at its mercy." Revenge, if left to itself, almost invariably goes too far, being "a sweet passion and of great impression." Besides, revenge leads to retaliation; an infinite vista of injury is opened out. Revenge in self defence has to take extreme measures; "dead men tell no tales!" Fear is a powerful ingredient, and so revenge belongs to weaker natures, "womanlike taking revenge too deep!" The tyrant "*cuncta ferit, dum cuncta timet*," forgiveness is a dangerous precedent. But revenge has a good side; men fear to commit many crimes, which the law cannot touch, through fear of the consequences to themselves. Yet lynch law is a terrible alternative for lawlessness. Even as a motive to seek justice it is dangerous. Law becomes an instrument of revenge, and is applied to for the ruin of others. Perhaps the worst and most insidious form of revenge is that of Blandois in Dickens' *Little Dorrit*, the revenge of the enemy to society, who, envious of the success of others, and conscious of his own deserved failure, preys on his fellow-creatures. Vicarious revenge is not uncommon; when the injured, unable to punish his stronger oppressor, turns on weakness to vent his rage, and avenge his injured honour. Germany takes Alsace, and France seizes Tunis. Revenge is often for fancied wrong especially in barbarous, or ignorant, or sensitive natures. Lastly, it often defeats itself by going too far; men die, as well as kill, to be revenged.

V. Of Adversity.

able perhaps more

IT was a high speech of Seneca (after the manner of the Stoics), that "*the good things which belong to prosperity are to be wished, but the good things that belong to adversity are to be admired.*" *Bona rerum secundarum optabilia, adversarum mirabilia.* Certainly, if miracles be the command over nature, they appear most in ad-

versity. It is yet a higher speech of his than the other (much too high for a heathen), "*It is true greatness to have in one the frailty of a man, and the security of a*"
 10 *god.*" *Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei.* This would have done better in poesy,
 where ^{higher things} transcendencies are more allowed; and the poets, indeed, have been busy with it. For it is in effect the thing which is figured in that strange fiction
 15 of the ancient poets, which seemeth not to be without mystery, nay, and to have some approach to the state of a Christian: that "*Hercules, when he went to unbind Prometheus (by whom human nature is represented), sailed the length of the great ocean in an earthen pot or*
 20 *pitcher;*" lively describing Christian resolution, that saileth in the frail bark of the flesh through the waves of the world.

But to speak in a mean.^{moderately} The virtue of prosperity is temperance; the virtue of adversity is fortitude:
 25 which in morals is the more heroical virtue. Prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament; adversity is the blessing of the New: which carrieth the greater benediction, and the clearer revelation of God's favour. Yet even in the Old Testament, if you listen to David's
 30 harp, you shall hear as many hearse-like airs as carols; and the pencil of the Holy Ghost hath laboured more in describing the afflictions of Job than the felicities of Solomon. Prosperity is not without many fears and
 35 distastes; and adversity is not without comforts and ^{hopes}. We see in needleworks and embroideries, it is more pleasing to have a lively work upon a sad and solemn ground, than to have a dark and melancholy work upon a lightsome ground. Judge, therefore of

the pleasure of the heart by the pleasure of the eye. Certainly virtue is like precious odours, most fragrant 40 when they are incensed or crushed ; for prosperity doth best discover vice, but adversity doth best discover virtue.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. The value of adversity as a moral discipline is not recognized in the Mosaic dispensation. The lesson of Job, that prosperity is no criterion of goodness, that afflictions may be blessings in disguise, came as a new revelation. Every Jew believed himself to be the child of promise, who, in return for his zealous worship, would be rewarded in this life for his righteousness. The teaching of the prophetic writings rather insists on joy, hope, victory to come, than on purification by suffering. The captivity should have taught the lesson, but the nation regarded their troubles as temporary clouds, soon to be dispelled by greater prosperity.

ii. It is not till man becomes introspective, and analyzes his spiritual life, that he realizes the necessary existence of adversity, either as sent by envious deities, or engendered by his own unbridled passions. The Greek Gnostic poets insist on the necessity and value of suffering. Polycrates in vain courts adversity as an antidote to excessive prosperity. The exceeding prosperous become insolent, and then are "trashed for overtopping." The next step is to see that misery is inherent in the world, and the tragedians send forth a wail of despair, "Not to have been born is the best lot, and the next best lot is to die as soon as possible."

iii. But a new science is developed under Socratic influences, morality comes to the rescue. The world certainly is evil, but man may become virtuous, and virtue (with a good physique), is sufficient for happiness. Socrates had advised mastery over the desires, the Cynics carried this further ; the desires were to be absolutely eliminated, otherwise no independence could be obtained. Man was to cut himself off from all relations with the outer world, to have no wants and no pleasures. Antis-

thenes said, "May I rather be mad than feel pleasure." The only way of meeting adversity was to give it no vantage-ground in the passions. Another solution was suggested by the Cyrenaics. Things were to be taken as they came, man was to float like a waif on the sea of life, entering into no stable relation with the external world, which would give circumstances a power over the individual. The Cyrenaic motto was, "Take things as you find them. Enjoy when you can, and placidly ignore adversity."

iv. It is obvious that the Cynic and Cyrenaic doctrines are partial and inadequate solutions that cannot satisfy the whole of human nature. Aristotle saw that independence is not secured by abnegation of the external world. Isolation exposes a man to adversity. The proper life lies in the civilized society of the city. Social, domestic, and civic relations must be formed. A rightly organized community will ensure the satisfaction of every want; will train, protect, and even feed its citizens, so that no evil can come near them. The passions and pleasures are not bad in themselves, but must be regulated by reason. Virtue, which is sufficient for happiness, does not mean asceticism.¹ Superhuman adversity may crush it, and some amount of external prosperity is necessary, but on the whole, virtue can defy moderate ill-fortune. The ideal of philosophy had almost been realized by the Athens of Pericles, and the problem seemed easy. But the Macedonian, and, later, the Roman Empire, broke down the city walls, and the new problem presented to the philosopher was the happiness, not of the Greek or Roman citizen, but of the man. Philosophy has to face the fact that evil is rampant in the world, and the passions in the individual. Stoicism² constructs a new philosophy for the individual, apart from the State. Like previous systems, Stoicism was based on the idea of human perfectibility, and grew out of intellectual pride.

¹ Aristotle places the life of contemplation higher than the life of (civic) virtue, and insists that it is less exposed to adversity.

² The doctrine of the Cynics was more ethical, and less metaphysical. The Cynics supposed that a man could be virtuous in a tub, like Diogenes. The Stoics said that virtue was living in accordance with reason.

"The emotional is to be absolutely eliminated. The wise man, who lives according to reason, goes through the world untouched by adversity. Virtue must not be looked for in man's physical nature." It is true that the Stoics, in the first instance, attempted to reconcile the material and intellectual elements of humanity, but the conditions of the world made this impossible. The Stoic system was powerless before the vast material forces of imperial Rome, and avoidance of adversity was proved impossible. Stoicism advocated first indifferentism, and then suicide.¹ Generally, Greek ethical systems were based on the idea of the control or extinction of the emotions and the sovereignty of reason. Greek philosophy began in intellectual pride and ended in pessimism.

v. It was left to Christianity to see the true and higher side of adversity. Human nature is sinful and corrupt, no perfection is possible. The world is evil, reason a broken reed. Misery cannot be ignored, and is the proper medicine for human sin ; it must be borne, sought, and even loved as a good. On the one hand, adversity tries, and therefore strengthens, the will. On the other, it is a homœopathic remedy for evil. Like cures like. Evil in the soul can only be remedied by pain in the body. But this is only possible to the religious ; the Christian leans on God, who gives strength to meet temptation and to bear misery. So every man can be virtuous because he can be religious. If virtue rests on reason, it is the possession of but few. Christianity is the gospel for the poor, the weak, the ignorant. Adversity is recognized as our earthly lot. The flames, which burn the martyr's body, are a bed of roses. Christianity at the same time emphasized the doctrine of immortality. The reward for suffering in the world is eternal life hereafter. The doctrine of the nobility of suffering degenerated into asceticism under monastic influences. Emperors retired into the desert to pray. Saints practised on their own bodies worse tortures than the malignity of their enemies could devise. Suffering was not to end with this life, even the best would go through a further purification in purgatory.

¹ See Essay on *Fear of Death*. The Stoics called suicide, *ἐξαιγωγή*, ushering oneself out of the world.

Asceticism only disappears with the influx of wealth after the Crusades, and the growth of the industrial spirit, but the value of a gospel of misery is finding daily proof.

vi. It may be said of adversity, that (a) it tries, braces, and strengthens the will, develops high moral and mental qualities, and kills out the weaklings in the struggle for existence. Failure shows the causes of failure. Men rise higher on the stepping-stones of their dead selves. The consciousness of ill-success leads to renewed effort. The love of power is a strong motive. The world has not treated its great men well, but it is no excuse to say, that by so doing it has provided a school for great men. Carlyle goes so far as to say that, if Shakespeare had not been prosecuted for deer stealing, we should never have heard of him as a poet.¹ Carlyle's model is Jean Paul Richter. "A high cheerful Stoicism grew up in the man. Poverty, pain, and all evil, he learnt to regard, not as what they seemed, but as what they were. He learnt to despise them, nay, in kind mockery to sport with them." Lessing is an equally striking example of gold tried in the fire. "Poverty is the sixth sense," says a German proverb. Undoubtedly the successful struggle with adversity strengthens and gives confidence, but there is a *per contra* account. The struggle must stop somewhere, and must be finally successful. "I cannot but say to poverty, welcome ! so thou come not too late in life." Carlyle says that "poverty surrounds a man with ready-made barriers, which, if they do mournfully gall and hamper, do at least prescribe for him, and force on him, a sort of course and goal ; a safe and beaten, though circuitous course. A great part of his guidance is secure against fatal error, is withdrawn from his control. The rich, again, has his whole life to guide, without goal or barrier, save of his own choosing, and tempted as we have seen, is too likely to guide it ill."² Yet it is a tenable view that poverty involves constraint for evil as well as for good. The great may be warped by adversity, especially if physical weakness be present. "Slow rises worth by poverty depressed." Diderot went astray ;

¹ *Hero-worship*, 361.

² A good comment on Bacon's "Prosperity doth best discover vice, and adversity doth best discover virtue."

Heine was warped into cynicism ; Burns was lowered and driven to forget his higher self. Becky Sharp thought that even she could be good with ten thousand a year. Poverty may drive the politician to become a place-hunter, the man of letters a newspaper hack, and the artist a painter of "pot-boilers." It is in many cases the laughing, mocking *persifleur*, who bears adversity better than the truly noble. Greatness does come to the front, but maimed and mangled. It might presumably have asserted itself without suffering. Goethe was never proved in the fire of adversity. The amount of adversity that is good for a man is not a definable quantity. Men who, like Rousseau, have had to seek in their own soul all that the world has denied them, have often lost in character and development. Some endure to the end, but many fall out of the ranks.¹ Some adversity is a good thing. No one will fight a duel with a king.² Even the gods are represented as imperfect, that they may seem perfect by triumphing over their imperfections.

(β) Sorrow extends our sympathies, makes us charitable and thoughtful for others. "Diderot can get no dinner one Shrove Tuesday : he swore that if ever he came into anything, he would never in his life refuse a poor man help, never condemn his fellow-creature to a day so painful." It is at the same time true, that adversity hardens some natures, and makes men self-contained and isolated. Others, they say, must take their share in trouble. Even the sense of power, which the successful struggle with adversity produces, often has an unlovely influence in the character. Yet who are so kind to one another as the poor? Adversity should be, if it is not, a softening influence. Sympathy appeals to most men.

(γ) Of adversity as a punishment for sin, and a valuable reformatory influence, little need be said. Many a hardened sinner has been brought to better ways by great trouble. Much adversity is brought upon ourselves by our own folly. Out of experience comes knowledge, *παθήματα μαθήματα*. It is, however, an easily misused argument. If we had no poisons we should need no antidotes. Besides, suffering does not come only to the sinner.

¹ See also Theophrastus Such, *Essay* i. p. 9.

² Montaigne, *Essays*.

(δ) Lastly, adversity often teaches us to look for higher help. The world is evil, and human nature weak. "Here we have no abiding city, but we seek one to come." The most crushing adversity may be borne by the help of true religion. A few weaker natures are forced into bitterness and scepticism, but the finer nature will turn to the religious life. The "uses of adversity" are powerful for good, as they develope and strengthen belief. "Burns," says Carlyle, "could not bear adversity, because he had no religion." Adversity teaches true humility; not the prudential humility of Uriah Heep, but the sense of human weakness and imperfection. Our worldly efforts, hopes, and aspirations fail; adversity comes to all. Happiness lies in a man's self. Character, says Goethe, is formed in the storm of the world. Adversity can only be met by the higher life. The great danger is lest human weakness should, in desperation, drift into pessimism. Pessimism is the worst form of fatalism. The attitude of the fatalist is passive endurance. He does not learn the lesson of adversity, because he merely bears it. He folds his arms, and says, Allah is great.

[See also Essay xl. *On Fortune.*]

VI. Of Simulation and Dissimulation.

DISSIMULATION is but a faint kind of policy, or wisdom. For it asketh a strong wit and a strong heart to know when to tell truth, and to do it. Therefore it is the weaker sort of politicians that are
 5 the great dissemblers.

Tacitus saith, "*Livia sorted well with the arts of her husband and dissimulation of her son;*" attributing arts or policy to Augustus, and dissimulation to Tiberius. And again, when Mucianus encourageth Vespasian to

take arms against Vitellius, he saith, "*We rise not* ¹⁰ *against the piercing judgment of Augustus, nor the extreme caution or closeness of Tiberius.*" These properties of arts or policy, and dissimulation and closeness, are indeed habits and faculties several and to be distinguished. For if a man hath ^{such} ~~that~~ penetration of ^{deline} ~~15~~ judgment ^{that} as he can discern what things are to be laid open, and what to be secretted, and what to be shewed at half-lights, and to whom and when (which indeed are arts of state, and arts of life, as Tacitus well calleth them), to him a habit of dissimulation is a hindrance ²⁰ and a poorness. But if a man cannot obtain to that judgment, then it is left to him generally to be close, and a dissembler. For where a man cannot choose or vary in particulars, there it is good to take the safest and wariest way in general, like the going softly by one ²⁵ that cannot well see. Certainly the ablest men that ever were have had all an openness and frankness of dealing, and a name of certainty and veracity. But then they were like horses well ^{trained} managed; for they could tell passing well when to stop or turn: and at ³⁰ such times when they thought the case indeed required dissimulation, if then they used it, it came to pass that the former opinion, spread abroad, of their good faith and clearness of dealing, made them almost invisible.

35

There be three degrees of this hiding and veiling of a man's self: the first Closeness, Reservation, and Secrecy,—when a man leaveth himself without observation, or without hold to be taken, what he is; the second, Dissimulation, in the negative,—when a man ⁴⁰ lets fall signs and arguments that he is not that he is;

and the third, Simulation in the affirmative,—when a man industriously and expressly feigns and pretends to be that he is not.

45 For the first of these, Secrecy, it is indeed, the
virtue of a confessor. And assuredly the secret man
heareth many confessions ; for who will open himself
to a blab or a babbler ? But if a man be thought secret,
it inviteth discovery, as the more close air sucketh
50 in the more open. And, as in confession the revealing
is not for worldly use, but for the ease of a man's heart,
so, secret men come to the knowledge of many things
in that kind, while men rather discharge their minds
than impart their minds. In few words, mysteries are
55 due to Secrecy. Besides (to say truth) nakedness is
uncomely as well in mind as body ; and it addeth
no small reverence to men's manners and actions, if
they be not altogether open. As for talkers, and futile
persons, they are commonly vain and credulous withal.
60 For he that talketh what he knoweth, will also talk
what he knoweth not. Therefore set it down that, *an
habit of secrecy is both politic and moral.* And in this
part it is good that a man's face give his tongue leave
to speak. For the discovery of a man's self, by the
65 tracts of his countenance, is a great weakness and be-
traying ; by how much it is many times more marked
and believed than a man's words.

For the second, which is Dissimulation, it followeth many times upon Secrecy, by a necessity. So that he
70 that will be secret, must be a dissembler in some degree. For men are too cunning to suffer a man to keep an indifferent carriage between both, and to be secret, without swaying the balance on either side. They will

so beset a man with questions, and draw him on, and pick it out of him, that, without an absurd silence, he ^{obtain a} 75 must show an inclination one way; or if he do not, they will gather as much by his silence as by his speech. As for equivocations, or oraculous speeches, ^{and equi} 80 they cannot hold out long. So that no man can be secret, except he give himself a little scope of dissimulation; which is, as it were, but the skirts or train of secrecy.

But for the third degree, which is Simulation and false profession, that I hold more culpable, and less politic; except it be in great and rare matters. And, 85 therefore, a general custom of Simulation (which is this last degree) is a vice rising either of a natural falseness, or fearfulness, or of a mind that hath some main faults, which because a man must needs disguise, it maketh him practise simulation in other things, lest his 90 hand should be out of ure. 463

The great advantages of Simulation and Dissimulation are three. First, to lay asleep opposition, and to surprise; for where a man's intentions are published, it is an alarum to call up all that are against them. 95 The second is, to reserve to a man's self a fair retreat; for if a man engage himself by a manifest declaration, he must go through, or take a fall. The third is, the better to discover the mind of another; for to him that opens himself men will hardly show themselves adverse, but ^{will} 100 will fair let him go on, and turn their freedom of speech to freedom of thought. And therefore it is a good shrewd proverb of the Spaniard, *Tell a lie and find a troth*: as if there were no way of discovery but by Simulation. There be also three disadvantages to set 105

it even. The first, that Simulation and Dissimulation commonly carry with them a show of fearfulness, which, in any business, doth spoil the feathers of round flying up to the mark. The second, that it puzzleth ^{notions} and perplexeth the conceits of many, that perhaps 110 would otherwise co-operate with him, and makes a man walk almost alone to his own ends. The third, and greatest, is, that it depriveth a man of one of the most principal instruments for action; which is trust and 115 belief. The best composition and temperature is to have openness in fame and opinion; secrecy in habit; dissimulation in seasonable use; and a power to feign, if there be no remedy.

THE ANTITHETA OF SIMULATION AND DISSIMULATION.

For.

1. Dissimulation is a compendious wisdom.

2. We are bound to be consistent not in our words but in our purposes.

3. Even in the mind nakedness is uncomely.

4. Dissimulation is at once a grace and a safeguard.

Against.

1. Though we cannot think according to the truth of things, yet let us at least speak according as we think.

2. It is only those who find true policy above their understanding that substitute dissimulation for wisdom.

3. The dissembler deprives himself of the best instrument for action, viz. credit.

4. Dissimulation invites dissimulation.

5. Dissimulation is a fence of counsels.

6. Some persons are deceived to their own advantage.

7. The man that never dissembles, deceives as much as the dissembler; for the majority either does not understand, or does not believe him.

8. Want of dissimulation means want of self control.

5. To be a dissembler is to be not free.

COMPARE THE ANTITHETA ON "KEEPING SECRETS."

For.

1. The silent man has nothing kept secret from him because he may be safely trusted with secrets.

2. He who likes to air his knowledge is like to air his ignorance.

3. Even mysteries are due to secrecy.

Against.

1. The best way of keeping one's mind secret is to vary one's manners.

2. Silence is the virtue of a confessor.

3. The silent man has no secrets told him; for one recompenses silence with silence.

4. A veiled face is no better than a strange face.

The *Antitheta* on "Loquacity" also bear on this subject.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. There is a marked difference between dissimulation (the irony of Aristotle) and simulation (his *ἀλαζονεία* or imposture). A man may indeed hold back the truth for a wrong motive, but he can hardly utter an untruth for

the sake of righteousness. Aristotle describes his moral hero the *μεγαλόψυχος* as somewhat of a dissimulator, but only to the uneducated rabble, who cannot appreciate his high mission. Reserve argues self-control. The reticent man has his feelings well in hand, and will not blurt out truths at the wrong time and place. To tell the bare truth may sometimes be not only harmful but misleading. Just as the great man unfolds his character and plans by degrees, so the poet his plot. The spectators are as it were taken into confidence; but the uninitiated actors make mistakes, which add a zest to the enjoyment of the superior audience. So in science, knowledge must be communicated, as it comes, by degrees; propagandism is often as harmful as it is unjustifiable.¹ Professor Virchow lays it down as a rule that you must not *teach* a theory, while it is only a theory. Establish it first, and then use it for education, but abstain from spreading unestablished hypotheses. Our Lord only communicated his mission by degrees to his chosen followers. But *suppressio veri* must never lead to *suggestio falsi*—concealment must never lead to active deceit, or simulation.

ii. Simulation stands on quite a different footing. Since casuistry has been made the by-science of morality, the professors of this new learning have made simulation a *punctum saliens*. Dr. Newman,² in his *Apologia*, reminds his readers that "almost all authors, whether Catholic or Protestant, admit that, when a just cause is present, there is some kind of verbal misleading which is not sin." "Silence gives consent," and yet silence is sometimes necessary. Dr. Chandler's illustration was as follows. A commits a secret to B, which if known would cause A's ruin. C asks B a question which cannot be answered truly without disclosing the fatal secret. What is B to do? Sir W. Scott denied to impertinent inquirers that he was the author of the Waverley novels. "Veracity," it is said, "is a kind of justice; some have no claim to justice and therefore to truth." Or "Truth is for the good of society, and may not be practised for society's harm." The Greek fathers upheld an untruth in self-defence, in the cause of charity, out of zeal for God's

¹ See Antitheta, "For," 7.

² See *Saturday Review*, March 17, 1883.

honour, etc. Jeremy Taylor says, "To tell a lie for charity, to save a man's life, hath not only been done at all times, but commended by great and good and wise men." Milton asks, "What man in his senses would deny that we may deceive boys, madmen, the sick, the intoxicated, enemies, men in error, thieves?" He argues further that a lie which does not injure our neighbour is not a breach of the ninth commandment. So Paley, "There are falsehoods which are not lies, *i.e.* are not criminal." On the other hand, the Latin fathers condemn untruths, but allow equivocation. Dr. Newman says that *equivocation* is cowardly and reprehensible, *lying* occasionally defensible and necessary. Undoubtedly in equivocation we leave the straight path, and are likely to lose ourselves in an intricate tangle of "motive grinding." So far lying is preferable to equivocation, in that it is in harmony with Luther's "Pecca fortiter." The conscious lie is less likely to lead to the lie in the soul than is the tortuous maze of equivocation.

iii. Again others than professed casuists will say that men in official positions, lawyers, doctors, diplomatists, detectives, generals, and the like are frequently obliged to practice simulation. It is not urged that such simulation is right, that the end justifies the means, that the morality of an action depends on the intention rather than the act, but the plea put forward is necessity. Wotton's definition of ambassadors as "Servants who lie abroad for their masters' good," is in point. There are certain walks in life where it seems almost impossible, as things are, to get along without positive deceit. Yet even in diplomacy the straight dealing of a Canning or a Lawrence outwits and mates oriental *finesse*.

iv. So in the social intercourse of men, it is said, "The line between tact and artifice, between discretion and craftiness, is not easy to define." Complaisance may spring from a desire to give pleasure as well as from laziness or untruthfulness. Many pretend to agree and sympathize with people for the sake of peace. It is at least legitimate to hear adverse opinions silently. Flattery, it is urged, greases the wheels of society, which is, and must be, artificial. Indeed, without some simulation, it is hard to see how daily intercourse could go on.

v. In answer to the claims of casuistry, expediency, and society, Carlyle may be heard when he vigorously defends Cromwell against the charge of falsity and hypocrisy.¹ "If they come to me and say, 'Acknowledge a lie, pretend to say you are worshipping God, when you are not doing it; believe not the thing that *you* find true, but the thing that *I* find, or pretend to be true' (the good and great man will say), 'No, by God's help, no! You may take my purse, but I cannot have my moral self annihilated. The purse is any highwayman's who might meet me with a loaded pistol; but the self is mine, and God my Maker's.'" Casuistry makes two mistakes; in the first place it looks too exclusively to the intention,—the mental circumstances of the act,—harshly separating the intention from the act, and forgetting that two sets of moral conditions are rarely the same, prematurely frames general propositions² based on the individual instance. Right is sacrificed to the desire for moral rules. Secondly, by insisting on the implied doctrine that the end justifies the means, casuistry opens the door to the distortion of ends. The moral imagination easily presents the end in the wished-for light. The desires insensibly colour the determinations of the will. Where two obligations clash, the higher is to be chosen. It is dangerous to legislate further. Morality is not mechanical, and therefore not exact. If, in diplomacy and war, deceit consciously pursued is necessary, an argument from imperfection does not legalise wrong. Diplomacy and war are rather to be deprecated as requiring untruth, than untruth defended as required by them. Plain dealing will go further than is usually supposed. Coleridge writes, "What can an

¹ *Heroes and Hero-worship*, 343-345.

² Casuistry is the *case law of morality*. It frames *quasi*-moral rules, as the judges frame legal rules. It is an attempt to make morality exact. The strength of casuistry is that it strongly asserts the unchangeable nature of morality. An action is either moral or immoral. Nothing is to be left to the individual. A falsehood is, under certain conditions, right or wrong. Casuistry tries to keep pace with changes in the environment. But while the device of law to keep a balance between stability and new conditions is fairly successful, the finer phenomena of morality apparently defy rule.

Englishman abroad really want but an honest and bold heart, a love for his country, and the ten commandments? Your art diplomatic is stuff; no truly great man would negotiate on such shallow principles." Greatness and goodness are not to be divorced. Morality must be observed by the State, as well as by the individual. It has been said that the House of Commons is the "school of evasion." Some would make it so, but a refusal to answer is not necessarily untruthful. The opposite charge has been brought against English diplomacy, and indeed, against English politics generally, that, like the Athenian dêmos, our ways are too guileless and open. England's word is her bond, even with enemies. International morality is daily becoming more recognized, and England takes the lead in the recognition. Nations and corporations may conceivably have consciences.

vi. Social deceits may soon be disposed of. Sins of society, so far as they are accepted conventions, are harmless, except in so far as they deceive or scandalize outsiders; for instance, a new servant ordered to say that her mistress is "not at home." Yet, as all such conventions originated in intentional deceit, and have a tendency to grow and multiply, the strong man who can afford to break through them, and the scrupulous who objects to them on principle, both play a useful part. Conventions are a necessity to society, as a shell to the oyster, but, as Heine complains, it tends to become all shell, without a living heart within.

vii. Bacon writes from the standpoint of the politics of his own day, when statesmanship was thought exempt from the ordinary rules of morality. But he could grasp the right view. In *Advanc. of L.*, bk. I. ii., I. i. iii. 5, he strongly condemns the divorce of politics from learning, and the self-seeking, low morality of politicians. That his nature was shifty, and his doctrine pernicious, no one will deny. But he is writing from the political, not from the moral standpoint. He does not, like casuistry, defend deceit as moral, but as expedient. It had not been clearly shown that neither Church nor State could reap benefit from double dealing. Bacon may be said to have been in advance of the low political morality of his times, when he wrote, "Certainly the ablest men that ever were, have

had an openness and frankness of dealing, and a name of certainty and veracity." Yet he was constantly mistaking the politics of his day for morality, and erecting the shallow empiricism of the politician into rules for moral conduct. His morality was political rather than personal, and the confusion of ethics and politics made his moral standard low. [The *Antitheta* on Simulation and Disimulation are suggestive.]

VII. Of Parents and Children.

THE joys of parents are secret, and so are their
 griefs and fears. They cannot utter the one,
 nor they will not utter the other. Children sweeten
 labours, but they make misfortunes more bitter; they
 5 increase the cares of life, but they mitigate the re-
^{membrance}embrance of death. The perpetuity by generation
 is common to beasts; but memory, merit, and noble
 works, are proper to men. And surely a man shall see
 the noblest works and foundations have proceeded
 10 from childless men, which have sought to express the
 images of their minds, where those of their bodies
 have failed. So the care of posterity is most in them
 that have no posterity. They that are the first raisers
 of their houses are most indulgent towards their
 15 children, beholding them as the continuance, not only
 of their kind, but of their work; and so both children
 and creatures.

The difference in affection of parents towards their
 several children is many times unequal, and sometimes
 20 ^{unlike}unworthy, especially in the mother; as Salomon saith,
 "A wise son rejoiceth the father, but an ungracious son
 shames the mother." A man shall see, where there is a

house full of children, one or two of the eldest respected, and the youngest made wantons ; but in the midst some that are as it were forgotten, who, many times, nevertheless, prove the best.

The illiberality of parents, in allowance towards their children, is a harmful error, makes them base, acquaints them with shifts, makes them sort with mean company, and makes them surfeit more when they come to plenty. And therefore the proof is best when men keep their authority towards their children, but not their purse. Men have a foolish manner (both parents, and schoolmasters, and servants), in creating and breeding an emulation between brothers during childhood ; which many times sorteth to discord when they are men, and disturbeth families.

The Italians make little difference between children and nephews, or near kinsfolk ; but, so they be of the lump, they care not, though they pass not through their own body. And, to say truth, in nature it is much a like matter : inasmuch that we see a nephew sometimes resembleth an uncle, or a kinsman, more than his own parent, as the blood happens.

Let parents choose betimes the vocations and courses they mean their children should take ; for then they are most flexible. And let them not too much apply themselves to the disposition of their children, as thinking they will take best to that which they have most mind to. It is true that, if the affection or aptness of the children be extraordinary, then it is good not to cross it ; but generally the precept is good, *Optimum elige, suave et facile illud faciet consuetudo*. Younger brothers are commonly

55 fortunate, but seldom or never where the elder are disinherited.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. The first form of government was the patriarchal. The dependence of the child on the father was the first bond of political society. The family was the state, and the head of the family the king. Even when families had grown into tribes, and tribes into states, the political unit was the family. The government was a close oligarchy of heads of houses, and by the institution of adoption, the fiction was preserved that the whole state was one gigantic family, ruled by the lineal descendants of the race. There was little or no conception in ancient politics of the family as a separate institution inside the state, with its separate rights, duties, and associations. Late in time, when the individual¹ had been substituted for the family, and citizenship no longer implied sonship, the old state of things remained in certain political and religious institutions, which could only be performed by a descendant of the so-called father of the race. At Rome, though *patria potestas* did not apply to *jus publicum*, and the son might therefore in his father's lifetime vote, hold civil and military office, and become a *tutor*, the authority of the father over the person and property of his son was rigorously maintained until the later days of the republic. But in Greece, the control of the father over the son who had reached manhood was weakened, if not abolished, at an early age. Even when patriarchal institutions were in full force, Ulysses took the place of the decrepit Laertes. Wisdom could compensate for bodily strength, but when the mind began to fail, the son stepped into his father's place. In historic Greece, the domestic authority

¹ The substitution of local proximity for blood relationship as a title to citizenship, was due to (1) commerce, the new tie of buyer and seller was formed. (2) War made new alliances. Military equality levelled distinctions. (3) Strangers settled within the family circle. (4) Slaves were enfranchised. (5) The inhabitants of conquered States were transferred to the cities of the conquerors.

of the father had completely ceased, and bumptious Strepsades beat his ignorant father for disregarding genders. At Rome, it is true, the political power of the father might be taken from him by the stronger and more intelligent son, but in reference to private law, the son "lived under a domestic despotism for many centuries."¹ *Patria potestas*, or power of the father over the person and property of the son, could only be cancelled by a triple sale. When and how this power was weakened, cannot be accurately defined; probably in many cases it existed *de jure*, rather than *de facto*, when the son could hold superior power to his father in war, and in the counsels of the state. The unemancipated son could at first only acquire property as *peculium*, like a slave. This was extended to *castrense peculium*, or the acquisitions of soldiers on service, and afterwards to *quasi-castrense peculium*, or earnings in the civil employment of the state. Otherwise the power of the father over the property of the son remained in force for many ages.² Many of the institutions of the Roman law of *status* were congenial to the German immigrants, and later to the spirit of feudalism. [How far has the conception of *patria potestas* influenced English and continental law?]

ii. If the father had such power over his son of full age, it is not surprising that infant life was placed under the absolute control of the father in early societies. The right of the father to allow his child to live, was but slightly modified by the emotions of compassion and affection, which would be undeveloped in a warlike and often nomadic age; nor was the position of mother such as to allow her to have a voice in the matter. When we come to the age of history, we find infanticide allowed more or less directly. In Greece, where the individual was enfranchised at a comparatively early period, sensuality, the low position of women, and the small size of the communities tended to sanction the unchecked sacrifice of

¹ Maine's *Ancient Law*, p. 137.

² The father also had obligations in reference to his son. He was responsible for his son's "delicts," though he could surrender his person in compensation. He was also unable to dispose of his property by will, as he pleased.

infant life. At Rome, on the other hand, where *patria potestas* theoretically extended to the power of life and death, infanticide was restrained by positive law, custom, the comparatively high position of women, and the habitual policy of encouraging population. In imperial Rome, though humane emperors discouraged infanticide by law, the crime pervaded Roman society.

iii. Christianity, besides directly discountenancing the murder of children, and influencing rulers in favour of those of tender years, indirectly checked the crime (1) by insisting on the equal value of the personal and immortal soul in all God's creatures ; (2) by developing the softer emotions ; (3) by instituting charities for deformed and unprotected children. Christianity approached the matter somewhat cautiously, in the fear lest sensuality might be encouraged by the protection of illegitimate children ; but undoubtedly infanticide was checked, if not absolutely prevented, by the influence of the Church.

iv. Apart from the political and legal importance of the relationship of father and child, the sentimental, personal, and moral side of the question should be noticed. The value of the paternal tie in developing the finer and more unselfish instincts of our nature, has been insisted on in modern, rather than ancient and mediæval civilizations.

The young and helpless child appeals to the pity and affection of its parents ; the growth of intellect and morality in the young depends in a great measure on the example set by the elders of the family ; while the new life of the parent in the child gives the motive for countless acts of self-sacrifice, which cannot but beneficially act on the character. It is true that we have lost the conception of the tall and valiant sons fighting round their father for country, home, and family, but we have substituted the higher graces of self-sacrifice and affection.

The tendency of civilization is to relax the legal authority of the parent over the child, and to protect the child against the parent's neglect and wrong-doing. At the same time the moral ties are strengthened and prolonged. Thus in France the married daughter still looks on her mother as her friend and confidante. In England the ties between children and parents are looser and less enduring, but it is no longer regarded as natural and right

that the working man should let his father end his days in the workhouse.

[Consult also *Essays on Marriage, Love, Friendship.*]

VIII. Of Marriage and Single Life.

HE that hath wife and children hath given hostages to fortune ; for they are impediments to great enterprises, either of virtue or mischief. Certainly the best works, and of greatest merit for the public, have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men ; 5 which, both in affection and means, have married and endowed the public. Yet it were great reason that those that have children should have greatest care of future times ; unto which they know they must transmit their dearest pledges. 10

Some there are, who, though they lead a single life, yet their thoughts do end with themselves, and account future times impertinencies. Nay, there are some other that account wife and children but as bills of charges. Nay more, there are some foolish, rich, 15 covetous men that take a pride in having no children, because they may be thought so much the richer. For, perhaps, they have heard some talk, *Such an one is a great rich man*, and another except to it, *Yea, but he hath a great charge of children*, as if it were an abate- 20 ment to his riches. But the most ordinary cause of a single life is liberty, especially in certain self-pleasing and humorous minds, which are so sensible of every restraint, as they will go near to think their girdles and garters to be bonds and shackles. 25

Unmarried men are the best friends, best masters

best servants; but not always best subjects. For they are light to run away; and almost all fugitives are of that condition. A single life doth well with
30 churchmen; for charity will hardly water the ground where it must first fill a pool. It is indifferent for judges and magistrates; for if they be facile and corrupt, you shall have a servant five times worse than a wife. ^{as}For soldiers, I find the generals com-
35 monly, in their hortatives, put men in mind of their wives and children; and I think the despising of marriage among the Turks maketh the vulgar soldier more base.

Certainly wife and children are a kind of discipline
40 of humanity; and single men, though they be many times more charitable, because their means are less exhausted, yet, on the other side they are more cruel and hard-hearted (good to make severe inquisitors), because their tenderness is not so oft called upon.
45 Grave natures, led by customs, and therefore constant, are commonly loving husbands, as was said of Ulysses, "*Vetulam suam prætulit immortalitati.*" Chaste women are often proud and froward, as presuming upon the merit of their chastity. It is one of the best
50 bonds, both of chastity and obedience, in the wife, if she think her husband wise; which she will never do if she find him jealous.

Wives are young men's mistresses, companions for middle age, and old men's nurses; so as a man may
55 have a quarrel to marry, when he will. But yet he was reputed one of the wise men that made answer to the question when a man should marry? "*A young man not yet, an elder man not at all.*" It is often seen

that bad husbands have very good wives; whether it be that it raiseth the price of their husbands' kindness 60 when it comes, or that the wives take a pride in their patience. But this never fails, if the bad husbands were of their own choosing, against their friends' consent; for then they will be sure to make good their own folly.

65

ANTITHETA ON MARRIAGE AND SINGLE LIFE.

For.

1. The love of country has its rise in family affection.

2. A wife and children are a sort of training in courtesy and kindliness; while single men, on the other hand, are hard and severe.

3. Celibacy and absence of kindred are a qualification only for flight.

Against.

1. He that has a wife and children has given hostages to fortune.

2. The perpetuation of brutes is offspring; but that of man is their glory, their deserts and their institutions.

3. Family considerations often overthrow public ones.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

[The subject is exhaustively treated in Lecky's *History of European Morals*, vol. ii. ch. v.; MacLennan's *Primitive Marriage*; Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, ch. xlv.]

i. Marriage began with polygamy. "Woman is the slave of man and the minister to his passions. Marriage is recognized solely as the basis of the patriarchal form of government. Wives are either stolen, captured, or bought."¹ They became absolutely the property of their captor or purchaser. In Greece the position of the wife was improved at an early date by the payment of a

¹ See MacLennan on *Primitive Marriage*.

dowry by the father, and by the right of separation in cases of ill-treatment. Among the early Germans the husband gave the bride a gift¹ on the morning after marriage. Even more important than all these was the institution of monogamy, the system which prevailed in Greek as opposed to Oriental civilization. It is a curious fact that heroic Greece gives far higher types of conjugal virtue than the later historical period. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the chivalric spirit developed by a military age. The wives, in the absence of their husbands, became virtually heads of houses. The position of wives was, however, improved from social rather than legal considerations.

ii. In historic Greece "the legal position of women had in some respects slightly improved, but their moral condition had undergone a marked deterioration."² Marriage was recognized exactly in so far as purity of birth was a necessary condition of citizenship. Both in Athens and Sparta the family had given place to the citizen, and the State, as the public educator, took the place of parental authority and supervision. Where the State so educated, the strength and importance of the marriage tie were necessarily weakened. The experiment proved a failure. The small communities of Greece, after a short life of brilliant intensity, fell easy victims to Macedon, and later to Rome. The substitution of State for family was too artificial to bear the brunt of stronger, because more natural, bodies corporate. It is true that we get a recognition of the beauty of married life in the writings of Plutarch. But the condition there described is exceptional and ideal. The work of a Greek wife was in most cases limited by domestic duties. She lived in absolute seclusion, and her chief merit was "not to be spoken of either for good or for evil." Her morality was to be of the strictest, but absolute laxity was allowed to her husband. Even philosophy barely countenanced marriage. It has been the misfortune of the world that many have deemed the higher life incompatible with marriage. In Greek philosophy, where it is not implicitly

¹ "The Morgengab," as it was called, is the origin of the jointure.

² Lecky, *History of European Morals*, ii. p. 280.

condemned, as by Plato, or repudiated, as by the Cynics, it is passed over in contemptuous silence or insisted on only as a necessity for household duties. The conjugal tenderness of the heroic age is nowhere regretted as a lost grace of life.

iii. At Rome, where many patriarchal institutions survived, after they had been swept away elsewhere, the woman by marriage passed *in manus viri*, becoming virtually a child in reference to her husband. But while legally inferior, the position of the wife was materially improved by the following circumstances: (α) Roman religion was essentially domestic. The *Flamen Dialis* represented the sanctity of the marriage relation. (β) The Romans were not intellectual, but busy, practical men (*negotiosi*). The whole duty of the wife was *domi manere lanam carpere*. The ideal was a low one, and within the powers of women as they were. (γ) The State did not educate. At Rome we find an idea of the family inside the State. Much had to be left to the mother, who strove to rear sons worthy of the State.¹ (δ) Especially the Roman types of virtue, patriotism, stern resolution, frugality and chastity, are essentially produced by a careful domestic training from early years. The brilliant intellectual virtues of the Greeks imply a public rather than private education. Accordingly we get high types of woman and an acknowledgment of their value in republican Rome. A corresponding improvement was before long made in their legal *status*. The wife was only temporarily deposited with her husband by her family. She remained under the tutelage of guardians appointed by her parents, whose power was nominal in reference to herself, but could over-ride the authority of her husband,² so that she was practically free from all control. The Roman jurists treated the question of marriage in the most liberal spirit.³ But abuses increased with luxury and the degrading influences of imperialism. The

¹ "*Haec mea sunt ornamenta*," said Cornelia of her sons, the Gracchi.

² Maine's *Ancient Law*, p. 155 *seqq.*

³ Lecky quotes the definition of Modestinus, "*Nuptiae sunt conjunctio maris et feminae et consortium omnis vitae, divini et humani juris communicatio.*"

absence of control gave opportunity for license, and the independence of the wife facilitated divorce. Christianity, shocked by the vice of the age, adopted in preference the patriarchal theory of marriage giving the man complete power over the woman. The Germanic and Slavonic codes also insisted on the subjection of wives, but the barbarians who practised these codes held marriage in higher esteem than the luxurious Romans. Hence it was that while canon law allowed comparative freedom to the unmarried and to widows, it imposed the heaviest disabilities on wives. The circumstances of the times were favourable to the importance of canon law as a refuge alike from barbarians, despots, and feudal oppression, an importance which was enhanced by the growing influence of religion, and the able and centralized government of the papacy. Christianity indirectly improved the position of women in many ways. It raised the ideal of womanhood by the reverence paid to the Virgin Mary. It developed the female virtues of self-sacrifice, charity, modesty, and chastity. The mediæval abbesses were types of the highest womanhood. The Church enforced the obligation of mutual fidelity, and waged internecine war against concubinage and facilities for divorce, making marriage essentially a religious ceremony. The value, again, of the prohibition to contract marriage within certain degrees of relationship, cannot be exaggerated. But, on the other hand, the legal status of woman was conceived in the narrow spirit of canon law, to the great injury of all countries,¹ where that portion of common law which relates to marriage is based on canon law. And further, the glorification of the ascetic type has been productive of great harm to humanity. The Church was kinder to unmarried than to married women. The passive dislike or bare toleration of matrimony became active opposition in the case of second marriages, and marriages of the clergy.

iv. Side by side with Christianity, the institutions and sentiments of chivalry tended to raise the position of married women. The general tendency of a military age is to glorify and honour woman, as giving grace and

¹ As of England, wherever the laws relating to marriage were not touched by statutes or equity.

refinement to a life of hardship. The development of the sentiment of honour contributed to protect the weaker sex. No true knight would harm one who could only appeal to his knightly gallantry as her defence. Poets sang the praises of women and the ennobling influences of love. At tournaments beauty incited the combatants to deeds of daring, and rewarded champions by its preference. But most important of all was the position in which women were placed by the absence of their lords in the Holy Land. The unprotected *châtelaine*, left in dangerous times as the responsible head of her husband's household, appealed to the imagination of a sentimental and heroic age, and a romantic charm was given to the marriage state.

v. Puritanism, on the other hand, was essentially prosaic and unideal.¹ Its creed appealed to the conscience rather than the emotions, and the virtues which it called into life were the virtues rather of men than of women. But, if Puritanism was less favourable to the development of womanhood generally, it gave a new and higher importance to the marriage state by the recognition of the value of domestic life. The almost Sabine sternness and simplicity of the Puritan character, as it was the result of careful and home training, had a softer and more human side in the development of the domestic emotions. Though the legal *status* of women was not improved, there was neither the intellectual dislike of philosophy to marriage, nor the religious, though mistaken, antagonism of the early Church. "If the Puritan type lost in wide sympathy, brightness and humour, it gained in tenderness of home-feelings, self-respect, and the conception of social equality."

vi. Since the rise of Puritanism, the importance of marriage has been gradually more fully recognized as necessary for public and private well-being. Lawful wedlock is the only way to produce and train good citizens. The growth of the domestic emotions is a valuable antidote to selfishness, and necessary for the complete development of human nature. Friendship can never be a substitute for marriage. Man can only find a suitable companion

¹ The opposite view is ably stated in Kingsley's *Plays and Puritans*.

in woman. The feminine nature contributes the emotional and religious elements of character, man the practical, prudential, and intellectual. Neither is complete without the other. The antagonism of the higher life to marriage in past times is easily explained. The education of women has hitherto been miserably defective, and altogether insufficient for the development of their nature. Hence, though the married more than match the unmarried in genius (all the world poets of the first order have, as far as we know, been married men), yet the majority of their marriages have been unhappy, and it is likely that the Shakespeares and Goethes will ever be "companionless among the stars that own a lesser birth."¹

vii. Montaigne compares marriage unfavourably with friendship because the former is (1) a contract entered freely but of forced continuance, (2) it is contracted for prudential motives which divert the current of love, (3) woman's talent is too inferior to that of man. Marriage is certainly a contract of which law prescribes and directs all the subsequent acts. But this would hardly be an objection if marriage were well ordered by law. Unfortunately our marriage laws, and indeed many laws relating to the position of women, are survivals of canon law and tainted by the primitive conception of *patria potestas*. Slowly but surely the legal enfranchisement of women is being accomplished. As to the second objection, a "marriage of convenience"—such as Bacon contracted himself, and takes as the typical marriage in this essay—is doubtless inferior to a true friendship. In the third place, it cannot be denied that if women are intellectually unfit companions for men, the fault lies, as above remarked, in their defective education. This was the result of the low conception of marriage, and the idea that every woman would find a husband—a possibility only in a polygamic age. A great man is greater when married to a great wife, *vita plena exemplorum est*. Bacon's marriage with the handsome daughter of the alderman was not a happy one. The union was blessed neither by affection nor by children. His cold, philosophic nature was incapable of feeling or even imagining the loves

¹ *Essay*, xxvii.

of a Cornelia and Paulus, a Posthumus and Imogen. Philosophy was his mistress, which he deserted in an evil hour for political life.

[Consult also *Essays on Parents and Children, Love, Friendship.*

IX. Of Envy.

THERE be none of the affections which have been noted to fascinate or bewitch, but Love and Envy. They both have vehement wishes; they frame themselves readily into imaginations and suggestions, and they come easily into the eye, especially 5 upon the presence of the objects: which are the points that conduce to fascination, if any such thing there be. We see, likewise, the Scripture calleth envy *an evil eye*; and the astrologers call the evil influences of the stars *evil aspects*: so that still there seemeth to 10 be acknowledged, in the act of envy, an ejaculation or irradiation of the eye. Nay, some have been so curious as to note that the times when the stroke or percussion of an envious eye doth most hurt, are when the party envied is beheld in glory or triumph; for that sets an 15 edge upon envy; and, besides, at such time, the spirits of the person envied do come forth most into the outward parts, and so meet the blow.

But leaving these curiosities (though not unworthy to be thought on in fit place), we will handle *what* 20 *persons are apt to envy others; what persons are most subject to be envied themselves; and what is the difference between public and private envy.*

A man that hath no virtue in himself ever envieth

25 virtue in others. For men's minds will either feed upon their own good, or upon others' evil; and who wanteth the one will prey upon the other; and whoso is out of hope to attain another's virtue, will seek to come at even hand, by depressing another's
30 fortune. *be even*

A man that is busy and inquisitive is commonly envious. For to know much of other men's matters cannot be because all that ado may concern his own estate. Therefore it must needs be that he taketh a
35 kind of play-pleasure in looking upon the fortunes of others. Neither can he that mindeth but his own business find much matter for envy. For envy is a gadding passion, and walketh the streets, and doth not keep home; *Non est curiosus, quin idem sit*
40 *malevolus.*

Men of noble birth are noted to be envious towards new men when they rise. For the distance is altered: and it is like a deceit of the eye that, when others come on, they think themselves go back.

45 Deformed persons, and eunuchs, and old men, and bastards, are envious. For he that cannot possibly mend his own case, will do what he can to impair another's: except these defects light upon a very brave and heroical nature, which thinketh to make his
50 natural wants part of his honour; in that it should be said that a eunuch, or a lame man, did such great matters; affecting the honour of a miracle; as it was in Narses the eunuch, and Agesilaus and Tamerlane, that were lame men.

55 The same is the case of men that rise after calamities and misfortunes. For they are as men fallen out

with the times, and think other men's harms a redemption of their own sufferings.

They that desire to excel in too many matters, out of levity and vain-glory, are ever envious. For they cannot want work ; it being impossible but many, in some one of those things, should surpass them. Which was the character of Adrian the emperor, that mortally envied poets and painters, and artificers in works wherein he had a vein to excel. 65

Lastly, near kinsfolks and fellows in office, and those that have been bred together, are more apt to envy their equals when they are raised. For it doth upbraid unto them their own fortunes, and pointeth at them, and cometh oftener into their remembrance, and incurreth likewise more into the note of others ; and envy ever redoubleth from speech and fame. Cain's envy was the more vile and malignant towards his brother Abel, because, when his sacrifice was better accepted, there was nobody to look on. Thus much 75 for those that are apt to envy.

Concerning those that are more or less subject to envy : first, persons of eminent virtue, when they are advanced, are less envied. For their fortune seemeth but due unto them ; and no man envieth the payment 80 of a debt, but rewards and liberality rather. Again, envy is ever joined with the comparing of a man's self ; and where there is no comparison, no envy : and therefore kings are not envied but by kings. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that unworthy persons are 85 most envied at their first coming in, and afterwards overcome it better ; whereas, contrariwise, persons of worth and merit are most envied when their fortune

continueth long. For by that time, though their
90 virtue be the same, yet it hath not the same lustre :
for fresh men grow up that darken it.

Persons of noble blood are less envied in their
rising. For it seemeth but right donē to their birth.
Besides, there seemeth not much added to their
95 fortune ; and envy is as the sunbeams, that beat
hotter upon a bank, or steep rising ground, than upon
a flat. And, for the same reason, those that are
advanced by degrees are less envied than those that
are advanced suddenly, and *per saltum*.

100 Those that have joined with their honour great
travels, cares, or perils, are less subject to envy. For
men think that they earn their honours hardly, and
pity them sometimes ; and pity ever healeth envy.
Wherefore you shall observe, that the more deep and
105 sober sort of politic persons, in their greatness, are
ever bemoaning themselves what a life they lead,
chanting a *quanta patimur*. Not that they feel it so,
but only to abate the edge of envy. But this is to be
understood of business that is laid upon men, and not
110 such as they call unto themselves. For nothing in-
creaseth envy more than an unnecessary and ambitious
engrossing of business. And nothing doth extinguish
envy more than for a great person to preserve all other
inferior officers in their full rights and pre-eminences
115 of their places. For, by that means, there be so many
screens between him and envy.

Above all, those are most subject to envy which
carry the greatness of their fortunes in an insolent and
proud manner ; being never well but while they are
120 showing how great they are, either by outward pomp,

or by triumphing over all opposition or competition ; whereas wise men will rather do sacrifice to envy, in suffering themselves, sometimes of purpose, to be crossed and overborne in things that do not much concern them. Notwithstanding, so much is true, ¹²⁵ that the carriage of greatness in a plain and open manner (so it be without arrogancy and vain-glory), doth draw less envy than if it be in a more crafty and cunning fashion. For in that course a man doth but disavow fortune, and seemeth to be conscious of his ¹³⁰ own want in worth, and doth but teach others to envy him.

Lastly, to conclude this part : as we said in the beginning that the act of envy had somewhat in it of witchcraft, so there is no other cure of envy but the ¹³⁵ cure of witchcraft ; and that is to remove the lot (as they call it), and to lay it upon another. For which purpose, the wiser sort of great persons bring in ever upon the stage somebody upon whom to derive the ¹⁴⁰ envy that would come upon themselves ; sometimes upon ministers and servants, sometimes upon colleagues and associates, and the like. And, for that turn there are never wanting some persons of violent and undertaking natures, who, so they may have power and business, will take it at any cost. ¹⁴⁵

Now, to speak of public envy. There is yet some good in public envy, whereas in private there is none. For public envy is an ostracism, that eclipseth men when they grow too great. And therefore it is a bridle also to great ones, to keep them within bounds. ¹⁵⁰

This envy, being in the Latin word *invidia*, goeth in the modern languages by the name of *discontentment* ;

of which we shall speak in handling Sedition. It is a disease in a State like to infection. For, as infection
 155 spreadeth upon that which is sound, and tainteth it ;
 so, when envy is gotten once into a State, it traduceth
 even the best actions thereof, and turneth them into
 an ill odour. And therefore there is little won by
 intermingling of plausible actions. For that doth
 160 argue but a weakness and fear of envy, which hurteth
 so much the more ; as it is likewise usual in infections,
 which, if you fear them, you call them upon you.

This public envy seemeth to bear chiefly upon principal officers or ministers, rather than upon kings and
 estates themselves. But this is a sure rule, that if the
 165 envy upon the minister be great, when the cause of it
 in him is small, or if the envy be general in a manner
 upon all the ministers of an estate, then the envy
 (though hidden) is truly upon the State itself. And
 170 so much of public envy or discontentment, and the
 difference thereof from private envy, which was handled
 in the first place.

We will add this in general, touching the affection
 of envy, that of all other affections it is most importune
 175 and continual. For of other affections there is occasion
 given but now and then ; and therefore it was well
 said, *Invidia festos dies non agit* ; for it is ever working
 upon some or other. And it is also noted, that
 love and envy do make a man pine, which other
 180 affections do not, because they are not so continual.
 It is also the vilest affection, and the most depraved ;
 for which cause it is the proper attribute of the Devil,
 who is called *The envious man that soweth tares amongst
 the wheat by night* ; as it always cometh to pass,

that envy worketh subtilly, and in the dark, and to the 185
prejudice of good things, such as is the wheat.

ANTITHETA ON ENVY.

For.

1. It is natural to hate the standing reproach of one's own failure.

2. In public affairs envy acts the part of a wholesome ostracism.

Against.

1. Envy keeps no holidays.

2. Nothing will reconcile envy to virtue but death.

3. Envy tasks the virtues as Juno did Hercules.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Bain defines envy as "The feeling of inferiority with a malevolent sentiment towards the rival." *Φθόνος* plays an important part in Greek theology. The deity "envies" excessive eminence, and lays it low as an invasion of divine rights, making men insolent and aggressive.

ii. Like many other mental states, envy is primarily based on a feeling which may be directed either to evil or to good. The sense of inferiority is in itself morally colourless. Its right direction may make it virtuous. A consciousness of inferiority and determination to win our right place, fired by the example of a success, which we can and sometimes ought to imitate, is called emulation; and within certain limits is praiseworthy. All must strive upwards, but without greed and malevolence. Some carry emulation too far, and without wishing ill to others, grasp after all the good things of the world. Emulation must be limited by consciousness of power and worthiness;

"Envy, to which the ignoble mind's a slave,
Is emulation in the wise and brave."

Envy tries to pull another down to our own level. Emulation would raise us to a higher life. Envy is at its lowest when it takes the form of *ἐπηρεασμός*, dog-in-the-

mangerism, which is defined as οὐχ ἵν' αὐτός τι ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκεῖνος—"Not that we may obtain some good, but that another may not." Envy goes nearest to virtue when it involves a sense of indignation at injustice, or ill-deserved success.¹ Here, however, envy is lost in the sense of right and justice. We have most excuse for envying one who has obtained a good, to which we have a better right, especially when thereby our own hopes of preferment are destroyed.

iii. Envy is a degrading vice. It involves harm to another in its essential nature. It is not merely gratification to self but harm to others, the elimination of good from the world. Science, virtue, religion, are all to be crushed. It is hatred in cold blood and "is more incapable of reconciliation than hatred."² Carlyle's Teufelsdröckh writes, "The last stage of human perversion, it has been said, is when sympathy corrupts itself into envy, and the indestructible interest we take in men's doings has become a joy over their faults and misfortunes." To some natures the sympathetic motive appeals most powerfully, and is the mainspring of right action. But with envy the light has become darkness. Self has monopolized both sides, another's joy has become a pain, another's pain a joy. Sympathy has turned round, and our morality is topsy-turvy. It might be urged that we envy a man because he is now independent of us. We can no longer exercise a power over him by the bestowal of gifts and favours. The successful man is cut off from a reciprocity of kindly acts and feelings in reference to us. He can put us under an obligation.³ We can make no return. The millionaire is out of sympathy with his *quondam* fellow-struggler. The one does not wish for the memory of his former troubles. The other cannot sympathize with his friend's success. The relations between the two are rudely severed. So the unsuccessful wishes to bring his friend back to his own level and rejoice with him. It is conceivable that some such motives could produce a state of

¹ Νέμεσις, virtuous indignation, is a mean between φθόνος and ἐπιχαιρεκακία. *Arist. Nic. Eth.*, bk. iii.

² La Rochefoucauld.

³ Aristotle's high-minded man does not like to be reminded of favours received.

mind nearly akin to envy, but we are not envious, because our sympathetic soul has received a rude shock, but because we selfishly identify another's happiness with our own loss of happiness. Envy identifies the success of another with a wrong done to ourselves. A common form of envy is depreciation of others. The clever but unsuccessful Gowan of *Little Dorrit*, who stings when he praises, gives us an example of envy as one of the fine arts.

iv. The ancients materialized envy, assigning to it a blighting influence. The evil eye of the envious withered up all prosperity. Bacon explains envy physically in this Essay and in his *Natural History*:¹ "The affections no doubt do make the spirits more powerful and active, and especially those affections which draw the spirits into the eye, which are two, love and envy, which is called *oculus malus*." Hence great conquerors have often been indisposed for some days following their triumph. Bacon appreciates the vileness of envy. It is the worst of all passions, and feedeth on the spirits, and they gain upon the body, and so much the more, because it is perpetual, and as is said, keepeth no holidays. But at times he regards it as a natural, and even useful evil. It may serve as a wholesome check on insolence and unworthiness. Bacon often thus loses sight of the means in the end (see the Antitheta). Locke's estimate of envy is too mild, "Envy is an uneasiness of mind caused by the consideration of a good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have it before us."² The envious man could hardly wish for a better defence.

v. Envy has been almost universally condemned from the clever sketch of Lady Fidget in the *Tatler*,³ to the aphorism of La Rochefoucauld, "*La plus véritable marque d'être né avec de grandes qualités, c'est d'être né sans envie*." A great man can hardly be envious. Envy is based on unworthiness. "A man," says the *Tatler*, "cannot have an idea of perfection in another, which he is not sensible of in himself." He knows his own imperfection, but makes it the standard for all. Envy is barren of all aspiration and improvement. Coleridge writes,

¹ *Natural History*, cent. x., § 944.

² *Human Understanding*, bk. ii., ch. xx., *ad fin.*

³ *Tatler*, 174. Cf. 227.

"Genius may coexist with idleness, wildness, folly, and even crime, but not long, believe me, with selfishness and the indulgence of an envious disposition." "Envy is *κακίστος καὶ δικαίτατος Θεός*, it dwarfs and withers its worshippers." It brings its own retribution, and makes the good work which it depreciates impossible for its possessor. It is "almost the only vice which is practicable at all times and in every place. It is a stubborn weed of the mind. The great law of benevolence is more often violated by envy than by interest."¹ Who can minister to a mind diseased? It is in the mind, it often cannot have the wholesome correction which corrects the evil-doer. Envy does not act boldly, it feeds itself on its own evil thoughts. Luckily for the world, envy fears to do all that it wishes. It depreciates worth, cavils at authority and breeds sedition, but generally slinks out of the consequences of its doctrines.

By public envy (*invidia*) Bacon means discontent.

X. Of Love.

THE stage is more beholding to Love than the life of man. For, as to the stage, love is ever matter of comedies, and now and then of tragedies; but in life it doth much mischief, sometimes like a Siren, sometimes like a Fury. You may observe that amongst all the great and worthy persons (whereof the memory remaineth, either ancient or recent), there is not one that hath been transported to the mad degree of love: which shows that great spirits and great business do keep out this weak passion. You must except, nevertheless, Marcus Antonius, the half-partner of the empire of Rome, and Appius Claudius, the decemvir and lawgiver; whereof the former was

¹ Johnson, *Rambler*, 153.

indeed a voluptuous man, and inordinate, but the latter was an austere and wise man : and therefore it ¹⁵ seems (though rarely) that love can find entrance, not only into an open heart, but also into a heart well fortified, if watch be not well kept.

It is a poor saying of Epicurus, "*Satis magnum alter* ^{Man to man is an ample theatre} *alteri theatrum sumus :*" as if Man, made for the con- ²⁰ templation of heaven, and all noble objects, should do nothing but kneel before a little idol, and make himself subject, though not of the mouth (as beasts are), yet of the eye ; which was given him for higher purposes. It is a strange thing to note the excess of this ²⁵ passion, and how it braves the nature and value of things, by this—that the speaking in a perpetual hyberbole is comely in nothing but in love. Neither is it merely in the phrase. For, whereas it hath been well said, that the arch-flatterer, with whom all the ³⁰ petty flatterers have intelligence, is a man's self ; certainly the lover is more. For there was never proud man thought so absurdly well of himself as the lover doth of the person loved. And therefore it was well said, that *it is impossible to love and to be wise.* ³⁵ Neither doth this weakness appear to others only, and not to the party loved ; but to the loved most of all, except the love be reciproque. For it is a true rule, that love is ever rewarded either with the reciproque, or with an inward and secret contempt. By how much ⁴⁰ the more men ought to beware of this passion, which loseth not only other things, but itself. As for the other losses, the poet's relation doth well figure them—that he that preferred Helena, quitted the gifts of Juno and Pallas ; for whosoever esteemeth too ⁴⁵

much of amorous affection quitteth both riches and wisdom.

This passion hath his floods in the very times of weakness, which are great prosperity and great adversity (though this latter hath been less observed); both which times kindle love, and make it more fervent, and therefore show it to be the child of folly. They do best who, if they cannot but admit love, yet make it keep quarter, and sever it wholly from their serious affairs and actions of life. For if it check once with business, it troubleth men's fortunes, and maketh men that they can no ways be true to their own ends. I know not how, but martial men are given to love: I think it is but as they are given to wine; for perils commonly ask to be paid in pleasures.

There is in man's nature a secret inclination and motion towards love of others, which, if it be not spent upon some one or a few, doth naturally spread itself towards many, and maketh men become humane and charitable, as it is seen sometimes in friars. Nuptial love maketh mankind; friendly love perfecteth it; but wanton love corrupteth and embaseth it.

ANTITHETA ON LOVE.

For.

1. See you not that every man seeks himself, but the lover alone finds himself?

2. There is no better government for the mind than that of some noble passion.

Against.

1. The stage owes much to love, life nothing.

2. Nothing is of such motley hue as love; for it is either so foolish that it does not know what it is, or so vile that it hides itself in deceit.

3. He who is wise will seek something for which to long; for the man who has no strong desires, will find life unpleasing and tiresome.

4. As soul and body are one, so man and wife.

3. I dislike your men with one idea.

4. Love limits the range of mental vision.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Bacon classes love with envy. "As for love the Platonists (some of them) go so far as to hold that the spirit of the lover doth pass into the spirit of the person loved, which causeth the desire of return into the body whence it was emitted, . . . and this is observed likewise that the aspects that procure love are not gazings but sudden dartings of the eye."¹ So Shakespeare—

"Tell me where is fancy (love) bred
Or in the heart, or in the head?

• * * * *

It is engendered in the eyes
With gazing fed: and fancy dies
In the cradle where it lies."

Others supposed a physical attraction towards the object of affection which need not be reciprocal. The world of nature, according to Aristotle, yearns upwards to the deity, though the deity loves not the world. It would not be hard to connect such theories with Goethe's elective affinities and sympathetic union of spirit with spirit, which play so important a part in mediæval mysticism and modern spiritualism. These theories are crude attempts to give a physical explanation of phenomena, partly physical and partly mental.

ii. Naturally the physical side of love appeared first. While the masses did not rise above the identification of love with passion, philosophy attempted to spiritualize it.

¹ *Natural History*, x. 944. Cf. the Greek *ῥοαὶ ὀφθαλμῶν* and *ἀπορῥοαὶ τοῦ κάλλους*.

In no case was it supposed to be a necessary condition of marriage. Marriage, in Greek life, was a state entered upon from motives of utility. The Homeric wife¹ was an exception to the general rule. In Homer we get genuine feeling and a high ideal of marriage purity, but otherwise the position of women was far too low to admit of the highest side of love, while philosophy and the intellectual aspirations of Greek life tended to idealize human affection as a stepping-stone to abstract thought. *Ἔρως φιλόσοφος*, or love transformed by philosophy, was a valuable medium in the development of intellectual perfection. From love of the beautiful body, the soul was to rise to love of the beautiful mind, and so to love of abstract beauty as reflected in unity, order, reality, and virtue.² So love was to supply the motive for philosophic research and contemplation. Hence we get a fine conception of friendship in Greek life, but no application of the doctrine of half souls to marriage. Eros was stricken with love for Psyche in spite of the envious malignity of Aphrodite, who wished to punish love by kindling a passion for a monster. The rougher civilization of Rome really did more for the purification of love through the importance attached to married life. In Greece the elimination of natural affection was advocated by Cynic philosophy, and its degradation by the Cyrenaics. Platonism was too artificial and ideal. Spiritualization was found to be impossible.

iii. The loss of self in the object of human affection was transferred to religion by Christianity. The cardinal virtue of the Christian is love widened into charity. Augustine defined virtue by "ordered love,"³ "God is love," and the self-sacrifice and worship of the lover is applied to the love of the soul for God. Mariolatry brought worship under fresh emotional influences. The love for the Madonna appealed to some natures more strongly than more abstract conceptions. Human love for wife, child, and even friend was sternly crushed by asceticism, and emotional life was restricted to religious ecstasy.

¹ See Essay "On Marriage."

² Cf. Emerson, Essay 5, "Love."

³ "*Brevis et vera definitio virtutis ordo est amoris.*"

iv. The poetry of the troubadours and the institution of "Courts of Love" had good effects in refining and humanizing an otherwise rough and lawless age. The troubadour spirit strongly influenced Dante and Petrarch, and through Italian literature permeated the whole world of chivalry. Love for a woman was regarded as a necessary part of knightly character, and though at times there seemed danger that true love would degenerate into courtly trifling and conceited jargon, the mediæval idealization of love did good service in purifying the affections as well as in refining the world. The allegorical poetry of love was enlisted in the service of the Church, where the emotional side of religion was already emphasized, and the religious emotions were represented by different phases of earthly love—a representation rendered possible by the purifying influences of the poetical imagination on the affections. But most important was the influence of the troubadour spirit, through Italian literature, on English writers of the Elizabethan age. Dante's love for Beatrice, the inspiration and subject of the *La Vita Nuova*, was at once romantic and spiritual. The elements of purity, real affection and worship, were marvellously combined, and we see in Dante that spiritual love, which had taken the form of Mariolatry in the Church, and the real, human, self-sacrificing passion of Romeo and Juliet. Dante gave reality to the somewhat unpractical emotionalism of the troubadours.

iv. The poetry of love was peculiarly congenial to the fresh national life of the time. But the conception of love was widened and deepened by the Elizabethan writers from Surrey and Wyatt to Spenser and Shakespeare. Without the affected mannerisms of the epic and dramatic poetry of France, Italy, and Spain, the treatment of love was no longer formal and artificial, in the conventional spirit of chivalry, but natural, fresh, and strong. The poetry of love was brought to the highest perfection in the five plays of Shakespeare which treat of it.¹ Gervinus points out that the Shakespearian treatment of love is not characterized by the mawkish

¹ *Two Gentlemen of Verona, Love's Labour's Lost, All's Well that Ends Well, Midsummer Night's Dream, Romeo and Juliet.*

(popular) sentimentality of Germany, nor by the ideal emotionalism of Schiller, nor by the sensuous naturalism of Goethe. Shakespeare fully recognized the truth, that love is higher than passion, however idealized by the imagination. There must be a union of qualities of mind and body ; love is not a transient emotion, weakened by possession of its object, but marriage often means a steady enduring flame fed by a lifelong reciprocity of good influences. Shakespeare, unlike the troubadours, insisted on the necessity of marriage. Portia is loved for her mind as well as her beauty, and as a wife. Wit is an essential characteristic of Shakespeare's heroines. Shakespeare also saw the double side of love, not only its influence as a source of refinement, power and action, as with the troubadours and their successors, but its sadder side as "paralyzing action, endangering morals, and plunging men into sorrow and crime."¹ Shakespeare's treatment of love is eminently many-sided, human and unideal, though pure, unselfish and lofty: The passionate *abandon* and almost reckless self-sacrifice of the lover is as noticeable as the holy influence and pure exalted sentiments which love sheds over its votaries.

v. The soberer world of Puritanism deepened, if it did not intensify affection.² New female qualities were developed and emphasized by the importance assigned to the domestic emotions, and love became less exclusively the worship of beauty, and found new motives for its presence in religion, virtue and maternity. (See Kingsley's *Plays and Puritans*.)

vi. As the world gets older and wiser the necessity of intellectual as well as moral and physical beauty as an element of love is becoming more fully recognized. We find that, as the intellectual enfranchisement of women gains ground, the conception of love and marriage is deepened and purified. Love can only be felt for a woman. Friendship has been called "glorified love," and may fulfil the spiritual element of love ; but it is not, and can never be, love. Some have pitched love too high, as others too

¹ *Gervinus* ; and see *Venus and Adonis*, 1135-1163.

² Undoubtedly the example of Luther's household had great influence on Protestant Europe.

low; the physical side exists. The essence of mutual love is that "each must supply the other's felt deficiencies." There must be a contrast, and hence love between man and woman is love *par excellence*.¹ Man and woman, as Tennyson teaches in the *Princess*, imply each the other. Neither's nature is complete by itself. It is true that in friendship each should give what the other has not; there is a necessity for contrast in friendship, but the friend is often a reflex of self. Friendship was more possible in ancient than modern times. Gravity and dignity were the characteristics of the ancients. Love is undignified, especially for a woman, an inferior, as society was once constituted. Cicero bases friendship on admiration of (physical) beauty, "*amor conatus est amicitiae faciendæ ex pulchritudinis specie*." But in modern friendship the passionate element is more rarely found. Montaigne and La Boétie, Gray and Bonstetten, Jacquemont and William Fraser, Tennyson and Arthur Hallam are exceptional pairs. Platonic affections (as the modern phrase goes) are more common.

vii. It is certain that the least passionate nations, the English and German, are more capable of deep, spiritualized and life-long affection than the more impulsive nations of southern Europe. A German expects less companionship than an Englishman, and lays more stress on the domestic duties. German love is more sentimental, and more on the surface than that of an Englishman. The English nature when stirred is deeply stirred and by the higher motives. "Worst," says Emerson,² "is it when this (self-interest) withers the hope and affection of human nature by teaching that marriage signifies nothing but a housewife's thrift, and that woman's love has no higher aim." If love for woman ends in housekeeping, the love of friends is far higher, as Montaigne³ contends. Even the ordinary, everyday love of the practical middle class is based on social instincts, desire for sympathy, and the recognized necessity which each sex has for the other, as supplying qualities each is without.

¹ Coleridge, after pointing out the necessary correlation between man and woman, doubts whether souls are sexless.

² *Essays*, "Love."

³ *Essay* 27.

viii. Love is a holy, unselfish passion¹ distinct from a transient fancy, "*un goût suivi d'un prompt dégoût, une fantaisie romanesque, une liaison sans attachement.*" It is a settled state of mind which eliminates self, rebuilds the world, and makes all men akin:—"all men love the the lover." "It expands our nature, makes a new man, calls out soul; makes him a lover of music and verse and all that is beautiful." "Love," says Emerson, "is a revelation of the beautiful. . . . It works a revolution in mind and body, unites man with his race, pledges him to the civic and domestic relations, carries him with new sympathy into nature, enhances the power of the senses, opens the imagination, adds to his character heroic and sacred attributes, establishes marriage, and gives permanence to human society." It was not without reason that Goethe identified love and life, and Emerson wrote—

"The sense of the world is short,
 Long and various the report;
 To love and be beloved,
 Men and gods have not outlearned it;
 And how oft soe'er they've turned it,
 'Twill not be improved."

The death of self and perception of the mystery of beauty carries us higher and higher, and frees all our best aspirations, instincts and powers.

Bacon, himself a confirmed fortune-hunter, knows nothing of the influence of unselfish and holy love for a fair mind in a fair body. His prudential treatment of the whole subject is scarcely better than the sneers of La Rochefoucauld. Without transcendentalism, love for woman can be idealized and spiritualized. And further, love for the best and most beautiful things of the material world can lead us to seek spiritual life. [Compare Bacon's *Essay* with Tennyson's *Miller's Daughter* and Coventry Patmore's *Angel in the House*.]

¹ "Love took up the harp of life and smote on all the chords with might;
 Smote the chord of self that trembling passed in music out of sight."

XI. Of Great Place.

MEN in great place are thrice servants—servants of the sovereign or state, servants of fame, and servants of business ; so as they have no freedom, neither in their persons, nor in their actions, nor in their times. It is a strange desire to seek power and 5 to lose liberty ; or to seek power over others, and to lose power over a man's self. The rising unto place is laborious, and by pains men come to greater pains ; and it is sometimes base, and by indignities men come to dignities. The standing is slippery, and the regress 10 is either a downfall, or at least an eclipse, which is a melancholy thing : "*Cum non sis qui fueris, non esse cur velis vivere.*" Nay, retire men cannot when they would, neither will they when it were reason ; but are impatient of privateness even in age and sickness, 15 which require the shadow ; like old townsmen, that will be still sitting at their street-door, though thereby they offer age to scorn. Certainly great persons had need to borrow other men's opinions to think themselves happy ; for if they judge by their own feeling, 20 they cannot find it : but if they think with themselves what other men think of them, and that other men would fain be as they are, then they are happy as it were by report, when, perhaps, they find the contrary within. For they are the first that find their own 25 griefs, though they be the last that find their own faults. Certainly, men in great fortunes are strangers to themselves, and while they are in the puzzle of business, they have no time to tend their health, either

death fall the weight on him who, to others, let all know
 dies a burden to himself. *Illi mors gravis incubat, qui
 30 of body or mind. notus nimis omnibus, ignotus moritur sibi."*

In place there is license to do good and evil,
 whereof the latter is a curse; for in evil, the best
 condition is not to will, the second not to can. But
 35 power to do good is the true and lawful end of aspiring.
 For good thoughts, though God accept them, yet
 towards men are little better than good dreams, except
 they be put in act; and that cannot be without power
 and place, as the vantage and commanding ground.
 40 Merit and good works is the end of man's motion, and
 conscience of the same is the accomplishment of
 man's rest. For if a man can be a partaker of God's
 theatre, he shall likewise be partaker of God's rest.
 "*Et conversus Deus, ut aspiceret opera, quæ fecerunt*
 45 *manus suæ, vidit quod omnia essent bona nimis;*"
 and then the Sabbath.

In the discharge of thy place set before thee the
 best examples; for imitation is a globe of precepts.
 And after a time set before thee thine own example,
 50 and examine thyself strictly whether thou didst not
 best at first. Neglect not also the examples of those
 that have carried themselves ill in the same place;
 not to set off thyself by taxing their memory, but to
 direct thyself what to avoid. Reform, therefore, with-
 55 out bravery, or scandal of former times and persons:
 but yet set it down to thyself as well to create good
 precedents as to follow them. Reduce things to the
 first institution, and observe wherein and how they
 have degenerated; but yet ask counsel of both times;
 60 of the ancient time, what is best; and of the latter
 time, what is fittest. Seek to make thy course regular,

that men may know beforehand what they may expect ; but be not too positive and peremptory, and express thyself well when thou digressest from thy rule. Preserve the right of thy place, but stir not questions ⁶⁵ of jurisdiction , and rather assume thy right in silence, and *de facto*, than voice it with claims and challenges. Preserve likewise the rights of inferior places, and think it more honour to direct in chief than to be busy in all. Embrace, and invite helps and advices touch- ⁷⁰ ing the execution of thy place ; and do not drive away such as bring thee information, as meddlers, but accept of them in good part.

The vices of authority are chiefly four : delays, corruption, roughness, and facility. For delays— ⁷⁵ give easy access ; keep times appointed ; go through with that which is in hand, and interlace not business but of necessity. For corruption—do not only bind thine own hands or thy servants' hands from taking, but bind the hands of suitors also from offering. For ⁸⁰ integrity used doth the one ; but integrity professed, and with a manifest detestation of bribery, doth the other. And avoid not only the fault, but the suspicion. Whosoever is found variable and changeth manifestly without manifest cause, giveth suspicion of corruption. ⁸⁵ Therefore always when thou changest thine opinion or course, profess it plainly, and declare it, together with the reasons that move thee to change ; and do not think to steal it. ⁹⁰ A servant or a favourite, if he be inward, and no other apparent cause of esteem, is commonly thought but a by-way to close corruption. For roughness—it is a needless cause of discontent : severity breedeth fear, but roughness breedeth hate.

Even reproofs from authority ^{place} ought to be grave, and
 95 not taunting. As for facility, it is worse than bribery.
 For bribes come but now and then ; but if importunity
 103. or idle respects lead a man, he shall never be with-
 out. As Salomon saith, "*To respect persons it is not*
good, for such a man will transgress for a piece of
 100 *bread.*"

It is most true that was anciently spoken :—*A place*
showeth the man. And it showeth some to the better,
 and some to the worse. "*Omnium consensu, capax*
imperii nisi imperasset," saith Tacitus of Galba; but
 105 of Vespasian he saith, "*Solus imperantium, Vespasianus*
mutatus in melius." Though the one was meant of
 sufficiency, the other of manners and affection. It is
 an assured sign of a worthy and generous spirit, whom
 honour amends. For honour is, or should be, the
 110 place of virtue : and as in nature things move
 violently to their place, and calmly in their place, so
 virtue in ambition is violent, in authority settled and
 calm.

All rising to great place is by a winding stair ; and
 115 if there be factions, it is good to ~~side~~ ^{side} a man's self
 whilst he is in the rising, and to balance himself when
 he is placed. Use the memory of thy predecessor
 fairly and tenderly ; for if thou dost not, it is a debt
 will sure be paid when thou art gone. If thou have
 120 colleagues, respect them ; and rather call them when
 they look not for it, than exclude them when they
 have reason to look to be called. Be not too sensible
 or too remembering of thy place in conversation and
 private answers to suitors ; but let it rather be said,
 125 *When he sits in place, he is another man.*

ANTITHETA ON GREAT PLACE.

For.

1. High offices are not pawns in the hands of a despot (as the saying goes), but in that of Divine Providence.

2. Great place throws a strong light both on virtue and vice; accordingly, it spurs on the one, and bridles the other.

3. No one knows how far he has advanced on the road of virtue, unless office gives him a fair field for action.

4. Like all other things, virtue moves violently to her proper place, but, when there, calmly. Now virtue's place is high office.

[See also Antitheta and Essay on "Empire."]

Against.

1. While we are seeking for high office, we are stripping ourselves of our freedom.

2. High office for the most part places in our power those things for which it is best not to have the wish, and next best not to have the power.

3. The ascent to high office is steep, the standing slippery, the descent headlong.

4. Those, who hold high office, must borrow the view which the vulgar take of them, in order to deem themselves happy.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. "As we cannot attain to it, let us revenge ourselves by railing against it." Montaigne, after thus excusing his depreciation of great place, enumerates its many disadvantages. "It goes less, the more it pleases. Moderate competence and ease is better, and the self-denial of those who have refused greatness has been exaggerated, especially as many in so rejecting it covet the honour which attends such a refusal. The most difficult employment is to be a king. Measure is impossible to the immeasurable. Kings are above morality, and indeed above humanity. The least good a king does affects so many that it is magnified. Besides his actions are addressed to the people, who are easily deceived. A

king cannot enter into trials with his subjects from a desire to emulate them in honourable and noble qualities. He has no equals who will dare to match themselves with him. Carneades said that the sons of princes learn nothing right but to ride the great horse. A horse will not flatter, but throws the king as it would a porter. A king must beg for disturbance and opposition as for alms. Tiberius was wise in refusing the prize of eloquence awarded by the servile senate. A king is great because he is a king, not because he is really great. Even his vices and imperfections are copied. Pollio refused to write verses in a match with Augustus, Favorinus to dispute with Hadrian."

ii. What Montaigne says of kings, may be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to all great place. The chief objections against it may briefly be said to be, (1) the nature of the means by which it often has to be attained; (2) the influence on the mind of the exalted; (3) the dangers from without, either from the jealousy of the ruler, or the envy of inferiors; (4) finally the great man's position is precarious and his fall from a dangerous height. The great man must stoop to rise. Power tries a man, and there are many waiting for a false step. The great man is discarded, when he ceases to be useful, and has no safe and honourable retreat.

iii. It is a mistake to suppose that great place gives freedom to act at will. The great are often, like Napoleon, creatures of a gigantic destiny which hurries them forward in certain directions. Often men are least free when they seem to be most free. The will is fettered, no step backward is allowed. In a democracy a member must vote with his party, and is dictated to by the caucus which send him to parliament. The representatives have one choice, the choice of a party, and then all is over. As the statesman rises, he becomes less and less free, and is alternately forced to distasteful acts by his party and by circumstances. Besides, all his actions are exposed to a fierce fire of criticism from opposition crocheteers and envious rivals. He is judged by success and has to make way for an inferior, who is more amenable to control, and represents the last new whim of a section of his constituency or party. The position of the great man in a

monarchy is not much better. It is true that he is the confidential adviser of his sovereign, but he rules without the sweets of power. He is the buffer on the one side against a powerful and jealous nobility, and on the other against a discontented proletariat. The fiction that the king can do no wrong does not render his position more enviable, if the monarch has any real power. He is then responsible, not only for his own mistakes but also for those of his sovereign.

iv. Against this it may be said that the man in high place has the following advantages : (1) Office increases our power to do good. (2) It develops high qualities, and destroys love of self in the exalted aims which it sets before the individual. The sense of responsibility brings out the best qualities of human nature. (3) The love of fame is one of the best instincts of humanity. To be a maker of history is the highest glory of man. (4) It is cowardly and selfish to say "*nolo episcopari*." Tennyson speaks of "the craven fear of being great." (5) It is the fault of the politician, if he is led instead of leading. A true statesman and patriot can never be a delegate. He will say with Aristippus "*et mihi res non me rebus subjungere conor*." Great place should imply greatness. The great man catches the light first, he stands on a hill and sees far into the future. He must never be a mere occasionalist.

v. Unfortunately, however, great place does not necessarily imply greatness. It is so hard to be great in great place that philosophy and experience have often depreciated or refused it. The Stoics held that the wise man could be a king, if he chose, but that he would be better off as a philosopher, at any rate till the millennium of Plato arrived with philosopher-kings and a grateful and obedient people. The vanity of human greatness is a theme which has been "tossed and tumbled by a thousand writers." The fickleness of kings, mobs and fortune is proverbial from Sejanus to Wolsey. The wind of criticism, opposition, misrepresentation and demagogism blows too strongly for those cast in gentler mould. The best Athenians held aloof from office, where they would have to out-bawl Cleon. Cincinnatus left his plough reluctantly at the call of patriotism. "Individualism," or

retirement from public life is one of the worst results of American politics.¹ Caucuses, rings, jobs, lobbyism, coarse abuse, and political bribery by money and places frighten the best away from the paths of patriotism and statesmanship. Our own House of Commons does not always tempt the greatest to come forward into public life. Many fear to take part in the Republican assembly of Versailles, just as, under the Empire, many of the greatest shunned the dangerous privilege of greatness. The air of democracy is unfavourable, the air of imperialism is dangerous to greatness in the Baconian sense.

vi. The difficulties of great place have a tendency to vanish in times of national crisis. Opposition, criticism, envy are hushed before the great danger which it is felt that the great man alone can avert. In ordinary times men may rise to the high place by the "winding stair," and readiness, audacity, roughness and abuse may be among the qualities necessary for the holding of high office. But a great crisis brings the great man to the front, and placemen and timeservers are eclipsed or extinguished. It must also be remembered that as the military and the diplomatic spirit die out, the necessities for high office grow less and less. Bureaucracy, with all its evils, means in many cases the weakening of personal influence. Public business is carried on by a number of minor officials with a responsible head, and the great minds of the world turn their attention to art, science, and commerce. The general and the diplomatist wither as the world grows more and more. Modern society tends to liberty, fraternity, and equality. The prerogatives of office grow less and less. Greatness is felt to depend less and less on office, rank and dignity, and more and more on moral worth and intellectual achievements. Mr. Darwin is acknowledged a greater man than Prince Bismarck. We may some day hope to do without generals and diplomatists, stars and orders, we can never do without Shakespeares, Newtons, and Howards. Again, in religion great place no longer implies the great qualities which it once implied. A bishop can neither be a Savonarola nor a Ridley. Lastly, charity is the cardinal virtue of Christianity. Philanthropy is freer,

¹ See Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*,

wider, and less selfish when untrammelled by office and ambition. Bacon might have filled the place left vacant by Cecil. He was popular, tolerant, versed in the rules of public procedure, farseeing and capable of conceiving a great policy. He had not yet made any fatal mistakes, though his conduct towards Essex shewed him ready to sacrifice delicacy of feeling to utility. Yet he was not admitted to share in the affairs of the government. Either James distrusted him or Cecil had warned him against his cousin, whom he probably regarded as a visionary. It is hypothetical to say that Bacon might have been a great statesman, and that great place might have hidden the defects of his character, he certainly had many conditions of success, but he was wanting in many others.

XII. Of Boldness.

^{First}
IT is a trivial grammar-school text, but yet worthy a wise man's consideration :—question was asked of Demosthenes, *What was the chief part of an orator?* he answered, *Action* : *What next?* *Action* : *What next again?* *Action*. He said it that knew it best, and had ⁵ by nature himself no advantage in that he commended. A strange thing, that that part of an orator which is but superficial, and rather the virtue of a player, should be placed so high above those other noble parts, of invention, elocution, and the rest; nay, ¹⁰ almost alone, as if it were all in all. But the reason is plain. There is in human nature generally more of the fool than of the wise; and therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men's minds is taken are most potent. Wonderful¹⁵ like is the case of boldness in civil business; What first? boldness: What second and third? boldness. And yet boldness is a child of

ignorance and baseness, far inferior to other parts. But nevertheless it doth fascinate and bind hand and
20 foot those that are either shallow in judgment or weak in courage, which are the greatest part; yea, and prevaieth with wise men at weak times. Therefore we see it hath done wonders in popular States; but with senates and princes less; and more ever
25 upon the first entrance of bold persons into action, than soon after; for boldness is an ill keeper of promise.

Surely, as there are mountebanks for the natural body, so there are mountebanks for the politic body;
30 men that undertake great cures, and perhaps have been lucky in two or three experiments, but want the grounds of science, and therefore cannot hold out. Nay, you shall see a bold fellow many times do Mahomet's miracle. Mahomet made the people
35 believe that he would call an hill to him, and from the top of it offer up his prayers for the observers of his law. The people assembled; Mahomet called the hill to come to him again and again; and when the hill stood still, he was never a whit abashed, but said,
40 "*If the hill will not come to Mahomet, Mahomet will go to the hill.*" So these men, when they have promised great matters, and failed most shamefully, yet, if they have the perfection of boldness, they will but slight it over, and ^{try some tricks} make a turn, and no more ado.

45 Certainly to men of great judgment bold persons are a sport to behold; nay, and to the vulgar also boldness hath somewhat of the ridiculous. For, if absurdity be the subject of laughter, doubt you not but great boldness is seldom without some absurdity.

Especially it is a sport to see when a bold fellow is 50 out of countenance, for that puts his face into a most shrunken and wooden posture, as needs it must ; for in bashfulness the spirits do a little go and come, but with bold men, upon like occasion, they stand at a stay ; like a stale at chess, where it is no mate, but 55 yet the game cannot stir. But this last were fitter for a satire than for a serious observation.

This is well to be weighed, that boldness is ever blind, for it seeth not dangers and inconveniences. Therefore it is ill in counsel, good in execution. So 60 that the right use of bold persons is, that they never command in chief, but be seconds, and under the direction of others. For in counsel it is good to see dangers, and in execution not to see them, except they be very great.

ANTITHETA ON BOLDNESS.

For.

1. Half-heartedness encourages criticism.

2. Boldness is to the statesman, what action is to the orator. It is the first, second and third condition of success.

3. I like a shame that owns faults, not that which acts the accuser. (Innocence is bold.)

4. Self-confident bearing brings minds sooner together.

5. Give me a veiled face and a frank tongue.

Against.

1. Boldness is the forerunner of folly.

2. Shamelessness is useless except for imposture.

3. Self-confidence is a tyrant to fools, a sorry jester to the wise.

4. Boldness is the child of sluggish perception and an evil will.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. When Greek philosophy said that virtue was knowledge, and bravery a "knowledge of the terrible," boldness was defined as "ignorance of the terrible." Neither definition is satisfactory. The mere knowledge of what is terrible need not be a motive to action, nor is the bold man one who misconceives the nature of the circumstances of his actions. In both case knowledge and ignorance are rather the condition than the cause of the character. The brave man only knows what is terrible because he is brave, and the bold man ignores the danger because through his boldness it seems slighter than it really is. The Greeks were not constitutionally brave. Courage to a Greek was little more than patriotism. The love of country was *par excellence* the motive which led men to face danger. It was the result of training, and rather an intellectual than a physical quality; while boldness, like cowardice, only seemed to be the child of ignorance. The coward thinks the non-terrible to be terrible, the bold man the terrible to be non-terrible. Aristotle, however, was far in advance of ancient thought in his description of courage and boldness. He saw that boldness was physical nature unrestrained by law, while courage was the deliberate encounter of danger from a higher motive. He was inclined to eliminate the physical as far as possible from courage, though he allows that it is more physical in its nature than the other virtues. But except that he exaggerated the power of education, his psychology was searching and correct.

ii. Physical courage is the virtue of a barbarous age, and tends to disappear in civilized societies from want of exercise. It depends in part on callousness to bodily pain and imperfect sympathies. "A boy who had got the better in the beginning of a fight, was observed suddenly to knock under and behave like a coward. When questioned, he explained that on making his opponent's nose bleed in the first round, he felt his heart sink, and could not go on. None of his schoolfellows credited the story, but it was probably true. Again, a lady in Australia, whose house was attacked by bushrangers in her husband's absence, exposed herself to the greatest peril

in coming out with a rifle and deliberately shooting the head of the gang. Her hand never trembled as she took aim, though she knew that she was in danger of instant death. But the moment she saw him reel and fall, she dropped her rifle and flew with a cry back to the house. In each case the failure in courage was due to excess of sympathy."¹

iii. The essential nature of boldness is physical. It is in a measure inherited, but partly based on health and partly on experience. Much depends on a man's knowledge of his own powers and on the state of his nerves. Digestion largely enters into boldness. Bold men are generally those whose actions are limited by the physical world as opposed to the spiritual world of conscience and religion. In a sense, boldness is ignorance of the terrible. The bold man, if he has no superstition, has often no conscience. The actions of the bold man, as far as they are not instinctive, depend on a practical induction. A man has successfully climbed three dangerous peaks, he therefore attempts to climb a fourth. If he breaks his neck he has not broken the moral law, and is rather to be pitied than blamed. Boldness becomes more positively hurtful and nearer to vice, when it degenerates into recklessness and foolhardiness, though it is wanting in the necessary condition of all vice, the conscious pursuit of an evil end. Boldness is nearer to courage than cowardice, the bold man may easily become brave, the coward hardly. Cowardice is physically opposed to bravery. Boldness becomes vicious when it is enlisted in the service of evil, and appears as brutality, ruffianism, and insolent contempt for things human and divine. The world attaches too much value to boldness, and gives the prizes of life to the bold plunger, not to the man of caution who sits shivering on the brink and tries the chill stream with his thermometer. Prudence is essentially timorous, and *coups d'état* are possible because boldness and readiness are comparatively rare. Undoubtedly in war, diplomacy and politics bold strokes dazzle, nonplus and succeed, but there is generally a reaction, and boldness is first cousin

¹ I borrow these illustrations from a boy's essay. I gave as the subject to my "Bacon" class "a comparison of courage and boldness,"

to opportunism. Yet on the other hand the bold man breaks through dilemmas, cuts the knot which can no longer be loosened, and brings about a salutary reformation, which, if staved off, would have become a revolution. Danton's is a true maxim for great crises, when to think is to be lost. For action, it is certainly true that a man may know too much. So in science, while orthodoxy *stat super antiquas vias*, the bold mind dashes forward with startling theories. It sees no obstacles and revolutionizes existing theories by some daring hypothesis. But boldness rarely succeeds without knowledge and judgment. Darwinism was a bold theory, but it was the result and outcome of patient plodding, and systematic collection of instances. Most forward movements are leaps in the dark, and though prudence alone is superior to boldness, the two combined can alone give the greatest successes.

iv. Courage is boldness reduced to a virtue by the presence of moral law. It goes deeper than boldness and depends on a practical syllogism.

In all actions choose the highest motive.

This is the highest motive.

Therefore choose this.

The brave man acts boldly because it is right to do so, not because he is instinctively bold, nor because he argues from previous power to perform. It is a settled moral state as opposed to a physical instinct. Courage involves the existence of the spiritual side of human nature. The courageous man is both religious and conscientious. Boldness is limited by physique. There is ideally no limit to courage. At the same time courage presupposes boldness, and is, like boldness, weakened or rendered impossible by superstition. The Romans, though scrupulously obedient to the letter of the law, broke through superstition when it stood in the way of bold action, as when Claudius threw the sacred fowls into the sea, bidding them drink, if they would not eat. We may compare this conduct with that of Nikias, in Sicily, though Greek religion was less exacting than that of Rome.

v. In one sense courage is a very high quality, for it cannot easily become mechanical. "Courage," says Aristotle, "brings pain, and is justly praised;" and again, "The actions of the courageous man are not pleasurable

except in so far as he realizes his end." The occasions and conditions of courage are ever varying. The attack is sudden, and surprise always possible. The courageous man must have his feelings well in hand, and be able to apply the moral law at the shortest notice.

vi. Courage is essentially a relative virtue. There is no absolute rule. The end pursued in each case justifies the danger encountered, and the conditions which make men courageous vary with individuals. What is courage in one may be boldness in another, and heroism in a third. Wordsworth, in the *Happy Warrior*, well insists that the really courageous man is one—

"Who through the heat of conflict keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw ;
More brave for this, that he hath much to love."

This is truer philosophy than Bacon's: "And surely a man shall see the noblest works and foundations have proceeded from childless men." And again, "He that hath a wife and children hath given hostages to fortune ; for they are impediments to great enterprises, either of virtue or mischief." Still, unmarried men are "light to run away." Burgess soldiers, who have given hostages to fortune, have at times contrasted favourably with mercenaries.

vii. In moral courage the danger to be met is transferred from the body to the mind. Most cowardice is in a measure mental, the anticipation of pain being often out of proportion to the actual suffering ; but in moral courage we face ridicule, contempt, apparent failure and defeat by the less scrupulous. The moral coward acts wrongly because he is afraid to do right, not because he furthers his own material interests. He has the moral law, his conception of the end is correct, but in time of temptation he falls away, because he fears mental discomfort. Analogous to moral courage is that courage which consists in holding to one's convictions in science and art. Here the motive may be wrong, if it is based on an obstinate unreasoning dislike to change, and a fear lest a *volte-face* may seem weak and undignified. On the other hand, no man should be laughed or frightened out of his genuine convictions.

viii. Though Bacon in his attack on mediæval science, and his advocacy of the new philosophy did not lack courage, yet his temperament was deficient in boldness, and his failure in public life was mainly due to his want of courage. His shifty, prudential nature preferred the winding stair to the knee-timber which is ordained to be tossed on the sea. Calm encounter of danger, stability and purity of moral purpose, firm-seated conviction, were wanting in his character, and he skilfully ignores courage while exposing the folly of boldness.

[See also Essays on *Delays*, *Dispatch*.]

XIII. Of Goodness, and Goodness of Nature.

I TAKE Goodness in this sense,—the affecting of the weal of men, which is that the Grecians call *Philanthropia*; and the word humanity (as it is used) is a little too light to express it. Goodness I call the habit, and Goodness of Nature the inclination. This, of all virtues and dignities of the mind, is the greatest, being the character of the Deity; and without it, man is a busy, mischievous, wretched thing, no better than a kind of vermin. Goodness answers to the theological virtue, *Charity*, and admits no excess, but error. The desire of power, in excess, caused the angels to fall; the desire of knowledge, in excess, caused man to fall; but in charity there is no excess; neither can angel or man come in danger by it. The inclination to goodness is imprinted deeply in the nature of man; insomuch that, if it issue not towards men, it will take unto other living creatures; as it is seen in the Turks, a cruel people, who, nevertheless, are kind to beasts, and give alms to dogs and birds; insomuch as Busbechius reporteth, a Christian boy in Constantinople

had like to have been stoned for gagging, in a wag-gishness, a long-billed fowl.

Errors, indeed, in this virtue of goodness or charity, may be committed. The Italians have an ungracious proverb, *Tanto buon che val niente* · *So good that he is* 25 *good for nothing*. And one of the doctors of Italy, Nicholas Machiaveli had the confidence to put in writing, almost in plain terms, that *the Christian faith* | 173 *had given up good men in prey to those who are tyrannical and unjust*. Which he spake because, indeed, 30 there was never law, or sect, or opinion, did so much magnify goodness as the Christian religion doth. Therefore, to avoid the scandal, and the danger both, it is good to take knowledge of the errors of an habit so excellent. Seek the good of other men, but be 35 not in bondage to their faces or fancies : for that is but facility or softness ; which taketh an honest mind prisoner. Neither give thou Æsop's cock a gem, who would be better pleased and happier if he had had a barley-corn. The example of God teacheth the 40 lesson truly : *He sendeth his rain, and maketh his sun to shine upon the just and the unjust* ; but he doth not rain wealth nor shine honour and virtues upon men equally. Common benefits are to be communicate with all ; but peculiar benefits with choice. And 45 beware how, in making the portraiture, thou breakest the pattern. For divinity maketh the love of ourselves the pattern, the love of our neighbours but the portraiture. *Sell all thou hast, and give it to the poor, and follow me* ; but sell not all thou hast, except thou 50 come and follow me ; that is, except thou have a vocation wherein thou mayest do as much good with

little means as with great ; for otherwise, in feeding the streams, thou driest the fountain.

55 Neither is there only a habit of goodness directed by right reason ; but there is in some men, even in nature, a disposition towards it ; as, on the other side,
 26. | there is a natural malignity ; for there be that in their nature do not affect the good of others. The lighter
 60 sort of malignity turneth but to a ^{grossness} ~~crossness~~, or forwardness, or aptness to oppose, or ^{difficileness} ~~difficileness~~, or the like ; but the deeper sort to envy, and mere ^{actual mischief} ~~mischief~~. Such men, in other men's calamities, are, as it were, in season, and are ever on the loading part : not so
 65 good as the dogs, that licked Lazarus' sores, but like flies that are still buzzing upon anything that is raw :
 474 | *Misanthropi*, that make it their practice to bring men to the bough, and yet never have a tree for the purpose in their gardens, as Timon had. Such dispositions
 70 are the very errors of human nature ; and yet they are the fittest timber to make great politiques of : like to knee-timber, that is good for ships that are ordained to be tossed, but not for building houses that shall stand firm.

75 The parts and signs of goodness are many. If a man be gracious and courteous to strangers, it shows he is a citizen of the world, and that his heart is no island cut off from other lands, but a continent that joins to them. If he be compassionate towards the
 80 affliction of others, it shows that his heart is like the
 474 noble tree that is wounded itself when it gives the balm. If he easily pardons and remits offences, it shows that his mind is planted above injuries, so that he cannot be shot. If he be thankful for small bene-

fits, it shows that he weighs men's minds, and not ⁸⁵ their trash. But, above all, if he have St. Paul's perfection, that he would wish to be an *anathema* from Christ, for the salvation of his brethren, it shows much of a divine nature, and a kind of conformity with Christ Himself.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. The question "what is virtue?" is easier to answer than the questions "why is virtue virtue?" and "how can virtue be sought and found?" All will agree with Bacon when he says in the *Advancement*, "There is formed in everything a double nature of good: the one as everything is a total or substantive in itself; the other as it is a part or member of a great body, whereof the latter is in degree the greater and worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form." Roughly our test for all action should be whether it will increase or diminish the sum total of good, and therefore of happiness in the world. Virtue is altruistic; it begins where the egotistic desires of the individual give way to the good of the commonalty. Here modern ethics generally contrast favourably with ancient systems. The philosophers of the "Porch" and "Academy" made virtue too self-regarding. Good works were judged by the standard of self-perfection, not by that of self-sacrifice. Self-denial, humility, and charity, are the cardinal virtues of Christian rather than of pagan ethics, in which personal dignity was a stronger motive than personal responsibility. Of course there is no separation of the highest egoism from altruism, but morally the difference is great between consciously aiming at self-perfection, and making the paramount of truth to be "love your neighbour." Moreover the religious factor introduced by a system of rewards and punishments made the position of altruism less paradoxical, and reconciled it with the highest egoism. But the recognition of the principle of philanthropy "*necesse est ut eam non ut vivam,*" involved a sense of right far above the hope of

future happiness. Reward follows virtue, but can never be the motive to virtue. It must also be remembered that the selfish standard was less dangerous in ancient than in modern times. Formerly State interference, patriotism, discipline, restrained selfishness, and the moral law was restricted to the requirements of the individual. This was in a measure the case with the guilds and corporations of the middle ages. Now, "instead of seven corporate spirits we have twenty-four million of dis-corporate selfish spirits, and the rule, 'man, mind thyself,' makes a jumble and a scramble and crushing press (with dead pressed figures and dismembered limbs enough), into whose dark chaotic depths one shudders to look."¹ Other conditions of ancient life favoured the development of heroic and individual types of virtue. The difficulty of over-population, where it occurred, was met by infanticide. Poverty was almost unknown in its most appalling forms. The poor man could claim State support, and the sphere of individual benevolence was limited.

ii. The evolution of the idea of sacrifice of self to the public good, parallel to the political idea of the supremacy of the public will, is co-extensive with the growth of civilization. As individuals grew into tribes, tribes into nations, and nations became united by the peaceful alliances of commerce, science, and art, the impossibility of separating the interest of the individual from that of the tribe, nation, and even world at large, became more fully recognized. Side by side with growth of this unity of interest, the field of morality became extended. There is a natural history of morality. Local types die out; even "patriotism shall become as antiquated as tribal loyalty." "Natural selection," says Professor Caird, "will year by year operate with more remorseless vigour, as natural and artificial boundaries grow weak. . . . The tendency is to kill the local type of everything, and to replace it by a higher variety. Hence the tendency is to clear away old causes of strife, and ally all men by the ties of a brotherhood." Not that virtues die, except those which have had a provisional and temporary force like chivalry and the point of honour. The only death is a

¹ Carlyle, *Essays*, "Diderot."

new life, a higher stage in the ever-extending chain of development. The moral law is of the nature of a formula of universal application, which is from time to time filled up by the discoveries of newer and wider interests.¹

iii. What, then, is the difference between *morality* and *expediency*? *Morality* says, "You *must* further the interests of humanity." *Expediency* advises, "*It is better for your own interest* to further the interests of humanity." Practically there have been three explanations of this difference given by ethical philosophers. (i.) The atomistic school (Hobbes and his followers) deny that there is a real difference. Self-interest, it is said, is the only motive to action. There is a moral, as there is a social, compact. A consults the interests of B, because B has agreed to consult those of A. Virtue only differs from other actions, because the agreement is tacit and not enforced by law. "Must" is a valuable fiction. As society "is anarchy and a policeman," so morality is selfishness restrained by an agreement mutually accepted. Against this it may be said that there never has been such a compact, that it would constantly have to be renewed to be binding on each generation, and that morality does not include the idea of reciprocity. The commands are absolute, "steal not," "lie not;" not conditional, "steal not from others, lest others steal from you." One important truth may be noticed in connection with this theory, namely, that any civilized society does infinitely more for any individual than any individual for society. (ii.) The idea of moral obligation is a growth capable of historical analysis. It has grown into our mental nature, and is as much a part of it as the idea of colour, size, etc. There was a time when there was no difference, but there is a difference now. Morality is transformed expediency of universal necessity and application. Against this it is urged (α) Moral and expedient actions differ in kind not in degree, and the idea of expediency could never give the idea of obligation. (β) Besides, the greatest expediency has often been non-moral or even immoral.² Why should some

¹ Cf. Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, lv.

² The world has been more benefited by revenge, cruelty, self-assertion, war, selfishness, heterodoxy, etc., than by forgive-

interests be formed into moralities, while others are left to die a natural death? (γ) New expediencies are at once erected into moralities, if they conform to the moral law. Yet by our theory they have not had time to become so stereotyped and transformed. (δ) If we calculate consequences we shall never act. (The answer to this objection is, that the calculation has been done for us. We have inherited experience.) (ϵ) The judgment is likely to be warped, the end made to justify the means. (A practical rather than theoretical objection to utilitarianism, which calculates tertiary, secondary, and primary consequences). (ζ) Utilitarianism is a beautiful plant without a root. The utilitarian $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, or the principle of Christian love is good, but utilitarianism cannot give the "why." (iii.) The idea of obligation is given *ab intra* by the mind to actions, and cannot be analyzed. "I hope also that they will attack earnestly," says Carlyle, "that idle habit of 'accounting for the moral sense,' as they phrase it. . . . A very futile problem, my friends; futile, idle, and far worse; leading to what you little dream of! The moral sense, thank God, is a thing you never will 'account for'; that, if you would think of it, is the perennial miracle of man, in all times visibly connecting poor transitory man here on this bewildered earth, with his Maker who is eternal in the heavens." Against this it is urged: (α) The theory is unhistoric. (β) Causes must not be unnecessarily multiplied. (γ) Morality is not an inherent quality of actions. (δ) Just as beauty in the visible world may be analyzed into simpler feelings, so morality in the mental world. (ϵ) The growth of the faculty is co-extensive with the growth of material interests. Where expediency fails as a motive, sympathy (or religion) will lead to virtue. (ζ) Virtues do die. (η) If morality is intuitive, it is also unteachable. The "moral faculty" theory was modified by the Kantian School into the doctrine that morality is a form of thought, which is part of the original furniture of the mind. (θ) The intuitive school argues in a circle. Actions are right because they conform to the moral faculty.

ness, submission, obedience, self-sacrifice, peace, simple unquestioning faith. Cf. the evolutionist theory of an "hereditary conscience."

The moral faculty decides what is right. Utilitarianism at least gives us something definite and tangible.

iv. The great difficulty of education must necessarily be, to the utilitarian and intuitivist alike, how far natural tendencies can be eradicated by training. Unquestionably the State should provide education. Neither morality nor expediency have taught men to do this for themselves. The means to be used must be determined by psychology. It is sufficient to say that whether morality is intuitive or derived, we only become just by doing just actions ; that education is intimately connected with the proper application of pleasures and pains ; that the moral law is only grasped out of collection of experiences which the young cannot seek of their own strength and goodwill ; and, lastly, that only those who lose their life shall find it.

Bacon's own views on the subject, which are eminently Aristotelian,¹ are given at length in the *Advancement to Learning*, in his discussion on the *Appetite and Will of Man*. See also his *Essays*, *Of Nature in Men*, and *Of Custom and Education*.

v. Three difficulties connected with goodness here present themselves.

(a) Is the great man necessarily the good man? The great man must be unselfish. Ambition is not necessarily selfish if it means the desire to do great work in the world. (See *Essay on Ambition*.) Great conquerors, kings, and diplomatists, have made shipwreck because they have erected their own ends into primary ends. Science must labour for truth only, or the light which it should catch before the rest of the world will be obscured by self-interest. The selfish will always be misled by false beacon fires, siren voices, lotus fruit, and all the temptations of the flesh. But will the great man have to employ base means to great ends? It is the duty of the great man to remove the evil which would compel him

¹ He rather unfairly criticises Aristotle's opinion that "Things which consist by nature cannot be changed by custom." Aristotle uses *φύσις* in many ways, as we do nature, and would allow all that Bacon maintains. Aristotle wishes to take morality out of the sphere of the natural, to make it the fit end of education. It is impossible to teach a stone to fall upwards.

to the employment of base means. At any rate the danger of distorting ends to justify means must be avoided. Bacon is a very Balaam. The morality of the Attorney-General is better than that of the Chancellor. He knows that virtue is lovely, and wishes to die the death of the righteous; but when tried by power and brought face to face with the realities of political life, his morality flies to the four winds, and his doctrine that good ends justify bad means, leads to the choice of bad ends as well as of vicious means. If Bacon had never been a politician, his character would never have suffered. His desire to benefit humanity by the "interpretation of nature," was genuine and unselfish. But from the beginning he lost sight of the means, even in his scientific work. Instead of following nature he anticipated and distorted her. So in morality, the end of human action is vigorously and nobly maintained to be the "good of others"; but the "good of others" soon comes to mean the "good of self," when once the door is opened to interest by losing sight of virtue in reference to the means.

(β) How can we relieve distress and give place to charity and benevolence, without promoting the evils which we seek to lessen?

(γ) What is the exact morality of the infliction of cruelty to animals for the sake of science, or pleasure?

XIV. Of Nobility.

WE will speak of Nobility first as a portion of an estate, then as a condition of particular persons. A monarchy where there is no nobility at all is ever a pure and absolute tyranny, as that of the 5 Turks. For nobility attempers sovereignty, and draws the eyes of the people somewhat aside from the line royal. But for democracies, they need it not; and they are commonly more quiet, and less subject to sedition than where there are stirps of nobles. For

Latin: Lat. stirpes, stirpes = families

men's eyes are upon the business, and not upon the 10
persons ; or, if upon the persons, it is for the business'
sake, as fittest, and not for ¹⁶²¹⁻¹⁶²² flags and pedigree. We
see the Switzers last well, notwithstanding their
diversity of religion and of cantons ; for utility is
their bond and not respects. The United Provinces 15
of the Low Countries in their government excel. For
where there is an equality, the consultations are more
¹⁶²¹⁻¹⁶²² indifferent, and the payments and tributes more
cheerful. A great and potent nobility addeth
majesty to a monarch, but diminisheth power, and 20
putteth life and spirit into the people, but presseth
their fortune. It is well when nobles are not too
great for sovereignty, nor for justice ; and yet main-
tained in that height, as the insolency of inferiors may
be broken upon them before it come on too fast upon 25
the majesty of kings. A numerous nobility causeth
poverty, and inconvenience in a State ; for it is a sur-
charge of expense ; and besides, it being of necessity
that many of the nobility fall in time to be weak in
fortune, it maketh a kind of disproportion between 30
honour and means.

As for nobility in particular persons : it is a reve-
rend thing to see an ancient castle or building not in
decay, or to see a fair timber tree sound and perfect ;
how much more to behold an ancient noble family, 35
which hath stood against the waves and weathers of
time. For new nobility is but the act of power, but
ancient nobility is the act of time. Those that are
first raised to nobility are commonly more ¹⁶²¹⁻¹⁶²² virtuous,
but less innocent, than their descendants ; for there 40
is rarely any rising but by a commixture of good and

evil ^{qualitative} arts. But it is reason the memory of their virtues remain to their posterity, and their faults die with themselves. Nobility of birth commonly abateth
 45 industry ; and he that is not industrious, envieth him that is. Besides, noble persons cannot go much higher ; and he that standeth at a stay when others rise, can hardly avoid ^{86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100} motions of envy. On the other side, nobility extinguisheth the passive envy from
 50 others towards them, because they are in possession of honour. Certainly, kings that have able men of their nobility shall find ease in employing them, and a better slide into their business ; for people naturally bend to them as born in some sort to command.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. Those who have virtue ingrained in their nature by descent, cannot be wicked, if they would.

2. Nobility is a laurel wreath, which time places on the heads of men.

3. We respect antiquity even in lifeless monuments ; how much more in living ones !

4. If we despise noble birth in families, what is the difference between the offspring of men and the offspring of brutes ?

5. Noble birth withdraws virtue from envy and commends it to favour.

Against.

1. Nobility rarely springs from virtue, and more rarely virtue from nobility.

2. Nobles more often find pardon than advancement to honour by the favour of their ancestors.

3. Such is the energy of new men, that noblemen seem by their sides to be mere statues.

4. Noblemen in the race look back too often—a sign of a bad runner.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

[Consult Hallam, *Middle Ages*, vol. i. ; Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, vol. ii. ch. ii. ; Stubbs' *Constitutional History of England*, vol. i. ; Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* ; Emerson, *Essays on England, Aristocracy*.]

i. The distinguishing feature of despotism as compared with other forms of personal government is the absence of a nobility. Between the despot and the subject are found only a number of court and military officials—superior slave-drivers. The conditions of Eastern civilization made this possible. A great lord like Naaman was merely a successful official, with no privileges except such as his supreme master chose to bestow, privileges which might be taken away at the tyrant's will, and their possessor sent to an ignominious death. Prowess and court service were rewarded with money, favour, power, and even a distinctive dress, but not with a definite, privileged nobility which could be transmitted to descendants. In an early and superstitious age, religion rather than prowess gave rise to a kind of nobility. The medicine man was as distinguished as the brave. The Magians and Brahmins were powerful and privileged castes, with a position assured by descent.

ii. We can speak with little certainty of the nature of prehistoric monarchy in Greece. It is sufficient to say that the threefold division, king, council, assembly, is a common Aryan possession to be found among the Homeric Achæans on earth, and the Homeric gods on Olympus. The king and assembly disappeared before the power of the council of chiefs and elders. The king was only *primus inter pares* in the first instance, and the freemen possessed few rights. So monarchy gave way to oligarchies, consisting of a limited number of families. Even where, as at Sparta, the title of king was retained, the power was but a shadow.

iii. The origin of the Eupatrids is not always clear. Grote speaks of them as "a small number of privileged persons among whom the kingly attributes were distributed and put in rotation, being those nearest in rank to the king himself ; perhaps members of the same large

gens with him, and pretending to a common descent." The change gave little, if any, benefit to the freeman. The governing class formed a close order, united by birth, privileges, and in many cases the exclusive knowledge and ministration of the rites of religion. They "transmitted their privileges to their children, but admitted no new members to a participation." The most usual name of these patrician orders is *gamori* or *geomori* (landed proprietors). In Dorian states we find the great distinction of Dorian and non-Dorian. The Dorians being immigrants and conquerors, dispossessing and governing the original inhabitants. Such oligarchies existed at Corinth, Sikyon, Sparta, and Megara. We further learn that in Chalkis, Eretria, Eubœa, and Thessaly, the oligarchs are identical with the cavalry militia. Common descent from a god, religious sanctity, landownership, conquest, military service, seem the chief titles to nobility, and it would not be hard to establish a connection between these claims to distinction. At Athens the principle of birth gave way to the principle of wealth, though in early communities the two tend to become identical. The same city speedily saw the further change to democracy, though under oligarchical conditions, and with a violent oligarchical party ready for disturbance. Elsewhere in Greece, wherever Athenian power was not felt, the oligarchical form of government remained until the end of Grecian independence.

iv. The Roman nobility, connected by mythology with the original settlers who followed Æneas, was probably a heterogeneous body formed by three distinct sets of conquerors. The Roman nobles first appear under the modest title of *patres*, wise in counsel and brave in war. Their descendants constituted a nobility of birth with political and religious powers, and a monopoly of the public land. By a series of reforms the plebeians were admitted to a share in the government, and before long a nobility of office supplemented a nobility of birth. But the *nobilis* did not become a *patrician*. The ranks of the old nobility of blood could only be recruited by the legal fiction of adoption.

v. Under the Roman empire, it suited politic emperors to flatter and to parade reverence for the old patrician

families, but most of the power not retained by the chief of the State, was in the hands of the freedmen, eunuchs, and military adventurers.

vi. Teutonic political life, from the earliest days, sets before us the distinction of *eorl*¹ and *ceorl*, *gentle* and *simple*. The *jarl*² or *eorl* was the primitive noble, in the first instance winning his nobility by superior might, but in later times noble in virtue of his descent, with privileges allowed rather from reverence than legal right, and holding in his own absolute possession a large allotment of land, which he or his ancestors obtained as original settlers.

vii. Side by side with these great nobles, the king had his personal following of *gesithas* or companions, whom he rewarded with grants of *folcland*. As the king increased in power at the expense of the great military chiefs, while, on the one hand the *gesith* follower or companion became the *thegn*³ or servant of the king, on the other, his service conferred a new dignity, and he gradually took the place of the *eorl*. The term *æthel*, which denoted all of noble birth, the *eorlas*, disappeared in the *thegn*, and the title *ætheling* was restricted to the king's kin. Freeman aptly compares the patrician and the nobilis, the gentleman of ancient family and the holder of office. The new nobility was open to the *ceorl*, who could become a *thegn* in several ways, though not an *eorl* in the original sense. The *eorls* themselves in many cases enrolled themselves as king's *thegns*, and the name ceased to mean noble, and was applied to those who held the office of *ealdorman*. It is more than probable that an *eorl* who became a *thegn*, and so combined nobility of service with nobility of descent, was held in higher reverence, as he would also possess

¹ Different derivations have been given for the word *eorl* or *jarl*. Some derive from the *Heruli* or *Eruli*, a conquering tribe, others from the root of *ἄρσεν*, male, others from *ærn* to plough, so that *jarl* = landowner. Max Müller, followed by Canon Stubbs, provisionally, and Freeman, definitely, connect it with *ealdor*.

² *Jarl* is the Norsk term, analogous, if not exactly equivalent at first to *eorl*.

³ "The *thegn* seems primarily to be the warrior *gesith*," Stubbs i., 155.

more land than one who was merely a *thegn*. *Thegnhood* implied the possession of land of a certain value with jurisdiction, but no new dependence on his lord was involved in such ownership, and the *thegn* was noble as a follower, not as a landowner. It must at the same time be noticed that the privileges and powers of the *thegn* were not at first large in theory. He was overshadowed by, as he owed his creation to, the king. The *ceorl* was eligible for the ealdormanship and could become a *thegn*. It is true that a gradually increasing number of *thegns* attended the witenagemot, with ealdormen, bishops, and abbotts. But the *thegns* are called *ministri*, and were present as king's servants rather than nobles, while perhaps theoretically every freeman was a member of the "great meeting" of the realm;¹ and the elective, judicial, and legislative powers attached to membership of the witan were not necessarily involved in the idea of *thegnhood*. Still the free churl sank into the *villein* before the growing power of the *thegn*. Freeman and noble disappear before *thegnhood*.

viii. It is noticeable that the *ealdormanship* tended to become *hereditary*, and, in the reign of Ethelred, the title *earl* was adopted instead of *ealdorman*. Canute divided the country into four great earldoms, with authority over a number of subordinate ealdormen or earls, a state of things which existed to the Conquest. So the mere *thegn*, sank into insignificance before the higher official nobility of the *ealdorman*. *Comes*, *princeps*, and *dux* are all translated by, or translate the title, *ealdorman* or subsequently *earl*.

ix. Such was the state of things before the Norman Conquest. The germs of feudalism existed in the tendency to connect nobility with landownership, in the gifts of *folcland* made by the king to his gesiths, and the growing idea that the tenure of land involved personal service to the king. The four great earls, owing obedience only to the king, "were a nearer approach to a feudal division of England than anything that followed the Conquest."² The prevailing feature, however, of feudalism

¹ Green, *A Short History of the English People*, p. 56; Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, i., 100.

² Stubbs, i., 202.

was vassalage, not the *comitatus*. The nobility of feudalism is different from the nobility which in England it partially superseded, in that land tenure became the title to nobility, and at the same time implied dependence on a feudal superior, a state of things which had grown up from two great sources—the *beneficium* and the *commendation*. The greater and lesser barons were the greater and lesser tenants-in-chief, *i.e.* those who held directly from the king. The Frank of large estate was styled a noble; if he wasted or was despoiled of his wealth, the new possessor became noble in his stead. The free subject, the essence of Teutonic institutions, is lost in the ennobled vassal. Grants of immunity and rights of judicature increased the privileges of the ennobled landowners, and in 877 “Charles the Bald recognized the hereditary character of all benefices.” The link between a nobility of blood and a nobility of land was the institution of inalienable fiefs.

x. On the Continent, feudalism was introduced into the machinery of government. The possessors of beneficiary estates were royal judges or generals, and the tendency of feudalism was to increase the power of the great vassals at the expense of the central authority. The feudal vassal became by a natural process the provincial lord. In England the feudal system of land tenure was adopted, but the disruptive influences of feudalism were steadily and successfully resisted by the English kings, as they were checked by natural causes.¹ The strength of the crown threw the nobility into the arms of the people, and the extension of popular privileges was the price paid for this alliance. In England, William granted baronies only on terms favourable to the crown, and retained many of the institutions of the conquered. Feudalism was rather a check on dangerous power; the earldoms became fiefs, and bishops had to accept the status of barons. If the Norman count became the English earl, the English earl became the Norman count. In France, on the other hand, everything tended to throw power into the hands of the nobles, and to form a despotic aristocracy, strengthened by the assumption of surnames in the tenth

¹ See Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, ii., 115 *et seq.*

century, by the recognition of the principles of heredity of office in the eleventh, and in the twelfth century by the invention of armorial bearings. The process of feudal aggrandisement was not carried so far in France as in Germany, where the lord became the petty independent prince, but the privileges conferred on the great landowner were excessive, and only less dangerous than in Germany, where the process of disruption was carried to extreme limits. As compared with England, the French nobles, in spite of the repressive policy of Philip Augustus, held extreme power. "They held their lands by prescription rather than grant." The power of the crown was weak. They had the right to coin money and to levy war. They were exempt from legislative control and from all public tributes except the feudal aids. They possessed considerable, if not exclusive, judicial power in their own territories, and finally, through the custom of sub-infeudation, the institutions of feudalism took deep root in the country. In England class oppression virtually ceased at the end of the sixteenth century. In France a sanguinary revolution, two hundred years later, swept away abuses which reform had been powerless to touch.

xi. In the eleventh century the principle of personal merit was introduced by the institutions of chivalry. But the spirit of chivalry was rather to increase the privileges of the nobles by engrafting the principle of merit on that of descent. Only the noble by birth could receive knighthood, the highly esteemed prize of faithful and courageous service, and knighthood could not be bequeathed. Chivalry reformed and quickened the old aristocracy, but it increased the strength of the protective institutions and class privileges of feudalism. In England knighthood was territorial, implying a special land-tenure and obligations, instead of an honorary and voluntary service. It soon lost its military and distinguished character, and before the end of the fifteenth century had fallen into actual disrepute.

xii. We have now briefly to notice the rise of a court nobility in the practice of granting letters of nobility, begun in 1271 by Philip the Hardy. The natural result of making nobility no longer dependent on lineage and landed wealth was at first to lower the high standard.

Lawyers pretended that nobility "could only rest on royal concession," and were rewarded by an official nobility in return for the defence of prerogative. "The war lord gave place to the law lord" at a later date in England than in France, but when peerage by tenure ceased, England alone thoroughly recognized the great truth that nobility should be the outward symbol of merit, past or present. At first the service was rendered to the monarch as an individual, then to the monarch through the State in war, religion, law, politics, commerce, science, art. The English nobility, though tending more and more to become a plutocracy, can claim to have represented the true aristocracy of the country. In France great statesmen and lawyers were from time to time ennobled; but the later French nobility was essentially a court nobility, and on the Continent we have no exact parallel to the steady stream of merit which has given vitality to the English aristocracy. In England the military spirit soon gave way to the industrial, and military prowess ceased at an early date to be the one road to nobility except court patronage. Constitutional government brought great lawyers and statesmen to the front, besides limiting the power of the king to enoble court favourites and ministers to kingly intrigues. Charles II. momentarily assimilated the Court of St. James's to the Court of Versailles, but the evil was soon checked. In England, again, nobility has always descended only to the eldest male in direct line, not to the whole family of the noble, a valuable limitation to the principle of inherited nobility. Compare the French, German, Italian, and Spanish aristocracies with that of England. The physical features of Scotland, and the weakness of the crown gave an excessive strength to the Scottish nobility, which, though vigorously resisted by the clergy, was only weakened by the union, and later, by the co-operation of the nobles in the rebellion of 1745.

xiii. Comparing ancient with modern aristocracy, we may notice the unity of the former in opposition to the disruptive tendencies of the latter. Mr. Freeman writes,¹ in reference to the mediæval cities of Italy, "A Greek

¹ Freeman, *Essays*.

aristocracy was a body of invaders, who settled in a conquered city, and who handed on exclusive political rights to their descendants. Sometimes a privileged class arose by a gradual process from among the body of their fellow-citizens. This was the case with the long-lived oligarchy of Venice, and the brilliant and more righteous oligarchy of Berne. A city which contained a large patrician element from its first foundation, enlarged its territory by repeated conquests and purchases, till the civic oligarchy found itself changed into the corporate despot of an extensive dominion. Hence the Grecian, Venetian, and Bernese oligarchies acted strictly as an oligarchical class bound together by a common spirit and interest. But in most Italian cities the half-tamed feudal lords were gathered into the town not a little against their will. They were isolated and lawless." Modern aristocracies have been, with some important whig exceptions, atomistic, except where the defence of class privileges has drawn their members together. The ancient noble was at once the citizen of a large city, and a member of the government. The modern noble was a territorial lord, a petty prince in possible antagonism with the central authority.

xiv. Is the existence of a nobility an advantage or a disadvantage to a community? The disadvantages are obvious. The progress of mankind is towards equality. In some communities there is a stronger movement towards social than towards political equality, though the latter is immeasurably more important. At present schemes to bring about material equality are chimerical. America and Switzerland have no ennobled class, and France has at present determined to distribute no more titles. With the decline of the military spirit, the *raison d'être* for nobility ceased, and with the rise of a reign of law and equal justice, the protection of the powerful and the obedience of the weak, as a return for protection, were no longer necessary. Class distinctions are essentially harmful, and contain the seeds of disunion and sedition. Many peerages were conferred for disgraceful services rather than for public merit. True worth is lost sight of in titular distinction, and the principle of heredity is as mistaken as it is dangerous. A good and useful

citizen is lost to the State as a member of a privileged and obstructive class. Reform is less possible when it has always to fear the opposition of a powerful nobility, strongly interested in the maintenance of the *status quo*. The tendency of modern civilization is to lower aristocracy with its "theatrical exhibition." "Society is becoming less stately."

xv. From a purely political point of view, if the nobility are *ex officio* a part of the legislature, it may be urged that the born legislator is a fiction, that class privileges are intensified and aggravated, that the Upper House can never be brought into harmony with the Lower House, and public affairs are sure to be brought to a deadlock ; that the principle of descent is contrary to the principle of representation, and handicaps the commoner in his services to the State ; and, lastly, that as a matter of history the House of Lords has obstructed every reform in law, commerce, and education, every means of civil and religious enfranchisement that has been carried during the last fifty years.

xvi. On the other hand it may be argued that eminence must exist even with the industrial spirit. Commerce leaves room for an aristocracy of wealth and intelligence ; it requires the protection of great generals, and the guidance of great statesmen. It is to the advantage of the State that merit be openly and handsomely recognized by titular distinctions and social privileges. Moreover, nobility is an outward mark and symbol of greatness, appealing strongly to a certain class of minds, which would otherwise not respect greatness nor obey authority. Again, it sets before men a higher goal, and, to a certain extent, prevents the race for money from becoming universal. To be a millionaire is more than half way to a peerage. Yet a man, however rich, is still expected to show some public service before he can claim one. It also prevents the worship of office, and the rule of a powerful bureaucracy, as in France. Finally, it does in a faint and ghost-like fashion represent that age of chivalry whose obsequies Burke pronounced. Mr. Arnold, while proclaiming the gospel of equality, acknowledges the virtues of the "barbarians," as he styles our English aristocracy. "Breeding," "gentleness," "nobility" have acquired a new connotation,

but the old meaning is not wholly lost. Descent is, perhaps, not the best title to distinction ; but few will seek a greatness which comes only in old age if they cannot leave it as an inheritance to their children.

xvi. In the world of politics it may be said that the existence of a "House of Lords" is a bulwark against revolution, but only, as Mr. Bagehot notices,¹ up to a certain point. It is an anomaly, and, to some extent, exists only on sufferance. Its existence shows that revolution is unlikely. If the revolution came, it would be powerless to stem the torrent. It is not the best form of a second chamber, but it shares in the advantages which the double system of legislation enjoys. It is useful as a check on the legislative tyranny of sinister interests which have escaped the notice of the Lower House. It gives unity and coherence to measures, as its composition is more uniform than that of the Lower House. It understands the principles of compromise and mediation. It has more leisure and dignity, and can calmly revise and correct measures without the hurry and conflicting interests of the more powerful assembly. It is less accessible to sordid influences, and its members are trained up from infancy in questions of statesmanship. It must, however, be allowed that a nobility of descent possessing legislative powers theoretically equal to those of the Lower House, is an anachronism. It is true that the Upper House may be "tuned aright" by the infusion of new blood, and that the numerous members of the Lower House, who are sons of peers, bring the new into harmony with the old ; but, as the House of vested interests, it is sure to come more and more into collision with the Commons, and, if differently constituted, it might take the initiative in some cases, instead of merely revising and correcting, as has been the case since the time of the Duke of Wellington. The anomaly is undoubtedly felt by the peers themselves. A law lord has more real power than a duke ; so great peers seldom appear where they do not show to the best advantage. Much influence is exerted indirectly, but the consciousness of being a sort of legislative *roi fainéant* makes the action of the House of Lords uncertain, timid, and temporizing. Johnson de-

¹ *English Constitution.*

fends primogeniture on the ground that "it only makes one fool in a family." The best work in the Upper House is done by the ex-official element.

xvii. Bacon's views may be thus summarized : "nobility is a protection against despotism ; but it is a source of sedition, and unnecessary for a democracy. The noble is useful to the sovereign as a bulwark against the people, and a source of dignity to the throne. A nobility is expensive, but infuses life and spirit into a nation. A noble house is the work of time, and is an object of reverence, like an ancient castle or oak. In the first instance the founder of the house rose by ability, though not perhaps by virtue. The nobles are apt to be indolent and envious, but they make good servants of kings, as being less exposed to envy from others and as in some sort born to command."

xviii. Bacon's treatment of the subject is temperate and sensible. He does not, like Machiavelli, insist on the necessity of the tumultuous conflict of classes for the passing of good laws. The English noble holds a position quite different from that of the Italian noble. In England the struggle was not between patricians and plebeians, but between king and commons. The noble was, in a way, the connecting link useful to both, being a protection of and check on monarchy, and lessening the friction between them. In Bacon's time nobility was a reality. There was still some danger from "overgrown subjects," and the people had yet to learn their power. The purses and lives of the people needed protection ; kings needed useful ministers, who would strengthen their legitimate authority, but repress despotism. Nobility was further a necessity, as war was a necessity. It gave spirit to a nation. A splendid nobility "must conduce unto martial greatness." Such a conception of nobility left room for Bacon as chief councillor of a powerful and well-intentioned monarch with kindly thoughts for science.

[See also Essay, *Of Ceremonies and Respects.*]

XV. Of Seditions and Troubles.

SHEPHERDS of people had need know the calendars of tempests in State; which are commonly greatest when things grow to equality, as natural tempests are greatest about the aequinoctia. And as there are certain hollow blasts of wind and secret swellings of seas before a tempest, so are there in States:

*"Ille etiam cecos instare tumultus
Sape monet, fraudesque et operta tumescere bella."*

Libels and licentious discourses against the State, when they are frequent and open; and in like sort, false news often running up and down to the disadvantage of the State, and hastily embraced, are amongst the signs of troubles. Virgil, giving the pedigree of Fame, saith, she was sister to the giants:

*"Illam terra parens, ira irritata deorum,
Extremam (ut perhibent) Caeo Enceladoque sororem
Progeniuit."*

As if fames were the relics of seditions past. But they are no less indeed the preludes of seditions to come. Howsoever, he noteth it right, that seditious tumults and seditious fames differ no more but as brother and sister, masculine and feminine: especially if it come to that, that the best actions of a State, and the most plausible, and which ought to give greatest contentment, are taken in ill sense and traduced. For that shows the envy great, as Tacitus saith, "*Conflata magna invidia, seu bene seu male gesta premunt.*" Neither doth it follow that because these fames are a sign of troubles, that the suppressing of them with too

much severity should be a remedy of troubles. For the despising of them many times checks them best ; and the going about to stop them doth but make a wonder long-lived. Also that kind of obedience, which Tacitus speaketh of, is to be held suspected : 30
“*Erant in officio, sed tamen qui mallent mandata imperantium interpretari, quam exequi.*” Disputing, excusing, cavilling upon mandates and directions, is a kind of shaking off the yoke, and assay of disobedience : especially if in those disputings they 35 which are for the direction speak fearfully and tenderly, and those that are against it, audaciously.

Also, as Machiavel noteth well, when princes, that ought to be common parents, make themselves as a party, and lean to a side, it is as a boat that is 40 overthrown by uneven weight on the one side : as was well seen in the time of Henry III. of France ; for, first himself entered League for the extirpation of the Protestants, and, presently after, the same League was turned upon himself. For when the authority of 45 princes is made but an accessory to a cause, and that there be other bands that tie faster than the band of sovereignty, kings begin to be put almost out of possession.

Also, when discords, and quarrels, and factions are 50 carried openly and audaciously, it is a sign the reverence of government is lost. For the motions of the greatest persons in a government ought to be as the motions of the planets under *primum mobile* (according to the old opinion), which is, that every of them 55 is carried swiftly by the highest motion, and softly in their own motion. And, therefore, when great ones

in their own particular motion move violently, and, as Tacitus expresseth it well, "*liberius quam ut imperantium meminissent*," it is a sign the orbs are out of frame. For reverence is that wherewith princes are girt from God, who threateneth the dissolving thereof: *Solvam cingula regum.*

So when any of the four pillars of government are mainly shaken, or weakened (which are Religion, Justice, Counsel, and Treasure), men had need to pray for fair weather. But let us pass from this part of predictions (concerning which, nevertheless, more light may be taken from that which followeth), and let us speak first of the materials of seditions, then of the motives of them, and thirdly of the remedies.

Concerning the Materials of seditions. It is a thing well to be considered: for the surest way to prevent seditions (if the times do bear it), is to take away the matter of them. For if there be fuel prepared, it is hard to tell whence the spark shall come that shall set it on fire. The matter of seditions is of two kinds, much poverty, and much discontentment. It is certain so many overthrown estates, so many votes for troubles. Lucan noteth well the state of Rome before the civil war:

"*Hinc usura vorax rapidumque in tempore fœnus,
Hinc concussa fides, et multis utile bellum.*"

This same "*multis utile bellum*" is an assured and infallible sign of a State disposed to seditions and troubles. And if this poverty and broken estate in the better sort be joined with a want and necessity in the mean people, the danger is imminent and great. For the rebellions of the belly are the worst. As for dis-

contentments, they are in the politic body like to humours in the natural, which are apt to gather a ^{pre}ternatural heat, and to inflame. And let no prince 90 measure the danger of them by this, whether they be just or unjust (for that were to imagine people to be too reasonable; who do often spurn at their own good), nor yet by this, whether the griefs whereupon they rise be in fact great or small; for they are the 95 most dangerous discontentments, where the fear is greater than the feeling. *Dolendi modus, timendi non item.* Besides, in great oppressions, the same things that provoke the patience do withal ^{take} ~~mate~~ the courage; but in fears it is not so. Neither let any prince, or 100 State, be secure concerning discontentments, because they have been often, or have been long, and yet no peril hath ensued. For as it is true that every vapour or fume doth not turn into a storm, so it is nevertheless true, that storms, though they blow over 105 divers times, yet may fall at last. And, as the Spanish proverb noteth well, *The cord breaketh at the last by the weakest pull.*

The Causes and Motives of sedition are innovation in religion, taxes, alteration of laws and customs, 110 breaking of privileges, general oppression, advancement of unworthy persons, strangers, dearths, disbanded soldiers, factions grown desperate, and whatsoever in offending people joineth and knitteth them in a common cause.

115

For the Remedies; there may be some general preservatives, whereof we will speak: as for the just 116 cure, it must answer to the particular disease, and so be left to counsel rather than rule.

120 The first remedy or prevention, is to remove, by all means possible, that material cause of sedition whereof we speak, which is want and poverty in the estate. To which purpose serveth the opening and well-balancing of trade; the cherishing of manufactures; 125 the banishing of idleness; the repressing of waste and excess by sumptuary laws; the improvement and husbanding of the soil; the regulating of prices of things vendible; the moderating of taxes and tributes; and the like. Generally, it is to be fore- 130 seen that the population of a kingdom (especially if it be not mown down by wars), do not exceed the stock of the kingdom which should maintain them. Neither is the population to be reckoned only by number. For a smaller number, that spend more 135 and earn less, do wear out an estate sooner than a greater number that live low and gather more. Therefore the multiplying of nobility, and other degrees of quality, in an over-proportion to the common people, doth speedily bring a State to necessity; and so doth 140 likewise an overgrown clergy; for they bring nothing to the stock; and in like manner, when more are bred scholars than preferments can take off.

It is likewise to be remembered, that, forasmuch as the increase of any estate must be upon the foreigner 145 (for whatsoever is somewhere gotten is somewhere lost), there be but three things which one nation selleth unto another; the commodity as nature yieldeth it, the manufacture, and the vecture, or carriage. So that, if these three wheels go, wealth will flow as in a 150 spring tide. And it cometh many times to pass, that *materiam superabit opus*, that the work and carriage

is worthier than the materials.

is more worth than the material, and enricheth a State more; as is notably seen in the Low Countrymen, who have the best mines above ground in the world. | 47

Above all things, good policy is to be used, that the treasures and money in a State be not gathered into few hands. For otherwise, a State may have a great stock, and yet starve; and money is like muck, not good except it be spread. This is done chiefly by suppressing, or at the least keeping a strait hand upon the devouring trades of usury, engrossing, great pasturages, and the like. 155 160

For removing discontentments, or, at least, the danger of them: there is in every State (as we know), two portions of subjects, the nobles and the commonalty. When one of these is discontent, the danger is not great: for common people are of slow motion, if they be not excited by the greater sort; and the greater sort are of small strength, except the multitude be apt and ready to move of themselves. Then is the danger, when the greater sort do but wait for the troubling of the waters amongst the meaner, that then they may declare themselves. The poets feign that the rest of the gods would have bound Jupiter; which he hearing of, by the counsel of Pallas sent for Briareus, with his hundred hands, to come in to his aid. An emblem, no doubt, to show how safe it is for monarchs to make sure of the goodwill of common people. 165 170 175

To give moderate liberty for griefs and discontentments to evaporate (so it be without too great insolency or bravery), is a safe way. For he that turneth the humours back, and maketh the wound bleed in- 180

wards, endangereth malign ulcers and pernicious
185 impostumations. *abscess*

The part of Epimetheus mought well become Prometheus, in the case of discontentments ; for there is not a better provision against them. Epimetheus, when griefs and evils flew abroad, at last shut the
190 lid, and kept hope in the bottom of the vessel. Certainly, the politic and artificial nourishing and entertaining of hopes, and carrying men from hopes to hopes, is one of the best antidotes against the poison of discontentments. And it is a certain sign
195 of a wise government and proceeding, when it can hold men's hearts by hopes, when it cannot by satisfaction ; and when it can handle things in such manner as no evil shall appear so peremptory but that it hath some outlet of hope : which is the less
200 hard to do, because both particular persons and factions are apt enough to flatter themselves, or, at least, to brave that which they believe not.

Also, the foresight and prevention, that there be no likely or fit head whereupon discontented persons may
205 resort, and under whom they may join, is a known, but an excellent point of caution. I understand a fit head to be one that hath greatness and reputation, that hath confidence with the discontented party, and upon whom they turn their eyes, and that is thought
210 discontented in his own particular ; which kind of persons are either to be won and reconciled to the State, and that in a fast and true manner, or to be fronted with some other of the same party that may oppose them, and so divide the reputation. Generally,
215 the dividing and breaking of all factions and combina-

tions that are adverse to the State, and setting them at distance, or, at least, distrust among themselves, is not one of the worst remedies. For it is a desperate case, if those that hold with the proceeding of the State be full of discord and faction, and those that are against it be entire and united. 220

I have noted that some witty and sharp speeches which have fallen from princes, have given fire to seditions. Cæsar did himself infinite hurt in that speech, "*Sylla nescivit literas, non potuit dictare,*" for it did utterly cut off that hope which men had entertained, that he would at one time or other give over his dictatorship. Galba undid himself by that speech, "*legi a se militem, non emi:*" for it put the soldiers out of hope of the donative. Probus, likewise, by that speech, "*Si vixero, non opus erit amplius Romano imperio militibus;*" a speech of great despair for the soldiers. And many the like. Surely princes had need, in tender matters and ticklish times, to beware what they say, especially in these short speeches, which fly abroad like darts, and are thought to be shot out of their secret intentions. For, as for large discourses, they are flat things, and not so much noted. 235

Lastly, let princes, against all events, not be without some great person, one, or rather more, of military valour, near unto them, for the repressing of seditions in their beginnings. For, without that, there useth to be more trepidation in court upon the first breaking out of trouble than were fit. And the State runneth the danger of that which Tacitus saith—"Atque is habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur." But let such

And such was the state of the Roman empire, that it was tolerated by all.

justly
 military persons be assured and well reputed of, rather than factious and popular; holding also good
 250 correspondence with the other great men in the State: or else the remedy is worse than the disease.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. All sedition, says Aristotle, springs from a desire for equality; this should not be absolute but proportionate to men's deserts. Unfortunately men agree that justice consists in relative equality, but the agreement is only verbal. The democrat claiming absolute equality, while the oligarch and despot, on the strength of partial superiority, demand absolute inequality. When a person or a class assess their value at a higher rate than it is assessed at under the existing state of things, an attempt is made to effect a redistribution. In some cases the movement is natural and spontaneous. In others, the injustice to be remedied is brought before the notice of the aggrieved by an agitator or by a philanthropist. Sedition is also often produced by the insolence and oppression of the governors, which rouses the people to a sense of injustice before they are positively sensible of the unjust distribution of privileges, political, social, and material. All men seek equality, but most are content to get it by small instalments, and a crisis is the result of injudicious oppression.

ii. In Greece sedition was a normal condition of the small civic communities, but the struggle was rather for political privileges than for a redistribution of material comforts. In Grecian states, with their slave population, poverty was almost unknown, and the disturbing causes came either from the excessive prominence of an ambitious citizen, or from the dangerous friction of classes. At Athens and Sparta, sedition rather arose from the discontented selfishness of classes, or individuals, than from a down-trodden proletariat. The Helots were a danger, but the Perioeci and Metoeci seem to have been fairly contented, while we scarcely hear of Athenian slaves as striving after equality. After the suppression of the despots, Greek states were in unstable equilibrium

between democracy and oligarchy. The danger of despotism, which threatened both forms of government, was guarded against by ostracism. Sparta was an exception, where the rigorous and equal pressure of the Lycurgan discipline on rich and poor alike prevented most of the causes productive of sedition. Strict obedience to the law was enforced on all without exception. Elsewhere an oligarch was as seditious as a democrat. Each thought that his was the best form of government. Each might have the fullest freedom, and every material comfort, everything in short except the particular form of government which he affected. The struggle was as much for an idea, as for a reality. Undoubtedly the oligarchs pressed hard on the democrats, and *vice versa*, but no democrat would have been satisfied with an oligarchy, however just and public-spirited. The conditions of Greek political life at once fostered discontent and supplied opportunities for sedition. Slight differences of opinion were so accentuated that they became real grievances; the public good was lost sight of in public strife. The Greeks had little knowledge of a mixed form of government, and there was no middle-class to keep the balance.

iii. The republics of mediæval Italy present a very similar state of things. There, too, seditions and counter seditions soon begat a thoroughly bad constitutional morality, and interests soon took the place of principles.¹ Party excesses and uncompromising hostility of classes gradually wore away the free institutions of Florence and Mantua, Pisa, Ferrara, until small tyrannies were erected on the ruins of republican government.

iv. Forms of government may be said, *ceteris paribus*, to be stable according to the extent of territory in which they prevail.² This is owing to (a) the impressive effect on the imagination of widespread institutions. There is a certain mystery about them. The machine is at work, but its workers are invisible. In the Greek cities the speedy fall of royalty was owing to their small size. The king was too open to inspection, and generally too near

¹ Freeman, *Essays*.

² The Swiss Federal Republic is a striking exception.

his subjects. (β) The aggressive forces are naturally greater in a small State, and the malcontents can more easily combine. The weak point in the existing government is easily detected. (γ) The repressive force at the disposal of the executive is small, and a sudden *coup* is more possible. (δ) The political passions are stronger and not so well balanced as in a large State. There is no temperate, industrial middle-class, and no provincial caution to check the discontent of the capital. (ε) Every man expects a direct share in the government, and is rarely satisfied with the amount conceded. (ζ) Any disturbance of the relative strength of parties is more direct and more immediate in its influence. Any increase of wealth or strength in any particular class is likely to move the political centre of gravity, and to change institutions. (η) Revolution takes the place of reform.

v. So at Rome, in spite of agrarian distress, class privileges, military spirit, and political adventurers, we find nothing corresponding to the restless agitation of Greek cities. The system of clientship solved many of the problems of pauperism. The respectable, middle-class burgess contributed to the stability of the government. The country tribes added an element of conservative caution and primitive morality. Reform followed reform, and the franchise was wisely though sparingly meted out to conquered districts. Sometimes the reform came too slowly, or a slave-rising threatened the public safety. Sometimes the franchise was given too grudgingly. Not unfrequently class distinctions endangered the public peace. Political adventurers disquieted only the last years of the republic. The discontented veterans did not become a danger until the times of Sulla. Catiline was a solitary instance of a real sedition. The causes of discord were finally checked by the strong hand of imperialism, and the senate ceased to hold the reins of authority. The struggle was not between two forms of government, but between rival claimants to supreme power.

vi. The chief dangers of the imperial government came from palace intrigues, military adventurers, and discontented mercenaries. The old patrician families accepted the new *régime* with comparative docility. The senate was educated to submission, and flattered by outward

respect and the semblance of power. The degradation of society, and the absence of any solid centre of resistance offered the imperial purple as a prize to any adventurer, but no change of government was desired except by a few conservatives of the old republican type, who rather isolated themselves from public life than actively assailed the government. The end of the Roman empire was a perfectly natural one. It broke up by its own weight and size. If institutions are unstable in small states, overgrown empires tend to disintegration. Just as the Macedonian empire collapsed when the master mind ceased to direct and check ambitious generals, so the different parts of the Roman empire gradually lost their cohesion, and distant provinces either fell off from the imperial government or offered a base of operations for an attack on the central government. The end came late, for such "federations" have this advantage, that, the secession of one or more communities does little harm, if the central government is strong. The loss of a limb is not fatal. But each blow enfeebled the body politic, and weakened the cohesion of the remaining members, until the farce of imperialism was ended by the deluge of barbarians.

vii. The republics of Italy have been already noticed. Elsewhere in mediæval Europe the peaceful and comparatively undisturbed development of England stands in marked contrast to the turbulent politics of her contemporaries. On the Continent we find constant resistance on the part of powerful subjects; the great feudal lord was at once a protection and a danger. Individual kings were again and again deposed, and dynasties changed. Religious intolerance, the great danger of Bacon's time, often produced rebellion, and the commercial cities of Brabant and Flanders seditiously clamoured and fought against the infringement or denial of commercial privileges. But there was no organized attempt to substitute more popular forms of government for those already existing. The protective spirit was too strong. The power of the king, nobles, and church generally united against risings of the oppressed subjects. The evil day was averted until the French revolution in France. With other nations the change has yet to come, in a less violent form, but effec-

tively and surely. In England we get the steady advance of a middle-class unmolested by the privileges of the nobles, disliking violent change, and always ready to side with law against sedition. The disputes connected with land tenure and the free labourer at one time seemed a serious danger, but timely, if not final, reform usually followed. Freedom of thought and conscience was gained after a short struggle. The would-be despotism of the Stuarts was, not without bloodshed and a reaction, exchanged for a constitutional monarch.

viii. The English ideal is rather *freedom* than *equality*. Undoubtedly the two tend to become identical, but there is an equality of subjection and suffering. In America and France freedom is lost sight of in the desire for equality, and especially social equality. The Frenchman is satisfied with the social equality of *la vie Parisienne*. The titles of the aristocrats were as obnoxious to him as their oppression. In America the rowdy, the senator, the plutocrat, and the president are all plain citizens. The English submit to a great deal of unnecessary social inequality. An Englishman loves a lord. He is content if there are no restrictions placed on rising. He rarely upholds wild schemes of reorganizing society and asserting the equality of all men. Chartism has little in common with the Socialism of Germany, the Communism of France, and the Nihilism of Russia. Compared with France, Germany, and Russia, the Englishman is free and therefore contented. The English are proverbial grumblers, but at the same time the national temperament is practical and sensible. There is at present a movement towards more widely diffused political power in the adoption of the caucus-system, and the change of the representative into the delegate. The movement is, however, soberly and legitimately made. Timely reform represses sedition. Heine writes, in his *English Fragments*, "The Englishman loves freedom as his lawful wife, he possesses her, and, if he does not treat her with special tenderness, he knows how to defend her like a man in the hour of need, and woe to the Lothario who breaks into her holy dwelling. The Frenchman loves freedom as a mistress. He glows and burns for her, he throws himself at her feet with high-flown protestations, he fights

to the death, he ventures on a thousand different follies for her dear sake. The German loves freedom as his aged grandmother." But "the splenetic Englishman gets tired of his wife, ties a rope round her neck, and takes her for sale to Smithfield. The sickle Frenchman becomes faithless, deserts her, and dances off singing to join the fine ladies of the *Palais Royal*. The German will never quite turn his old grandmother out in the cold, he will ever give her a place at his fireside, where she can tell her fairy tales to his listening offspring." Yet the Englishman never forgets freedom, though he may temporarily lose sight of it in wild socialistic schemes for equality or abject worship of gold and rank. The picture of the Frenchman is far truer. He postures and writes, and will even die for freedom, but he wins it only to lose it again. He is the victim of political ideas, and the enemy of compromise. He loves change, and the reign of ideas. His imagination is excited by theatrical *coups*. Moreover, Paris is France. Centralization reproduces the evils of the small state system. The German respects and thinks of freedom, but dreamily and impassively. He could have freedom and yet allows himself to be over-governed.

ix. Still even in England socialism is on the increase. The relations between capital and labour are seriously strained. The questions of rent and land-tenure are dangerously important. Material equality seems to be chimerical. Tocqueville¹ points out that the division and perfection of labour limits and restricts the powers of the workman. The director of large industrial establishments expands, but the better the workman, the worse the individual. The mistake of socialism is to ignore the necessity of higher and consequently more expensive qualities for management, as well as to suppose that selfishness can be eliminated from human action. Material equality is tantamount to the destruction of civilization, progress, intellect, and in its last form communism, to the destruction of morality. It is only possible for gods or brutes. Socialism handicaps intellect. At present the dullard is at a disadvantage. The fittest, it is said, ought to survive. Artificial restrictions on the law of survival of the fittest are dangerous.

¹ *Democracy in America*, Part II., bk. iii., ch. xx.

x. The best preventives of sedition are liberty of thought and conscience, a free press, with perfect liberty to ventilate grievances, representation, a judicious settlement of the land and rent questions, an open road for merit to win advancement, social equality in theory, if not in practice, cautious state interference, a steady, widely diffused increase of material comforts, moderate and equal taxation (the salt tax was not the least influential cause of the French revolution), the growth of a good political morality, and patriotism, which comes only in its best form as the steady affection for free institutions. Emigration is of the nature of a *pis aller*. Hence democracy, which most nearly fulfils these conditions, is eminently unrevolutionary. Commerce is unseditionary, and democracy is commercial. "When social conditions," says Tocqueville,¹ "are equal, every man is apt to live apart, centred in himself, and forgetful of the public. . . . If ever America undergoes great revolutions, they will be brought about by the presence of the black race on the soil of the United States."² Again, "in a great democratic people the poor are comparatively few in number, and the laws do not bind them together by the ties of irremediable and hereditary penury. . . . The wealthy, on the other hand, are scarce and powerless. . . . They do not form a distinct class. . . . As there is no race of poor men, so there is no race of rich men; the latter spring up daily out of the multitude, and relapse into it again." Yet there is an aristocracy of commerce, and the struggle for material equality, the struggle of labour against capital, may be only beginning.

XVI. Of Atheism.

I HAD rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind. And therefore

¹ *Democracy in America*, Part II., bk. iii., ch. xxi.

² Written in 1840.

God never wrought miracles to ^{refute} convince atheism, because His ordinary works convince it. It is true 5 that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but when it 10 beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity. Nay, even that school which is most accused of atheism, doth most demonstrate religion; that is, the school of Leucippus, and Democritus, and Epicurus. 15 For it is a thousand times more credible, that four mutable elements and one immutable fifth essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions or seeds unplaced, should have produced this order and beauty without 20 a divine marshal.

The Scripture saith, "*The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God;*" it is not said, *The fool hath thought in his heart*: so as he rather saith it by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly 25 believe it, or be persuaded of it; for none deny there is a God, but those for whom it maketh that there were no God. It appeareth in nothing more, that atheism is rather in the lip than in the heart of man, than by this, that atheists will ever be talking of that 30 their opinion, as if they fainted in it themselves, and would be glad to be strengthened by the consent of others. Nay, more, you shall have atheists strive to get disciples, as it fareth with other sects. And, which is most of all, you shall have of them that will 35

suffer for atheism, and not recant : whereas, if they did truly think that there were no such thing as God, why should they trouble themselves ? Epicurus is charged, that he did but dissemble for his credit's sake, when
 40 he affirmed there were Blessed Natures, but such as enjoy themselves without having respect to the government of the world. Wherein they say he did temporize, though in secret he thought there was no God. But certainly he is traduced ; for his words are noble
 45 and divine : "*Non deos vulgi negare profanum ; sed vulgi opiniones diis applicare profanum.*" Plato could have said no more. And although he had the confidence to deny the administration, he had not the power to deny the nature. The Indians of the West have
 50 names for their particular gods, though they have no name for God (as if the heathens should have had the names Jupiter, Apollo, Mars, etc., but not the word Deus), which shows that even those barbarous people have the notion, though they have not the
 55 latitude and extent of it. So that against atheists the very savages take part with the very subtlest philosophers. The contemplative atheist is rare : a Diagoras, a Bion, a Lucian perhaps, and some others. And yet
 49 they seem to be more than they are, for that all that
 60 impugn a received religion, or superstition, are, by the adverse part, branded with the name of atheists. But the great atheists indeed are hypocrites, which are ever handling holy things, but without feeling, so as they must needs be cauterized in the end.

65 The causes of atheism are, divisions in religion, if they be many (for any one main division addetn zeal to both sides, but many divisions introduce atheism) ;

another is, scandal of priests, when it is come to that which St. Bernard saith, "*Non est jam dicere, ut populus, sic sacerdos; quia nec sic populus, ut sacerdos;*" a third 70 is, a custom of profane scoffing in holy matters, which doth by little and little deface the reverence of religion; and lastly, learned times, especially with peace and prosperity; for troubles and adversities do more bow men's minds to religion.

75

They that deny a God destroy man's nobility, for certainly man is of kin to the beasts by his body; and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base and ignoble creature. It destroys likewise magnanimity, and the raising of human nature. For take 80 an example of a dog, and mark what a generosity and courage he will put on when he finds himself maintained by a man, who to him is instead of a God, or *melior natura*: which courage is manifestly such as that creature, without that confidence of a better 85 nature than his own, could never attain. So man, when he resteth and assureth himself upon divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and faith which human nature in itself could not obtain; therefore, as atheism is in all respects hateful, so in this, 90 that it depriveth human nature of the means to exalt itself above human frailty. As it is in particular persons, so it is in nations. Never was there such a State for magnanimity as Rome. Of this State hear what Cicero saith: "*Quam volumus, licet, patres con-* 95 *scripti, nos amemus, tamen nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pænos, nec artibus, Græcos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis et terræ domestico nativoque sensu Italos ipsos et Latinos; sed pietate, ac*

100 *religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod deorum immortalium numine omnia regi, gubernarique perspeximus, omnes gentes nationesque superavimus."*

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Practical atheists, whether savages who have never risen to the conception of a God, or civilized men who live without God in the world, have been common enough ; but it is questionable whether there has ever existed a genuine dogmatic atheist. So Milton, in the *Samson Agonistes*—

" Just are the ways of God,
And justifiable to men ;
Unless there be who think not God at all.
If any be, they walk obscure ;
For of such doctrine never was there school,
But the heart of the fool,
And no man therein doctor but himself."

So, too, J. S. Mill writes of his father, " Dogmatic atheism he looked upon as absurd, as most of those whom the world has considered atheists have always done." Generally, it has been used as a vague term of abuse, implying nothing more than a difference in religious opinions. Thus Mæcenas writes to Augustus, " Do not tolerate any atheist or magician (ἄθεον ἢ γόητα) ; chastise all innovations in religion as likely to form conspiracies and seditions." Atheism was a common charge against the first Christians. Luther denounced the Pope as an atheist, and the papists retaliated on the reformers generally.

ii. The atheistic spirit is fostered by various influences. It may mean a critical and polemical age, an excessive and one-sided study of physical science, an undue exaltation of logic and the powers of the human intellect, an age of utilitarian morality, an age of mechanism, convention, artificiality ; an age of social misery, when the old system is doomed, and the new order of things is only seen through a glass darkly, when luxury, extortion, and class-interests trample down for the last time a starved, taxed, illiterate humanity. Atheism is the

first note of revolution. Pessimism grows until it denies a God. The destruction of the belief in things divine ends in the destruction of government and society. Change is almost invariably carried too far. Hatred of superstition leads to the annihilation of religion. Fear of tyranny ends in anarchy.

iii. Atheism was the forerunner of the French revolution. Carlyle tells us that David Hume, dining once with Diderot and others, said that he did not think that there were any atheists. "Count us," said a certain Monsieur —. They were eighteen. "Well," said he, "it is pretty fair if you have fished out eighteen at the first cast, and three others who know not what to think of it." "The case," writes Carlyle, "was common. Your *philosophe* of the first water had grown to reckon Atheism a necessary accomplishment. Diderot was a proselytizing atheist, who esteemed the creed worth earnest, reiterated preaching."

iv. Reason of itself cannot demonstrate the existence of God. Mere logic—the meagre "rushlight of closet logic"—is powerless unless the conclusion is assumed in the premisses. "He who will admit no organ of truth but logic, and nothing to exist but what can be argued on, must even content himself with this sad result, of the æther to make a gas, of God a force, of the second world a coffin, of man an aimless nondescript, little better than a kind of vermin." The mechanical system of thought is in itself atheistic. The argument from design has a flaw. The watch may have made itself, or have been made, to tick, not to show the time. The Druses had a theory that God made the world, and then became non-existent. Besides, design only proves God outside the world. We want to find God in the world. "Think ye," says Goethe, "that God made the world, and then let it run round His little finger?"

v. Like Coleridge¹ and Carlyle,² we must dismiss "faint possible Theism,"³ which leads nowhere, and is scarcely distinguishable from Pantheism. "Pantheism," says Herr Professor Teufelsdröckh, "is impossible: '*Il y a dans le cœur humain une fibre religieux.*'" No Atheist denies

¹ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*.

² Carlyle, *Essays*.

³ *Theism* is personal; *Pantheism*, impersonal.

a Divinity, but only some name of a Divinity." The doctrine of an innate idea is inconsistent with modern theories of development. The belief in a personal God is a growth both in the race and individual. De Tocqueville associates pantheism with democracy. The individual is lost in the community. The human mind is fixed on the gigantic whole, which it reduces to unity; firstly by a single cause, then by including God and the universe in one great whole. He might have added that democracies are material and bedazzled by the triumphs of exact science—followers after laws of nature rather than the spiritual life. Pantheism cannot be far off from atheism. The divinity of motion or electricity is the concrete form of the abstraction. "Against Pantheism," says De Tocqueville, "all who abide in their attachment to the true greatness of man, should struggle and combine."

vi. The incompleteness of the human system without a personal God, the universality of the idea in *the highest and best minds*, the Spencerian appeal to consciousness, the belief in the existence and final supremacy of good, are among the threads of argument which, apart from revelation, guide us to a belief in a personal God.¹

vii. The transcendental position is thus stated by Carlyle: "To the transcendentalist the whole question of the origin and existence of nature must be greatly simplified. The whole hostility of matter is at an end, for matter is itself annihilated, and the black spectre of Atheism, with all its sickly dews, melts into nothingness for ever." "The reason (*Vernunft*) is absolute and beyond the relative understanding, and includes the doctrine of true faith² and worship." Jacobi says that it is the instinct of the understanding to correct the reason. Faith, by St. Augustine's definition, is "*intuitiva cognitio*."

viii. To this must be added the "moral" solution. The idea of God dwells in our souls as a motive to action, and gains strength as we grow in goodness. Carlyle says,

¹ Aristotle wavers between a personal Deity and Pantheism. His general view is that the Divine is the manifestation of reason in the world, as form (*εἶδος*) or law.

² So Hegelianism, leaving room for faith, is generally regarded as more orthodox than other philosophy.

"We must not look *there*, but *here*. The vast domain of the invisible can only be seen by the eye of inspiration. We see and know God just in so far as He is in us."

ix. There is a half-way house between atheism and belief, to which allusion may briefly be made. Some are content to leave the matter in suspense, and to relegate all things superhuman to the realm of the unknowable. All inquiry, they say, is useless. Judgment must be suspended. There is no light. Agnosticism is the convenient word invented by Professor Huxley to express this creed which voluntarily gives up the motive of religion, because, like other mysteries of science and philosophy, the human intellect is too finite to present an accurate conception of divinity.

x. Atheism revolts the sentiments more than the reason. "I plunge stupidly," says Montaigne, "head foremost into this dumb deep, which swallows me and chokes me in a moment—full of insipidity and indolence." Atheism has often been a fashion; it can scarcely become a creed. "There is no being eloquent for atheism. In that exhausted receiver the mind cannot use its wings,—the clearest proof that it is out of its element."¹ So, "it was Diderot's allotment to die with all due stupidity."² Jean Paul Richter reveals to us in vision a world without God. "I could with less pain deny immortality than the Deity; there I should lose but a world covered with mists, here I should lose the present world, namely, the sun thereof. The whole spiritual universe is dashed asunder by the hand of Atheism into numberless quicksilver points of Me's, which glitter, run, waver, fly together or asunder, without unity or continuance. No one in creation is so alone as the denier of God. He mourns with an orphaned heart that has lost its great father by the corpse of nature, which no world-spirit moves and holds together." And again, "When I looked up to the immeasurable world for the divine eye, it glared on me with an empty, black, bottomless eye-socket. . . . We are orphans, I and you; we are without a father." John Wesley simply points to the same truth in his fable of the toad which had never seen the light. Atheism is misery. "Anti-Christ also bears our cross for us." There is a logicity and grandeur.

¹ Hare, *Guesses at Truth*.

² Carlyle, *Essays, Diderot*.

and unity in pantheism which have commended it to the philosophic, and especially to the Teutonic mind. It admits poetry and sentiment, yet seems to go hand in hand with science; but atheism is despair and pessimism.

xi. Is atheism less harmful than superstition? A community of atheists is scarcely conceivable, but there have been, and are, communities of the superstitious. "Fanaticism," says Voltaire, "is a thousand times more fatal than atheism. Atheism does not inspire fatal passions like fanaticism. Atheism, it is true, does not oppose crimes, but fanaticism causes them. People one town with Epicuruses, Protagorases, and Desbarreaux, and another with Jansenists and Molinists, and you will soon see in which town are more troubles and quarrels." But this contrast is obviously unfair. The first town should be peopled with a mixed population of atheists and theists. There is, as Bacon says, such a thing as a superstitious horror of superstition. It may fairly be argued that atheists have rarely persecuted, because they have rarely had the chance. That they might do so, if they got the upper hand, the French revolution proves.

XVII. Of Superstition.

IT were better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of Him. For the one is unbelief, the other is contumely: and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity. Plutarch saith well to that purpose: "*Surely*," saith he, "*I had rather a great deal men should say there was no such a man at all as Plutarch, than that they should say there was one Plutarch that would eat his children as soon as they were born,*" as the poets speak of Saturn. And as the contumely is greater towards God, so the

danger is greater towards men. Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation: all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not. But superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute ¹⁵ monarchy in the minds of men. Therefore atheism did never perturb States; for it makes men weary of themselves, as looking no further: and we see the times inclined to atheism, as the times of Augustus Cæsar, were civil times. But superstition hath been ²⁰ the confusion of many States, and bringeth in a new *primum mobile*, that ravisheth all the spheres of government.

The master of superstition is the people, and in all superstition wise men follow fools; and arguments are ²⁵ fitted to practice, in a reversed order. It was gravely said by some of the prelates in the Council of Trent, where the doctrine of the schoolmen bare great sway, that "*the schoolmen were like astronomers, which did feign eccentrics and epicycles, and such engines of orbs,* ³⁰ *to save the phenomena, though they knew there were no such things;*" and, in like manner, that the schoolmen had framed a number of subtle and intricate axioms and theorems to save the practice of the Church.

35

The causes of superstition are; pleasing and sensual rites and ceremonies; excess of outward and pharisaical holiness; over-great reverence of traditions, which cannot but load the Church; the stratagems of prelates for their own ambition and lucre; the ⁴⁰ favouring too much of good intentions, which openeth the gate to conceits and novelties; the taking an aim

at divine matters by human, which cannot but breed mixture of imaginations ; and, lastly, barbarous times,
 45 especially joined with calamities and disasters.

Superstition, without a veil, is a deformed thing ; for, as it addeth deformity to an ape to be so like a man, so the similitude of superstition to religion makes it the more deformed. And as wholesome
 50 meat corrupteth to little worms, so good forms and orders corrupt into a number of petty observances.

There is a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best if they go furthest from the superstition formerly received ; therefore care
 55 would be had that (as it fareth in ill purgings) the good be not taken away with the bad, which commonly is done when the people is the reformer.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. Those who err through zeal are not to be encouraged, but still are worthy of love.

2. Morality gives us "moderation ;" religion, "perfection ;" *or*, morality gives "self-restraint ;" religion, "self-sacrifice."

3. Superstition is religion of the future (literally, superstition is religion elect).

4. I would sooner believe most incredible marvels of

Against.

1. As apes are rendered more hideous by their likeness to men, so is superstition by its likeness to religion.

2. As self-seeking is hateful in matters of state, so is superstition in matters of religion.

3. It is better to have no belief in God than to have an insulting belief in Him.

4. It was not the sect of Epicurus, but the Stoics,

any religion than that all nature works without a Providence. that troubled common-wealths in olden time.

5. The human mind is incapable of dogmatic atheism. The real atheists are those arch-hypocrites who are always meddling with sacred things, but never feel pious awe.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Superstition is to religion what astrology is to astronomy. "It is founded on fear or ignorance, and leads men to form false ideas of duty, to dread chimeras, and to lean on a broken reed."¹ Belief in omens, oracles, powers of nature; servile attachment to ritual, usage, form of words; the introduction of a supernatural element into every incident of life, all come under the head superstition. The primary meaning of the word is simply belief in the supernatural (cf. Acts xvii. 22); but it has come to be used only *in malam partem*. It is by derivation extra-belief, *aberglaube*.

ii. As far as quantity is concerned, no hard-and-fast line can be drawn between superstition and religion. "Superstition," says Burke, "is the religion of feeble minds, and they must be tolerated in an intermixture of it in some trifling or enthusiastic shape or other, else you will deprive weak minds of a resource found necessary for the strongest." Men wonder first, and know afterwards. In the earliest ages of the world all nature was supernatural. Fetichism conceived all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to that of men, and differing only in intensity.² When man began to generalize and classify phenomena, and perceived their succession in time, he began to group his fetiches, and then to give similar attributes to, and, by a further economy, to unite analogous functions in one divine agent external to the

¹ Pascal, *Pensées*.

² Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, bk. vi., ch. vii.

object. So the gods and goddesses of each tree and forest are absorbed in the deity of vegetable life, and the further generalization of all growth under a higher god was only prevented by the philosophic treatment of nature and the glimpse caught by Greek metaphysics of development. The Greek religion was livelier and more natural than that of Rome. It was also more in harmony with the highest thought and feeling of the age. In a word, it was more humanizing and less superstitious—less of a religion, as Lucretius uses the word.¹

iii. Religion is progressive. The religion of one age is the superstition of the next. The world began by giving all to religious agency. Fear as well as respect was necessary for a primitive people, and all superstition has been defended as useful and necessary for the enforcement of obedience. But religion should move with humanity and civilization, and religious fictions, if countenanced merely as necessary for material happiness, turn to the ruin of those who use them, when a more enlightened age hesitates to prune away effete superfluities. Early Christianity increased the number of evil agencies which warred against man. Every temptation was personified, every sin was the direct work of the powers of evil. By dwelling on the corruption of human nature the imagination presented a host of evil spirits to the mind of the pious. Ahriman was scarcely conquered by Ormuzd. The problem of the inherent corruption of matter was explained by Manichæism. Early civilization required strong checks. Evil, personified and powerful, was a valuable restrictive influence; but sorcery, witchcraft, and other forms of belief in evil spirits lingered on as dangerous influences when higher moral checks than fear of evil agencies had been established. The last execution for witchcraft was in 1682.

iv. At the same time all religion must be, in a way, superstition, *aberglaube*, over-belief. Religious belief is the result of the effort to reproduce in a tangible, concrete form the great mysteries which we can only "see through a glass darkly." Matthew Arnold well expresses this:²

¹ See Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. i., bk. i., ch. xii.

² *Literature and Dogma*, ch. ix., p. 303.

"But for the popular science of religion, one has, or ought to have, an infinite tenderness. It is the spontaneous work of nature; it is the travail of the human mind to adapt to its grasp and employment great ideas of which it feels the attraction, but for which, except as given to it by this travail, it would be immature." And again, "It is an *aberglaube*, or extra-belief and fairy-tale, produced by taking great names and great promises too literally and materially; but it is not a degrading superstition." "*Aberglaube*," says Goethe, "is the poetry of life." Religion is not positive. There will always be a mystery. Science begins and ends with ignorance. Evolution is not antagonistic to, but presupposes, religion, which alone can answer the questions, when, how, and why did matter begin to evolve, as it alone can solve the problem of the existence and future state of the human soul.

Great men and great generals have often been called superstitious. It may be that the sense of their high mission has inspired them to see more deeply into things unseen, and that the consciousness of great work has increased the consciousness of great weakness and the desire for more light, and so for more confidence.¹ Again, highly poetic, sensitive natures are superstitious generally with a strong tendency to nature-worship (cf. Wordsworth's *Excursion*).

v. Extra-belief may, however, attribute to divinity attributes incompatible with divine nature. The Greek word for superstition is *δεισιδαιμονία*. The religion of primitive communities is proverbially cruel. Not only are the deities associated with all the destructive elements of nature, but they are to be propitiated only by cruelty practised by their votaries. Missionaries have complained that, while savage tribes will accept and emphasize any hint of divine wrath and vengeance, they obstinately reject the attributes of mercy and loving-kindness. The sacrifice of human beings survived in many parts of the world when, elsewhere, animal victims were supposed to be acceptable. The belief in divine cruelty, vengeance, jealousy, and anger reacts on the believers, who appease the deity by the acts of cruelty in which he delights. Superstition is nearly akin to fanaticism, and fanaticism

¹ *Spectator*, 441.

is essentially cruel. Religion, falsely so called, has sanctioned the worst cruelties of persecution—torture and massacre. It is the tendency of extra-belief to develop into positively wrong belief. Even the pure doctrines of Christianity were invaded by the excesses of fanaticism and monasticism. The grossest superstition could not go further than conceive a deity who approved of the Inquisition, the massacre of the Albigenses, and the Eve of St. Bartholomew.

vi. The causes of superstition have been, in a measure, hinted at, but we may further define them :—

(α) Ignorance of natural laws. A primitive as opposed to a reading and thinking age is superstitious. Man has not emancipated himself from nature. He is at the mercy of natural forces, and, even where nature is kind, he cannot understand the laws of physical phenomena. The lower and less educated the people, the greater their superstition. It must be remembered that nature deceives as well as conceals.

(β) The existence of abnormal and terrible natural phenomena where “human power failing, superhuman power is called in.” Spain is most subject to earthquakes of European countries, and the Spanish are the most superstitious people of Europe. So where wild beasts, snakes, poisonous plants, are dangerous to human life. With any people a great national calamity, like the plague at Athens, produces superstition. The earth seems to be given up to the powers of evil. Righteousness is no longer the road to happiness.

(γ) Soldiers are less superstitious than sailors, as having to deal with a better known and more manageable element. The dweller in the country is more superstitious than the dweller in the town. Women are more superstitious than men.

(δ) The reign of authority, as opposed to the free-play of the individual, causes the human mind to lean unduly on supernatural support. It at once fears and trusts in excess. Tacitus speaks of the mathematicians, *i.e.* the astrologers, as a class which was always being expelled, and yet always flourishing, under the first emperors.

(ε) The growth of the imagination at the expense of the reason often leads astray. So, too, the growth of the

emotions at the expense of the senses. The man who "does not see, but feels," is easily led astray.

(§) Doubt is painful. The human mind seeks finality, *i.e.*, positive conceptions on which the imagination may dwell. Especially the mind seeks the concrete at once, "to realize and invest with bodily presence the objects of its worship." Humanity reads itself into the supernatural. "Man," says Goethe, "does not know how anthropomorphic he is." There is a strong process of action and reaction in anthropomorphism. The divine is the human, and the human the divine. Xenophanes remarks, that men have created gods in their own image; the Æthiopians make their gods black and flat-nosed, just as cows and lions if they could draw, would draw their gods like cows and lions.

(η) The fear of death makes men superstitious. About death the imagination has full play, and the reason is silent. Where life is more precarious, as in the tropics, there is more superstition.

vii. Bacon, speaking of "nature erring or varying," would not altogether exclude sorcery and witchcraft, which he allows have an element of superstition, but thinks worthy of classification and investigation. Science had not enfranchised itself from the theological stage. Superstition is not with Bacon superfluous belief, but injurious belief, a degrading, harmful conception of the divine nature. For though he allows a causation,¹ which we should not admit, he steadily reprobates religious superstition which is "exaggerated, degenerate, and really selfish religion."² Natural science is "*certissima superstitionis medicina*" and "*religioni fidissima ancilla*,"³ "the surest remedy of superstition" and "the most trusty handmaid of religion." Bacon's test of religion is practical utility. Superstition is all that is benighted, harmful, and degraded. It is worse than atheism, which is negative, while superstition brings in a positive sanction for immorality and cruelty. This is perfectly true of civilized communities, and superstition has destructively checked progress in the hands of the papacy; but it may

¹ Cf. treatment of *Love* and *Envy*.

² Kuno Fischer *On Bacon*, ch. x. ii. § 4.

³ *Nov. Org.*, i. 89. Quoted by Kuno Fischer.

be questioned whether in primitive society superstition has not been a necessary stage while atheism would have been fatal. The denial of a deity professes to leave untouched sanctions which it is continually undermining. It is content to attack one institution at a time, but in the end, logically worked out, it means immorality and anarchy. The religious side of human nature may be wrongly developed, but surely it is easier to cure disease than to create a new nerve.

XVIII. Of Travel.

TRAVEL, in the younger sort, is a part of education; in the elder, a part of experience. He that travelleth into a country, before he hath some entrance into the language, goeth to school, and not
5 to travel. That young men travel under some tutor, or grave servant, I allow well; so that he be such a one that hath the language, and hath been in the country before; whereby he may be able to tell them
10 where they go, what acquaintances they are to seek, what exercises or discipline the place yieldeth; for else young men shall go hooded, and look abroad little.

It is a strange thing that, in sea-voyages, where
15 there is nothing to be seen but sky and sea, men should make diaries; but in land-travel, wherein so much is to be observed, for the most part they omit it; as if chance were fitter to be registered than observation. Let diaries, therefore, be brought in use.
20 The things to be seen and observed are; the courts of princes, especially when they give audience to

ambassadors ; the courts of justice, while they sit and hear causes, and so of consistories ecclesiastic ; the churches and monasteries with the monuments which are therein extant ; the walls and fortifications of cities 25 and towns, and so the havens and harbours ; antiquities and ruins ; libraries, colleges, disputations and lectures, where any are ; shipping and navies ; houses and gardens of state and pleasure near great cities ; armouries, arsenals, magazines ; exchanges, burses, 30 warehouses ; exercises of horsemanship, fencing, training of soldiers, and the like ; comedies, such whereunto the better sort of persons do resort ; treasuries of jewels and robes ; cabinets and rarities ; and, to conclude, whatsoever is memorable in the places where 35 they go. After all which the tutor or servants ought to make diligent inquiry. As for triumphs, masks, feasts, weddings, funerals, capital executions, and such shows, men need not be put in mind of them ; yet they are not to be neglected. If you will have 40 a young man to put his travel into a little room, and in short time to gather much, this you must do. First, as was said, he must have some entrance into the language before he goeth. Then he must have such a servant, or tutor, as knoweth the country, as 45 was likewise said. Let him carry with him also some card, or book, describing the country where he travelleth, which will be a good key to his inquiry. Let him keep also a diary. Let him not stay long in one city or town : more or less, as the place deserveth, 50 but not long. Nay, when he stayeth in one city or town, let him change his lodging from one end and part of the town to another ; which is a great adamant

of acquaintance. Let him sequester himself from the
55 company of his countrymen, and diet in such places
where there is good company of the nation where he
travelleth. Let him, upon his removes from one place
to another, procure recommendation to some person
of quality residing in the place whither he removeth,
60 that he may use his favour in those things he de-
sireth to see or know. Thus he may abridge his
travel with much profit.

As for the acquaintance which is to be sought in
travel, that which is most of all profitable, is acquaint-
65 ance with the secretaries, and employed men of
ambassadors. For so, in travelling in one country,
he shall suck the experience of many. Let him also
see and visit eminent persons in all kinds which are
of great name abroad, that he may be able to tell how
70 the life agreeth with the fame. For quarrels, they
are with care and discretion to be avoided. They
are commonly for mistresses, healths, place, and
words. And let a man beware how he keepeth
company with cholerick and quarrelsome persons.
75 For they will engage him into their own quarrels.
When a traveller returneth home, let him not leave
the countries where he hath travelled altogether
behind him, but maintain a correspondence by letters
with those of his acquaintance which are of most
80 worth. And let his travel appear rather in his dis-
course than in his apparel or gesture; and in his
discourse let him be rather advised in his answers
than forward to tell stories: and let it appear that he
doth not change his country manners for those of
85 foreign parts but only prick in some flowers of that

he hath learned abroad into the customs of his own country.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Some letters signed by Lord Essex, but probably wholly or in great part the work of Bacon, will illustrate this essay. 'The gifts,' it is said, 'or excellencies of the mind are three—beauty, health, and strength. Beauty chiefly shows itself in sweet behaviour, which comes by practice and imitation. Health means self-control and reformation, which are best taught by observation. Strength of mind implies fortitude and liberality, which spring from a habit of clear judgment. For clear judgment teaches us to esteem riches at their proper value, and that pain and danger are only by opinion, and that there is nothing fearful but fear itself. Travel supplies infinite variety of behaviour to study, suggests passions to conquer, supplies opportunity for courage, and increases knowledge of men and things. A man must be careful not to be caught by novelty, nor to become the creature of fashion nor given to *affection*.' In the second letter the writer emphasizes 'the necessity of intelligent travel for diplomacy and statesmanship. But a man must not by his conduct verify the vulgar scandal of travellers that few return more religious than they went out, but must hold fast to his principles, examining the corruptions and superstitions of other religions to set his mind more firmly in the truth.' A third letter gives further advice to 'study the physical conditions of a country, as affecting the disposition of its inhabitants.'

ii. Ancient history suffered deplorably from the difficulties of travel. Hardly any looked beyond their own countries, and few knew thoroughly the manners, customs and physical conditions of their own people. Herodotus was a traveller, but he was palpably misled by the priests of Sais. Travel was "material for lies"; and the ancient geographers and historians either contented themselves with dry, unauthenticated lists of persons and events, or accepted the strange stories of marvel-mongers as authentic descriptions of distant lands. Livy was pre-

sumably too lazy to examine inscriptions in or in the neighbourhood of Rome. Yet there were important exceptions. Pythagoras was a great traveller. "The Platonic laws," says Montaigne, "forbid travel till forty or fifty years old, that men's travels might be more useful and instructive in so mature an age." Greek commercial and colonial activity must have brought many into contact with other lands, or at least habituated men's minds to travel. It was one of the discomforts of the despot that he could not travel through Greece to see all that there was to be seen without fear of conspiracy. Clearchus, Diogenes, Chrysippus, Zeno, and Antipater were all travellers. Aristotle insists on the necessity of investigating the causes of national prosperity and decay by the light of the different kinds of constitutions existing in different countries.¹ He had himself visited, from choice or necessity, Thebes, Athens, Atarneus, Mitylene, Macedonia, and Chalcis.² Like Bacon, he wished to treat politics inductively, and to collect instances for generalization.

iii. The educated Roman of later republican Rome travelled in most cases to a Greek university; and under the early empire the excellent roads, the fair inns, and the organized system of posting for officials, made travelling quite as safe and nearly as rapid as it was at any time till within the last fifty years. Lecky strongly insists on the importance of facilities and opportunities for travel on producing a gentler and more cosmopolitan spirit.³ "Travelling," he writes, "had become more easy, and perhaps more frequent than it had been at any other period before the nineteenth century. The subjection of the whole civilized world to a single rule removed the chief obstacles to locomotion."

iv. The Crusades drew the countries of Europe together, introduced men to new scenes, widened their interests, forcibly appealed to the imagination, and opened out commerce with the East; but the motive and conditions of the Crusades prevented them from

¹ Aristotle *Ethics*, bk. x., *ad fin.*

² See Congreve's Introduction to the *Politics of Aristotle*.

³ Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. i. p. 234. (Fifth edition, 1882.)

positively increasing or widening human sympathies and knowledge. But they certainly gave an impulse to travel, though further development in that direction was prevented by numerous causes. Travel did not become at all common until the latter end of Henry VIII.'s reign, when "there sprang up a new company of courtly makers, of whom Sir Thomas Wyatt, the elder, and Henry of Surrey were the two chieftains, who having travelled into Italy, and there tasted the sweet and stately measures and style of the Italian poesy, as novices newly crept out of the schools of Dante, Arioste, and Petrarch, they greatly polished our rude and homely manner of vulgar poesy from that it had been before, and for that cause may justly be said to be the first reformers of our English metre and style."¹ Generally the growing spirit of travel had an important value on the literature of the Elizabethan period, and in many other ways stimulated national progress, and widened the national sympathies and conceptions. Shakespeare is constantly alluding to the desire to see foreign lands, though not always with approval. Rosalind says, "Farewell, monsieur traveller: look you lisp and wear strange suits; disable all the benefits of your own country; be out of love with your nativity, and almost chide God for making you that countenance you are; or I will scarce think you have swam in a gondola."² This is very like the description of the "Affectate Traveller" in Overbury's characters. Shakespeare will allow that "a good traveller is something at the latter end of a dinner," but otherwise he rather ridicules or depreciates travel, holding with the proverb that "Never went out ass, and came home horse." On the other hand, Montaigne writes,³ "Conversation with men is of great use, and travel into foreign countries of singular advantage; not to bring back (as most of our young monsieurs do) an account only of how many paces Santa Rotonda is in circuit, or of the richness of Signiora Livia's attire; . . . but to be able chiefly to give an account of the humours, manners, customs, and laws of those nations where he has been. And, that we may

¹ See Henry Morley's *First Sketch of English Literature*, ch. v., § 43, p. 285.

² *As You Like It*, Act iv., sc. 1.

³ *Essay* 25.

whet and sharpen our wits by rubbing them upon those of others. And also 'tis the general opinion of all that a child should not be brought up in its mother's lap." Especially he would send boys to countries "whose language is most different from our own." The literary importance of travel is to be seen again in the French influences of the seventeenth century. Many Englishmen had taken refuge in France, and the restoration brought back French ideas, customs, and literary models. The main influence was bad; and the English court at one time seemed likely to become a servile and degraded copy of the court of Versailles. The study of French literature acted beneficially by pruning down the conceited luxuriance of the so-called metaphysical school and by directing attention to form, but the loose morality of French comedy and the stilted diction of the "heroic drama" had a pernicious influence on English authors.

v. From Dryden's time the gallicized John Bull was an object of attack and source of ridicule to satirists and caricaturists. Samuel Foote, Gillray, Cruikshank, and many others have given representations of the exquisite (male and female) of the period returning to the land of roast beef and plum-pudding with French airs, phrases, and costumes. This is obviously a one-sided view. Every one knows how unjustly Johnson condemned foreigners and travel: "What does a man learn by travelling? Is Beauclerk the better for travelling? What did Lord Charlemont learn in his travels? except that there was a snake in one of the pyramids of Egypt."

vi. Yet Johnson is not singular in his condemnation of travel. Landor¹ speaks bitterly of its evil influence on Englishwomen. "Fool," says Carlyle, "why journeyest thou wearisomely in thy antiquarian fervour to gaze on the stone pyramids of Gizeh, or the clay ones of Sacchara? These stand there, as I can tell thee, idle and inert, looking over the desert foolishly enough for the last three thousand years. But canst thou not open thy Hebrew Bible, then, or even Luther's version thereof?" Julius Hare² qualifies its value by a fatal objection: "If

¹ *Imaginary Conversations between Peter Leopold and President Du Paty.*

² *Guesses at Truth*, p. 169. (Edition, 1866.)

we could but so divide ourselves as to stay at home at the same time, travelling would be one of the greatest pleasures, and of the most instructive employments in life. As it is, we often lose both ways more than we gain."

vii. Travel is not absolutely necessary nowadays for wide sympathies and conceptions, when the best literature of every country is brought to our doors, and great thoughts can be freely interchanged, and even customs, industries, etc., be studied at home through exhibitions, histories, and accounts of travels. Formerly the life, past and present, of foreigners could only be observed and investigated in their own countries.

viii. But it is sheer one-sidedness to deny the many benefits of travel. Mr. Buckle¹ insists on its importance as a preventive of war, dissipating foolish prejudice, and teaching nations to admire and respect each other. England and France were constantly embittered against each other so long as the traditional ungrounded contempt existed between the two nations. "The greater the contact the greater the respect," for in each country there is more good than bad. Instinctive dislikes are foolish and harmful. It is always best to see a supposed enemy. He may turn out to be a good sort of man. Misanthropes and pessimists, like the monks and hermits of the Middle Ages, shut themselves up and brood over their own wrongs, and the vices of others. Just so, those who never go into society get eccentric and narrow-minded. There is nothing like rubbing up against one's fellow-creatures to clear the brain and brush away moral and mental cobwebs. With all his faults the typical man of the world, however cynical and inclined to take a low standard of human life, is rarely unkind or pessimistic. Every fresh steamer which crosses the Channel brings more men into contact. The man who has never left his native village or town stagnates. Life is more than a sequence. Co-existences must be studied. The stay-at-home is a protectionist; the traveller is the free-trader in all spheres of human activity. The one spins arguments from single instances, which he erects into laws. He may hold fast to principles, and be more stable than the citizen of the world. He may be the better patriot, but is often the

¹ *History of Civilization in England*, vol. i., p. 219, 221.

worse philanthropist. He is more obedient to authority, tradition, and custom ; but he will be rudely awakened by revolution, where the more versatile type of man steadily progresses and reforms.

ix. At the same time a well-balanced mind is necessary if travel is to be entirely profitable. The citizen of the world is often the citizen of no country. Resource, confidence in self, widened sympathies, tastes and ideas are developed by travel, but often at the expense of fixed principles and consistent beliefs. Eclecticism takes the place of enthusiasm and a creed. Many travellers only see variety and absence of law in the constantly shifting scenes of the kaleidoscope. Restlessness of mind and body is developed. Some only look for the curious or marvellous. They only care to do what nobody else has done ; and foreign life filters through their minds without a residuum. Many travel only in an antiquarian and pedantic spirit to investigate the dead bones of the past, rather than to compare the present with itself, or with the past. Not a few only seek for the novel, however trivial. "You must swear by *Allah*, smoke *chibouques*, and spell *pasha* differently from every predecessor, or we shall scarcely believe you have been in a *hareem*!" But apathetic indifference or ignorance is far commoner. Now that steam and rail have made Switzerland more accessible to the Londoner than York was at the beginning of the century, the tourist has supplanted the traveller, and the holiday maker rarely brings with him either the inclination or the previous knowledge requisite to profit by foreign scenes. These are the people who, as Sterne says, travel from Dan to Beersheba, and declare that the land is all barren, or are like the heroine in one of Coppée's *Contes nouveaux*, who, when asked her nationality, answers, "Je ne suis ni de Londres, ni de Paris, ni de Vienne, je suis de table d'hôte."

XIX. Of Empire.

IT is a miserable state of mind to have few things to desire and many things to fear. And yet that commonly is the case of kings; who, being at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more languishing; and have many representations of perils and shadows, which makes their minds the less clear. And this is one reason also of that effect which the Scripture speaketh of, that *the king's heart is inscrutable*. For multitude of jealousies, and lack of some predominant desire, that should marshal and put in order all the rest, maketh any man's heart hard to find or sound. Hence it comes likewise, that princes many times make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon toys; sometimes upon a building; sometimes upon erecting of an Order; sometimes upon the advancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art, or feat of the hand: as Nero for playing on the harp; Domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow; Commodus for playing at fence; Caracalla for driving chariots; and the like. This seemeth incredible unto those that know not the principle, that *the mind of man is more cheered and refreshed by profiting in small things than by standing at a stay in great*. We see also that kings that have been fortunate conquerors in their first years, it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely, but that they must have some check or arrest in their fortunes, turn in their latter years to be superstitious and melancholy, as did Alexander the

30 Great, Dioclesian, and in our memory Charles V., and others; for he that is used to go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favour, and is not the thing he was.

To speak now of the true temper of empire: it is a
 35 thing rare and hard to keep; for both temper and distemper consist of contraries. But it is one thing to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. The answer of Apollonius to Vespasian is full of excellent instruction. Vespasian asked him, "*What*
 40 *was Nero's overthrow?*" He answered, "*Nero could touch and tune the harp well; but in government sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low.*" And certain it is, that nothing destroyeth authority so much as the unequal and
 45 untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much.

This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter times in princes' affairs is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and mischiefs, when they are near
 50 than solid and grounded courses to keep them aloof. But this is but to try masteries with fortune. And let men beware how they neglect and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared. For no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come. The difficultie
 55 in princes' business are many and great, but the greatest difficulty is often in their own mind. For it is common with princes (saith Tacitus) to will contraries: "*Sunt plerumque regum voluntates vehementes, et inter se contrariæ.*" For it is the solecism
 60 of power to think to command the end, and yet not to endure the mean.

governor that
 rules men

Kings have to deal with their neighbours, their wives, their children, their prelates or clergy, their nobles, their ~~second~~ nobles or gentlemen, their merchants, their commons, and their men of war; and⁶⁵ from all these arise dangers, if care and circumspection be not used.

First, for their neighbours; there can no general rule be given (the occasions are so variable), save one which ever holdeth:—Which is, that princes do keep⁷⁰ due sentinel, that none of their neighbours do overgrow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them than they were. And this is generally the work of standing councils to foresee⁷⁵ and to hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings King Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the First, king of France, and Charles the Fifth, emperor, there was such a watch kept that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would⁸⁰ straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were by a war, and would not in anywise take up peace at interest. And the like was done by that league (which Guicciardine saith was the security of¹⁴⁸⁰ Italy), made between Ferdinando, king of Naples,⁸⁵ Lorenzious Medices, and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the opinion of some of the schoolmen to be received, that a war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent injury or provocation. For there is no question⁹⁰ but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.

For their wives; there are cruel examples of them.

Livia is infamed for the poisoning of her husband ;
95 Roxolana, Solyman's wife, was the destruction of that
renowned prince, Sultan Mustapha, and otherwise
troubled his house and succession, Edward the
Second of England his queen had the principal hand
in the deposing and murder of her husband. This
100 kind of danger is then to be feared chiefly when the
wives have plots for the raising of their own children,
or else that they be adventresses.

For their children ; the tragedies likewise of dangers
from them have been many. And generally the
105 entering of the fathers into suspicion of their chil-
dren hath been ever unfortunate. The destruction of
Mustapha (that we named before) was fatal to Soly-
man's line, as the succession of the Turks from Soly-
man until this day is suspected to be untrue, and of
110 strange blood ; for that Selymus the Second was
thought to be supposititious. The destruction of
Crispus, a young prince of rare towardness, by Con-
stantinus the Great, his father, was in like manner fatal
to his house, for both Constantinus and Constance, his
115 sons, died violent deaths ; and Constantius, his other
son, did little better ; who died, indeed of sickness,
but after that Julianus had taken arms against him.
The destruction of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second
of Macedon, turned upon the father, who died of
120 repentance. And many like examples there are ; but
few or none where the fathers had good by such dis-
trust ; except it were where the sons were in open
arms against them, as was Selymus the First against
Bajazet, and the three sons of Henry the Second, king
125 of England.

For their prelates ; when they are proud and great, there is also danger from them ; as it was in the times of Anselmus and Thomas Becket, archbishops of Canterbury, who, with their croisers, did almost try it with the king's sword ; and yet they had to deal with 130 stout and haughty kings, William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The danger is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence of foreign authority, or where the churchmen come in and are elected, not by the collation of the king, or 135 particular patrons, but by the people.

For their nobles ; to keep them at a distance, it is not amiss ; but to depress them may make a king more absolute, but less safe, and less able to perform anything that he desires. I have noted it in my 140 history of King Henry the Seventh of England, who depressed his nobility ; whereupon it came to pass, that his times were full of difficulties and troubles. For the nobility, though they continued loyal unto him, yet did they not co-operate with him in his busi- 145 ness. So that in effect he was fain to do all things himself.

For their second nobles ; there is not much danger from them, being a body dispersed. They may sometimes discourse high ; but that doth little hurt. 150 Besides, they are a counterpoise to the high nobility, that they grow not too potent. And, lastly, being the most immediate in authority with the common people, they do best temper popular commotions.

For their merchants ; they are *vena porta*, and if 155 they flourish not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish little. Taxes

and imposts upon them do seldom good to the king's revenue. For that that he wins in the hundred he
 160 leeseth in the shire: the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading rather decreased.

For their commons; there is little danger from them, except it be where they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle with the point of re-
 165 ligious, or their customs, or means of life.

For their men of war; it is a dangerous state where they live and remain in a Body, and are used to dona-
 164 tives; whereof we see examples in the janizaries, and pretorian bands of Rome. But trainings of men, and
 170 arming them, in several places, and under several commanders, and without donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.

Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times, and which have much veneration,
 175 but no rest. All precepts concerning kings are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances:
 0 | *Memento quod es homo*, and *Memento quod es Deus*, or
 1 | *vice Dei*. The one bridleth their power, and the other their will.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. It is a blessing to enjoy happiness, but a still greater blessing to be able to impart it to others.

2. Kings are not as men, but as the stars; they have a great influence not only on persons, but even on times and seasons.

Against.

1. How wretched to have hardly anything to desire, and everything to dread!

2. Men in command are like the heavenly bodies which have great honour but no rest.

3. To resist God's vicergerent on earth is more than treason, being a kind of revolt 'of man against God.

3. No one of human rank is admitted to the feasts of the gods, except to give them cause for mirth.

[See also the Antitheta on *Great Place*.]

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Empire is personal rule on a large scale. "The relation between barbarism and loyalty is one of those beneficent arrangements which 'the servant and interpreter of nature' everywhere meets with. The subordination of many to one is a form of society needful for men so long as their natures are savage, or anti-social."¹ Religion is enlisted on the side of the personal ruler who is god, or demi-god, or at least godlike.

ii. In Greece and Rome personal government gave way to oligarchy or democracy, but under forms which only suited small states. Ancient democracy was premature and almost still-born. A strong and centralized power was needful as a protection against external aggression and internal anarchy. The Greek hatred of despotism was intense. In some cases the objections were philosophical and ethical. Despotism was unnatural and illogical, besides being bad for governor and governed. The despot was virtually without check, the subject was a slave without individuality. Besides, the normal condition of despotism was one of war. Tyrants live in fear and by force. They have no time or opportunities for self-improvement and culture. Their only recreation is a feverish round of amusement,² and this is only possible in a limited degree and at a great expense. They are even debarred from the most ennobling pleasures. Oligarchy and democracy flourished artificially, and under peculiar circumstances in Greece. They had disruptive rather than unifying influences, and were only suited to the small state system. Thus the political

¹ Herbert Spencer, *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 198

² Aristotle, *Ethics*, bk. x.

atomism of Greece fell an easy prey to the Macedonian empire. Representation was almost an unknown principle to antiquity, or had been sparingly and unsystematically applied to organizations like the Olympic games and the Amphictyonic council.

iii. At Rome patriarchal monarchy gave way to a constitutional oligarchy. The government of the senate, recruited by ex-officials, was temperate, liberal, and successful until the increased size of the State called for a new state of things. Greek unity was a sentiment and a dream. Roman unity was only possible under the vigorous and centralized power of imperialism. It must be remembered that the problems of government were comparatively simple and within the powers of one man to direct and manage. At first the new system worked well, but the military conditions of imperial rule brought degradation, disintegration, and ruin. The emperors in many instances were the nominees and tools of the army. Unity and government were impossible when the legions of a distant province might promote their general to the imperial purple, or give the senate a *congé d'élire*.

iv. It is no argument for imperialism to say that it is the only government for some nationalities, unless the despot is the means to national improvement. The weak, degraded, passive, fatalistic character of Orientals, has always favoured the existence of despotism, but it has never served as a transitional stage to permanent improvement. The case is different with the monarchies of mediæval Europe. Here a strong, central government was necessary, as a rallying centre against the disruptive forces of feudalism, and protection against aggression and anarchy. A still higher unity was conceived by the holy Roman empire; but the positive benefit to Europe was comparatively slight. For the short time during which it was a reality under the German emperors, it was valuable as a check on the pretensions of the papacy, and the aggression and despotism of feudal princes; but its existence was on the whole shadowy and undefined, and without that centralizing and protective force wherein for some time lay the value of the papacy. It proved an instrument of oppression and a motive for war in the hands of Charles V., until finally, after doing

some service in maintaining a balance of power, it became little more than an honourable fiction, in the service of the Hapsburgs, the protectors of everything that was retrograde. In England, in Bacon's time, feudalism had been broken by the power of the monarchy. Her insular position promoted the rapid rise of industrialism, and the decay of the military spirit; but the necessity for a strong personal form of government had not yet departed. Bacon was unable to see the next stage, the rise of constitutional monarchy and representative institutions. He disliked despotism as only suitable for passive Orientals, and was fairly alive to the rights of the people. But he fell into the error of his times, and upheld the maintenance of the king's prerogative. "To resist God's vicegerent is not merely treason, but rebellion against God. An absolute king, or an absolute monarch, meant with the Tudor statesmen, who used the phrase, a sovereign or ruler complete in himself, and independent of all foreign or papal interference. James chose to regard the words as implying the monarch's freedom from all control by law, or from responsibility to anything but his own royal will."¹ Bacon's idea of the king as the *primum mobile* and his defence of prerogative contrasts unfavourably with Coke's sturdy independence.

v. If we allow that absolutism was once necessary as a protective force against external aggression and internal anarchy, it is not hard to understand the political theories of Hobbes. The *Leviathan* was published in 1651, against the Puritans and Cromwell, and the Jesuits and Cardinal Bellarmine who were striving to subordinate the civil to the ecclesiastical power. Hobbes, influenced by the disorder and trouble of the time, argues that the natural state of man is war, which is only to be avoided under a strong and centralized government. Each individual was to give up his rights to the sovereign, on condition that other men did the same. So the subject has no rights in the presence of his sovereign. If he rebels, he rebels against himself. The only justification for disobedience is if the sovereign fails to afford general security. Hobbes believes that without absolute monarchy, men would constantly be returning to a state of nature.

¹ J. R. Green's *Short History of the English People*, p. 465.

vi. Rousseau held that the natural state of man was one of peace, but that selfish interests had overgrown the original perfection. He would, if possible, make society a *tabula rasa*, and return to primitive simplicity and unanimity. The problem is, how to establish a state without giving up one's birthright; how are individual wills to be brought into harmony with the general will? Evidently if each has a share in the government. By the *contrat social* each agrees to submit himself to the general will, on condition that others do the same, and each becomes an indivisible part of the whole. The best form of government is that which "unites all to equal duties and rights." Each should have a direct share in the government. Rousseau condemns representation as opposed to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. The administration is a delegacy subject to the good pleasure of the *être collectif*. Rousseau accordingly prefers a small state, which gives most direct power to each. Monarchy is the most practical form of government for a large state, being alone sufficiently strong and centralized to control the mass of individual wills, which otherwise would admit of no unity or government.

vii. J. S. Mill regards monarchy as a transitional stage,¹ useful and even necessary. "A race trained in energy and courage by struggles with nature and with their neighbours, but who have not yet settled down into permanent obedience to any common superior,"—such a people will only submit to a "military leader, except occasionally to some prophet supposed to be inspired from above or conjuror regarded as possessing miraculous power." A central power, despotic in principle, though much restricted in practice, is valuable as a means of resistance to local despotism. The French kings were a centre of resistance against the great feudal lords. "Nothing short of despotic rule or a general massacre could have effected the emancipation of the serfs in the Russian empire." A strong central government breaks up the old spirit of locality. Society becomes less atomistic when all alike are subjected to the strong authority of the one. In prehistoric Greece scattered townships were united into a State by monarchy, and in mediæval

¹ J. S. Mill, *Representative Government*, ch. iv.

Europe, Florence, Pisa, and Milan advanced to the "provincial unity of Tuscany or Lombardy." In the above cases absolutism is useful and necessary. But sometimes the general weakness of the national character or the backward state of knowledge renders a nation unfit to reap the full benefit of representative institutions. The follies of the nation would be reflected in the representatives. Here Mill would sanction absolutism, if the monarch could and would secure permanent improvement. But an Augustus, a Charlemagne, a Peter the Great, are rare accidents. Their influence could be exercised without despotic power. Free institutions would sooner teach men their own interests and educate them to a higher civilization. In such cases the use of despotism is most manifest in a community where "a small but leading portion of the population, from difference of race, more civilized origin, or other peculiarities of circumstance, are markedly superior in civilization and general character to the remainder." Here the ruler wishes to raise the masses as a counterpoise to the dominant class, and the dominant class offer a nucleus of collective resistance capable of development into national representation. Lastly, a people may have their love for freedom overshadowed by the desire to exercise power over others. Each individual is willing to forego his own liberty and submit to despotism provided that he himself has an opportunity of wielding power over his fellow-citizens. Equality is cared for rather than liberty. Each man becomes a place-hunter. Authority must merely be open to free competition, and then may be practically despotic. The love of power masters prudence, and military conquests are necessary for the national vanity. The despot and his advisers eagerly make capital out of this fatal passion for power, and strengthen their own position by the maintenance of standing armies and by fostering the military spirit. Chauvinism or Jingoism argues as if war in itself was a blessing. The Malthusian argument that war is a check on over-population has been practically and dangerously used by French politicians. Bacon¹ holds that war is not only the normal, but the necessary state

¹ Letter of Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his Travels.—Spedding, *Life*, vol. ii., p. 12.

of things. "If it seem strange that I account no state flourishing but that which hath neither civil wars nor too long peace, I answer that politic bodies are like our natural bodies, and must as well have some exercise to spend their humours as to be kept from too violent or continual outrages, which spend their best spirits." So again, in Essay 29, he writes, "Nobody can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body nor politic; and certainly to a kingdom or an estate a just and honourable war (*i.e.* a foreign war) is the true exercise." If a nation is to be great all must be subordinated to war. He holds with Tennyson¹—

"Why do they prate of the blessings of Peace? we have made
 them a curse,
 Pickpockets, each hand lusting for all that is not its own;
 And lust of gain, in the spirit of Cain, is it better or worse
 Than the heart of the citizen hissing in war on his own hearth-
 stone?"

* * * * *

"When a Mammonite mother kills her babe for a burial fee,
 And Timour-Mammon grins on a pile of children's bones,
 Is it peace or war? better war! loud war by land and sea,
 War with a thousand battles, and shaking a hundred thrones."

Such theories have become so obsolete that they scarcely need discussion. War is brutalizing and ineffective. The military spirit lingered in the so-called policy of intervention and maintenance of the balance of power. If the normal state of man is war of all against all, increase of power must be jealously watched. Otherwise excessive size is dangerous to the possessor. War creates unnatural groupings of territory. Nationality makes itself. We are still suffering from the artificial results of the *idées Napoléoniennes*. The utility of war to spread civilization and open up commerce is extremely doubtful. Its only defence is as a necessary evil to be sparingly used against aggression and oppression. It is questionable whether England has not lost more than she has gained by her Indian empire, allowing that men may "do to other countries, for the supposed benefit of their own

¹ *Maud*, Part I. vi., xii. Dr. Abbott quotes from Æschylus, "Let there be foreign wars, not scantily coming."

country, what they would not be justified in doing to other men for their own benefit.”¹ Even those who advocate separation will allow that England has tried to benefit India, though with the mistakes necessarily incident to the government of a country by foreigners. India may have lost more than she has gained by the despotism of England.²

viii. Imperialism has, however, been defended on higher grounds.³

(α) Society is becoming more and more decomposed into special interests. Representation will merely stereotype the disruptive forces at work, and prove cumbrous and wanting in unity, whereas monarchy is simple and centralized.

(β) The conflicting interests or political apathy of electors leads them to elect a comparative “dummy” with no strong ideas, originality, or definite policy. Vestries and town councils are allowed failures. The best men do not come forward, and if they did, would not be chosen when the tests of merit are money and influence. Our House of Commons reproduces class-interests in an aggravated form. The majority consists of lawyers, soldiers, sailors, etc., who are interested in the maintenance of the *status quo*. An autocrat has the strongest motive to make use of ability wherever it exists; he will take even his barber into council if he finds him to be a clever fellow.

(γ) Deputed administration is allowed to be bad in mercantile affairs. “Management by partially interested directors is immensely inferior to management by a single, wholly interested head.”

(δ) The direct influence of public measures on each legislator is so small that he neglects these for local interests, where strong influence is brought to bear on him. The monarch is, or should be, strictly impersonal, and above all local, as above all selfish, interests. He cannot mount higher. His true interest and only ambition is good government, conceived in the widest spirit of philanthropy.

¹ Mill, *Representative Government*, p. 132.

² Cf. *Ibid.* p. 134, *et seq.*

³ Herbert Spencer, *Essays*, vol. ii., “On Representative Government.”

(e) It is harder to check public extravagance in democracy than in monarchy. It is easier to limit the expenditure of an autocrat, than the expensive schemes of a representative body. Manhood suffrage is a species of communism, where the mob, through its representatives, votes away the money of the richer classes with the reckless waste or unfair appropriation usually found when servants spend the money of their masters.

(f) Representative government is government in solution. It gives the merest fragment of power to each at the price of decentralization, cumbrousness, and weakness. At times of national crisis there is no head.

(g) The people ought to have the power to choose their own form of government. An empire may rest on the declared will of the people, as the French empire was sanctioned by the *plébiscite* of 1869.

(h) The *laissez faire* theory of government has broken down. Government has positive as well as protective duties. Paternal government implies a single autocratic authority.

ix. There is much that is true in these arguments, but they assume two things. First, that it is possible to find the ideal autocrat who will govern firmly, wisely, and unselfishly ; and, secondly, that a good despotism is better than an imperfect democracy. Granting that the best man could be chosen, the machinery of the Napoleon III.'s *plébiscite* was not fitted for the discovery of the national will. But, as there is probably no test for the discovery of the great ruler in a non-military age, so it may be said that autocracy is disproved by development, which tends to specialization of functions. What one man could secure the greatest happiness of a large, complex, civilized, peaceful society? One man brings one utility to the common stock ; no character is so versatile as to be the absolute ruler *ex officio*. Government, according to Guizot, should gather together and represent all the incomplete ideas—truth, reason, and justice—which are to be found in every community. No individual will has any right or qualifications for supreme power. But, if the great man could be found, despotism is a bad educator. Even benevolent despotism is terribly liable to mistakes. The reaction against Puritanism was the result of Cromwell's iron sup-

pression of all pleasures in life. Paternal government, where necessary, is best supplied by representation. There is less danger of over-legislation, and no intrusion of personality. The despot reforms capriciously and by starts. Reform should be natural and gradual. "A bad despot," says Mill,¹ "when his own personal indulgences have been provided for, may sometimes be willing to let the people alone ; but a good despot insists on doing them good by making them do their business in a better way than they themselves know of. The regulations which restricted to fixed processes all the leading branches of French manufactures, were the work of the great Colbert."

x. And, even if the despot makes no mistakes, despotism promotes the passive type of character. It is no argument to say that representation has defects. It admits of infinite improvement, while despotism is stationary and dangerous. "The subordination of a nation to a man is not a wholesome, but a vicious, state of things—needful, indeed, for a vicious humanity, but to be outgrown as fast as may be. The instinct which makes it possible is anything but a noble one. Call it 'hero-worship' and it looks respectable. Call it what it is—a blind awe and fear of power, no matter of what kind—and it is by no means to be admired. . . . Autocracy presupposes inferiority of nature on the part of both ruler and subject : on the one side a cold, unsympathetic sacrificing of others' wills to self-will ; on the other, a mean, cowardly abandonment of the claims of manhood."² Mill bases his antagonism to personal government on the Rousseauistic idea of the sovereignty of the people. But he holds that representation is the best solution of the difficulty. Some extreme thinkers would make the legislature a delegacy, as Rousseau does the executive.

xi. One man cannot be trusted, absolutely and without appeal, with the interests of others, except ideally, and ideally all government would cease. Autocracy has been tried and found wanting. The march of progress is towards freedom. If it is held that the positive functions

¹ *Representative Government*, p. 27.

² Herbert Spencer, *Essays*, vol. ii., "On Representative Government."

of government are to be limited to the maintenance of justice, if the governor is a policeman, and there are few national, and no imperial rights, mediocrity of intellect is sufficient for the task, and the great man is better employed elsewhere. In any case the great man rules, though in a disguised form. His rule is dependent on success, when his great ideas win their way to realization. The nominal ruler has to work at the great man's bidding, and thus a wholesome dualism is created.

XX. Of Counsel.

THE greatest trust between man and man, is the trust of giving counsel. For in other confidences men commit the parts of life, their lands, their goods, their children, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make their counsellors they commit the whole: by how much the more they are obliged to all faith and integrity. The wisest princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness, or derogation to their sufficiency, to rely upon counsel. God himself is not without, but hath made it one of the names of the blessed Son; *The Counsellor*. Salomon hath pronounced that *in counsel is stability*. Things will have their first or second agitation. If they be not tossed upon the arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon the waves of fortune, and be full of inconstancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling of a drunken man. Salomon's son found the force of counsel, as his father saw the necessity of it. For the beloved kingdom of God was first rent and broken by ill counsel. Upon which counsel there are set for our instruction the two marks whereby bad counsel is

being given and that which is followed

for ever best discerned : that it was young counsel, for the persons ; and violent counsel, for the matter.

The ancient times do set forth in figure both the incorporation and inseparable conjunction of counsel ²⁵ with kings, and the wise and politic use of counsel by kings : the one, in that they say Jupiter did marry Metis, which signifieth counsel, whereby they intend that Sovereignty is married to Counsel ; the other in that which followeth, which was thus : They say, after ³⁰ Jupiter was married to Metis, she conceived by him, and was with child : but Jupiter suffered her not to stay till she brought forth, but ate her up ; whereby he became himself with child, and was delivered of Pallas armed out of his head. Which monstrous fable ³⁵ containeth a secret of empire, how kings are to make use of their counsel of state : that first, they ought to refer matters unto them, which is the first begetting or impregnation ; but when they are elaborate, moulded, and shaped in the womb of their counsel, and grow ripe ⁴⁰ and ready to be brought forth, that then they suffer not their counsel to go through with the resolution and direction, as if it depended on them, but take the matter back into their own hands, and make it appear to the world, that the decrees and final directions ⁴⁵ (which, because they come forth with prudence and power, are resembled to Pallas armed) proceeded from themselves, and not only from their authority, but (the more to add reputation to themselves) from their head and device. ⁵⁰

Let us now speak of the inconveniences of counsel, and of the remedies. The inconveniences that have been noted in calling and using counsel, are three.

First, the revealing of affairs, whereby they become
 55 less secret. Secondly, the weakening of the authority
 of princes, as if they were less of themselves. Thirdly,
 the danger of being unfaithfully counselled, and more
 for the good of them that counsel than of him that is
 counselled. For which inconveniences, the doctrine
 60 of Italy, and practice of France, in some kings' times,
 hath introduced cabinet councils, a remedy worse than
 the disease.

As to secrecy ; princes are not bound to communi-
 cate all matters with all counsellors, but may extract
 65 and select. Neither is it necessary that he that con-
 sulteth what he should do should declare what he will
 do. But let princes beware that the unsecreting of their
 affairs comes not from themselves. And as for cabinet
 councils, it may be their motto, *Plenus rimarum sum.*
 70 One futile person, that maketh it his glory to tell, will
 do more hurt than many that know it their duty to
 conceal. It is true there be some affairs which require
 extreme secrecy, which will hardly go beyond one or
 two persons besides the king. Neither are those
 75 counsels unprosperous. For, besides the secrecy,
 they commonly go on constantly in one spirit of
 direction without distraction. But then it must be a
 prudent king, such as is able to grind with a hand-
 mill. And those inward counsellors had need also be
 80 wise men, and especially true and trusty to the king's
 ends : as it was with King Henry the Seventh of
 England, who in his greatest business imparted him-
 self to none, except it were to Morton and Fox.

For weakening of authority ; the fable sheweth the
 85 remedy. Nay, the majesty of kings is rather exalted

than diminished when they are in the chair of counsel. Neither was there ever prince bereaved of his dependencies by his council; except where there hath been either an over-greatness in one counsellor, or an over-strict combination in divers; which are things soon found and holpen.

For the last inconvenience, that men will counsel with an eye to themselves: certainly, *non inveniet fidem super terram* is meant of the nature of times, and not of all particular persons. There be that are in nature faithful and sincere, and plain and direct, not crafty and involved. Let princes, above all, draw to themselves such natures. Besides, counsellors are not commonly so united but that one counsellor keepeth sentinel over another. So that if any counsel out of faction or private ends, it commonly comes to the king's ear. But the best remedy is, if princes know their counsellors, as well as their counsellors know them:

Principis est virtus maxima nosse suos.

And on the other side, counsellors should not be too speculative into their sovereign's person. The true composition of a counsellor is, rather to be skilful in his master's business, than in his nature; for then he is like to advise him, and not to feed his humour. It is of singular use to princes if they take the opinions of their council both separately and together. For private opinion is more free, but opinion before others is more reverend. In private, men are more bold in their own humours, and, in consort, men are more obnoxious to others' humours. Therefore it is good to take both; and of the inferior sort, rather in private,

to preserve freedom ; of the greater, rather in consort, to preserve respect. It is in vain for princes to take counsel concerning matters, if they take no counsel
 120 likewise concerning persons. For all matters are as dead images ; and the life of the execution of affairs resteth in the good choice of persons. Neither is it enough to consult concerning persons, *secundum genera* (as in an idea, or mathematical description), what the
 125 kind and character of the person should be. For the greatest errors are committed, and the most judgment is shown, in the choice of individuals. It was truly said, *Optimi consilarii mortui: Books will speak plain, when counsellors blench*. Therefore it is good to be
 130 conversant in them, specially the books of such as themselves have been actors upon the stage.

The councils at this day in most places are but familiar meetings, where matters are rather talked on than debated. And they run too swift to the order or
 135 act of council. It were better that, in causes of weight, the matter were propounded one day, and not spoken to till the next day ; *in nocte consilium*. So was it done in the commission of union between England and Scotland, which was a grave and orderly assembly.
 140 I commend set days for petitions. For both it gives the suitors more certainty for their attendance, and it frees the meetings for matters of estate, that they may *hoc agere*. In choice of committees for ripening business for the council, it is better to choose indifferent
 145 persons, than to make an indifferency by putting in those that are strong on both sides. I commend also standing commissions ; as, for trade, for treasure, for war, for suits, for some provinces. For where there

be divers particular councils, and but one council of estate (as it is in Spain), they are, in effect, no more ¹⁵⁰ than standing commissions, save that they have greater authority. Let such as are to inform councils out of their particular professions (as lawyers, seamen, mint-men, and the like), be first heard before committees, and then, as occasion serves, before the council. And ¹⁵⁵ let them not come in multitudes, or in a tribunitious ¹⁶⁵ manner; for that is to clamour councils, not to inform them. A long table and a square table, or seats about the walls, seem things of form, but are things of substance. For at a long table, a few at the upper ¹⁶⁰ end, in effect, sway all the business; but in the other form there is more use of the counsellors' opinions that sit lower. A king, when he presides in council, let him beware how he opens his own inclination too much in that which he propoundeth. For else coun- ¹⁶⁵ sellors will but take the wind of him, and instead of giving free counsel, will sing him a song of *placebo*.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. "Best is the man," says Hesiod, "who can plan all things himself; next best is he who listens to good counsels." Zeus is "rich in counsel" as well as "lord of the thunderbolt," though he not unfrequently accepts the advice and help of the most important deities. The Homeric king is advised by his council. In early societies the counsellors in many cases superseded the king. Roughly, an age of counsel succeeded an age of force, even when the world was young. The tests of superior wisdom were rude and empirical, and force was constantly reasserting its sway. The conflict was rather between oligarchy and despotism, than between oligarchy and democracy. But both the Grecian oligarchies and

the Roman senate point to two important facts—the enfranchisement of the *few* as opposed to the *one*, and the recognition of mental as well as of physical power. Any further advance was prevented by the circumstances of the times—the want of natural unity, the absence of representative institutions and machinery for government, and the preponderance of material forces. A democracy would have been a reckless, uncontrolled mob. It must be remembered that in ancient states there was nothing which corresponded to ministerial guidance. Pericles is only an apparent exception to this truth. Even he did not hold the place of a permanent speaker or recognized leader of the house, at the head of a regularly organized cabinet. He was “president of the democracy” on sufferance, not because his direction was required by the constitution or by political precedent. He simply held his place through his genius, patriotism, and oratory.

ii. The dangerous post of counsellor to the Roman emperors was refused by the most honest and most capable. Seneca in vain asked to be allowed to retire. The cautious suspicion of Tiberius feared to admit any to the “secrets of rule.” His successors found no Agrippa, no Mæcenas to share or lighten the cares of an overgrown empire. In the Middle Ages the problems of the day were at first so exclusively military, and the government of states so simple, and within the powers of one man, that the counsellor *pur et simple* was hardly required, the good things of the world being given to the great military chiefs. Where diplomacy and craft were necessary, the autocratic warrior despised, even while fearing, the subtle, learned clerk whose counsels he was constrained to use in order to cope with the superior force of his enemies.

iii. But as feudalism grew weaker, and the royal power became stronger, the subordinate counsellor, as distinct from the almost co-ordinate warrior, became an important factor in the state. At the same time government was growing more complicated, and the increasing power of the Papacy encouraged the employment of other instruments than the sword. Machiavelli was more than a match for Cæsar Borgia. Though ecclesiastics were

not necessarily men of peace, the selection of these for the posts of confidential advisers points to the gradual rise of a new order of things. Louis XII. was well served by Cardinal d'Amboise. Wolsey, Richelieu, and Mazarin almost supplanted the kings who sought their counsels. Machiavelli advises his "prince" how to select ministers;¹ and in a letter to Raphael Girolami, ambassador to the emperor, tells him "to know the character of the prince, and those who sway his counsels."

iv. In England the modified form of feudalism introduced by the Conqueror, the rapid decline of feudal principles, the decay of the military spirit before industrialism, the rejection of Papal authority, the increasing stability of government, and the assertion of the royal supremacy in matters spiritual, increased the duties and powers of the ruler. The house of the Tudors is characterized by the importance of the non-military officials among the high servants of the crown. Morton, Empson, Dudley, More, Wolsey, Cromwell, Burleigh, Walsingham, Cecil, Essex, and Bacon advised their sovereigns on the whole for the public good. There began to be a more systematic and formal choice of advisers for each department of the State. The Privy Council included members of the Cabinet, so to speak, and discharged the functions of government. The folly of the Stuarts in promoting unworthy favourites to be their confidential advisers and officers, paved the way for constitutional government. Charles II., in 1679, to avoid collision with his parliament, reorganized the Privy Council, so that it might correspond in many respects to the modern cabinet. It was to consist of thirty persons, half of whom were to be the chief officers of the crown, while the other half "were to be men of character detached from the court, or of those who possessed credit in both Houses." The great importance of this proposed reform was the connection of the executive and the legislature, a connection which has since developed into the Cabinet. The Privy Council is now an advising body, of unlimited size, with a limited executive and judicial power, its most important functions belonging to the Cabinet.

¹ *Prince*, ch. xxii.

v. Though professedly connected with the legislature, the Privy Council was composed of the king's nominees. Those members of the legislature were chosen who would most faithfully reproduce the monarch's ideas, and carry out his wishes. They were essentially the ministers of the sovereign, who could best bring the legislature and executive into harmony with his policy. In other words, the sovereign was the most important fact in the machinery of the constitution. The name Cabinet Council was first used as a conventional description of those members of the Privy Council, who held the highest executive offices of the State, in the reign of William III. Two great principles were then adopted, that the Council of the State should consist of those who held identical political opinions, and, secondly, that it should be formed from the party which was in the majority in the House. During the seventeenth century, even if the monarch did not actually choose the policy of the nation, he still strongly influenced its choice, and the method of its operation. But gradually the influence of the sovereign became less and less. The stability of the Hanoverian princes was in a great measure due to their comparative non-interference with the will of the people, and their wise recognition of the two constitutional principles before mentioned. The presence of the king in a cabinet council ceased when the Hanoverian princes came to the crown, chiefly through their ignorance of the English language. "A century ago," says Mr. Bagehot,¹ "the Crown had a real choice of ministers, though it had no longer a choice in policy. During the long reign of Sir R. Walpole he was obliged not only to manage parliament, but to manage the palace. He was obliged to take care that some court intrigue did not expel him from his place. The nation then selected the English policy, but the Crown chose the English ministers. They were not only in name, as now, but in fact, the Queen's servants. Remnants of this great prerogative still remain. . . . The Cabinet is a board of control chosen by the legislature, out of persons whom it trusts and knows, to rule the nation." This board of advisers at once controls and obeys the legislature. Its existence

¹ *The English Constitution*, p. II.

is dependent on the approval of the people by their representatives, but it has the right of appeal to a new parliament. The value of this connection between the legislature and the controlling heads of the executive is great. Otherwise "the executive is crippled by not getting the laws it needs, and the legislature is spoilt by having to act without responsibility. . . . This difficulty has been so much felt in America that a semi-connection has grown up between the legislature and the executive."¹

vi. But the work of modern government is too complicated and special for a cabinet, however large.² It is also necessary to keep party considerations from unduly influencing the legislation of the country. To secure greater knowledge and impartiality, commissions are from time to time, independently of party feeling, issued to those who, whether within or outside the House, have special qualifications for the preparation of statistics, and the investigation of facts necessary for the framing of a bill affecting social, mercantile, or any legitimate private interests. The great danger from centralization is the disregard of local interests, and the neglect of local experience, a defect which has harmed the Colonial and Indian policy of England. The deliberations of the central parliament should always be helped by local counsel.

vii. Besides the positive control of the majority by the ministry, there are two other checks on hasty legislation in England. The House of Lords at once criticises and suggests, and an Opposition, with its own machinery, leaders, precedents, and traditions, subjects all bills to a thorough and often wise scrutiny. In his history of Greece Mr. Grote speaks of "opposition speakers" as Kleon; but the analogy is really misleading. Nikias was in no respect like a modern minister. He was often out-voted. He had often to carry through some bill of which he disapproved, while the so-called "Opposition" often carried its own bills. A regular, formally recognized Opposition, is a modern idea which has grown out of government by parties.

viii. The Baconian system of government has four dis-

¹ *The English Constitution*, p. 17.

² A privy councillor of high standing and special knowledge may be a member of the Cabinet without office.

inct interests—the interests of the monarch, of the executive or council, of individuals, and of the community. If the counsellor advises in his official interest or in that of the community as apart from the monarch, he is dangerous or useless, and the more despotic the monarch, the greater the danger or uselessness. If he advises the monarch in sincerity and faithful regard to the monarchical interests, he is a check on the public welfare. In no case would the individual be protected.

ix. By making the Cabinet responsible to the legislature, as the representative of both public and private interests, and at the same time by considering the ministers to be the actual servants of the Crown, two important results have been obtained. In the first place the conflicting interests of officialism, the *être collectif*, and the individual, which Rousseau deprecates as most obstructive to good government, are harmonized. In Germany an autocratic emperor, an irresponsible ministry, private interests, and an enlightened community, may possibly each pull in a different direction. France suffers from sub-division of parties, which makes it difficult for any ministry to keep together a working majority. In the second place the dignity and social influence of monarchy are preserved, while the power is reduced to a shadow. The king acts through ministers who are called his servants, but are independent of his influence, and the “king can do no wrong,” *i.e.* his responsible advisers can be punished. If we could suppose that monarchy would again be an actual power in the State, the value of the principle of ministerial responsibility would soon become manifest. Where kings have real power, this principle is at once a security and a check.¹

x. Generally it may be said that the idea of counsel is, in modern times, opposed to that of numerical superiority, as it was to physical force, when might was right. One of the great dangers of democracy is the disregard of minorities. A minority, could it have made its voice heard, would have saved France from the Mexican *fiasco*.

xi. In private life it is best to rely on self as far as possible. The man who is always running to his neighbour, as to the confessional, for advice, not only discloses

¹ See Sir G. C. Lewis *On Political Terms*, ch. iii., p. 27.

his private affairs, but weakens his own mental powers. Each man knows his own interests, and few can advise without bias, prejudice, or indifference. The sanguine man should not go to the sanguine for advice, nor the cautious to the cautious. It would be best if both natures were consulted, as the Germans are said by Tacitus to have given judgment both when drunk and sober. In cases where special knowledge is required, it is best to pay an expert for his advice, for as Lockhart said of literary counsel, "An unpaid contributor is *ex vi termini*, a fool." The best counsellors, or at least the most disinterested, are those of a man's own family, or who are themselves personally interested in his success. "Every one thinks himself able to advise another," and "*rien ne se donne aussi libéralement que les conseils*," but "he that builds according to every man's advice will have a crooked house," and "if you want to get into a bog, ask five fools the way to the wood."

[See also Essays on *Boldness* and *Delays*.]

XXI. Of Delays.

FORTUNE is like the market ; where, many times, if you stay a little, the price will fall. And again, it is sometimes like Sibylla's offer ; which at first offereth the commodity at full, then consumeth part and part, and still holdeth up the price. For *Occasion* (as it is in the common verse) *turneth a bald noddle after she hath presented her locks in front, and no hold taken* ; or, at least, turneth the handle of the bottle first to be received, and after the belly, which is hard to clasp. There is surely no greater wisdom ¹⁰ than well to time the beginnings and onsets of things. Dangers are no more light, if they once seem light ; and more dangers have deceived men than forced

taken men unaware

them. Nay, it were better to meet some dangers half
 15 way, though they come nothing near, than to keep
 too long a watch upon their approaches. For if a
 man watch too long, it is odds he will fall asleep. On
 the other side, to be deceived with too long shadows
 (as some have been when the moon was low, and
 20 shone on their enemies' back), and so to shoot off
 before the time, or to teach dangers to come on by
 over-early buckling towards them, is another extreme.
 The ripeness or unripeness of the occasion (as we
 said) must ever be well weighed. And generally it is
 25 good to commit the beginnings of all great actions to
Argus with his hundred eyes, and the ends to Briareus
 with his hundred hands : first to watch, and then to
 speed. For the helmet of Pluto, which maketh the
 politic man go invisible, is secrecy in the counsel, and
 30 celerity in the execution. For when things are once
 come to the execution, there is no secrecy comparable
 to celerity—like the motion of a bullet in the air,
 which flieth so swift as it outruns the eye.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. Fortune often sells to
 haste what she gives to
 delay.

2. While we hurry to
 grasp the beginning of
 things, we clutch at
 shadows.

3. While matters are un-
 certain, man must watch;
 when they turn, man must
 act.

Against.

1. Opportunity gives you
 first the pitcher's handle,
 then the belly.

2. Opportunity, like the
 Sibyl, makes her wares
 less, but her prices higher.

3. Speed is the helmet
 of darkness (lit., the cap of
 Pluto).

4. The first steps in actions must be handed over to Argus (of the hundred eyes), the ends, to Briareus (of the hundred hands).

4. Things done in time, are done with judgment; but if late, with intrigue.

[See also Essays on *Truth, Fortune, Boldness, Counsel, Dispatch.*]

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. The phenomena of delay belong to practical psychology. Every action, not automatic, involves three factors—a conception of the end, a resolution of the end into the means, and a practical imperative, or act of deliberate choice, the sovereign command which sets the bodily executive to its work. Now it is clear that a man may hesitate between two ends. He may say pleasure is a good, or interest is a good. Or he may rightly conceive the end, and yet be unable to resolve it into the chain of causation which will lead to action. And, lastly, he may conceive the end, know the means, and yet be impotent to act through inability to apply the particular to his own case.

ii. These difficulties often intersect. Where a man hesitates between a good and a bad end, and deliberately places evil before his mind as an alternative end, he has in a measure made evil his good,—a state of mind which arises from particular determinations of the will in a wrong direction. But a man may legitimately hesitate between two courses of action, duties or otherwise, which the complicated conditions of modern life present as equally desirable. “Making up one’s mind” in a conflict of duties, legitimate interests, and even legitimate pleasures, must often be a slow process. Shall Hannibal lead his drenched legions to Rome, or halt to recruit? How is a holiday to be spent? In such cases care must be taken that the reason is “a dry light” untouched by the desires. Bias must be eliminated.

iii. However the actual choice of the end, if left to the reason is generally of no great difficulty. But after a decision has been made, the mere conception of the end

is not sufficient. Thought is passive, and the mere thinker is apt to become a dreamer, idealist, or visionary. The end must be recognized by the will, or the mind will take no trouble to analyze it into the means necessary for its accomplishment. The Comtist maxim, "Think to act, act with affection," is as true of the first factor of action as it is of the third. The end must become the object of desire. The difficulty is moral (see § vi.).

iv. In the choice of means doubt and hesitation is often necessary and useful. The mere resolution of an end into means is not always enough. The first difficulty enters into the discovery of means. The end does not justify the means. Sometimes a good end is missed by inability to find the proper means. No one would deny that national education, and representation of the lower classes are "goods," but the means to both are subjects of dispute. The extreme advocates of the *laissez faire* theory of government would limit its functions to protection. A country may be unfit for representative institutions. The introduction of a new cause into the tangled web of human interests may produce an endless train of unforeseen results. If we combine an acid and an alkali we know what will follow, but only a prophet could tell the effects twenty years hence of the enfranchisement of women. The comparative method does not give certainty, only probability, varying with the complexity of the phenomena. Special knowledge should check the proverbial impulsiveness of majorities. On the other hand, delay is culpable when class interests or vested rights put a spoke in the wheel of national reforms. Law reforms are postponed because they would hurt practitioners so respectable as Mr. Vholes. At times there is a painful want of an Alexander to cut the knot. Modern life suffers, however much it gains, from the suppression of "personalities." A nation has to be educated and developed up to a pressing reform like "sanitary dwellings for the poor." "After me the deluge," is the maxim of most legislators. Modern legislation is often dilatory, tentative, and empirical—delay followed by revolution.

v. But while delay often is due to the want of a comprehensive, statesmanlike grasp of a social problem in

all its bearings, it may be the result of excessive knowledge. Essentials are often lost in a crowd of details. Pedants, dilettanti, specialists, are notoriously backward in action. Folly rushes in where knowledge fears to tread. Statistics may prove anything. It is even possible to know too much for action. An engine-driver may know too much of the complicated machinery of his engine. Physiology suggests hypochondria. Here knowledge is the reverse of power. The subtlety and variety of the phenomena prevent the final analysis of ends into means. The adjustment of means to ends is too delicate to seem practicable.

vi. Here we are brought face to face with the third difficulty, inability to choose the right set of means. The machinery may be so delicate, that, in spite of recognizing the means, a man may fear to use them, "letting 'I dare not' wait upon 'I would.'" The difficulty is now moral, in the will. The practical syllogism is in need of the imperative conclusion. The desires have not been trained to give their motive power on the side of reason. Sometimes the hesitation is rather non-moral than immoral. The sentimentalist cannot bring himself to favour the unpicturesque surroundings of some industrial enterprise to promote the good of mankind ; or he prefers stage coaches to locomotives. Mr. Ruskin would abolish railroads, Mr. W. Morris, machinery. Resolution is sicklied over with the pale cast of sentiment. In morality the facts are simple, the end and means are clear, the difficulty is in the will. The sinner is essentially the delayer. "To-morrow I will hear thee on this matter." "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian." Balaam said, "Let me die the death of the righteous," and he knew the conduct that makes for righteousness. But "Balaam, the son of Zippor, they slew with the sword."

"To-morrow and to-morrow and to-morrow,
Creeps in this petty pace, from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time ;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death."

Everybody intends to reform—on the morrow that never comes.

vii. All the difficulties of action find a meeting-place in laziness. Men are often too lazy to think, as they are to express their thoughts, and still more often men are too lazy to act. Dread of opposition and hard work keeps many from the performance which they are not too lazy to recognize as beneficial and practical. *La paresse (dans la vie) détruit et y consume insensiblement les passions et les vertus.* It is not a passion, but becomes more powerful than all the other passions. Superstition and laziness play into each other's hands.

viii. Superstition often leads to inaction. The superstitious man fears to interfere with the supernatural. At the same time much superstition is based on laziness. The fatalist throws everything, even his own sins, on the deity. The constitutional timidity of Nikias conjoined with pedantic superstition ruined the power of Athens in Sicily. The unenergetic Spartans, who were twitted by the Corinthian envoys at the Peloponnesian congress with their want of enterprise, were too ready to make a festival, like the Karneia, an excuse for inaction.

ix. The result of all this is to endeavour to show that delay as a state of the will is bad, while it is often a necessary condition of the reason, and though obstructive, is so rather through human imperfection and the complication of social problems. There are also cases where action is impossible and delay is a positive, though subordinate, good. "*Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.*" It is better to tire out a stronger adversary. Wait for your enemy's mistakes. Either he will trip through the confidence of success, or will otherwise relax his caution, or become weaker by the action of time. "Masterly inactivity" may compensate for superior strength. In a triangular war, the wise man lets his adversaries wear each other out, and then makes his effort. "*Divide et impera.*" Delay is not necessarily lazy. It often requires as much energy to keep out of the way of danger, and avoid making mistakes, as to take the initiative and act boldly. "By acting too quickly," says Sir Stafford Northcote, "you are giving impulse to forces, which, if you leave them alone, will exhaust themselves and do no harm." Action is essentially vulnerable. The passive strength of criticism and opposition will enfeeble the

strongest government. Men desire change and are disappointed with the present, which always falls short of their expectations. The successful man is often the man who can afford to wait. In a short time he can make his own terms. It is usual to gauge our own demands by the necessities of others. On the other hand commonplace philosophy is too enamoured with the doctrine of *laissez faire*. Men drift aimlessly through life, like Mr. Micawber, waiting to see if anything will "turn up." Force must be stored silently and patiently,—and then the lightning.

x. Proverbial philosophy is nearly balanced on the subject. It generally happens that we can get a fair travelling rule, if a balance is struck between two proverbs. Proverbs are themselves instances of hasty generalization. "The wisdom of many and the wit of one;" they are half truths, popular, but fallacious; downright, but superficial. The proverbial philosopher will not wait to hear both sides. Popular shibboleths, *mots d'ordre*, political war-cries, *et hoc genus omne*, are mostly instances of undigested thought. In the present case we have "delays breed remorse," balanced by "*festina lente*," "More haste, worse speed," *Che va piano va sano*. Talleyrand avoided committing himself prematurely by reversing the well-known proverb, and never doing to-day what he could put off till to-morrow.

xi. One great evil in delay arises from the proverbial delays of the law. Often the battle is not to the better cause but to the longer purse. This cuts both ways, and checks litigation. But cheap and rapid justice is a necessity.

xii. Through caution against haste men should not become mere calculating machines. What is impulsive, instinctive, emotional in our nature is often in a measure a positive inspiration. "First thoughts are best," says the Guesser at Truth, "being those of generous impulses; whereas second thoughts are those of selfish prudence; best in worldly wisdom, but in a higher economy, worst." But are not third thoughts best of all, as combining spontaneous generosity and practical wisdom?

XXII. Of Cunning.

WE take Cunning for a sinister or crooked wisdom. And certainly there is a great difference between a cunning man and a wise man, not only in point of honesty, but in point of ability.

5 There be that can ^{cheat} pack the cards, and yet cannot play well ; so there are some that are good in canvasses and factions, that are otherwise weak men. Again, it is one thing to understand persons, and another thing to understand matters. For many are

10 perfect in men's humours, that are not greatly capable of the real part of business ; which is the constitution of one that hath studied men more than books. Such men are fitter for practice than for counsel, and they are good but in their own alley. Turn them to new

15 men, and they have lost their aim. So, as the old rule, to know a fool from a wise man, *Mitte ambos nudos ad ignotos, et videbis*, doth scarce hold for them. And because these cunning men are like haberdashers of small wares, it is not amiss to set forth their shop.

20 It is a point of cunning to wait upon him with whom you speak, with your eye ; as the Jesuits give it in precept. For there be many wise men that have secret hearts and transparent countenances. Yet this would be done with a demure abasing of your eye

25 sometimes, as the Jesuits also do use.

Another is, that when you have anything to obtain of present dispatch, you entertain and amuse the party with whom you deal with some other discourse, that he be not too much awake to make objections.

I knew a counsellor and secretary, that never came ³⁰ to Queen Elizabeth of England with bills to sign, but he would always first put her into some discourse of state, that she mought the less mind the bills.

The like surprise may be made by moving things when the party is in haste, and cannot stay to con- ³⁵ sider advisedly of that is moved.

If a man would cross a business that he doubts ⁴⁰ some other would handsomely and effectually move, let him pretend to wish it well, and move it himself, in such sort as may foil it.

The breaking off in the midst of that one was about to say, as if he took himself up, breeds a greater appetite in him with whom you confer to know more.

And because it works better when anything seemeth ⁴⁵ to be gotten from you by question, than if you offer it of yourself, you may lay a bait for a question, by shewing another visage and countenance than you are wont; to the end, to give occasion for the party to ask what the matter is of the change; as Nehemias ⁵⁰ did, *And I had not before that time been sad before the king.*

In things that are tender and displeasing, it is good to break the ice by some whose words are of less weight, and to reserve the more weighty voice to ⁵⁵ come in as by chance, so that he may be asked the question upon the other's speech; as Narcissus did, in relating to Claudius the marriage of Messalina and Silius.

In things that a man would not be seen in himself, ⁶⁰ it is a point of cunning to borrow the name of the

world ; as to say, *The world says*, or, *There is a speech abroad*.

I knew one that, when he wrote a letter, he would
65 put that which was most material in the postscript, as if it had been a by-matter.

I knew another that, when he came to have speech, he would pass over that that he intended most, and go forth, and come back again, and speak of it as a
70 thing he had almost forgot.

Some procure themselves to be surprised at such times as it is like the party that they work upon will suddenly come upon them, and be found with a letter in their hand, or doing somewhat which they are not
75 accustomed, to the end they may be apposed of those things which of themselves they are desirous to utter.

It is a point of cunning to let fall those words in a man's own name which he would have another man
80 learn and use, and thereupon take advantage. I knew two that were competitors for the secretary's place, in Queen Elizabeth's time, and yet kept good
489 | quarter between themselves, and would confer one with another upon the business ; and the one of them
85 said, that to be a secretary *in the declination of a monarchy* was a ticklish thing, and that he did not affect it. The other straight caught up those words, and discoursed with divers of his friends, that he had no reason to desire to be secretary *in the de-*
90 *clination of a monarchy*. The first man took hold of it, and found means it was told the Queen ; who, hearing of a *declination of a monarchy*, took it so ill, as she would never after hear of the other's suit.

There is a cunning, which we in England call *the turning of the cat in the pan*; which is, when that 95 which a man says to another, he lays it as if another had said it to him. And, to say truth, it is not easy when such a matter passed between two, to make it appear from which of them it first moved and began.

It is a way that some men have, to glance and dart 100 at others by justifying themselves by negatives; as to say, *This I do not*; as Tigellinus did towards Burrhus, saying, "*Se non diversas spes, sed incolumitatem imperatoris simpliciter spectare.*" to the safety.

Some have in readiness so many tales and stories, 105 as there is nothing they would insinuate but they can wrap it into a tale; which serveth both to keep themselves more in guard, and to make others carry it with more pleasure.

It is a good point of cunning for a man to shape 110 the answer he would have, in his own words and propositions; for it makes the other party stick the less.

It is strange how long some men will lie in wait to speak somewhat they desire to say, and how far about 115 they will fetch, and how many other matters they will beat over to come near it. It is a thing of great patience, but yet of much use.

A sudden, bold, and unexpected question doth many times surprise a man, and lay him open. Like 120 to him that, having changed his name, and walking in Paul's, another suddenly came behind him, and called him by his true name; whereat straightways he looked back.

But these small wares and petty points of cunning 125

are infinite, and it were a good deed to make a list of them; for that nothing doth more hurt in a State than that cunning men pass for wise.

But certainly some there are that know the resorts
 130 and falls of business, that cannot sink into the main of it; like a house that hath convenient stairs and entries, but never a fair room. Therefore you shall see them find out pretty looses in the conclusion, but are no ways able to examine or debate matters. And
 140 yet commonly they take advantage of their inability, and would be thought wits of direction. Some build rather upon the ^{as others} abusing of others, and (as we now say) putting tricks upon them, than upon the soundness of their own proceedings. But Salomon saith,
 145 "*Prudens advertit ad gressus suos; stultus divertit ad dolos.*"

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

[See also Essays on *Truth, Simulation and Dissimulation, and Boldness.*]

i. "Be ye wise as serpents and harmless as doves." The relation of cunning to wisdom is not unlike that of boldness to courage. "Cunning," says Locke, "is the ape of wisdom." Frequently the motive to cunning is non-moral or immoral, and the means to the end are not tested by the standard of right. Cunning works through low utilitarianism. The wise man argues:

This is a universal good (a principle),

These means are the best (intellectually and morally),

Therefore choose them.

The cunning man says:

This end is pleasurable (to me),

These means (whatever they be) procure it,

Therefore they are to be chosen.

In the former case the premisses are sanctioned by morality, and are of the nature of principles.

ii. In cunning the premisses are rough generalizations based on individual experience and suggested by the desires. It is true that cunning often rightly conceives the end, but it is not careful as to the morality of the means ; and as the end is suggested by the desires rather than the reason, it is often bad. "Cunning leads to knavery, it is but a step from the one to the other, and that very slippery. Add lying to cunning and it is knavery."

iii. Further, cunning is natural and instinctive. Animals, savages, and children are cunning. All these primitive types of being have no idea of the value of straightforward simplicity, and twist and turn to obtain the slightest pleasure. A young leopard, even after long training, will not go straight for its food, but looks about, slinks up and snatches it, as if it were prey, which it had hunted in its native jungle. A dog turns round before it goes to sleep, perhaps looking for a possible enemy. Children will invent, wheedle, persevere, even use violence to obtain a small pleasure which would probably have been granted on mere asking. Cunning is the effect of weakness and ignorance, and is a survival of primitive life, when every man's hand was against his neighbour. Any work on natural history will illustrate the unnecessary cunning of animals after domestication. The great beast-epic *Reineke Fuchs* is the glorification of cunning.

iv. Carlyle speaks of "Vulpine knowingness," which "sits yet with its hopeless problem, 'Given a world of knaves to educe an honesty from their united action ;'—how cumbrous a problem, you may see in Chancery Law Courts, and some other places." Wisdom works through, and to, good ; cunning through evil and often for evil. Cunning sets a thief to catch a thief, it never sails boldly. The great man foresees the storm. Cunning is always on the defensive. An Asiatic cannot go straight to his point ; he embellishes his conversation with flowery compliments and exaggerated metaphors, while hate is rankling in his heart. Diplomacy is tortuous ; a direct answer is undiplomatic. Cunning trades on the weaknesses and vices of mankind ; it suggests desires, plays upon ignorance, flatters vanity, panders to the senses.

v. "In spite of all that grovelling minds," writes Cardinal

Newman, "may say about the necessity of acquaintance with the world and with sin, in order to get on well in life, yet after all, inexperienced guilelessness carries a man on as safely and more happily. The guileless man has a simple boldness and a princely heart; he overcomes dangers which others shrink from, merely because they are no dangers to him, and thus he gains even worldly advantages by his straightforwardness, which the most crafty persons cannot gain. It is true such single-hearted men often get into difficulties, but they usually get out of them as easily, and are almost unconscious of their danger and their escapes;" imposture and credulity go hand in hand. The cunning are often foolishly simple.¹

vi. Jesuitry is false as well as faint policy. So called "men of the world" expatiate on the folly of owning to a mistake. A sophistical quibble through the medium of a daily paper may raise a laugh and win a victory of words, but the losing side has the best of it in the end, for "*magna est veritas et prævalebit.*"

vii. Even La Rochefoucauld speaks of the uselessness of cunning. "We are sound to dissemble with other people, but in time we come to dissemble and deceive with ourselves." And again, "One man may be too cunning for another, but nobody can be too cunning for all the world." The will is weakened and depraved by constant dissimulation. "Hurry and cunning are the two apprentices of despatch and skill, but neither of them ever learns this master's trade."

viii. In savage life cunning takes the place of mental and physical power. In its next stage, as mind against force, it is rather a mediæval than a Greek, Roman, or modern vice. Ulysses is at once a type and an exception; the warrior placed in exceptional circumstances falls back on the attribute of the savage. It is true that the Greeks were not constitutionally brave, but Ulysses is the wanderer who sees strange sights and meets dangers beyond the limits of human endurance. Cunning appears in strong relief when the military spirit was just beginning to decline. Reynard the cunning appears when brute force is not the only recognized power, but the arts of peace work in fear and trembling. The means were

¹ *Advancement to Learning*, i. iv. 8.

frequently lost sight of in the end. This is the meaning of Machiavellism, and in a measure of Jesuitry. Intellect has to meet force, and is not particular as to its methods.

ix. "Among the polished Italians," writes Macaulay,¹ "enriched by commerce, governed by law, and passionately attached to literature, everything was done by superiority of intelligence. Their very wars, more pacific than the peace of their neighbours, required rather civil than military qualifications. Hence, while courage was the point of honour in other countries, ingenuity became the point of honour in Italy." Italian civilization was to some extent precocious. The richest and most enlightened parts of the world were threatened by the cruelty and rapacity of a semi-barbarous age of military force.

XXIII. Of Wisdom for a Man's Self.

AN ant is a wise creature for itself, but it is a shrewd thing in an orchard or garden. And certainly men that are great lovers of themselves waste the public. Divide with reason between self-love and society; and be so true to thyself as thou be not false to others, especially to thy king and country. It is a poor centre of a man's actions, himself. It is right earth. For that only stands fast upon his own centre; whereas all things that have affinity with the heavens move upon the centre of another, to which they benefit.

The referring of all to a man's self is more tolerable in a sovereign prince, because themselves are not only themselves, but their good and evil is at the peril of the public fortune. But it is a desperate evil in a

¹ Essays, *Machiavelli*.

servant to a prince, or a citizen in a republic. For whatsoever affairs pass such a man's hands, he crooketh them to his own ends ; which must needs be often eccentric to the ends of his master or State.

20 Therefore, let princes or States choose such servants as have not this mark ; except they mean their service should be made but the accessory.

That which maketh the effect more pernicious is, that all proportion is lost. It were disproportion
25 enough for the servant's good to be preferred before the master's ; but yet it is a greater extreme, when a little good of the servant shall carry things against a great good of the master's. And yet that is the case of bad officers, treasurers, ambassadors, generals, and
30 other false and corrupt servants ; which set a bias upon their bowl of their own petty ends and envies, to the overthrow of their master's great and important affairs. And for the most part the good such servants receive is after the model of their own fortune ; but the hurt they sell for that good is after the
35 model of their master's fortune. And certainly it is the nature of extreme self-lovers as they will set a house on fire and it were but to roast their eggs. And yet these men many times hold credit with their
40 masters, because their study is but to please them, and profit themselves ; and for either respect they will abandon the good of their affairs.

Wisdom for a man's self is, in many branches thereof, a depraved thing. It is the wisdom of rats,
45 that will be sure to leave a house somewhat before it fall. It is the wisdom of the fox, that thrusts out the badger, who digged and made room for him. It

is the wisdom of crocodiles, that shed tears when they would devour. But that which is specially to be noted is, that those which (as Cicero says of Pompey) ⁵⁰ are *sui amantes sine rivali*, are many times unfortunate. And whereas they have all their time sacrificed to themselves, they become in the end themselves sacrifices to the inconstancy of fortune; whose wings they thought by their self-wisdom to have pinioned. ⁵⁵

For part of the manuscript of this passage is crossed out.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. "Political economists," writes Julius Hare,¹ "tell us that self-love is the bond of society. Strange, then, must be the construction of what is called society, when it is cemented by the strongest and most eating of solvents. For self-love not only dissolves all harmonious fellowship between man and man, but even among the various powers and faculties within the breast of the same man, which when under its sway can never work together, so as to produce an orderly organized whole. Can it be that society has been feeding upon poisons till they have become not merely harmless, but, as this opinion would make them, the only wholesome, nourishing diet?"

ii. It is a hackneyed truism that the highest interests of man are identical with the highest interests of society; but it is not easy to bring this home to the individual. The weakness of utilitarianism seems to be, first, that it supplies a vague, shadowy motive to any but public acts. The acts of private morality, which constitute so large a part of life, are left unregulated to the tender mercy of the desires. Only where a direct reference is possible to the happiness of humanity, does utilitarianism take a practical form. And, secondly, when the question, "Why should I increase the sum total of happiness in the world?" has to be answered, the only possible reply is the vicious circle, "because it is to my own personal advantage." Our own opinion of the theory is that it is

¹ *Guesses at Truth*, p. 184.

an inverted order to say, "Act rightly, because it is for the advantage of the individual." The train of reasoning should rather be, "Act rightly, because you are a rational moral agent ; because you have higher light than a brute ; and all the rest shall be added to you." Do your duty ; happiness will follow to you and to the whole world. The flaw of utilitarianism is that there is no leading principle. "Let us eat, drink, for to-morrow we die," rings in our ears as forcibly as the higher voice, "Self-love is self-denial." Pure altruism is the morals of Saturn, and is too distant an ideal to act as a living motive.

iii. Men are not only limited, but liable to self-deception, if they listen to self-love. It is true that even from the utilitarian standpoint reason may accurately calculate the sum total of results in the third or fourth degree, but the process stops somewhere, and expediency suggests the immediate rather than the distant result. It is proposed by the *laissez faire* school to connect the electoral franchise with taxation. A man, it is said, will vote wisely and well if he has a few pounds' stake in the country. It is only fair that those who give money should vote it away ; but to say that, instead of asking, "Is it right?" the independent voter is to say, "What will it cost?" is to take all the marrow out of the world.

"Only the ledger lives, and only not all men lie."

If democracy means mammon, by all means let us get back to something else.

iv. Another dangerous fallacy of modern thought is to suppose that the compound result of ten million atomistic self-loves will give a net result of unselfishness. On the contrary, the clash of modern interests is constantly intensified. Legislation by representation ideally reconciles conflicting influences ; but the great distinction of public and local interests cannot be satisfactorily maintained even by a public-spirited, impersonal, independent representative ; while the tendency of politics is to delegacy and representation of local interests. Six hundred delegates pledged to maintain six hundred special interests would rarely unite, even on the broadest principle.

v. Modern legislation is painfully one-sided and narrow-

minded.¹ "Enlighten self-interest," cries the philosopher, "do but sufficiently enlighten it." "We ourselves," writes Carlyle, "have seen enlightened self-interests ere now, and, truly, for the most part, their light was only that of a horn lantern, sufficient to guide the bearer himself out of various puddles, but to us and the world of comparatively small advantage. And figure the human species like an endless host seeking its way onward through undiscovered time, in black darkness save that each had his horn lantern, and the vanguard some few of glass." If we look round, examples of broken ideals strew our path and the path of the world; we shall find ourselves living in a fool's paradise with our enlightened self-love.

vi. Self-interest professes to listen only to reason, and lets in the passions at every pore. The fatal dexterity with which each can erect himself, his lower self, into a universal standard is daily bearing fruit. "Divine philosophy" is too easily made "procuress of the lords of hell." When pauperism is stamped out and education universal; when labour, in its struggle with capital, remembers that the labourer is also a consumer; when free-trade is universally recognized, and wars have ceased, we may talk of enlightened self-interest as a remedy for all evil. Belief in machinery, Acts of Parliament, and centralization is the fault of the age; it goes hand in hand with self-love; yet it is strange how men have to be forced to love themselves. Is it not better philosophy to say, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and then all these things shall be added to you"? Burke says that those who love themselves are far less indulgent to others than those who have lived a life of self-denial. Self-love confines a man wholly within himself. He can only be moral in so far as he realizes the identity of his own interest with that of others. La Rochefoucauld reduced virtue to self-love, but he never wished to erect self-love into virtue. It is not to be denied that, generally, each man does his own work best, but not unless he forgets self, and guards against the intrusion of the personal equation. And, further, this is often so impossible, and human reason is so fallible that, after finding himself in hopeless *culs-*

¹ See Herbert Spencer, *Essays, Representation, Parliamentary Reform, etc.*

de-sac, he flies back to the paternal government of the great man. Self-interest is a better test for right action than initiative motive to philanthropic legislation. The great man has to be judged by the public opinion which he partly makes, but to which he is in the end responsible. He should act from righteousness on the lines of utility. Here the individual only judges whether the act is beneficial to himself, but does not to any great extent originate. Thus the will is practically passive, the reason active. Otherwise all good is swallowed up in the whirling gulf of selfishness.

“ Sooner or later I too may passively take the print
Of the golden age—why not? I have neither hope nor trust ;
May make my heart as a millstone, set my face as a flint,
Cheat and be cheated and die : who knows? we are ashes
and dust.”

vii. Even political economy, the science of enlightened selfishness, shows a strong tendency nowadays to look at things from a humanitarian rather than an economic standpoint. The rights and duties of man are insisted upon by modern socialism, as against the principles of competition and of supply and demand. Having virtually ignored morality, the world is regretting its loss.

viii. It is hard to see how morality could ever have developed without some conception of man's proper estate and end. Even if conscience is an inherited growth from the last appetite, chastened by reason, still a boundary line has been fixed, a guidance has been discovered, which it is now proposed that man should surrender. Pure altruism, with morality and Christianity, says that he that loseth his life shall find it, and that the world will grow more homogeneous. Comte quotes as the positivist motto :

“ Amem te plus quam me, nec me nisi propter te.”

But morality and religion give practical reasons for altruism which can act directly as motives—the one, duty ; the other, God's will. Further, they both support man in his struggle for the higher life, while utilitarianism leaves him only the broken reed of self-love. The complete identification of the happiness of others with our

own good is perhaps hardly to be realized, but Christianity and morality enable each man to reap the rewards of his virtue in inward peace as well as outward prosperity. The pure altruist can have no comfort and no reward except that he is a link in an endless chain of development towards a shadowy perfection of which *ex hypothesi* he will never reap the fruits. He can never say, "I have done my work, and have found my reward here, as I hope for a greater one hereafter." Virtue is individual as well as altruistic. Pure altruism is self-extinction.

ix. An amusing, though somewhat fallacious, dilemma arises in connection with self-love. If it is so entirely for A's advantage to deny himself for B, A should unselfishly allow B to do so in his behalf; but pure altruism will not allow B to act, and so on to infinity. Action by being constantly referred to another becomes impossible. The difficulty does not occur if we allow that an action can be right in itself; when the standard of reference is the law of morality, as recognized by the individual. Otherwise we shall have to pity the lamentable condition of the wealthy.

x. Still, in avoiding the rock of self-love, we must avoid no less the mirage of sentimentalism. Self-love is a tangible fact and a practical guide to action. Much that is known as morality is based on enlightened self-love. The danger of a purely humanitarian standpoint is, perhaps, as great as the reduction of all things to the purely economic principles of competition and supply and demand. Malthus may be heard as well as Mr. Henry George. A fair travelling rule is that "morality is limited by expediency, as expediency should be by morality." There are features of Malthusianism which are sanctioned by morality, which, however, can never allow the rigid application of the brutal methods.

xi. The parallel between physical development and the growth of society is apt to mislead. All growth is to specialization or heterogeneity, but in the social organism the unifying principle is moral law; otherwise it will be torn asunder by disruptive forces, and there will be no unity in diversity.

[See also Essay, *Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature.*]

XXIV. Of Innovations.

AS the births of living creatures at first are ill-shapen, so are all Innovations, which are the births of time. Yet, notwithstanding, as those that first bring honour into their family are commonly more worthy than most that succeed, so the first precedent (if it be good) is seldom attained by imitation. For Ill, to man's nature as it stands perverted, hath a natural motion, strongest in continuance; but Good, as a forced motion, strongest at first. Surely every medicine is an innovation, and he that will apply new remedies must expect new evils. For time is the greatest innovator; and if time of course alters things to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall be the end? It is true that what is settled by custom, though it be not good, yet at least it is fit; and those things which have long gone together, are, as it were, confederate within themselves; whereas new things piece not so well; but, though they help by their utility, yet they trouble by their inconformity. Besides, they are like strangers, more admired, and less favoured. All this is true, if time stood still: which contrariwise moveth so round that a froward retention of custom is as turbulent a thing as an innovation; and they that reverence too much old times, are but a scorn to the new.

It were good, therefore, that men in their innovations, would follow the example of time itself; which indeed innovateth greatly, but quietly, and by degrees

scarce to be perceived; for otherwise, whatsoever is new is unlooked for: and ever it mends some, and 30
 impairs other; and he that is holpen takes it for a fortune, and thanks the time; and he that is hurt, for a wrong, and imputeth it to the author.

It is good also not to try experiments in States, except the necessity be urgent, or the utility evident; 35
 and well to beware, that it be the reformation that draweth on the change, and not the desire of change that pretendeth the reformation: and lastly, that the novelty, though it be not rejected, yet be held for a suspect; and, as the Scripture saith, that *we make a* 40
stand upon the ancient way, and then look about us, and discover what is the straight and right way, and so to walk in it. *Jer. vi. 16.*

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. All medicines are innovations.

2. He who dreads new remedies waits for new evils.

3. Time is the greatest innovator; let us, then, copy Time.

4. Ancient precedents are useless; modern are corrupt and selfish.

5. Allow fools and pedants to refer their actions to precedents.

6. As those who ennoble their family are more

Against.

1. New-born creatures are unshapely.

2. To my mind, Time is the only reformer.

3. All innovation does some wrong, for it tears up existing landmarks.

4. Things that are settled by custom, at least fit well together.

5. What innovator can imitate Time, who changes so gently as to escape notice?

6. Whatever happens beyond hope gives less plea-

worthy than their descendants, so to make precedents is mostly better than to imitate them (*or*, a new step is mostly better than a precedent).

7. A stubborn adherence to custom, no less than innovation, breeds disturbance.

8. Since of themselves things change for the worse, what end will there be to evil, unless by wise purpose we change them for the better?

9. The slaves of custom are the laughing-stocks of time.

sure where it profits, and more annoyance where it hurts.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. "Nature," says Aristotle, "does nothing in vain or scantily." If we understand this to mean that man cannot add to the forces of Nature, it is a truism; but, it is no less true that he can combine, direct, use, and so improve what Nature gives. Above all, he can increase and intensify those intellectual powers which, in the first instance, grew from sense impressions, and which, though resting on a physical basis, have become a new factor in the world's development. Man is in one aspect a part of Nature, in another above Nature; at once her slave and her master.

ii. We need not here discuss the nature of mind and matter, or the analogy between the growth of the individual and the growth of society. Whatever theory we may hold on these points, it is certain that the brain has the power of organizing conscious actions into reflex movements, and that this acquired faculty can be transmitted. It is this power that makes the education of the individual and the progress of the race possible. This rudimentary fact of physiology was seen by Bacon only through a glass

darkly, and its application to the philosophy of politics has produced a special theory of reform.

"I hold that through the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widened by the process of the
suns"—

are lines that could only have been written by a nineteenth-century poet.

iii. The tendency of this new conception of growth has been to limit the action of government. It has been argued by some that on the analogy of the individual, society develops of itself a guiding principle—the brain of the body politic which we call government. "Everything for the people and nothing by the people," was the watchword of the old school. But "security and cheapness" is the motto of the new school of politicians. Each class, each individual, knows its own interests best, and the less the interference of Government, the better for the interest of the governed.

iv. But of late a reaction¹ has set in against this belief in the efficacy of self-interest. In the case of education, of sanitation, and, some would add, of land and labour, the doctrine of *laissez faire* has broken down, and must be relegated to the limbo of social contracts and pantisocracies. This final disappearance of government is an ideal "whose margin fades for ever and for ever when we move."

v. Mr. Herbert Spencer, who is the apostle of the *laissez faire* school, practically allows this when he shows how vestries, local boards, companies, and trades-unions use their powers arbitrarily, selfishly, or injudiciously. The clash of private interests cannot be trusted to evolve the collective interest of the people. Take, for examples, protection, adulteration, the employment of women and children.

vi. We learn from the history of plant and animal life the lines on which reform should move. Plants and animals grow up under certain conditions. These conditions are altered or removed; some forms of life are stamped out, and the survivors adapt themselves as best they can to their new environment. Old functions decay

¹ "The New Toryism," *Contemporary Review*, Jan., 1884.

or remain as useless survivals. "The eye," says Helmholtz, "Nature's masterpiece, is a charming piece of mechanism ; it does its work, but that is all." "The intentions of Nature," says Goethe, "are always good, but not so the conditions which are required for the complete manifestation of her power."

vii. From the human point of view, Nature is not a reformer but a manufacturer of material force which is destructive to men unless regulated by the *vis humana*, without which all things tend to degenerate

"Sic omnia fatis
In pejus ruere et retro sublapsa referri."

Man provides those conditions which Nature refuses, prevents decay of the useful, lops off the useless, supplies elements for new growth, and keeps away parasites and destructive agencies.

viii. Even to keep present advantages the necessity for reform never stops. Man is always running a race with things. Just as a climate suddenly gets colder and the conditions of life are at once changed, so in the social organism an apparently trifling cause will necessitate a complete readjustment. A new tax, a new theory of wages, an extension of the franchise, a recognition of the principles of free trade, will set on foot a countless series of unexpected changes, which have promptly to be met. Social organisms are excellent conductors ; the motive force need not be powerful to send a shock through the whole system. The social nerve-centres are intimately connected and isolation is impossible. It is not enough that the motive be good ; any law, however well intentioned, may bring an excess of evil over good. So complex are the phenomena of society, that a new cause may develop in abnormal and possibly injurious directions. It is possible that a change may not only produce a new environment, but it may also so combine with other pre-existing causes as to give a product entirely different from that intended by the reformer. Temperance is the virtue of virtues ; "It does not create other virtues, but takes the place of them," says 'the philosopher on the roofs.' Yet a stringent liquor-bill might check external manifestations, but drive drunkenness in, or supply con-

ditions for the development of a new vice, like opium-smoking. The train of consequences which have resulted from the East Indian monopoly are totally unlike those which the original promoters had in view. America defends protection on the ground of possible war. It has other consequences, both harmful and different in kind from self-defence. On the other hand, some institutions require careful watching and nursing, or destruction from without or atrophy from within will supervene. The machinery of banking requires frequent supervision, not only from the delicate nature of the phenomena with which it is concerned, but also because destructive agencies are turning the safeguards of trade to the advantage of knaves. A forward movement not unfrequently, if left to itself, degenerates, either by way of excess or defect. The present is never secure; reform has constantly to be reformed. Fashion is a doubly bad influence; for besides hardening and stereotyping abnormalities, to the obstruction of future improvement, it takes away the spirit from the present, and leaves only a lifeless and superfluous formalism for the benefit of conceited ignorance.

ix. But, besides degenerating, the present must soon become the past. "The old order changeth." The material components of the human body, they tell us, are completely renewed every seven years. A higher range of being has to be reached. There should be no social mummies. Man must carefully watch against premature and unnecessary decay; but, when the spirit is dead, reform should cut away the useless branches. The phrase "radical reform," a term objected to by one class of thinkers,¹ at least expresses this truth, that when the tree ceases to bear fruit it must be ruthlessly destroyed, or it may endanger the growth and fruitfulness of other trees. The Romans patched and patched their constitution, establishing co-ordinate offices to balance injurious power, until at last the tribunician veto, in itself a valuable recognition of the rights of the people, could, and often did bring affairs to a deadlock, when the *Deus ex machina* of the dictatorship alone saved the state. It is at times difficult, and even dangerous, to break through the hard

¹ *Guesses at Truth.*

crust of custom and vested interests. The rights of property are enlisted in the service of the rights of extortion, but the day of change must come.

x. No reform is final ; a stoppage will give occasion for violence and revolution. Revolution is a last remedy,¹ more often killing than curing ; even Robespierre claimed to be only a reformer. It is a break with the past, and the old régime must be revived to keep the continuity.

xi. Revolution, in politics, religion, and art, is almost invariably followed by a reaction. Charles II. succeeded Cromwell. The old dynasty and régime returned when the French revolution had spent its force. A large part of Germany swung back from Protestantism. We should never glorify revolution, but not unfrequently it is impossible to dissolve the crust of custom without such a deluge ; the substitution of conscience for authority was a revolution. This is especially the case in art, science, and literature. Galileo, Bacon, Kepler, Newton, upset previous ideas. Men had been working on the wrong tack. The world, so to speak, had been temporarily off the rails. Rightly understood, the past should have led straight on in the right path ; the master mind leads thought back to its proper line of march. Scientific revolution generally involves no reaction, the emotional element being slight. A new theory may be carried too far ; it is possible to be too logical, as well as too conservative in applying a new principle, often to the extent of throwing disrepute on the principle itself ; but it is soon found that either the disturbing quantities have not been recognized, or that the wish to bring a new case under a principle has coloured the reason. Scientific exaggeration soon rights itself ; the application rather than the principle is at fault.

xii. In art and literature reform apparently works mainly through a see-saw of action and reaction. The sphere of most art and literature is emotional, and their subject-matter is in a high degree capable of imitation. Fashion, a danger which only indirectly threatens politics, and some

¹ One argument in favour of revolution is that a bold, subversive measure surprises and baffles opposition, while gradual reform is easily and fatally criticized.

unimportant sections of religion, easily becomes supreme. An original writer or artist strikes out new ideas and appeals to the emotions. These ideas are copied by clever imitators, and pinchbeck pictures and books win their way into public esteem. The idea is lost in the form. *Æstheticism* begins as a protest against philistinism, but itself became a silly fashion. Then comes a new renaissance. The French influence on English literature of the Restoration checked the feeble luxuriance into which the Italian influence had degenerated. Style asserted itself more and more, until the natural school of poetry corrected undue attention to the form, itself to degenerate into sickly sentimentality. Pointed epigrams ceased to please, but their place was after a while taken by spiritual nothings. The literary reformer strikes the balance between two extremes. The romantic and classical schools of art are alternately government and opposition. The 'tender idealism' of pre-Raphaelite art degenerated into morbid insipidity. The renaissance in its best influences still lives, but under less pagan and more moral conditions. When the master mind effects a synthesis, an advanced position is permanently occupied.

xiii. Reform rarely compromises, though it should take what is valuable from old ideas. It may not be able to stop short of revolution, but in most cases the evil is checked in time, and the new factor is introduced before the deluge. Despotism, infused with democratic principles, becomes constitutional monarchy. Some nations swing from empire to democracy, and from democracy to empire, and rarely reach stable equilibrium. It is said that a French elector only gets his freedom to vote himself into slavery. This is likely to happen whenever the national character has no practical resting-point between two ideals. Introduce by a timely reform the element of greatness into democracy, and in all probability a nation is saved from absolutism. A democracy should always be ready with a great man for a crisis. There are, of course, cases where no synthesis is desirable or possible, as in the case of a truth and an error; but most truth lies midway between two half-truths. Intuition, or inherited experience, must modify individual experience. "Take counsel of both times," the old and

the new. There is a *modus vivendi* between conscience and authority, between the heart and the head, between form and matter. No more practical rule can be given than the Aristotelian principle: "All excellence lies between excess and defect." So all reform is exposed to a double fire of criticism, besides having to fight against habit. There is no change which can be totally agreeable "unless it be," as Hare says, "here and there a honeymoon." The peasant would be uncomfortable in a palace. These strong midway positions reform is always seizing, if possible without revolution, for nature does nothing *per saltum*.

xiv. Change must be organic, not mechanical; natural, not artificial. Nations are organisms; they cannot be taken to pieces and reconstructed. Man does not create, he only combines or separates. And in this sense every man can and ought to be a reformer.

xv. Genius is comparatively powerless without what Emerson calls "character." The reformer must have self-control, truthfulness, love and patience as well as intellect and prudence. Even where change is impossible, every man can by his own life enter a vigorous protest against abuse. The *vis inertiae* is strong in all men, both to move or be moved. Laziness will always find excuses for inaction.

xvi. There must always be three parties in a state, if government is to be stable. Moreover, the middle term must readily combine with either of the other two, as occasion demands. The radical may be as dangerous as the conservative. True liberalism takes from each what is best, and uses the drag at dangerously steep inclines. The difficulty of the Jules Ferry ministry of 1883 has been to unite liberalism and radicalism into a party of steady republican progress.¹

xvii. Reform may be thorough and yet be moderate. What we call moderate reforms are too often a temporizing with some standing abuse. Generally compromise means lack of enthusiasm and idealism. The trimmer either cannot or dare not see the end. The great fault of Lord Russell's Reform Bill was its moderation. It was

¹ See *Fortnightly Review*, December, 1883, *A Year after Gambetta's Death*.

framed to meet the views of men like Lord Sidmouth, and was too conciliatory to the peers. Such men, worthy and upright, but strongly interested in the maintenance of the *status quo*, will use moderation as a selfish party cry. They will call reformation revolution, and when driven from that position will appeal to a glorious age of chivalry. "Let well alone," "Never do to-day what can be put off till to-morrow," are principles often in the mouths of statesmen like Sir Robert Walpole. The inherent fault of the late University Reform was its compromising nature. It was a measure drawn up by Conservatives to meet Radical views. The collegiate and professorial systems hardly admit compromise. Where there is no mean term it is futile to legislate on the basis of moderation. "With Lord Palmerston," says Mr. Green, "passed away the policy of political inaction ;" but the improvement was only temporary.

xviii. The English character is immoderately moderate. Englishmen hear both sides, and grumble about injustice. They are all for reform, and "enlarge a cowshed into a palace" rather than pull down the cowshed and build the palace. Even the so-called revolution of 1688 hardly changed the national landmarks. So evil gets stereotyped, and incongruities and anomalous survivals hamper progress. Politicians modify enactments intended for a different state of things. The English "Poor Laws," though originally framed to repress those who were little better than serfs, have been changed for the protection of freemen. Social reform, to check pauperism and aid distress, is eminently needed. "There is," says Peter Plymley, "always a copious supply of Lord Sidmouths in the world." When more radical changes were proposed in 1866, the cry was, "save the ten-pound franchise, the bulwark of the English constitution, the salt of political ideas." "We might all have been champing acorns, if a very few sensible people had been attended to."¹ Mr. Matthew Arnold and his followers deprecate English patchwork as wanting in sweetness and light, *i.e.* in idealism. On the contrary, the French are too ideal. "In France the nation always begins by pulling down

¹ The above embodies the ideas of an article in the *Westminster Review*, vol. 87, on *Reform*.

the edifice from the roof to the foundation-stone in order to construct something superior in beauty and regularity. That half the inhabitants should be buried under its ruins is of course inevitable, but that is of no importance—the building will be superb; there will be people enough to fill it by-and-by.” Sometimes excessive thoroughness is a fault on the right side. Practically most great reformers are revolutionary—The Gracchi, Luther, Cobden. Moderation is unavoidably cast to the winds.

xix. Reform must come. Forward movement is an irresistible force. It is folly to mop up the Atlantic Ocean, or to chain the Hellespont. And, moreover, in spite of alarmists, reform need not be feared.¹ Each extension of the franchise has been branded as revolutionary; but “there is no more reason to suppose that the mass of artisans and labourers would use political power with conscious injustice to their richer neighbours, than there is reason to suppose that their richer neighbours now consciously commit legal injustices against artisans and labourers.”

xx. The truest principles for parliamentary reform are those which ensure (α) equal electoral divisions; (β) repression of bribery and corruption; (γ) an educational standard;² (δ) some relation between bearing State burdens and enjoying State privileges;³ (ϵ) a recognition of the claims of religion and morality by the side of material prosperity, and the bestowal of the franchise on every one, man or woman, who can use a vote with judgment and honesty.

XXV. Of Dispatch.

AFFECTED Dispatch is one of the most dangerous things to business that can be; it is like that which the physicians call predigestion, or hasty

¹ See Herbert Spencer's *Essays On Parliamentary Reform; the Dangers and the Safeguards*.

² “Education is the only test for the franchise to which no logical objection can be taken.”

³ Cf. J. S. Mill, “*Representative government*,” p. 57, in reference to the “Hare Scheme of reform.”

digestion, which is sure to fill the body full of crudities, and secret seeds of diseases. Therefore measure 5 not dispatch by the time of sitting, but by the advancement of the business. And as in races it is not the large stride or high lift that makes the speed, so in business the keeping close to the matter and not taking of it too much at once, procureth dispatch. It 10 is the care of some, only to come off speedily for the time, or to contrive some false periods of business, because they may seem men of dispatch. But it is one thing to abbreviate by contracting, another by cutting off; and business so handled at several sittings 15 or meetings goeth commonly backward and forward in an unsteady manner. I knew a wise man that had it for a by-word, when he saw men hasten to a conclusion, *Stay a little, that we may make an end the sooner.*

20

On the other side, true dispatch is a rich thing. For time is the measure of business, as money is of wares; and business is bought at a dear hand where there is small dispatch. The Spartans and Spaniards have been noted to be of small dispatch: *Mi venga 25 la muerte de Spagna;* Let my death come from Spain; for then it will be sure to be long in coming.

Give good hearing to those that give the first information in business; and rather direct them in the 30 beginning than interrupt them in the continuance of their speeches. For he that is put out of his own order will go forward and backward, and be more tedious while he waits upon his memory, than he could have been if he had gone on in his own course. 35

But sometimes it is seen that the moderator is more troublesome than the actor.

Iterations are commonly loss of time. But there is no such gain of time as to iterate often the state of
 40 the question; for it chaseth away many a frivolous speech as it is coming forth. Long and curious speeches are as fit for dispatch as a robe or mantle with a long train is for a race. Prefaces, and passages, and excusations, and other speeches of reference to
 45 the person, are great wastes of time; and though they seem to proceed of modesty, they are bravery. Yet beware of being too material when there is any impediment of obstruction in men's wills; for pre-occupation of mind ever requireth preface of speech, like a
 50 fomentation to make the unguent enter.

Above all things, order and distribution, and singling out of parts, is the life of dispatch; so as the distribution be not too subtle. For he that doth not divide will never enter well into business; and he that
 55 divideth too much will never come out of it clearly. To choose time is to save time; and an unseasonable motion is but beating the air. There be three parts of business; the preparation, the debate or examination, and the perfection. Whereof, if you look for
 60 dispatch, let the middle only be the work of many, and the first and last the work of few. The proceeding upon somewhat conceived in writing doth for the most part facilitate dispatch. For, though it should be wholly rejected, yet that negative is more pregnant
 65 of direction than an indefinite; as ashes are more generative than dust.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. Danger more often deceives than overpowers.

2. It is less labour to meet danger, than to watch and guard against its growth.

3. If a danger seem slight, it is slight no longer.

Against.

1. The man who is always ready for danger, teaches danger to approach, and by his cure catches¹ the disease.

2. Some slight danger lurks beneath our very precautions.

3. It is better to have to do with a few remedies of tried value, than to fear everything as dangerous.

The above are given under the head '*principiis obstare*,' 'nip evil in the bud.'

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

[See Essays on *Delay*, *Boldness*, and *Fortune*.]

i. Delay, according to Goethe, proves that we have not the end clearly in our eye; hurry, that we do not know it. Dispatch implies a knowledge of the end sufficient for action, a right conception of the means, and an energetic character that does not shirk from hard work. The rapid workers have been the great men of action. Concentration of mental power, instinctive selection of essentials and rejection of accidentals, unhesitating action, are necessities if a man is to keep pace with time. Though nature does nothing by leaps, and development is slow and along fairly definite lines, most changes come suddenly upon nations and societies, and from time to time a new, rapid, and complete adjustment is necessitated. The best way to avoid hurry is to get beforehand with work. Diseases should be remedied before the acute stage. Much legislation is opportunist and unduly em-

¹ Or, reading *fingit* for *figit*, "dreads an imaginary disease," or "produces disease."

pirical. Every effect has a cause, but the human mind is liable to fix its attention exclusively on one set of phenomena,¹ and the neglected side of human affairs is suddenly brought before our notice. A slight spark kindles a war, but the fuel has been for a long time since becoming inflammable. "The last straw breaks the camel's back," but the fallacy is palpable. It is astonishing how unexpectedly most great reforms have come upon society. Political drifting is a sort of unconscious optimism which leads nowhere; yet few take the trouble to look reasonably far into the future, and the deluge is upon us before we can build an ark. The influence of "mind and all human agency" on the long chain of human development is not an exact quantity, but there generally are signs and warnings of coming change, as of coming danger; "*qui pacem desiderat, bellum parat.*" When the deluge has come *ex post facto* prophets swarm. Moreover, we want, not an "excellent passivity," but "a useful, reasonable activity." One of Goethe's great gifts was his never-failing tendency to transform into shape, into life, the feeling within him. In life we need something measurable, something appreciable, not a dim ideal; an ounce of action is worth a pound of theories. "Act to know" is a golden rule. Some men are hyperbolically said "never to stop to think." Everything good in the world has "*quelque chose de métrique ou de mesure.*" Human life is sufficiently measurable for all practical purposes, but human affairs require constant watching. Much nonsense is talked and written about the weakness of artificial systems, and the advantages of non-interference, as if human agency were necessarily artificial, and outside evolution. As usual, the word "nature" is used in two meanings, with misleading results. The gardener digs, sows, waters, prunes, manures, and trains the plants under his care. All *nature* runs wild without human agency. The gardener has always to contend against unknown quantities; like the politician, he can only foresee tendencies; but he must always be ready for an emergency, however sudden. Man does not create; he only combines or separates forces already existent. The

¹ Statesmen, says Cicero, must take care, "*ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant.*"

duty of the statesman is to prevent injurious, and promote beneficial, combinations. It is true that he is running a race with time. Time is both changing things and hurrying away, leaving the slow and half-hearted high and dry in the past. "The door is locked when the horse is stolen ;" vested interests will trip the reformer up, and the complexity of his subject bewilder and baffle, but he must never look back nor falter. "How could your wanderer," says Herr Teufelsdröchk, "escape from his own shadow? Nevertheless, still forward! I felt as if in great haste, to do I saw not what. From the depths of my own heart it called to me 'forwards!' The winds and the streams and all nature sounded to me 'forwards!' Ach Gott, I was even, once for all, a son of time." Our Lord's own teaching is that works lead to knowledge. 'If any man do My Father's will, he shall know of the doctrine.' This may not seem worldly wise, but positive forward action will cut knots that would have been untied in the closet.

ii. Practical hints for the rapid and thorough performance of business could easily be given from the experience of most workers. Punctuality and method are indispensable. Each must know his own powers. The mind must avoid all enfeebling influences, even in lighter moments. It is astonishing what an amount of work can be done in one day by a trained mind. The great mind need only supervise, and can leave much to carefully chosen subordinates. Education often teaches us to think, speak, and feel aright, without forcing us to *do* what is right. The man of feeling is rarely the man of action. "*Nihil citius lacrima arescit.*" We read romances, and are affected, softened, or roused; but we soon cool down, and "the primrose way to the everlasting bonfire" is strewn with good intentions. Dispatch is not mere self-assertion. The man who is first in the field is generally the one who feels that other men are as good as himself, and who is prepared only to use fair means. Again, to take a disease in time is not over-caution. The mouse saved the lion, and a scratch, if neglected, may kill. Meet each emergency as it arises, instead of ignoring it or nervously watching for further symptoms. Bacon's advice is, to catch evil at its birth, but not to produce evil by anticipating it.

iii. Above all, seize the occasion as it comes. There is no dispatch like that which takes the tide in human affairs at the flood. Without denying the power of man to shape and make his own occasions, the best advice for all is the Spanish proverb, "By the street of By-and-by one arrives at the house of Never." 'Servile opportunity' can be turned to gold only by the bold and active. Intellect is often passed in the race of life by common sense.

XXVI. Of Seeming Wise.

IT hath been an opinion, that the French are wiser than they seem, and the Spaniards seem wiser than they are. But howsoever it be between nations, certainly it is so between man and man. For, as the 5 Apostle saith of godliness, *Having a show of godliness, but denying the power thereof*, so, certainly there are, in point of wisdom and sufficiency, that do nothing or little very solemnly, *Magno conatu nugas*. It is a ridiculous thing, and fit for a satire to persons 10 of judgment, to see what shifts these formalists have, and what 15 prospectives, to make superficies to seem body that hath depth and bulk.

Some are so close and reserved, as they will not show their wares but by a dark light, and seem always 15 to keep back somewhat : and when they know within themselves they speak of that they do not well know, would nevertheless seem to others to know of that which they may not well speak. Some help themselves with countenance and gesture, and are wise by 20 signs ; as Cicero saith of Piso, that when he answered him he fetched one of his brows up to his forehead, and

bent the other down to his chin ; “ *Respondes, altero ad frontem sublato, altero ad mentum depresso supercilio, crudelitatem tibi non placere.*” Some think to bear ^{thei} it by speaking a great word, and being peremptory ; ²⁵ and go on, and take by admittance that which they cannot make good. Some, whatsoever is beyond their reach, will seem to despise, or make light of it, as impertinent or curious ; and so would have their ignorance seem judgment. Some are never without ³⁰ a difference, and commonly by amusing men with a subtlety, blanch the matter ; of whom A. Gellius saith, “ *Hominem delirum, qui verborum minutiis rerum frangit pondera.*” Of which kind also Plato, in his *Protagoras*, bringeth in Prodicus in scorn, and maketh him make ³⁵ a speech that consisteth of distinctions from the beginning to the end. Generally, such men, in all deliberations, find ease to be of the negative side, and affect a credit to object and foretell difficulties. For when propositions are denied, there is an end of ⁴⁰ them ; but if they be allowed, it requireth a new work : which false point of wisdom is the bane of business.

To conclude, there is no decaying merchant, or ^{decent} inward beggar, has so many tricks to uphold the credit ⁴⁵ of their wealth, as these empty persons have to maintain the credit of their sufficiency. Seeming wise-men may make shift to get opinion ; but let no man choose them for employment : for, certainly, you were better take for business a man somewhat absurd than ⁵⁰ over formal.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

[In these remarks *wisdom* and *virtue* have been treated together.]

i. "Men are not deceived," says Goethe; "they deceive themselves." Most dupes, in the first instance, dupe themselves. The desires suggest objects, which the imagination easily presents as obtainable. The impostor soon appears, who professes to give what is desired. "There is nothing like building our fortunes on the weakness of mankind," said Mr. Montague Tigg to Mr. Pecksniff, promising success, so long as "there were gulls on the wing." "Oh fie!" said Mr. Pecksniff, hypocritically deprecating this bold avowal of hypocrisy. "Gullible by fit apparatus, all publics are," is the conclusion of Carlyle, "and gulled with the most surprising profit. Towards anything like a *Statistics of Imposture*, indeed, little as yet has been done. With a strange indifference our economists, nigh buried under tables for minor branches of industry, have altogether overlooked the grand all-topping hypocrisy branch, as if our whole arts of puffery, of quackery, priestcraft, kingcraft, and the innumerable other crafts and mysteries of that genus had not ranked in productive industry at all."¹ The fact to which all imposture points is the infinite gullibility of mankind. The most palpable and ridiculous deceivers have found followers ready to believe what they desire. La Rochefoucauld's clever epigram does not go beyond the surface of hypocrisy and imposture. Hypocrisy is the homage paid by vice to virtue, and consequently "seeming wise" is the homage paid by ignorance to wisdom. La Rochefoucauld tried to evolve all human action from self-love, and lessen the distinction between vice and virtue. But imposture is not involuntary homage paid to virtue—a resolve to have the counterfeit, if the reality is unattainable; it is a deliberate deceit practised for personal advantage.² It recognizes that evil, without at least the semblance of good, is self-destructive. To the impostor

¹ The story of the *Diamond Necklace* is Carlyle's practical commentary on imposture.

² As Machiavelli says, "The semblance of virtue is found to be as useful as virtue itself."

light has become darkness ; he is going the way to be perfectly vicious. Knowing that wisdom and righteousness are lovely, he seeks only to seem good and wise before men. He has no craving after virtue.

ii. Yet there is necessarily a certain amount of concealment in human life. Thackeray says, "What good woman does not laugh at her husband's or father's jokes, time after time? Men are not provided with such powers of endurance ; they perish and pine away when bored, or they slink off to their club for comfort." No one need trumpet forth to the world, that his sight is defective, his exchequer low, or that he has not read the last poem of the last poet. All men are actors. Self-control is nothing but the playing of a part ; but there is a marked distinction between walking through life with borrowed plumes, and effusively chattering about our inward life to every stranger. Mrs. Billickin, when showing her apartments, unnecessarily emphasized all their discomforts, and "with the air of adding, convey me to the stake if you will, but while I live I will be candid."¹ Life should be made as pleasant as possible, compatibly with fair dealing and truth ; plain dealing is not necessarily self-condemnation. "The confession of our failings is a thankless office ; it savours less of modesty than of ostentation. It seems as if we thought our weaknesses as good as other people's virtues." There is a pride which apes humility, and is nothing but hypocrisy.

iii. La Rochefoucauld well says, "There is no vice that is not preferable to the means which we take to conceal it." Imposture drives ignorance and vice into the system. Usually it begins negatively, by the pretence of virtue or wisdom ; but counterfeit virtue breeds vice. He who assumes a wisdom, or virtue which he has not, loses the capacity for true wisdom and virtue ; and as life is positive, he soon revels in ignorance and vice. Plato held that the voluntary lie was preferable to the involuntary lie, because the former implies that the agent knows what is right, but tells a lie, through the deliberate choice of a higher duty or a greater utility. Unfortunately, the voluntary lie soon becomes the lie in the soul, and especially with the impostor, who deceives

¹ *Edwin Drood*, p. 171.

to escape from reformation, or to win personal advantages. "It is not in human nature to deceive others for any long time without, in a measure, deceiving ourselves." The impostor begins to think himself wise and virtuous. Conscience becomes so elastic that it sanctions any action. Mr. Pecksniff's inward monitor was a bank which honoured any moral call upon it. It encouraged and approved of his villainy to the last, when he was ignominiously exposed. Any one who follows the doctrine that the end justifies the means is on the high-road to being vicious and an impostor. "The mask," says Milton, "grows one with the face, and so we see it in the glass. The beginning of self-deception is when we find reasons for our propensities." We first excuse our defects to ourselves, then hide their existence to others. The hypocrite does not know how corrupt he is.

iv. We may go back one step further. The hypocrite often begins by judging others. A man feels that he is, or ought to be, wise and good when he so conscientiously and sagaciously notices defects in others. The critic begins to assume the airs of original authorship. Fault-finders are rarely admirable. The best and wisest are most charitable to their neighbours' follies and foibles. Many, too, in pulling out the mote overlook the beam.

v. Xenophon says that "the easiest way to seem good is to be good." It is true that some take as much trouble to counterfeit virtue, as would in another direction make them virtuous; yet the world cannot or will not recognize true wisdom and goodness. The reason for this lies in some degree in the essential nature of both. After all, men can only judge merit by its outward manifestation. "The world forgetting, by the world forgot," is the ideal of quietism. True merit dwells among untrodden ways. He is not the best of whom all men speak well, and some men are most to be feared when they praise. Good work excites jealousy and hate, until virtue retires within herself, and counterfeits and shams come to the front. The world is to blame for many of the impostures by which it is deceived. The palate gets corrupted, and prefers loaded wines.

vi. Second-hand knowledge is a current example of seeming wise. Many get their knowledge second-hand.

We live in an age of reviews, manuals, and hand-books. Often our knowledge comes to us at third or fourth remove from the original. Instead of reading Milton, we read in the *Pall Mall Gazette* a *précis* of Mr. Arnold's criticism of a French critic of Milton. The seeming wise in literature are afraid of expressing any opinion of their own. This will partly account for the bubble reputation of worthless authors. The few who think are dazzled by some novelty, and the herd follow the leader. Art, again, as a *terra incognita*, is a happy hunting-ground for the seeming wise

vii. Affectation is the "seal of mediocrity." With the many obscurity passes for profundity, on the principle of *omne ignotum pro magnifico*. Hence the seeming wise affect the jargon of art and the terminology of science, whereas true wisdom is plain, clear, and simple.

[See also Essay on *Prophecy*.]

XXVII. Of Friendship.

IT had been hard for him that he spake it, to have put more truth and untruth together in few words, than in that speech, *Whosoever is delighted in solitude, is either a wild beast or a god*. For it is most true, that a natural and secret hatred and aversation 5 towards society, in any man, hath somewhat of the savage beast; but it is most untrue, that it should have any character at all of the Divine nature, except it proceed, not out of a pleasure in solitude, but out of a love and desire to sequester a man's self for a 10 higher conversation: such as is found to have been falsely and feignedly in some of the heathens, as Epimenides the Candian, Numa the Roman, Empe- 15 docles the Sicilian, and Apollonius of Tyana, and truly and really in divers of the ancient hermits and holy fathers of the Church. But little do men per-

aristotle

to

unjust

495

ceive what solitude is, and how far it extendeth. For a crowd is not company, and faces are but a gallery of pictures, and talk but a tinkling cymbal, where there is
 20 no love. The Latin adage meeteth with it a little : *Magna civitas, magna solitudo* : because in a great town friends are scattered ; so that there is not that fellowship, for the most part, which is in less neighbourhoods. But we may go further, and affirm most
 25 truly, that it is a mere and miserable solitude to want true friends, without which the world is but a wilderness. And, even in this sense also of solitude, whosoever in the frame of his nature and affections is unfit for friendship, he taketh it of the beast, and not
 30 from humanity. *natura*

A principal fruit of friendship is the ease and discharge of the fulness and swellings of the heart, which passions of all kinds do cause and induce. We know diseases of stoppings and suffocations are
 35 the most dangerous in the body ; and it is not much otherwise in the mind. You may take *sarza* to open the liver, steel to open the spleen, flower of sulphur for the lungs, castoreum for the brain : but no receipt openeth the heart but a true friend ; to whom you
 40 may impart griefs, joys, fears, hopes, suspicions, counsels, and whatsoever lieth upon the heart to oppress it, in a kind of civil shrift or confession.

It is a strange thing to observe how high a rate great kings and monarchs do set upon this fruit of
 45 friendship whereof we speak, so great as they purchase it many times at the hazard of their own safety and greatness. For princes, in regard of the distance of their fortune from that of their subjects and ser

vants, cannot gather this fruit, except (to make themselves capable thereof) they raise some persons to be 50 as it were companions, and almost equals to themselves, which many times sorteth to inconvenience. The modern languages give unto such persons the name of favourites, or privadoes; as if it were matter of grace or conversation. But the Roman name at- 55 taineth the true use and cause thereof, naming them *Participes curarum*; for it is that which tieth the knot. And we see plainly that this hath been done, not by weak and passionate princes only, but by the wisest and most politic that ever reigned: who have 60 oftentimes joined to themselves some of their servants, whom both themselves have called friends, and allowed others likewise to call them in the same manner, using the word which is received between private men. 65

L. Sylla, when he commanded Rome, raised Pompey, after surnamed Great, to that height that Pompey vaunted himself for Sylla's over-match. For when he had carried the consulship for a friend of his, against the pursuit of Sylla, and that Sylla did a little 70 resent thereat, and began to speak great, Pompey turned upon him again, and in effect bade him be quiet; *for that more men adored the sun rising than the sun setting.* With Julius Cæsar, Decimus Brutus had obtained that interest, as he set him down in his 75 testament for heir in remainder after his nephew. And this was the man that had power with him to draw him forth to his death. For when Cæsar would have discharged the senate, in regard of some ill presages, and especially a dream of Calpurnia, this 80

man lifted him gently by the arm out of his chair, telling him he hoped he would not dismiss the senate till his wife had dreamed a better dream. And it seemeth his favour was so great, as Antonius, in a
85 letter, which is recited verbatim in one of Cicero's Philippic's, calleth him *venefica, witch*, as if he had enchanted Cæsar. Augustus raised Agrippa, though of mean birth, to that height as, when he consulted with Mæcenas about the marriage of his daughter Julia,
90 Mæcenas took the liberty to tell him, that *he must either marry his daughter to Agrippa, or take away his life; there was no third way, he had made him so great*. With Tiberius Cæsar, Sejanus had ascended to that height, as they two were termed and reckoned
95 as a pair of friends. Tiberius, in a letter to him, saith, *Hæc pro amicitia nostra non occultavi*; and the whole senate dedicated an altar to Friendship, as to a goddess, in respect of the great dearness of friendship between them two. The like, or more, was between
100 Septimus Severus and Plautianus. For he forced his eldest son to marry the daughter of Plautianus, and would often maintain Plautianus in doing affronts to his son; and did write also, in a letter to the senate, by these words: *I love the man so well, as I wish he*
105 *may over-live me*. Now, if these princes had been as a Trajan, or a Marcus Aurelius, a man might have thought that this had proceeded of an abundant goodness of nature. But being men so wise, of such strength and severity of mind, and so extreme lovers
110 of themselves, as all these were, it proveth, most plainly, that they found their own felicity, though as great as ever happened to mortal men, but as a half

piece, except they mought have a friend to make it entire. And yet, which is more, they were princes that had wives, sons, nephews ; and yet all these could 115 not supply the comfort of friendship.

It is not to be forgotten what Commineus observeth of his first master, Duke Charles the Hardy ; namely, that he would communicate his secrets with none ; and, least of all, those secrets which troubled him 120 most. Whereupon he goeth on, and saith that towards his latter time *that closeness did impair and a little perish his understanding*. Surely Commineus mought have made the same judgment also, if it had pleased him, of his second master, Louis XI., whose 125 closeness was indeed his tormenter. The parable of Pythagoras is dark, but true, *Cor ne edito* : Eat not the heart. Certainly, if a man would give it a hard phrase, those that want friends to open themselves unto are cannibals of their own hearts. But one 130 thing is most admirable (wherewith I will conclude this first fruit of friendship), which is, that this communicating of a man's self to his friend, works two contrary effects : for it redoubleth joys, and cutteth griefs in halves. For there is no man that imparteth 135 his joys to his friend, but he joyeth the more ; and no man that imparteth his griefs to his friends but he grieveth the less. So that it is, in truth, of operation upon a man's mind of like virtue as the alchymists use to attribute to their stone for man's body, that it 140 worketh all contrary effects, but still to the good and benefit of nature. But yet, without ^{calling} praying in aid of alchymists, there is a manifest image of this in the ordinary course of nature. For in bodies, union

145 strengthneth and cherisheth any natural action, and, on the other side, weakneth and dulleth any violent impression : and even so is it of minds.

The second fruit of friendship is healthful and ^{superior} sovereign for the understanding, as the first is for the affections. For friendship maketh indeed a fair day
150 in the affections from storm and tempests ; but it maketh daylight in the understanding, out of darkness and confusion of thoughts. Neither is this to be understood only of faithful counsel, which a man
155 receiveth from his friend ; but before you come to that, certain it is, that whosoever hath his mind fraught with many thoughts, his wits and understanding do clarify and break up, in the communicating and discoursing with another : he tosseth his thoughts more
160 easily ; he marshalleth them more orderly ; he seeth how they look when they are turned into words ; finally, he waxeth wiser than himself : and that more by an hour's discourse than by a day's meditation. It was well said by Themistocles to the king of Persia
165 *that speech was like cloth of Arras, opened and put abroad, whereby the imagery doth appear in figure ; whereas in thoughts they lie but as in packs.* Neither is this second fruit of friendship, in opening the understanding, restrained only to such friends as are
170 able to give a man counsel. They indeed are best : but, even without that, a man learneth of himself, and bringeth his own thoughts to light, and whetteth his wits as against a stone, which itself cuts not. In a word, a man were better relate himself to a statua
175 or picture, than to suffer his thoughts to pass in smother.

common idiom in S.

Add now, to make this second fruit of friendship complete, that other point which lieth more open, and falleth within vulgar observation; which is faithful counsel from a friend. Heraclitus saith well, in one of his enigmas, *Dry light is ever the best.* And certain it is, that the light that a man receiveth by counsel from another is drier and purer than that which cometh from his own understanding and judgment; which is ever infused and drenched in his affections and customs. So as there is as much difference between the counsel that a friend giveth, and that a man giveth himself, as there is between the counsel of a friend and of a flatterer. For there is no such flatterer as is a man's self, and there is no such remedy against flattery of a man's self as the liberty of a friend. Counsel is of two sorts; the one concerning ^{moral} manners, and the other concerning business. For the first, the best preservative to keep the mind in health is the faithful admonition of a friend. The calling of a man's self to a strict account is a medicine sometimes too piercing and corrosive. Reading good books of morality is a little flat and dead. Observing our faults in others is sometimes unproper for our case; but the best receipt (best, I say, to work, and best to take) is the admonition of a friend. It is a strange thing to behold what gross errors and extreme absurdities many (especially of the greater sort) do commit, for want of a friend to tell them of them; to the great damage both of their fame and fortune. For, as St. James saith, they are as men, *that look sometimes into a glass, and presently forget their own shape and favour.* As for business, a man may think,

if he will, that two eyes see no more than one ; or
 210 that a gamester seeth always more than a looker-on ;
 or that a man in anger is as wise as he that hath said
 over the four-and-twenty letters ; or that a musket
 may be shot off as well upon the arm as upon a rest ;
 and such other fond and ^{concocted} high imaginations, to think
 215 himself all in all. But when all is done, the help of
 good counsel is that which setteth business straight.
 And if any man think that he will take counsel, but
 it shall be by pieces ; asking counsel in one business
 of one man, and in another business of another man ;
 220 it is well (that is to say, better, perhaps, than if he
 asked none at all), but he runneth two dangers. One,
 that he shall not be faithfully counselled : for it is a
 rare thing, except it be from a perfect and entire
 friend, to have counsel given, but such as shall be
 225 bowed and crooked to some ends which he hath
 that giveth it. The other, that he shall have counsel
 given, hurtful and unsafe (though with good meaning),
 and mixed partly of mischief and partly of remedy.
 Even as if you would call a physician, that is thought
 230 good for the cure of the disease you complain of but
 is unacquainted with your body, and therefore, may
 put you in a way for present cure, but overthroweth
 your health in some other kind, and so cure the
 disease, and kill the patient. But a friend, that is
 235 wholly acquainted with a man's estate, will beware,
 by furthering any present business, how he dasheth
 upon other inconvenience. And, therefore, rest not
 upon scattered counsels, for they will rather distract
 and mislead than settle and direct.

240 After these two noble fruits of friendship (peace in

the affections, and support of the judgment), followeth the last fruit, which is, like the pomegranate, full of many kernels : I mean, aid and bearing a part in all actions, and occasions. Here, the best way to represent to ^{the} life the manifold use of friendship, is to cast ^{up} 245 and see how many things there are which a man cannot do himself; and then it will appear that it was a ^{temperate} sparing speech of the ancients, to say, that a *friend is another himself*; for that a friend is far more than himself. Men have their time, and die many 250 times in desire of some things which they principally take to heart; the bestowing of a child, the finishing of a work, or the like. If a man have a true friend, he may rest almost secure that the care of those things will continue after him. So that a man hath, 255 as it were, two lives in his desires. A man hath a body, and that body is confined to a place; but where friendship is, all offices of life are, as it were, granted to him and his deputy. For he may exercise them by his friend. How many things are there which a 260 man cannot, with any face or comeliness, say or do himself! A man can scarce ^{offer} allege his own merits with modesty, much less extol them; a man cannot sometimes stoop to supplicate or beg, and a number of the like. But all these things are graceful in a 265 friend's mouth, which are blushing in a man's own. So, again, a man's person hath many proper relations which he cannot put off. A man cannot speak to his son but as a father; to his wife but as a husband; to his enemy but upon terms: whereas a friend may 270 speak as the case requires, and not as it sorteth with the person. But to enumerate these things were end-

less : I have given the rule, where a man cannot fitly play his own part : if he have not a friend, he may quit the stage.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. Friendship gives the same results as fortitude, only more pleasantly.

2. Friendship is a sweet seasoning of every blessing.

3. The worst kind of solitude is to be without true friends.

4. It is a punishment worthy of bad faith to be deprived of friendship.

Against.

1. He that forms close friendships, involves himself in new necessities.

2. It is the sign of a feeble mind to share one's fortune with others.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

[See also Essays on *Love, Marriage, Parents and Children.*]

i. Addison, referring to this essay, remarks that there is no subject of morality that has been better handled and more exhausted than Friendship. To the several qualifications of a good friend given by Ecclesiasticus, Cicero, and others, Addison joins one by which he himself was pre-eminently distinguished, "a certain æquability or evenness of behaviour." In No. 385 of the *Spectator*, a formal definition is attempted :—"Friendship is a strong and habitual inclination in two persons to promote the good and happiness of one another." This definition leaves out of account the passionate element in friendship. In Elizabethan English "friend" and "lover" are almost interchangeable terms. Thus Cicero's test of a firm friendship—the same likes and dislikes—will not hold. As in love the difference of sex, so in friendship the difference of the weaker and the stronger character of moral qualities on the one side, balanced by physical or intellectual gifts on the other, adds zest to this relation-

ship. Only there must be at bottom a common basis, an agreement more commonly of temperament than of principles or pursuits.

ii. Emerson in his *Essays* has well traced the growth of Friendship to a fundamental principle of human nature. "Maugre all the selfishness, that chills like east winds the world, the whole human family is bathed with an element of love like fine ether." All men want at least sympathy; intellectual and active powers expand under the mellowing and congenial influence of love. The human loves humanity, as represented by the friend. There are two tendencies in mankind—one inward, centripetal; the other outward, centrifugal. "There is a healthy parasitic element in nature. Few remain satisfied with their own personality. To overcome our tendency to speciality we grow universal, catholic, cosmopolitan, forced to do so, some by instinct, some by philosophy, all from humanity. To maintain our identity we are forced into narrowness, centripetence and limitation."

iii. It is rare for kings or master minds to have friends. The distance between them and those next them is too great. "His soul was like a star and dwelt apart," writes Wordsworth of Milton. "Je mourrai seul," was Pascal's cry. "Multum incola fuit anima mea," is Bacon's own complaint. "I've a friend over the sea; I like him but he loves me," says Browning. Of many friends as well as of lovers the French proverb holds, "Il y a toujours l'un qui tend et l'autre qui baise la joue."

iv. The fact that men lean on one another, that the doctor and lawyer, however sagacious, do not prescribe for or decide their own cases, does not make friendship selfish. We have friends because we dread self. Friendship is a foe to egotism, a protest against atomism. When La Rochefoucauld¹ says, "Friendship after all is but a kind of bargain in which self-love always proposes to gain some advantage," he falls into its usual mistake of confusing the accompanying pleasure or benefit with the motive.

v. Youth is the age of friendship. Life is then full of pleasure and enthusiasm; the earth seems good and delightful. There is room for all, and enjoyment is

¹ Maxim 82.

heightened by fellowship. Constant contact is possible, and nature is plastic and ready to receive impressions and to accommodate itself to others. "As you can seldom fashion your tongue to speak a new language after twenty, the heart refuses to receive friendship pretty soon. It gets too hard to yield to the impression." Further, in youth the affections are strong, and utilitarian motives weak. There is time for friendship to develop without interruption from the claims of the struggle for existence.

vi. In the same way friendship was seen in its intensest form in the youth of the world. It was a substitute for marriage, a useful discipline for self, and a valuable preservative of state unity. The same conditions were present as in the youth of the individual. Greek friendship was heroic, tender, and truthful. "Love" (*i.e.* friendship), says Diotima, in the *Symposium* of Plato, "is the longing to create and generate through other minds and persons, so as to preserve ourselves, our name, and even ensure our immortality." By means of love for beauty of body, we rise to love of abstract beauty, *i.e.* of truth and goodness, wherein lie our higher being.¹ Greek friendship, as conceived by philosophy, began with passion and ended with idealism. A more practical view was taken by the legislator. Friendship was valuable for its influence in uniting citizens, strengthening patriotism, and giving stability to institutions. Associations like the "Sacred Band of Thebes," the "Associates of the Table" of Cyrus, were at once rallying centres against revolution and united champions in war. Friendship was well able to strengthen or take the place of kinship, and its duties were rendered more binding by the obligations of religion. When the intense, but precocious and fevered life of the Greeks burnt itself out, quietism and isolation became the approved philosophy of the times. Undoubtedly Greek friendship was too carnal, and we see the Stoic reaction remaining to influence Christianity in the doctrines of asceticism and isolation. The tendency of religion was rather to insist on the close and emotional relation of man to God, and amid the all engrossing claims of the spiritual life, to assign a secondary place to friendship as a virtue. The

cold, steady, and austere performance of duty on earth, was only tinged by emotion, by the beatific contemplation of the deity. All men are brothers, and the affections lose in intensity what they gain in universality. Montaigne well argues the cause of friendship,¹ and a military age, without a high conception of marriage, naturally offers notable instances of friendship. With all its evils, war undoubtedly forges friendships, which, when the danger is past, lead to something higher than mutual defence. Companionship in peril, privation, defeat or success; mutual experience of gallantry, devotion, and endurance, must lead to mutual admiration and respect. Military friendships are at once practical and sentimental. Though they rarely rise to the highest flights, they are often permanent and ennobling, and free from the fantastic emotionalism of youthful or philosophic love. Passionate friendship is the theme of endless mediæval romances. To give only a few instances, we have Sigurd and Gunas in the Scandinavian epic, Günther and Siegfried in the Nibelungen, Oliver of Castile and Artus d'Algaron in Spain, Alexander and Louis in the "Seven Sages," Amis et Amiles in the French fabliaux.

vii. Marriage and commerce, the exclusiveness of home life, and the hurry of competition have driven friendship out of the daily life of most of us. "Friendship in the old heroic sense no longer exists, except in the cases of kindred or other legal affinity."² It is quixotic and old-fashioned. Giving benefits is patronage. Counsel is useless, if the heart is wrong, and is often resented. Few are spiritual enough to be friends in the ideal. When a friend is gone he is useless and forgotten. The old devotion has gone with chivalry; friendship handicaps in the race for wealth, for the friend is a possible enemy.

viii. Friendship, out of school, is most possible among those who follow the same aims, before the rivalry of life is felt or intensified. This is especially the case with the young Bohemians of art and study. "*Quartier Latin*" friendships are real and almost heroic, though often shortlived. It must however be remembered that "Friendship is not a harem, one or two friends are enough."

¹ See Essays on *Love* and *Marriage*.

² Carlyle, Essays, *Burns*.

Quite as real, though less emotional, are the friendships of literary men. The spiritual life of itself draws men together without actual contact, and each is benefited by the interchange of ideas. Great intellects have usually great powers of idealization. Individuality and self-improvement are both possible, while the blighting influence of conventionality is absent. Such were the friendships of John Evelyn and Robert Boyle, of Pope and Bolingbroke, of Addison, Steele, and Tickell, of Johnson and Goldsmith. "Southey, though kind, was too cold and sober for Coleridge, who had more in common with the gentle, ideal Lamb." Goethe and Schiller dwelt long apart as 'spiritual antipodes,' until they discovered the higher synthesis of the real with the ideal. Jean Paul Richter and Christian Otto, on the other hand, are naturally friends "from their great similarity in deep love of nature, childlike simplicity and fervour, moral foresight and humility, and keen intellectual perception." Otto was perhaps wanting in imagination, and Jean Paul had a vein of bitter satire. Wider friendships, like those between the brilliant contributors to *Fraser's Magazine*, are midway between student friendships and the more intellectual union of two or three great writers. But after all, history is fuller of literary quarrels than of literary friendships.

ix. The world, following Steele's opinion, has generally held that Platonic love is either more or less than friendship. Yet there are endless instances of a pure and yet intense friendship between man and woman. Voltaire, Rousseau, Lamennais, Comte, Lessing, Lamartine, all enjoyed the influence and sympathy and refreshing admiration of woman. The relation is rather continental than English. Inequality is often present in friendship, but there must be reciprocity.

x. Friendship is also possible between those who are engaged in the disinterested pursuit of great aims. The type has not gone. Unity of thought and work draws men like Pusey and Newman together. Yet the greatest work is often done best alone. Christianity cuts at the roots of ideal friendship in two ways. It preaches universal brotherhood, and it insists on the relation of the individual to Christ, as paramount to all earthly ties.

xi. Bacon's treatment of friendship is eminently unideal. The utilitarian spirit was working its way into society. The age of chivalry and romance was fast passing away. But the conflict of interests was not yet fierce. Friends could take and give good counsel. The friend is the counsellor, "another and more versatile self, a remedy against flattery and blindness." Bacon's friendship with Toby Matthew was of this sober and practical but genuine character, and is probably the motive of the essay. Bacon says elsewhere,¹ "There is little friendship in the world, and least of all between equals, which was wont to be magnified. That that is, is between superior and inferior, whose fortunes may comprehend the one the other."

XXVIII. Of Expense.

RICHES are for spending, and spending for honour and good actions. Therefore extraordinary expense must be limited by the worth of the occasion (for voluntary undoing may be as well for a man's country as for the kingdom of heaven); but ordinary expense ought to be limited by a man's estate, and governed with such regard as it be within his compass and not subject to deceit and abuse of servants; and ordered to the best show, that the bills may be less than the estimation abroad. Certainly, if a man will keep but ¹⁰ of even hand, his ordinary expenses ought to be but to the half of his receipts; and if he think to wax rich, but to the third part. It is no baseness for the greatest to descend and look into their own estate. Some forbear it, not upon negligence alone, but ¹⁵ doubting to bring themselves into melancholy, in respect they shall find it broken. But wounds cannot

¹ *Of Followers and Friends*, ad fin.

be cured without searching. He that cannot look into his own estate at all had need both choose well
 20 those whom he employeth, and change them often; for new are more timorous and less subtle. He that can look into his estate but seldom, it behoveth him to turn all to certainities. A man had need, if he be plentiful in some kind of expense, to be as saving
 25 again in some other, as, if he be plentiful in diet, to be saving in apparel; if he be plentiful in the hall, to be saving in the stable, and the like. For he that is plentiful in expenses of all kinds, will hardly be preserved from decay. In clearing ^{realising} of a man's estate, he
 30 may as well hurt himself in being too sudden as in letting it run on too long; for hasty selling is commonly as disadvantageable as interest. Besides, he that clears at once will relapse; for finding himself out of straits, he will revert to his customs: but he
 35 that cleareth by degrees induceth a habit of frugality, and gaineth as well upon his mind as upon his estate. Certainly, who hath a state to repair may not despise small things: and commonly, it is less dishonourable to abridge petty charges than to stoop to petty get-
 40 tings. A man ought warily to begin charges which, once begun, will continue; but in matters that return not, he may be more magnificent.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. If virtue is what is useful to the race and individual, the world has had time to learn the evil results of lavish expenditure. Extravagance is harmful to self, for, as Aristotle points out, to spend you must get, and the cry is,

Rem,
si possis recte, si non, quocunque modo rem.

Avarice is first cousin to luxury—*alieni appetens sui profusus*. Moreover, artificial pleasures grow in intensity as they become more artificial. The more artificial and recondite the pleasure, the more entirely it must occupy the mind to the exclusion of higher and better ends. Morality is degraded and evil becomes good. Besides, the very indulgence of luxury has a depraving effect on the will. Instead of strengthening the mind to the endurance of pain and exertion, we become effeminated by constant pleasure, and the dose has continually to be increased.

ii. The spendthrift not only depraves himself, he demoralizes society. Mandeville's paradox, 'private vices, public virtues,' is now known as a commonplace fallacy. Aristotle prefers the spendthrift to the miser. Even if the miser buries his gold he does less positive harm than the spendthrift, but we must compare the spendthrift with the thrifty. In Greece extravagance generally found a vent in good works for the common weal, public banquets and public spectacles, while domestic expense was limited. The idea still survives with some who defend lavish expenditure on the ground that it is "good for trade." Luxury only benefits (in a questionable way) the unproductive consumer, and the producer of the article. If all the capital sunk in unproductive consumption were employed productively, we should not be troubled with communism. The best side of luxury is the artistic side—the refreshing influence of good books, good pictures, and even a good dinner, on the human faculties. But art need not be a monopoly of individuals. The tendency of luxury is to pauperize directly as well as indirectly. Fashion is changeable. The lacemaker can hardly turn his skill to filigree work. Capital is lost, and thousands are thrown out of work. Productive consumption may lead to overproduction; but matters soon right themselves. The production of luxury often leads to actual waste of capital. Further, the spendthrift encourages a tribe of hangers on, lackeys, touts and parasites.

iii. If a nation could become spendthrift, it would be on the high-road to ruin. Here the analogy between the individual and the community is almost perfect. Fortunately in modern times the simplicity and severity of the

provinces balances the luxury of cities. But everywhere the tide of public opinion has turned against idleness ; doing nothing is no longer a mark of a gentleman. The laziest make pretence at having a profession. The struggle for existence teaches self control (except where the population exactly fits the country, as in France), and the great principle, "live for others," is winning its way into the teaching of the highest and best. In spite of sporadic excesses, there is in the present age a marked tendency to husband resources, to check expenditure, and to invest capital productively. Even luxury gets fastidious, and men find that quality of pleasure is superior to quantity, and further, that the mere pleasure-seeker is never happy. Old age and poverty are skeletons served up with every feast. The sower of wild oats gets no pity, while marriage increases the necessity for thrift and calls out new emotions, which check extravagance for the sake of wife and children.

iv. If these and many similar circumstances are taken into consideration, the impolicy of state interference with extravagant expense is manifest. In ancient times obedience and public spirit were the highest necessities. The development of industrialism would have been premature and abortive. State interference was only the legitimate restriction placed by a paternal government on its children, when the State was the educator and knew what was expedient for its citizens. Moreover, luxury was positively dangerous in a small State, where the force of example was strong and excessive popularity—for the spendthrift is always popular, and extravagance may be diplomatic—was undesirable. In the Middle Ages, however, sumptuary laws were a check on commerce and liberty. "It is the highest presumption," says Adam Smith, "in king and ministers to pretend to watch over the economy of private people, and to restrain their expense either by sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of foreign luxuries. They are themselves always, and without any exception, the greatest spendthrifts in the society."¹ And in much the same strain Hallam says, "The kings of France and England were undoubtedly more egregious spendthrifts than any in their dominions."² The question is really for morality.

¹ *Wealth of Nations*.

² *Middle Ages*, iii. 343, 344.

Government interference in matters which are best left to the moral sense of the individual generally do more harm than good. Even though the national welfare may be affected by the action of individuals, it must be shown that Government will do the work better or that the evil will not cure itself.

v. Thrift, not parsimony, is the best road to national prosperity. Perhaps the English are not sufficiently thrifty. It is a common idea in England and even America that money will do everything, and that the most expensive commodities are the best. The English have apparently almost a superfluity of wealth, but from its unequal distribution there is more abject pauperism than in poorer countries, such as Holland and Switzerland. Thrift not only teaches men to save, but also to minimize their wants. The nest-egg is the best basis of resistance against the tyranny of capital. The labourer should pave his way to share in the profits of labour, not trust to communistic confiscation. The French owe their so-called elasticity to their thrift. Money saved staves off a difficulty; economy has given powers of endurance. Capital is always forthcoming in the country to develop its resources. Patriotism and stability are wonderfully increased where the interest on loans is paid to the inhabitants of the country whose resources are worked.

vi. Extravagance is not necessarily generous. The extravagantly generous man forgets justice and reason. He often selfishly gives away from a blind impulse, caring neither whom he wrongs, nor to whom he gives. Sometimes he is the victim of a laziness which harms society. He raises the price of even the necessities of life, and brings distress on many. Or, again, extravagance is merely bribery and corruption. Not a hundred years ago a contested election of a great county like Yorkshire cost the two candidates a hundred thousand pounds.

vii. Expense is a relative term. The foolish pay more than they need, either through folly or servile following of fashion. The price of a commodity not only depends on the cost of production, but also on the nature of the demand. The shrewd seller fixes his price according to the measure of the buyer's desire. Those who follow fashion usually pay too much, as do all who hunt after

what is singular and curious rather than what is intrinsically valuable. Nor unfrequently, by a strange infatuation, desire rises with the extortions of the seller.

viii. The best advice that can be given to those who would be thrifty is to hold the purse-strings themselves. Delegated financial authority is bad. The English Commons owe their supreme place in the State to their power of granting supplies. A great danger of democracy is that the many can impose burdens on the rich, or contract debts in the names of others. For the same reason an allowance is better than a lump sum, if dependence and economy are to be preserved. The paymaster is always master of the situation.

ix. In the next place avoid false economy. "The labourer," as Mr. Jobling¹ remarked, "is worthy of his hire," and *bis dat, qui cito dat*. Pay liberally and punctually. Capable managers are worth any wages. The market price is often no index of mental qualities. Honesty and experience are above the rough methods of supply and demand. What Bacon says of old servants is true with modifications. It is true that new brooms sweep clean, and that the ancient retainer is often spoilt, peevish, obstructive, and wasteful; but we live in the iron age of servants, and look back wistfully to a time when lengthy service meant faithful service—zeal from the servant, and kindness from the served. Modern servants are always trying to make expenses. All are ready to be generous at the expense of another.

x. Extravagance is not respected. Even those who profit by it laugh in their sleeve at the folly of the spendthrift. The master who gives liberal wages but forbids perquisites is better served than one who is always leaving loopholes for discontentment. The wealthy miser gets more attention than the generous prodigal.

¹ Dickens, *Bleak House*.

XXIX. Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates.

THE speech of Themistocles, the Athenian, which was haughty and arrogant, in taking so much to himself, had been a grave and wise observation and censure, applied at large to others. Desired at a feast to touch a lute, he said, *He could not fiddle, but yet he could make a small town a great city.* These words (holpen a little with a metaphor) may express two differing abilities in those that deal in business of estate. For, if a true survey be taken of counsellors and statesmen, there may be found (though rarely) ¹⁰ those which can make a small State great and yet cannot fiddle: as, on the other side, there will be found a great many that can fiddle very cunningly, but yet are so far from being able to make a small State great, as their gift lieth the other way, to bring a ¹⁵ great and flourishing estate to ruin and decay. And, certainly, those degenerate arts and shifts, whereby many counsellors and governors gain both favour with their masters and estimation with the vulgar, deserve no better name than fiddling; being things ²⁰ rather pleasing for the time, and graceful to themselves only, than tending to the weal and advancement of the State which they serve. There are also (no doubt) counsellors and governors which may be held (*negotiis pares*) able to manage affairs, and to ²⁵ keep them from precipices and manifest inconveniences; which, nevertheless, are far from the ability to raise and amplify an estate in power, means,

and fortune. But be the workmen what they may be,
30 let us speak of the work ; that is, the true greatness
of kingdoms and estates, and the means thereof. An
argument fit for great and mighty princes to have in
their hand : to the end that neither by over-measuring
their forces, they lose themselves in vain enterprises ;
35 nor, on the other side, by undervaluing them, they
descend to fearful and pusillanimous counsels.

The greatness of an estate, in bulk and territory,
doth fall under measure ; and the greatness of finances
and revenue doth fall under computation. The
40 population may appear by musters ; and the number
and greatness of cities and towns by cards and maps.
But yet there is not anything amongst civil affairs
more subject to error, than the right valuation and
true judgment concerning the power and forces of
45 an estate. The kingdom of heaven is compared, not
to any great kernel or nut, but to a grain of mustard
seed ; which is one of the least grains, but hath in it
a property and spirit hastily to get up and spread.
So are there states great in territory, and yet not apt
50 to enlarge or command ; and some that have but a
small dimension of stem, and yet are apt to be the
foundations of great monarchies.

Walled towns, stored arsenals and armouries, goodly
races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance,
55 artillery, and the like : all this is but a sheep in a
lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the
people be stout and warlike. Nay, number itself in
armies importeth not much, where the people are of
weak courage ; for, as Virgil saith, "*It never troubles*
60 *a wolf how many the sheep be.*" The army of the

Persians, in the plains of Arbela, was such a vast sea of people as it did somewhat astonish the commanders in Alexander's army ; who came to him, therefore, and wished him to set upon them by night ; but he answered, "*He would not pilfer the victory.*" And the 65 defeat was easy. When Tigranes, the Armenian, being encamped upon a hill with four hundred thousand men, discovered the army of the Romans, being not above fourteen thousand, marching towards him, he made himself merry with it, and said, "*Yonder 70 men are too many for an ambassage and too few for a fight.*" But, before the sun set, he found them enow to give him the chase with infinite slaughter. Many are the examples of the great odds between number and courage ; so that a man may truly make a judg- 75 ment, that the principal point of greatness in any State, is to have a race of military men. Neither is money the sinews of war (as it is trivially said), where the sinews of men's arms in base and effeminate people are failing. For Solon said well to Croesus 80 (when in ostentation he shewed him his gold), "*Sir, if any other come that hath better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold.*" Therefore, let any prince or State think soberly of his forces, except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers. And let 85 princes, on the other side, that have subjects of martial disposition, know their own strength, unless they be otherwise wanting unto themselves. As for mercenary forces (which is the help in this case), all examples show that, whatsoever estate or prince doth 90 rest upon them, *he may spread his feathers for a time, but he will mew them soon after.*

The blessing of Judah and Issachar will never meet; that the same people, or nation, should be
95 both the *lion's whelp*, and the *ass between burdens*:
neither will it be, that a people overlaid with taxes
should ever become valiant and martial. It is true
that taxes levied by consent of the estate, do abate
men's courage less; as it hath been seen notably in
100 the excises of the Low Countries; and in some
degree, in the subsidies of England. For, you must
note, that we speak now of the heart, and not of
the purse. So that, although the same tribute and
tax, laid by consent or by imposing, be all one to the
105 purse, yet it works diversely upon the courage. So
that you may conclude, that no people overcharged
with tribute is fit for empire.

Let states, that aim at greatness, take heed how
their nobility and gentlemen do multiply too fast.
110 For that maketh the common subject grow to be a
peasant and base swain, driven out of heart, and in
effect but the gentleman's labourer. Even as you may
see in coppice woods; if you leave your staddles too
thick, you shall never have clean underwood, but
115 shrubs and bushes. So in countries, if the gentlemen
be too many, the commons will be base; and you
will bring it to that, that not the hundred poll will
be fit for an helmet; especially as to the infantry,
which is the nerve of an army: and so there will be
120 great population, and little strength. This which I
speak of hath been no where better seen than by
comparing of England and France; whereof England,
though far less in territory and population, hath been,
nevertheless, an overmatch; in regard the middle

people of England make good soldiers, which the 125
 peasants of France do not. And herein the device of
 King Henry VII. (whereof I have spoken largely in
 the history of his life) was profound and admirable,
 in making farms and houses of husbandry of a
 standard; that is, maintained with such a proportion 130
 of land unto them, as may breed a subject to live in
 convenient plenty and no servile condition; and to
 keep the plough in the hands of the owners, and not
 mere hirelings. And thus indeed you shall attain to
 Virgil's character, which he gives to ancient Italy: 135

“Terra potens armis atque ubere glebæ.”

Neither is that state (which, for anything I know, is
 almost peculiar to England, and hardly to be found
 anywhere else, except it be, perhaps, in Poland) to
 be passed over; I mean the state of free servants
 and attendants upon noblemen and gentlemen: which 140
 are no ways inferior unto the yeomanry for arms.
 And therefore, out of all question, the splendour and
 magnificence and great retinues, and hospitality of
 noblemen and gentlemen, received into custom, doth
 much conduce unto martial greatness. Whereas, 145
 contrariwise, the close and reserved living of noble-
 men and gentlemen causeth a penury of military
 forces.

By all means it is to be procured, that the trunk of
 Nebuchadnezzar's tree of monarchy be great enough 150
 to bear the branches and the boughs; that is, that
 the natural subjects of the Crown, or State, bear a
 sufficient proportion to the stranger subjects that they
 govern. Therefore all states that are liberal of

155 naturalization towards strangers are fit for empire. For to think that an handful of people can, with the greatest courage and policy in the world, embrace too large extent of dominion—it may hold for a time, but it will fail suddenly. The Spartans were a nice
160 people in point of naturalization : whereby, while they kept their compass, they stood firm ; but when they did spread, and their boughs were becomen too great for their stem, they became a windfall upon the sudden. Never any State was, in this point, so open
165 to receive strangers into their Body as were the Romans. Therefore it sorted with them accordingly ; for they grew to the greatest monarchy. Their manner was to grant naturalization (which they called *jus civitatis*) and to grant it in the highest degree : that
170 is, not only *jus commercii*, *jus connubii*, *jus hæreditatis*, but also *jus suffragii* and *jus honorum* : and this not to singular persons alone, but likewise to whole families ; yea, to cities, and sometimes to nations. Add to this, their custom of plantation of colonies ;
175 whereby the Roman plant was removed into the soil of other nations ; and putting both constitutions together, you will say, that it was not the Romans that spread upon the world, but it was the world that spread upon the Romans : and that was the sure way
180 of greatness. I have marvelled sometimes at Spain, how they clasp and contain so large dominions with so few natural Spaniards : but sure the whole compass of Spain is a very great body of a tree, far above Rome and Sparta at the first. And, besides, though
185 they have not had that usage to naturalize liberally, yet they have that which is next to it : that is, to

employ, almost indifferently, all nations in their militia of ordinary soldiers, yea, and sometimes in their highest commands. Nay, it seemeth at this instant, they are sensible of this want of natives ; as ¹⁹⁰ by the Pragmatical Sanction, now published, appeareth.

It is certain that sedentary and within-door arts, and delicate manufactures (that require rather the finger than the arm), have in their nature a contrariety to a military disposition. And generally all warlike people ¹⁹⁵ are a little idle, and love danger better than travail. Neither must they be too much broken of it, if they shall be preserved in vigour. Therefore it was great advantage in the ancient States of Sparta, Athens, Rome, and others, that they had the use of slaves ; ²⁰⁰ which commonly did rid those manufactures. But that is abolished, in greatest part, by the Christian law. That which cometh nearest to it is to leave those arts chiefly to strangers (which, for that purpose, are the more easily to be received), and to contain the ²⁰⁵ principal bulk of the vulgar natives within those three kinds, tillers of the ground, free servants, and handicraftsmen of strong and manly arts, as smiths, masons, carpenters, etc. ; not reckoning professed soldiers.

But, above all, for empire and greatness, it importeth ²¹⁰ most that a nation do profess arms as their principal honour, study, and occupation. For the things which we have formerly spoken of are but habilitations towards arms : and what is habilitation without intention and act ? Romulus, after his death (as they ²¹⁵ report or feign), sent a present to the Romans, that above all they should intend arms ; and then they should prove the greatest empire of the world. The

fabric of the State of Sparta was wholly (though not
220 wisely) framed and composed to that scope and end.
The Persians and Macedonians had it for a flash.
The Gauls, Germans, Goths, Saxons, Normans, and
others, had it for a time. The Turks have it at this
day, though in great declination. Of Christian
225 Europe, they that have it are, in effect, only the
Spaniards. But it is so plain that *every man profiteth*
in that he most intendeth, that it needeth not to be
stood upon. It is enough to point at it, that no nation
which does not directly profess arms, may look to have
230 greatness fall into their mouths. And, on the other
side, it is a most certain oracle of time, that those
states that continue long in that profession (as the
Romans and Turks principally have done), do wonders.
And those that have professed arms but for an age,
235 have, notwithstanding, commonly attained that great-
ness in that age which maintained them long after,
when their profession and exercise of arms hath grown
to decay.

Incident to this point is for a State to have those
240 laws or customs which may reach forth unto them
just occasions (as may be pretended) of war. For
there is that justice imprinted in the nature of men,
that they enter not upon wars (whereof so many
calamities do ensue), but upon some at the least
245 specious grounds and quarrels. The Turk hath at
hand, for cause of war, the propagation of his law or
sect; a quarrel that he may always command. The
Romans, though they esteemed the extending the
limits of their empire to be great honour to their
250 generals when it was done, yet they never rested upon

that alone to begin a war. First, therefore, let nations that pretend to greatness have this; that they be sensible of wrongs, either upon borderers, merchants, or politic ministers; and that they sit not too long upon a provocation. Secondly, let them be prest and ready 255 to give aids and succours to their confederates; as it ever was with the Romans; insomuch as, if the confederates had leagues defensive with divers others States, and, upon invasion offered, did implore their aids severally, yet the Romans would ever be the fore- 260 most and leave it to none other to have the honour. As for the wars which were anciently made on the behalf of a kind of party, or tacit conformity of state, I do not see how they may be well justified, as when the Romans made a war for the liberty of Græcia; or 265 when the Lacedæmonians and Athenians made war to set up or pull down democracies and oligarchies; or when wars were made by foreigners, under the pretence of justice or protection, to deliver the subjects of others from tyranny and oppression, and the 270 like. Let it suffice, that no estate expect to be great, that is not awake upon any just occasion of arming.

No body can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body nor politic: and certainly, to a kingdom or estate, a just and honourable war is the true exer- 275 cise. A civil war, indeed, is like the heat of a fever: but a foreign war is like the heat of exercise, and serveth to keep the body in health; for in a slothful peace, both courages will effeminate, and manners corrupt. But howsoever it be for happiness, without 280 all question for greatness, it maketh to be still for the most part in arms: and the strength of a veteran

army (though it be a chargeable business), always on foot, is that which commonly giveth the law, or, at
285 least, the reputation, amongst all neighbour States ; as may be well seen in Spain, which hath had, in one part or other, a veteran army almost continually, now by the space of six-score years.

To be master of the sea is an abridgment of a
290 monarchy. Cicero, writing to Atticus of Pompey's preparation against Cæsar, saith, "*Consilium Pompeii plane Themistocleum est ; putat enim, qui mari potitur, eum rerum potiri ;*" and without doubt, Pompey had tired out Cæsar, if upon vain confidence he had not
295 left that way. We see the great effects of battles by sea. The battle of Actium decided the empire of the world. The battle of Lepanto arrested the greatness of the Turk. There be many examples where sea-fights have been final to the war : but this is
300 when princes, or States, have set up their rest upon the battles. But thus much is certain, that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will. Whereas those that be strongest by land are many times, never-
305 theless, in great straits. Surely, at this day, with us of Europe, the vantage of strength at sea (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of Great Britain) is great ; both because most of the kingdoms of Europe are not merely inland, but girt with the sea
310 most part of their compass ; and because the wealth of both Indies seems, in great part, but an accessory to the command of the seas.

The wars of latter ages seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honour which re-

flected upon men from the wars in ancient time. There ³¹⁵
be now, for martial encouragement, some degrees and
orders of chivalry (which, nevertheless, are conferred
promiscuously upon soldiers and no soldiers) ; and
some remembrance perhaps upon the escutcheon ;
and some hospitals for maimed soldiers ; and such ³²⁰
like things. But in ancient times, the *Trophies*
erected upon the place of the victory ; the funeral
laudatives and monuments for those that died in the
wars ; the crowns and garlands personal ; the style of
Emperor, which the great kings of the world after ³²⁵
borrowed ; the *Triumphs* of the generals upon their
return ; the great donatives and largesses, upon the
disbanding of the armies, were things able to inflame
all men's courages. But above all, that of the *Triumph*
amongst Romans was not pageants, or gaudery, but ³³⁰
one of the wisest and noblest institutions that ever
was. For it contained three things, honour to the
general, riches to the treasury out of the spoils, and
donatives to the army. But that honour, perhaps,
were not fit for monarchies ; except it be in the person ³³⁵
of the monarch himself, or his sons : and it came to
pass in the times of the Roman emperors, who did
impropriate the actual triumphs to themselves and
their sons for such wars as they did achieve in person ;
and left only for wars achieved by subjects some ³⁴⁰
triumphal garments and ensigns to the general.

To conclude, No man can by *care-taking* (as the
Scripture saith) *add a cubit to his stature*, in this little
model of a man's body ; but in the great frame of
kingdoms and commonwealths, it is in the power of ³⁴⁵
princes, or estates, to add amplitude and greatness to

their kingdoms. For by introducing such ordinances, constitutions, and customs, as we have now touched, they may sow greatness to their posterity and succession. But these things are commonly not observed, but left to take their chance.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

*“ All nature widens upwards. Evermore
The simpler essence lower lies.
More complex is more perfect, owning more
Discourse, more widely wise.”*

i. The Latin title of this Essay is “*de proferendis imperii finibus.*” To Bacon, national greatness is synonymous with expansion by conquest. It is the highest excellence of states as well as of individuals,¹ to profess arms. All other conditions of national prosperity, as we understand the term, are subordinate to war. Bacon must be judged by his own times, and by his literary antecedents. The ancients conceived the progress of science, but both to antiquity and mediævalism, national progress was limited by the number of worlds to conquer. Bacon, in the *Advancement* ² and *Novum Organum*,³ speaks enthusiastically of the advance of knowledge, though he says too much about “cycles” as opposed to continuous advance, and is too sanguine about “royal roads” to learning, and the possibility of a universal encyclopædia. As to national greatness, he believed in the necessity of constant war, and in 1607, spoke strongly in the House of Commons in favour of a spirited war policy; contrasting the imperial schemes of Spain with the “reckonings and audits” of Britain. Here Bacon is certainly not in advance of his own times. As a philosopher, he was the radical reformer of antiquity, and as a statesman, he might have advocated, instead of barely tolerating, the industrial spirit. There were many clear

¹ See Essay on *Empire*.

² Bk. ii. xxiv.

³ i. cxxix.

signs that the military spirit was passing away, but such prescience is hardly to be looked for in an Elizabethan statesman. France and Spain each regarded England as the prize and prey of the victor. The policy of both the Cecils, Bacon's uncle and cousin, was to play off one power against the other, and at the same time to stand prepared for an attack from either side.

ii. Progress is a modern idea. The march of humanity onwards and upwards, was but dimly perceived before the present century. Aristotle conceived of gradual ascent of matter to form, and by his doctrine of "potential existence," foreshadowed the great law of evolution. But in Greece, the commonly received idea of national life was that various forms of government succeeded one another in a cycle. Experience bore this out, and further taught that destruction, rather than progress, was to be expected. Further, the Greeks considered infinity of the nature of evil; all that is good is finite and measurable. The spreading power of Rome, especially during the early empire, suggested the idea of a world civilized by Roman influences, but the final lesson was that overgrown power falls to pieces. The Romans never conceived progress except as the gradual absorption of the world by Roman civilization which was *ex hypothesi* perfect.

iii. Mediæval thought was on the lines of antiquity. Besides, in the Middle Ages, men only saw falling kingdoms, and a shifting chaos of military supremacies, rather than well-defined national divisions. The Church, too, distinctly opposed the idea of human perfectibility. The reaction of Luther only turned men to see more clearly their own moral and spiritual degradation.¹ The great discoveries of the Elizabethan age were but germs of future greatness. Even the outburst of literary life was short-lived, and seemed to pale before that of Greece and Rome. As late as the seventeenth century, it was thought necessary to prove, as Bishop Hakewill did, that man had not degenerated.

iv. Vico, who lived from 1668 to 1743, first grasped intelligently the idea of progress. According to him, there are two sorts of progress. "That of nations from insignificance, passing through a period of greatness to

¹ See *Guesses at Truth*, p. 313, *et seqq.*

insignificance, and that of humanity, the march of one that advances and never recedes." This progress is from the restraint of physical force, *nulle terre sans seigneur*, to the free obedience of rational beings to reason. The flaw in Vico's position is that he conceives that nations necessarily flourish and decay, and that, as long as a nation holds the foremost place in the world, its history is the history of humanity. This is not the case; all grow together at different rates of speed as parts of a great whole.

v. Though Vico undoubtedly understood the problem of progressive history, the comparative method, which regards each phase of existence as a stepping-stone to something higher, was not conceived either by the philosophic or the popular mind in the eighteenth century. Viewed from the standpoint of evolution, progress is an infinite series of ever-increasing complexity, in which each lower factor is contained in that next above it. The two ideas which dominated the eighteenth century, were the immediate perfectibility of man, and the degradation of society. Some looked forward to a model state which existed only in imagination; others looked back to a golden age of primitive simplicity. In some cases the tendencies were purely destructive; existing institutions were absolutely to be destroyed. But most thought that humanity was perfectible, and preached the doctrine of an iron present, and a golden future. Doctrinaires had to learn again that utopias are vanity, humanity imperfect, and that nature *nihil facit per saltum*.

vi. In the nineteenth century we find the gradual rise of the comparative treatment of all branches of human knowledge applied to the phenomena of human progress. German thought, led by Hegel, with his "philosophy of history," and Goethe's "life of plants," first developed the idea to practical results. In the non-mechanical sciences, which deal with things in process of development, the question to be asked is not, "What is it and what are its antecedents now?" but, "How did this grow and to what is it growing?" In other words, the growth of causes, "crescent variables," have to be investigated. The attention is fixed solely on the increasing cause, and its law or series is determined as nearly as possible. Such

a law is a law of progress, and progress is consciously realized only in so far as definite results have been obtained. Hitherto we have got plenty of laws, but many of them are hypothetical and want verification and filling up. More is required than a blank formula often vague and unsatisfying. So thought has been derived from sensation, through ideas or remembered sensation; abstract language from onomatopœia, and interjections definitely and consciously attached to sensations. In the case of man, the "crescent variable" is reason. Progress is convertible with the growth of reason. The end of man is to do his own proper work in the best possible way. The greater the number of men who do so, the greater and more real the progress. The better the work, the more is it in accordance with reason. Reason may be defined as the faculty by which we conceive ends, and consciously adapt means to such ends. The growth of plants and animals is through instinctive adaptation to their environment. Man consciously modifies his own surroundings, as well as adapts himself to them.

vii. Freedom to develop and opportunities for development are primary necessities. Enfranchisement and education precede as well as follow progress. Monopolies, class privileges, standing armies, go hand in hand with ignorance. The man who has no responsibilities has no aspirations. Originality tends to heterodoxy and rebellion against authority. Science and literature subjected to the requirements of sacerdotalism and despotism can attempt no daring flights.

viii. Though reason is a crescent variable capable of infinite development from within, there are stationary elements, such as climate, food, geographical position, and language, which cannot completely be eliminated. The Ethiopian cannot change his skin, and human agency can but slightly modify physical surroundings.

ix. In describing progress in terms of reason, the growth of morality and religion as well as of material advance, can be equally recognized. In assuming that the world becomes more rational, it is not to be supposed that it becomes less moral, but rather that the claims of morality are more and more realized by reason, and that religion is brought into closer harmony with reason. The higher

the morality, the more rational. "Kill nobody," is better wisdom than "kill not a member of your tribe," and is at the same time more moral.¹ We need not fall into Mr. Buckle's mistake of supposing that morality is stationary, reason progressive.

The law of individual freedom is limited by the rights of others. A man may not step out of the ranks, refuse to pay taxes, disobey magistrates, wear no clothes, nor in any case carry heterodoxy to such excess as to impair the welfare of others.

x. No man can do everything. Each does one thing best. Civilization tends towards specialization. At first the same man is warrior, hunter, artisan,—a jack-of-all-trades. As things increase in complexity there is a tendency to separate off one individual or class for each work. The highest stage is when the differentiated products become so special as to be severally incapable of performing the other's work. Further, every new differentiation implies increase of population. The better a man does his own work the greater his dependence on the good work of others. Every new discovery specializes, and at the same time draws men together. Printing, gunpowder, steam, railways, emphasize all pre-existing differences, create new ones, and make all more dependent on the functions of others. And further, every specialization of any class *ipso facto* produces organic changes which lead to the specialization of other classes. As music improves, dancing and singing improve. As the eye sees better, the hand grows better fitted for its own work. The danger of specialization is the loss of spontaneity and many-sidedness.

xi. The great truth of specialization of functions, leads to a difficulty. If the Puritan and popular standpoint is correct, and if every man can be his own prophet, priest, and king, progress depends in a great measure on the way in which every man applies for himself the principles of morality, religion, and government, to the business of life. But if, on the other hand, morality, government, and religion get more complex, and are lost sight of in the fierce rush of worldly pursuits and the engrossing claims of self-love, then more than ever men will need the great

¹ See Essay on *Goodness and Goodness of Nature*.

moralist, preacher, and statesman, who will point out the truth, and disentangle the principles of true life from the tangled web of competition and pleasure. *Laisser faire*, may be as obstructive as over-government. Leaving the social organism to run wild is not necessarily giving it room to develop.

xii. Laws of progress are only rough generalizations of tendencies. Modern thought suffers from insisting too strongly on the analogy between social and other organisms, between the life of plants and of men. We can read the past only in outline, the future is a sealed book. It is not possible to forecast how far this or that nation will have advanced within a specific period. Herbert Spencer's great law is "Evolution is a process or progression from the simple homogeneous to the complex heterogeneous by continuous differentiation and integration." Or differently expressed, "All progress is through stages—unity, plurality, singularity." Humboldt says that "the end of government is the development of man in the greatest originality and variety possible." Matthew Arnold would have more "culture," a vague and ideal formula. Mill insists on the necessity of representative institutions—an engine, not an end. Comte expresses the history of humanity by three stages—the theological, metaphysical, and positive. "History," says Hegel, "is the embodiment of reason carried out through the imperfect medium of man's spirit." But the course of universal reason is either obscured or contradicted by exceptions, so that it is hardly ever possible to predict the next step. The human mind is virtually a sealed book. The great man is an incalculable factor in the problem of progress. This is especially the case with scientific as opposed to social and political progress. We can roughly sum the series and isolate the phenomena in the past, and see in outline how reason develops, but neither the nation nor the individual repeats itself, and we can only hope for a more complete union of individual ends with universal reason. A perfect science of history is an ideal which fades as we move.

xiii. Is progress a fact? There are always *laudatores temporis acti*, who sigh for a past that never was present. Most of us are one-sided, at the mercy of the strongest

impression, and unable to look out of our own life. In the present, evil seems actively predominant. Good seems ever liable to decay, except by constant watching and personal care.

“ The evil that men do lives after them ;
The good is oft interrèd with their bones.”

The future is hidden, the good of the past—*de mortuis nil nisi bonum*—is alone remembered, and encircled with a halo of virtue. Reverence and imagination lend to the past an illusory brightness. Further, there has been a tendency in the human mind, from the Preacher to Schopenhauer, to believe rather in present corruption than in future progress.

xiv. Apart from the natural tendency to grumble, most reforms are attended by a certain loss. The Puritan movement was accomplished at the cost of much that was valuable in art, literature, and manners. On a comparison of the age of Elizabeth with that of the Protectorate, England, in spite of much material advance, will seem to have retrograded. Many see only retrogression in the decay of chivalry. Even feudalism is a valuable counterpoise to the worship of money. “ Since the Reformation, the whole tendency of the world has been in an industrial direction.” Progress is often obscured or diverted into one channel. Change is not progress,¹ nor is freedom by itself. “ Intellectual emancipation,” says Goethe, “ if it does not give us control over ourselves, is poisonous.” The truest freedom is rational obedience to law, whether given from without or within. No one should be free till he knows how to obey.

xv. There is a dark side of the picture. Increased machinery and wealth have hardly benefited the masses. There is a growing tendency to inequality of property. Monopolies are not dead. Adulteration is too strong for the law. The union of democracy with the Church is not impossible, but the tendency of democracy is to aim only at material prosperity. In giving all an opportunity of rising, there seems some danger of dragging down rather than moving up, and fewer are willing to hold subordinate positions. Government tends to become “ a

¹ See Essay on *Innovation*.

joint-stock concern for the practice of Thrift." Improved social machinery tends to destroy self-help. Artificial helps lessen the struggle for existence, without which there will be degeneracy; men must go forward or go back. Malthusianism only sees ground for hope in checking population, communism in wholesale robbery and retrogression. Further, the traditional and fundamental principles of religion, morality, and society are questioned as hardly ever before. The fearful propaganda of Nihilism daily warns us that we live on a volcano. There is a feverish craving for novelty and excitement. Agnosticism is openly preached as a creed, and the sovereignty of reason is appealed to by the irrational. The policy of "blood and iron" is triumphant on the continent. These and many other considerations suggest the question, "are we progressing?" Thus the doctrine of despair, taught by Schopenhauer, is echoed in countries which have less ground for pessimism than Germany:¹ "To will, *i.e.* to live, is to suffer," will being the conscious application of force. The higher the civilization, the more consciously active, and, therefore, the more miserable is man. The only remedy is self-annihilation.

xvi. The vigorous mind will learn to look beyond. Pessimism argues a want of historical perspective. The pessimist ignores the comparative method, looks only at the present time, and only to some special phase of the present time. Then he rails, like Carlyle in his "Latter-day Pamphlets,"² against democracy and all the first-born of Egypt. There is a shadow which saddens life, but a great mind may feel this without bemoaning that the world is all out of joint. According to Leopardi, every stage of existence—science, culture, religion, commercial industry, and politics—wherein man seeks happiness, all are stages of illusion. Pessimism can never be a philosophy of life; it belongs to the effete dreamy Eastern character. In the East, life is a constant thirst and craving which is never satisfied. Pessimism may suit the lazy mysticism of Buddhism, but vanishes before the gospel of "act and you shall know." Asceticism is only another form of pessimism, a protest against

¹ See Sully's *Pessimism*, London, 1877.

² On *The Present Time*.

nature. It is not healthy to dwell with too accurate diagnosis on national pathology. Men are too ready to prophesy evil and then wish to see their prophecies fulfilled. Further, the disorder and evils of transition are a necessary stage.

xvii. The belief in an infinite series of progress is almost a religion to the best minds. "Let us allow and believe," says Wordsworth, "that there is a progress in the species toward unattainable perfection; or whether this be so or not, that it is a necessity of a good and gifted nature to believe in it." "Kant, while arguing that past progress does not necessarily imply future progress, sees surer ground for advance in the enthusiastic sympathies, excited throughout Europe by the outbreak of the French Revolution."¹ The French Revolution was more successful as a destructive than a constructive movement. It swept away the abuses of feudalism and class-privilege. Its dreams of universal brotherhood, a federation of nations, and a reign of universal reason were not realized. Yet with all its illusions, and in spite of all its crimes, it promoted freedom of thought, which is the tap-root of civilization. Compare the *whole* world, as it is, with the world as it was, or even a novel of George Eliot with one of Fielding or Smollett, and doubts will be quieted. We may yet live to see the "parliament of man, the federation of the world." The idea of international law and national conscience steadily grows. In catching sight of the universal, there seems some danger of losing many of the lights and shades of individual progress; but the race, as a whole, is advancing, in spite of back-eddies.

"Not in vain the distance beckons. Forward, forward let us
range,
Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of
change."

Goethe says that each man, like a star, should move restless but hasteless in his own sphere. For such there will be no more sickly questions whether "life is worth living."

[See also Essay on *Innovation*.]

¹ *Guesses at Truth*.

XXX. Of Regiment of Health.

THERE is a wisdom in this beyond the rules of physic : a man's own observation, what he finds good of, and what he finds hurt of, is the best physic to preserve health. But it is a safer conclusion to say, *This agreeth not well with me, therefore I will not* 5 *continue it*, than this, *I find no offence of this, therefore I may use it*. For strength of nature in youth passeth over many excesses which are owing a man till his age. Discern of the coming on of years, and think not to do the same things still ; for age will not be defied. 10 Beware of sudden change in any great point of diet, and if necessity enforce it, fit the rest to it. For it is a secret, both in nature and state, that it is safer to change many things than one. Examine thy customs of diet, sleep, exercise, apparel, and the like, and try, 15 in anything thou shalt judge hurtful, to discontinue it by little and little ; but so as, if thou dost find any inconvenience by the change, thou come back to it again : for it is hard to distinguish that which is generally held good and wholesome, from that which 20 is good particularly, and fit for thine own body. To be free minded and cheerfully disposed at hours of meat and of sleep and of exercise, is one of the best precepts of long lasting. As for the passions and studies of the mind, avoid envy, anxious fears, anger 25 fretting inwards, subtle and knotty inquisitions, joys and exhilarations in excess, sadness not communicated. Entertain hopes ; mirth rather than joy ; variety of delights rather than surfeit of them ;

30 wonder and admiration, and therefore novelties ; studies that fill the mind with splendid and illustrious objects, as histories, fables and contemplations of nature. If you fly physic in health altogether, it will be too strange for your body when you shall need it.

35 If you make it too familiar, it will work no extraordinary effect when sickness cometh. I commend rather some diet for certain seasons, than frequent use of physic, except it be grown into a custom. For those diets alter the body more, and trouble it less.

40 Despise no new accident in your body, but ask opinion of it. In sickness, respect health principally ; and in health, action. For those that put their bodies to endure in health, may in most sicknesses which are not very sharp, be cured only with diet and tendering.

45 Celsus could never have spoken it as a physician, had he not been a wise man withal, when he giveth it for one of the great precepts of health and lasting, that a man do vary and interchange contraries, but with an inclination to the more benign extreme ; use fasting

50 and full eating, but rather full eating ; watching and sleep, but rather sleep ; sitting and exercise, but rather exercise, and the like. So shall nature be cherished and yet taught masteries. Physicians are some of them so pleasing and comformable to the humour of

55 the patient, as they press not the true cure of the disease ; and some other are so regular in proceeding according to art for the disease as they respect not sufficiently the condition of the patient. Take one of a middle temper ; or, if it may not be found in one

60 man, combine two of either sort, and forget not to call as well the best acquainted with your body, as the best reputed of for his faculty.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. Care about health degrades the mind, and makes it dependent on the body.

2. A sound body is the soul's host, a sick body is the soul's prison.

3. Good health best forwards the greatest deeds ; but weak health keeps too many holidays.

Against.

1. He who often recovers health, often recovers youth.

2. Ill health is a valuable excuse which many of us use even in good health.

3. Good health unites soul and body too closely.

4. The couch and the litter have often managed great empires and great armies.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. "He whose mind directs not wisely will never take the way, and he whose body is crazy and feeble will never be able to advance in it." The ancient world to a great extent solved the problems of health by the drastic expedient of exposure of sickly children. So great was the importance attached to physical force, that a Greek philosopher would almost insist on a beautiful body as a necessary condition for a beautiful mind. Even small stature, precluding beauty, would unfit a man for virtue in its highest forms, and therefore for happiness. Modern thought has come back to a similar view when it identifies genius with good digestion. The Greek, by constant athletic exercises, and in most cases by plain diet, brought the body to the highest pitch of physical perfection. The Romans lived sparsely and healthily before the influx of oriental luxury. War inured the citizens to hardship and plain living. The Sabine ideal was simplicity. Considerable power was vested in the *Ædiles*, who looked after the sanitary arrangements of the city ; but the gist

of ancient sanitary legislation was rather to strengthen the strong to live through anything, than to remove dangers for weaklings.

ii. As long as asceticism preached the doctrine of mortifying the flesh, and considered filth the normal condition of piety, sanitary progress was seriously obstructed. Mediæval researches in the science of health took the form of charms, amulets, and elixirs of life. But the wholesomer spirit of the "new learning" and the Reformation gradually suggested the parallel between cleanliness and godliness, and health came to be regarded as an important part of education. In Bacon's time, sanitary problems were solved by rule of thumb, and could be settled by a few practical hints such as Locke gives in his *Thoughts on Education*. Health depends on three conditions, the individual, nature, and society. The Elizabethan age is generally characterized by a healthy tone of living and thinking. Health practically had reference only to the individual. Luxury was almost unknown; large and closely packed cities did not corrupt the benefits of nature. Life was less nervous. Water was plentiful, and food unadulterated; and though there were hard drinkers, the drink was beer or sack, not gin and other raw spirits. The phenomena of health had not been investigated by the study of life insurance, annuities, and reversions. England had not planted her flag and soldiers in every part of the world. Travellers were few, and experiments on climate and food not collected and used. At present the statistics gained from the relative health of different troop stations have largely influenced medical knowledge and sanitary legislation. The general result of Locke's¹ advice to parents is, "What concerns the body and health reduces itself to these few and easy observable rules: plenty of *open air exercise* and *sleep*, plain *diet*, no *wine* or *strong drink*, and very little or no *physick*, not too warm and strait *clothing*, especially the *head* and *feet* kept cold, and the *feet* often us'd to cold water and exposed to wet." The last measures are too drastic for any but strong constitutions, and of doubtful benefit even to these.

iii. Education is in one sense a branch of physiology,

¹ *Thoughts on Education*, p. 20 (Pitt Press Edition).

and teachers are beginning to recognize the duty imposed on them, not only to instruct their scholars, but to know and apply the principles of their art, to note the bodily as well as the mental development of their pupils. The adult must carry on for himself the work of health, and become his own doctor when arrived at years of discretion. Plain diet and moderate exercise will work wonders ; physic must be thrown to the dogs. Nowadays the evils of luxuries are better understood ; self-continnence is increasing. There is a decided movement in the direction of plain living, except among a pleasure-loving minority. The great danger of such self-help is that too incessant care about health leads to inaction and hypochondria ; the very fear and thought of disease is disease. In some cases the actual symptoms may be produced, as with the stigmatics. The more unconscious and instinctive the bodily functions, the more effective are their activities.

iv. As to nature, some dangers may be cured, marsh land may be drained, anti-malarial vegetation planted. Most men have a fair amount of adaptability. If a man will live in India, as he did in England, he must suffer. Much is put down to the fault of nature, which really is due to man. The gradual extension of the germinal theory of disease, and the demonstration that most germs are generated by human neglect, are eradicating the fatalist idea that pestilences and epidemics are the punishments of Providence or the works of Nature. Hereditary disease is the standing warning of past neglect. Nature is unkind when men use her wrongly. "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge."

v. Health becomes a public matter only when the danger threatens more than the individual. Yet it is hard to say exactly where the responsibilities of Government begin. It must be remembered that making men take proper steps for health, and preventing the manufacture of disease is not the same as constant active interference in the domestic arrangements of the individual, nor in any way obstructive to development and independence. The difficulty of heredity is almost insurmountable, but a strict sanitary police, and the introduction of laws of health into national education are

both possible and necessary. We have plenty of sanitary legislation, but it is cumbrous and ineffective. Many of our Nuisance Acts are practically a dead letter. Probably the low rate of mortality in England, as compared with other countries, is due in a measure to climate, national prosperity, and absence of war. Legislation in sanitary measures should be rather negative than positive. Economic, apart from humanitarian principles, teach us that disease spreads from the poor to the rich, and that unsanitary dwellings mean increased rates. The ratio of rates to national wealth is already alarming. Ventilation, water, and surfaces which will not harbour germs, are the simple essentials of sanitary measures. At any rate, politics and parties ought not to interfere with the improvement of public health. Against state interference it is argued fallaciously that the survival of weaklings is promoted, that the fittest do not survive, and that population increases too fast. Some have as superstitious a dread of interfering with development, as the "peculiar people" with disease in any shape. In all sanitary measures great help is given by the rapid improvement in the collection of statistics. Statistics do not establish a causal relation between two sets of phenomena, but they suggest an explanation, and as they become more exact, that is, as the phenomena under investigation become more isolated, the nearer are we brought to a solution. If two parishes, in most respects alike, differ in the rate of mortality, and the excess is due to fever, it is not hard to find the *causa efficiens* of the increased death rate.

vi. The relation of mind to body cannot be exactly determined. For scientific work, collection of facts, and discovery and application of principles, a good digestion and plain living, perhaps little more, is necessary. Still, though sanity is a general condition of the highest genius, and the wits that are allied to madness are the second-rate wits, yet it may be allowed that the highest development of the body and the mind are generally incompatible. University oars have become judges and bishops, and captains of elevens have turned into headmasters; but to do so they have had to abandon their cricket or rowing. If nervous energy goes in brain work, there is less avail-

able for making of muscle. Further, every thinker, and still more every professional man, is compelled by the conditions of his life to do unhealthy things, and to a certain extent deliberately to sacrifice his health. The M.P. must keep late hours, the barrister practise in ill-ventilated courts, the doctor expose himself to all weathers. Often it is a case of losing one's life to save it ; and while the physician tells us that we are killing ourselves by inches, the moralist warns us not *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*.

vii. Bacon's views on health are given in the *Silva Silvarum*, and in the treatise on *Life and Death ; or, the Prolongation of Life*. He notices¹ the remarkable health of the nation in the reign of Elizabeth, and in the *Advancement* fully discusses *the arts concerning the body*.² Bacon was as a boy of sickly constitution ; he never enjoyed robust health, and was also nervous and retiring. Mr. Abbott quotes : " I verily think your brother's weak stomach to digest hath been much caused and confirmed by untimely going to bed, and then musing *nescio quid* when he should sleep ; and then in consequent by late rising and long lying in bed, whereby his men are made slothful and himself continueth sickly." Like Carlyle, he had great vital power, but was delicate and constantly ailing. He had been in very weak health for some time before the fatal chill of March 1626.

XXXI. Of Suspicion.

SUSPICIONS amongst thoughts are like bats amongst birds,—they ever fly by twilight. Certainly, they are to be repressed, or, at the least, well guarded. For they cloud the mind, they lose friends, and they check with business, whereby business cannot go on currently and constantly. They

¹ *Certain Observations on a Libel*. The libel being against the Queen and the Government.

² Book ii. x. i.

dispose kings to tyranny, husbands to jealousy, wise men to irresolution and melancholy. They are defects, not in the heart, but in the brain; for they
10 take place in the stoutest natures, as in the example of Henry the Seventh of England. There was not a more suspicious man nor a more stout. And in such a composition they do small hurt; for commonly they are not admitted but with examination
15 whether they be likely or no. But in fearful natures they gain ground too fast.

There is nothing makes a man suspect much, more than to know little; and, therefore, men should remedy suspicion by procuring to know more, and not to keep
20 their suspicions in smother. What would men have? Do they think those they employ and deal with are saints? Do they not think they will have their own ends, and be truer to themselves than to them? Therefore there is no better way to moderate suspicions,
25 than to account upon such suspicions as true, and yet to bridle them as false. For so far a man ought to make use of suspicions, as to provide as, if that should be true that he suspects, yet it may do him no hurt.

30 Suspicions that the mind of itself gathers, are but buzzes; but suspicions that are artificially nourished, and put into men's heads by the tales and whisperings of others, have stings. Certainly, the best mean to clear the way in the same wood of suspicion, is frankly
35 to communicate them with the party that he suspects. For thereby he shall be sure to know more of the truth of them than he did before; and withal shall make that party more circumspect not to give further

cause of suspicion. But this would not be done to men of base natures. For they, if they find themselves once suspected, will never be true. The Italian says, *Sospetto licencia fede*, as if Suspicion did give a passport to Faith; but it ought rather to kindle it to discharge itself.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. Distrust gives the sinews of caution, but suspicion is the salve for the joints.

2. One may deservedly suspect the good faith which can be undermined by suspicion.

3. Suspicion loosens weak honour, but strengthens strong honour.

Against.

1. Suspicion gives honour its discharge.

2. Excess of suspicion is social madness.¹

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

“ And oft though wisdom wake, suspicion sleeps
At wisdom’s gate, and to simplicity
Resigns her charge, while goodness thinks no ill
Where no ill seems.”

i. If cunning is the ape of wisdom, suspicion is the ape of caution. Bacon unhesitatingly allows its necessity on the ground that men will have their own ends and be truer to themselves than to others. This is the exact position of suspicion; it argues as if all men were planning evil against each other. A friend must be loved as if some day to be an enemy; life is a sort of armed neutrality

¹ Dr. Abbott construes *mania civilis* by ‘a kind of civil madness,’ *i.e.* informal, and compares ‘a civil shrift.’

against humanity. Perhaps guardedness veiled by indifference is too much the tendency of modern times.

ii. Suspicion is the child of ignorance, but of an ignorance hard to cure. Its commonest form is the imputation of bad motives. In such cases it is difficult to show a man the groundlessness of his suspicions. The object of suspicion is often unaware that he is suspected. His acts of kindness may supply ground for further suspicion. Experience soon brings contempt of physical danger, but suspicion, dealing with the hidden springs of action, keeps alive the pernicious principle that there is more evil than good in the world. Physical, moral, and mental feebleness, oversensitiveness, oppression, crime, and ignorance produce suspiciousness. It is hopeless to attack the evil directly. The reform must be made in the radical defect of the nature of each. Suspicion is rooted in selfishness; over anxiety about self breeds disregard of others. The suspicious are cruel. The ancients said, "virtue is one, vice is manifold." On the contrary, there is a unity of vice as of virtue; the meeting-point is in the habit of referring all to the selfish desires. The motto of tyrants and secret societies is "*oderint dum metuant*," and suspicion aggravates the dangers which it avoids. Tiberius, Louis XI., Henry VII., Mazarin, the Secret Council of Venice, the Executive of the Inquisition, the Vehm-gericht invented crimes to satisfy their suspicions. The evil is not restricted to the Government. When a secret charge may bring secret punishment, and justice walks secretly, every man suspects his fellow. There is an informer ready to pervert the simplest phrase. So too, whenever the laws of morality and government are even temporarily suspended. The conspiracies of the East, the revolutions of Greece, the proscriptions of Rome, the fanatic enthusiasm and social disturbance of the Middle Ages, French revolutions, Popish plots, and Socialist vengeance, all point to the same truth, that if the passions of men are once stirred up, and the reign of law once suspended, innocence is no longer a protection. Not unfrequently, victims have to be offered to keep alive the popularity of a champion or to glut the passions which can no longer be checked. So war gives full license to suspicion. Bacon's view was undoubtedly suggested by

the conditions of his own age, and especially by the contemplation of the political methods of the Italian states and the Papacy.

iii. All that is great walks openly. Barbarian prudence may identify the *hospes* and the *hostis*, but unless every man is to be thought innocent until he is guilty, society will return to "war of all against all." Even in the race for wealth, the battle is to the truthful and confiding. There is something in confidence that begets confidence, which is the sword of the strong, as suspicion is the shield of the weak. The worst is when men begin to justify their suspicions. Montaigne¹ says, "Confidence in another man's virtue is no light evidence of a man's own." The individual gauges others by himself. Pope's weakly nature suspected Addison's genuine admiration of the "Rape of the Lock."

iv. There is a certain amount of truth in the proverb, "Set a thief to catch a thief." Wickedness can detect itself and virtue, better than virtue can detect virtue and wickedness, *Tam sæpe nostrum decipi Fabullum, quid Miraris, Aule? Semper bonus homo tiro est.* Thrasy-machus, in the Republic of Plato, calls virtue a certain Quixotic goodness of nature.²

v. Suspicion falls into the danger which it has created by its imaginary dread. The suspicious man is always showing his hand, suggesting his own weak points and arming others with weapons against himself. Even a good nature may be deteriorated by unjust suspicions. Suspicion "gives honour its discharge." Caution is not suspicion; caution rather seeks to avoid mistakes and escape from possible evil. The knight is not less vulnerable because he dreads every shadow. His sword should be sharp, and his armour strong, but suspicion assumes the existence of evil, and is tripped up by its own phantoms. It is active where passivity is required, and *vice versâ*.

vi. The tendency of vice is to engender suspicion. Deceit "debases the moral currency;" A deceives B, and B, perhaps falsely, suspects C. The process never stops. Bacon's philosophy is contrary to facts. If suspicion is allowed, it can hardly be checked, but like envy, it feeds

¹ *Essay*, 40.

² *Εὐθραία τις γενναία.*

on itself. Men come to suspect their best friends, justify their suspicions, cruelly avenge themselves for fancied wrongs, and drive goodness away from daily life. The only hope is that a man will confess his suspicions instead of acting upon them.

vii. Suspicion is worst in the young, as showing an instinctive conception of evil. After long battling with the world, evil not unfrequently seems to predominate. But youth should be fresh, enthusiastic, and simple.

viii. All strong passion is suspicious. The ill-tempered man thinks that all the world has conspired against him. Love is suspicious as well as blind. Anger is conscious of weakness, and also argues by a false analogy. A has done B a wrong, therefore C will wrong A. This is different from the case of the man who kicks his dog because he is angry, when the action is reflex, muscular, rather than deliberate. The very fear of losing what is passionately desired, causes some amount of suspicion.

ix. Fear should, as far as possible, stop at defensive methods. The man who fears violence should always fear to use violence. Daniel Deronda advises Gwendolen "turn your fear into safety. Keep your dread fixed on the idea of increasing your remorse. Take your fear as a safeguard. It is like quickness of hearing. It may make the consequences passionately present to you."

XXXII. Of Discourse.

SOME in their discourse desire rather commendation of wit, in being able to hold arguments, than of judgment, in discerning what is true; as if it were a praise to know what might be said, and not what should be thought. Some have certain common-places and themes, wherein they are good, and want variety: which kind of poverty is for the most part tedious, and, when it is once perceived, ridiculous.

The honourablest part of talk is to give the occasion, and again to moderate and pass to somewhat else : for then a man leads the dance. It is good in discourse, and speech of conversation, to vary, and intermingle speech of the present occasion with arguments ; tales with reasons ; asking of questions with telling of opinions ; and jest with earnest , for it is a dull thing ¹⁵ to tire, and as we say now, to jade anything too far. As for jest, there be certain things which ought to be privileged from it ; namely, religion, matters of state, great persons, any man's present business of importance, and any case that deserveth pity. Yet there be ²⁰ some that think their wits have been asleep, except they dart out somewhat that is piquant and to the quick. That is a vein which would be bridled :

Parce puer stimulis, et fortius utere loris.

And generally, men ought to find the difference between saltness and bitterness. Certainly, he that hath a ²⁵ satirical vein, as he maketh others afraid of his wit, so he had need be afraid of others' memory.

He that questioneth much shall learn much, and content much , but especially if he apply his questions to the skill of the persons whom he asketh. For he ³⁰ shall give them occasion to please themselves in speaking, and himself shall continually gather knowledge. But let his questions not be troublesome ; for that is fit for a poser : and let him be sure to leave other men their turns to speak. Nay, if there be any that would ³⁵ reign and take up all the time, let him find means to take them off, and bring others on ; as musicians use to do with those that dance too long galliards.

If you dissemble sometimes your knowledge of
40 that you are thought to know, you shall be thought,
another time, to know that you know not.

Speech of a man's self ought to be seldom, and well
chosen. I knew one was wont to say in scorn, *He*
must needs be a wise man, he speaks so much of himself:
45 and there is but one case wherein a man may com-
mend himself with a good grace ; and that is in com-
mending virtue in another, especially if it be such a
virtue whereunto himself pretendeth.

Speech of touch towards others should be sparingly
50 used ; for discourse ought to be as a field, without
coming home to any man. I knew two noblemen, of
the West part of England, whereof the one was given
to scoff, but kept ever royal cheer in his house , the
other would ask of those that had been at the other's
55 table, "*Tell truly, was there never a flout or dry blow*
given ?" To which the guest would answer, "*Such*
and such a thing passed." The lord would say, "*I*
thought he would mar a good dinner."

Discretion of speech is more than eloquence ; and
60 to speak agreeably to him with whom we deal, is
more than to speak in good words or in good order.

A good continued speech, without a good speech of
interlocution, shows slowness , and a good reply, or
second speech, without a good settled speech, sheweth
65 shallowness and weakness. As we see in beasts, that
those that are weakest in the course, are yet nimblest
in the turn ; as it is betwixt the greyhound and the
hare. To use too many circumstances ere one come
to the matter, is wearisome ; to use none at all, is
70 blunt.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

"To make a good converser, good taste, extensive accomplishments are the chief requisites, to which may be added an easy and elegant delivery and a well-toned voice. I think the highest order of genius is not favourable to this talent."—Sir W. Scott.

"Natural talk, like ploughing, should turn up a large surface of life rather than dig mines into geological strata. Masses of experience, anecdote, incident, cross-lights, quotation, historical instances, the whole flotsam and jetsam of two minds, forced in and upon the matter in hand from every point of the compass, and from every degree of mental elevation and abasement, these are the material with which talk is fortified, the food on which talkers thrive."

i. There are many types, and each type has many subtypes of talkers. First comes the man who "holds forth," like Coleridge, "persists in monology."¹ He is a fund of knowledge, but solid, one-sided, and unappreciative, and often silenced before other lions. Then comes the duellist, able to carry on a dialogue, but wanting in readiness and many-sidedness. Conversation proper requires a number of talkers, not too many, nor too few.

ii. Spoken as opposed to written thought always has a tendency to sacrifice depth and reality to effect and versatility. The intellectual value of discourse varies according to the number of talkers. Sydney Smith said of Sir James Mackintosh, that "his conversations might go from the fireside to the press." Burke did not talk from any desire of distinction, but because his mind was full. In the Addisonian age conversation and literary composition had much in common. The essay of the period, the sensible, if not profound, reflections of the novelist, and the easy flowing, epigrammatic couplet of the poet produce an impression that they might have been spoken

¹ "Did you ever hear me preach?" asked Coleridge of Charles Lamb. "I never knew you do anything but preach," answered Lamb.

as well as written. There has in France been much similarity between thinking and writing. But the man who talks like a book is not a good 'talker.' "It is the mark of genuine conversation that the sayings can scarce be quoted with their full effect beyond the circle of common friends." Conversation is the perfection of discourse, but it is farthest from intellectual excellence. The truest friends do not converse too readily together; the springs of friendship lie deep.

iii. Literary conversations are not biographies nor photographs. Plato, Lucian, Cicero, Erasmus, Bacon, Courier, Diderot, and Landor, use the form rather than the spirit of conversation. The essence of conversation lies in a free "give and take," in readiness and versatility. The good talker uses a revolver rather than a Krupp gun. Life-like vivacity, as opposed to intellectual solidity, and knowledge of the world, rather than philosophic depth, are called into play. The good talker would make the good biographer rather than the original theorist. Taste, arrangement, logic, wit, appreciation, courtesy, general information, and a dash of vanity are needful.

iv. Conversation does not require the highest genius. Only cynics would say that conversation is all a sham, "that we insensibly, as in a sea-voyage, leave the shore without perceiving it." But it needs only second-rate powers. Goldsmith "wrote like an angel and talked like poor Poll." Tasso, Dante, Chaucer, Milton, Dryden, Ben Jonson, Swift, La Fontaine, Corneille, and many others, were poor talkers. Rousseau could hardly ever arrange his thoughts for conversation. Vergil is said to have been *in sermone tardissimus*. "Discourse" is a virtue of men of the Chesterfield or St. John stamp. It is "*Tout toucher, rien approfondir*." "When adversaries grow warmly enthusiastic, end the conversation by some gentle badinage," is the advice of Chesterfield. Dialogues, monologues, and oratory in its highest flights are the more intellectual forms of speech, but are anti-social. Ordinary debate combines the nature of oratory with that of conversation. The debater must be able to give and take, but needs no profundity of view. And lastly, all spoken thought is infected with rhetoric, the object in many cases being rather to persuade or defend than to

discover the truth. The effect is transitory and the methods are often emotional.

v. Discourse and knowledge were originally almost coextensive. Talkative Athens and rhetorical Rome were superior in most respects to their more silent contemporaries. It is true that Sparta was physically stronger than Athens, but under conditions which were insupportable and in the end impossible. In the first instance poetry and philosophy, epic and dialectic, were spoken. Though Rome never reached original literary greatness, and the Romans were rather busy men of the world than wits and literati, yet citizens of the better class were trained in oratory. Story-telling in the East, and strolling minstrelsy in the West, took the place of written literature. In the Middle Ages doctors verbally debated subtle points of theology and philosophy.

vi. The advance of literature in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries affected rather the upper classes than the masses. Brilliant talkers are men of education and refinement, those who would be most benefited by literary culture. At the same time life was not hurried, and the necessities for public speaking were comparatively few; absolute monarchy is not a favourable soil for the growth of public oratory. At times the dead level of packed parliaments was broken by the premature eloquence of the reformer. But speech was, on the whole, a social rather than political accomplishment; the brilliant talker was more prominent than the keen debater. Much of the best oratory was emasculated or perverted in flattery to the monarch or plausible defence of the royal prerogative. Conversation has never been pre-eminently an English accomplishment; home life has given a different type of excellence. At one time it showed a tendency to degenerate into the jargon of Euphuism; at another, into courtly quips and epigrammatic nothings. But a fairly unbroken line of good talkers can be quoted from Elizabeth to George IV. The influences at work were in a great measure French, and we are too often reminded of the mistaken efforts of the donkey to imitate the lapdog, or of the elephant to dance. The English *raconteur* rather abounds in recollections and anecdotes, than epigrams and *bel esprit*; solid reason rather than bright

sparks of genius. But the following were undoubtedly brilliant talkers—Johnson, Leigh Hunt, the celebrated quartette, Burke, Curran, Beauclerc, Garrick, and Sir James Macintosh. The Englishman holds a monologue or takes part in a dialogue better than he converses. Swift says, "Since the ladies have been left out of all meetings except parties of play, our conversation has degenerated." This is hardly borne out by facts; the British matron rarely is or has been a good talker. The *espèglerie* of an actress has been worth listening to, but ladies have been more at home in the nursery than the *salon*. Generally, in England, things are rated by their practical utility. Apologists for talking insist on the difficulty of acquiring the art,¹ and its educational value, when found. Conversation in England may be said to lack spontaneity. There is a substratum of Puritanism in English society which looks askance on the "agreeable rattle" as worldly and flippant. The English nature is rather humorous than satirical. The best subjects for conversation are conduct and art. Many are too serious or charitable to discuss the former, while the latter is frequently a sealed book.

vii. Conversation, as a social quality, is eminently French. The French can follow the maxim "*glissez, n'appuyez pas*." The feminine element is strong, and family life has not diverted the attention of the Frenchwoman. The Frenchman is vivacious, dramatic, and harmlessly vain. He is essentially a sociable animal; his ideal is social equality. "The French," says Heine,² "are not a stay-at-home people; they are not fond of sitting together in silence, which they call '*une conversation Anglaise*;' their light champagne-blood and inborn spirit of movement drives them to seek a life of society." In the *salons* the witty *roturier* was the equal of the noble. Wit, to a Frenchman, is the same as money to an Englishman, the key to the highest society of the land. Natural gifts, so highly prized in this republic of spirit, would be developed by training and culture. The French are the wittiest, as the English are the richest, nation in the world. The German is too dreamy and metaphysical to be a good

¹ *Cornhill Review*, May, 1882, *Talk and Talkers*.

² *English Fragments*, i.

talker. Until lately the Frenchman, excluded from free speech about politics, has been forced to discuss, often satirically, though not unkindly, human foibles and passions ; while literature and art have become the breath of French society. All these subjects are many-sided and more or less personal ; ‘monology’ is from their very nature impossible. No pearl of price is discovered, like Newton’s law of gravitation, but “the soil is laboured and oxygenated, and yields more freely its natural products.” The heyday of *salon* life was in the eighteenth century. The cold etiquette of the court of Napoleon I. chilled and destroyed the republic of wit. Strongly marked divisions were drawn between the different coteries ; men and women only lived and talked for their own circle, and the original equality was broken up. The old *noblesse* looked suspiciously at a mushroom nobility. Life was too stern and active and real for the excellent trifling of society and its leaders. Frenchmen are naturally talkers, but, except in some limited literary circles, the brilliant converse of the Voltairean age has found few echoes in the nineteenth century. Many causes which have operated elsewhere, have helped to lessen conversational vigour even in France.

viii. In many cases, and especially in England, brilliant talking has been driven out of the field by modern life. A thousand channels divert skill in speech. Modern life is too busy and nervous for “*noctes ambrosianæ*.” Sheridan and his contemporaries could meet at a sensible hour for dinner and spend some hours in brilliant discourse without interfering even with their gambling propensities. Now there is not the same spur of social distinction ; the town is too big for a talker to gain reputation beyond a coterie, whereas the successful writer is at once known to thousands. Life, too, is fuller and busier ; intellect has hardly a spare moment. The daily press, society journals, magazines, novels, lectures, and debating societies absorb the wit and talent which used to shine in conversation. Not that there are no good after-dinner talkers left, but conversation is no longer an important means of communicating and receiving ideas.

ix. A new type is growing up—the silent man. Richter says, “It is a common remark that men talk most who

think least ; just as frogs cease their croaking when a light is brought to the waterside." Mr. Joaquin Miller indulges in some curious speculations about the "man of the future." "The heroes of Homer shook their shields and recited the deeds of their fathers and grandfathers, even back to the gods. All Greek tragedy is in the same strain. St. Paul found the Greeks great talkers. Civilization, in its march West, around the world, has been faithful to the Greek drama. Words ! words ! words ! But out yonder, in the Far West, this is all changed. The American pure and simple does not talk. He acts. And this grand, silent, massive American is to be the central figure for the American, the entirely new play. Whether this dignity of soul is born of the sublimity about him, the eternal peaks of snow above him, the vast tranquillity of the plain below, I do not say. But I do say that this grand, unspeaking, acting man exists—a new man, a silent man in a noisy world. And I should say he is peculiarly the growth of the land. For whoever saw an Indian whom wrong or pain or pity could move to words or tears ? What man has ever heard an Indian baby cry ? It took General Grant twenty years to learn to talk after he left us in the Far West. He used but two words in all the grand drama of the seizure of Vicksberg—"Unconditional surrender." I admit that along the Atlantic seabank there seems a noisy brood ; abroad, too, and in Congress ; for the old Bible fool, known by his "multitude of words," is alike in all lands. And the fool has his uses, even in the drama. But this silent man, with his silent woman at his side ; this man of action and not of words, from Middle America, as the central figure, is to mark and distinguish the New-World play from the Old. At West Point you read on a little monument that a portion of our army being ambushed in one of our Indian wars, every man stood his ground, fighting till only three survived, when help came. Grand ! Immortal ! But what moved me, and seems most truly American, is the fact, as told me by a survivor, that not one word of command was given after the first order. Every officer silently drew his sword, became a common soldier, and so fought on to the end. There was no need of command, only the low prayer of the dying ; the message to the

loved ones at home ; and all day the deadly fight went on. That is America, that is American character emptied of the froth of Fourth of July and foreign tradition. And that is the germ of the great American play. Years ago I crossed over the Sierras into the new mines of Nevada, then a part of California. I found an old friend standing at the mouth of his mine shouting out his commands in monosyllables down the shaft. New cities gleamed below ; mines opened above ; progress thundered through the land. "What are you doing here?" I cried. He took in the horizon under his hat ; bit off the end of his cigar ; looked at the new cities below, the tremendous mining engines all about, the tunnels piercing the mountains above—but did not speak. "Why, what on earth are you all doing here in Nevada?" I again shouted. "World-building!" And that was all that this silent man, now a United States senator, answered. It was enough. He made that word then and there, I think. He coined it as from his new silver. So Carlyle,¹ "Let us honour the great empire of silence once more ! The boundless treasury which we do not jingle in our pockets, or count up and present before man ! It is perhaps the usefulest for each to do in these loud times !" He hopes that the English will long maintain their "*grand talent pour le silence*." Cromwell is his hero. "Cromwell had lived silent ; a great, unnamed sea of thought round him all his days ; and in his way of life little call to attempt naming or uttering that." And again, "Poor Cromwell, prophet who could not speak, rude, confused, struggling to utter himself with his savage depth, his wild sincerity." So he is superior to Napoleon, who has no deep positive belief, only glib theories of rights of man. To Napoleon, man can be cajoled, amused, led, but not saved. Empty vessels make the most sound. The great man is isolated, attracting others to his sphere, but rarely descending ; he either sees truths which he cannot utter because of the imperfection of language, or the ignorance of the masses, or because he himself only sees through a glass darkly. Besides, silence implies self-control.² Goethe says, "I look on and hold my tongue about many things

¹ *Hero-worship*, Lecture iii.

² See Essay on *Simulation and Dissimulation*.

because I would not disturb others in their faith or enjoyment, and am content to endure what is distasteful to me." Lastly, there are so many lights and shades to all truth, and there are so many ready to misconstrue, that silence is often the best policy.

x. The proverb that "silence is golden" may be carried too far. The solemn impostor deceives until he is driven into a betrayal '*quam sit sibi curta supellex.*' Rapid action often implies secrecy. Speech is often as necessary to statesmen and generals to conceal as to express their thoughts ; William the Silent is an example of the strength of silence. It has been said of a famous general¹ that he knew how to be silent in several languages. Silence may imply a reserve of force and vigorous self-control. Intellectual greatness is best studied in books, as it is best trained and expressed by writing. Still, after saying all that can be said for silence, there is left a wide margin for conversation. A talker often says concisely and forcibly what he might not be able to write. The best thought is perhaps to be written, but conversation is often the best remedy for loose and feeble thought, hardly realized, rarely corrected, and liable to degenerate into dreamy idealism. The talker clears up his own thoughts by expressing them to others, and learns what opinions other men hold. From the legal point of view it is better to speak than to write, better to think than to speak, but the phlegmatic silence of Knickerbocker's "Walter the Doubter" is sheer stagnation. Speech often appeals more forcibly than writing. The illiteracy and ignorance of the masses is thus best overcome. Such expression of great ideas is the best step to their popularization. Much silence is due to laziness or incapacity. Cromwell did speak when his time came.

[Fielding's *Essay on Conversation*, and Swift's *Hints towards an Essay on Conversation* may be compared with Bacon's, on *Discourse*.]

¹ Von Moltke.

XXXIII. Of Plantations.

PLANTATIONS are amongst ancient, primitive, and heroical works. When the world was young, it begat more children; but now it is old, it begets fewer. For I may justly account new plantations to be the children of former kingdoms. 5

I like a plantation in a pure soil, that is, where people are not displanted to the end to plant in others. For else it is rather an extirpation than a plantation.

Planting of countries is like planting of woods. 10 For you must make account to leese almost twenty years' profit, and expect your recompense in the end. For the principal thing that hath been the destruction of most plantations hath been the base and hasty drawing of profit in the first years. It is true, speedy 15 profit is not to be neglected, as far as it may stand with the good of the plantation, but no further.

It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of people, and wicked condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant. And not only so, 20 but it spoileth the plantation. For they will ever live like rogues, and not fall to work, but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and be quickly weary, and then certify over to their country to the discredit of the plantation. The people wherewith you plant 25 ought to be gardeners, ploughmen, labourers, smiths, carpenters, joiners, fishermen, fowlers, with some few apothecaries, surgeons, cooks, and bakers.

In a country of plantation, first look about what

30 kind of victual the country yields of itself to hand ; as chestnuts, walnuts, pine-apples, olives, dates, plums, cherries, wild honey, and the like ; and make use of them. Then consider what victual or esculent things there are, which grow speedily, and within the year :
35 as parsnips, carrots, turnips, onions, radish, artichokes of Hierusalem, maize, and the like. For wheat, barley, and oats, they ask too much labour : but with peas and beans you may begin ; both because they ask less labour, and because they serve for meat as well as for
40 bread. And of rice likewise cometh a great increase, and it is a kind of meat. Above all, there ought to be brought store of biscuit, oatmeal, flour, meal, and the like, in the beginning, till bread may be had. For beasts or birds, take chiefly such as are least subject
45 to diseases, and multiply fastest : as swine, goats, cocks, hens, turkeys, geese, house-doves, and the like.

The victual in plantations ought to be expended almost as in a besieged town, that is, with certain allowance ; and let the main part of the ground em-
50 ployed to gardens or corn be to a common stock, and to be laid in, and stored up, and then delivered out in proportion ; besides some spots of ground that any particular person will manure for his own private.

Consider likewise, what commodities the soil where
55 the plantation is doth naturally yield, that they may some way help to defray the charge of the plantation : so it be not, as was said, to the untimely prejudice of the main business ; as it hath fared with tobacco in Virginia. Wood commonly aboundeth but too much,
60 and therefore timber is fit to be one. If there be iron ure, and streams whereupon to set the mills, iron is a

brave commodity where wood aboundeth. Making of
bay salt, if the climate be proper for it, would be put
in experience. Growing silk, likewise, if any be, is a
likely commodity. Pitch and tar, where store of firs 65
and pines are, will not fail. So drugs and sweet woods,
where they are, cannot but yield great profit. Soap
ashes likewise, and other things that may be thought
of. But moil not too much under ground. For the
hope of mines is very uncertain, and useth to make 70
the planters lazy in other things.

For government, let it be in the hands of one,
assisted with some counsel; and let them have com-
mission to exercise martial laws, with some limitation.
And, above all, let men make that profit of being in 75
the wilderness, as they have God always and His service
before their eyes. Let not the government of the
plantation depend upon too many counsellors and
undertakers in the country that planteth, but upon a
temperate number. And let those be rather noblemen 80
and gentlemen, than merchants; for they look ever to
the present gain.

Let there be freedoms from custom, till the planta-
tion be of strength, and not only freedom from custom,
but freedom to carry their commodities where they 85
may make their best of them, except there be some
special cause of caution.

Cram not in people, by sending too fast company
after company; but rather hearken how they waste,
and send supplies proportionably: but so as the 90
number may live well in the plantation, and not by
surcharge be in penury.

It hath been a great endangering to the health of

some plantations, that they have built along the sea
 95 and rivers, in marish and unwholesome grounds.
 Therefore, though you begin there, to avoid carriage
 and other like discommodities, yet build still rather
 upwards from the streams than along. It concerneth
 likewise the health of the plantation that they have
 100 good store of salt with them, that they may use it in
 their victuals when it shall be necessary.

If you plant where savages are, do not only enter-
 tain them with trifles and gingles, but use them justly
 and graciously, with sufficient guard, nevertheless.
 105 And do not win their favour by helping them to invade
 their enemies ; but for their defence, it is not amiss.
 And send oft of them over to the country that plants,
 that they may see a better condition than their own,
 and commend it when they return.

110 When the plantation grows to strength, then it is
 time to plant with women as well as with men, that
 the plantation may spread into generations, and not
 be ever pieced from without. It is the sinfullest thing
 in the world to forsake or destitute a plantation once
 115 in forwardness. For, beside the dishonour, it is the
 guiltiness of blood of many commiserable persons.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

“ Slowly comes a hungry people as a lion creeping nigher,
 Glares at one that nods and winks behind a slowly dying fire.”

i. Roman colonies were military outposts, obtained by conquest or free submission, with various degrees of independence, and more or less complete rights to share the privileges of Roman citizenship. They were almost

invariably the work of the State, and in idea were an integral part of the Roman empire. Roman colonization was an important factor in the gradual absorption of the known world by imperial Rome. Greek colonies were the result of external pressure, internal discontent, commercial activity, over-population, and, in some cases, military exigencies. They were, for the most part, worked by private enterprise, with the sanction of the State, which they reproduced, like suckers carefully cut away from the parent tree. Though it was customary for the branch colonies to seek a leader in the mother city, to which all offshoots owed respect, a Greek colony was an independent State from the beginning. In a war the Dorian colonies would side with Sparta, and those of Ionian blood with Athens, but the tie was one of interest and association rather than necessity; Ægina was an exception. Modern colonization combines many of the features of the past. The Goths and Saracens were not colonizers. *Plantation* revived under the auspices of Pisa, Genoa, and Venice, was vigorously carried on by imperial and Catholic Spain, and was adopted by the private enterprise of England to get gold or escape persecution. Modern colonies are either *débouchements* for population, new outlets for commerce, or military outposts. In the first two cases they have, with England, been the result of private movements, sanctioned and upheld in later times by the State,¹ or as now with France, they are the result of a government *exploitation*, with economic and commercial objects. The third class are military stations to protect the commerce and general interests of the mother country. In some cases the settlers have been of mixed nationalities, and have driven out or exterminated the original inhabitants. In others, the settlers have amalgamated with the natives; while in others, the European State rules, but neither expels nor mixes with the natives. Following these differences of origin, colonies have different grades of independence, varying from complete dependence, as in India and the military colonies, to self-government, except

¹ Mr. Thorold Rogers says that "*England has never systematically colonized with anything but convicts.*"

where imperial interests are concerned,—the Crown reserving the right to dispose of waste lands. In the latter case the mother country sends out a governor, who is to all intents a constitutional monarch, with little real, but much nominal power. England has never attempted, like France, Spain, Portugal and Holland, to increase the national resources by the “subjugation of regions occupied by communities whose political organization had been considerably developed, but who were unable to resist the shock of European warfare.” The position of the imperial nation to dependencies like India, ought perhaps to be considered as a troublesome inheritance, rather forced upon its rulers by the force of circumstances than beneficial to them. Whether the dependency profits by the imposed civilization of a more advanced nation is a debatable point.¹

ii. The chief difficulties connected with colonization centre round colonies proper those formed by individuals to escape persecution or poverty, but associated with the home government in the first instance with their own consent. One school of politicians maintain that colonies are like ripe fruits, which in the fulness of time fall away from the mother country. Their opponents urge that the connection between the colony and the home state should rather be strengthened than gradually weakened, that colonies are useful for emigration and consumption of home produce, that they might and should be organized into a vast imperial system, to contribute to imperial taxation and to send contingents to the imperial army.

iii. Even if we accept the analogy, care must be taken that the fruit is *ripe*. It is undoubtedly a mistake of English social and political philanthropy to be in advance of public opinion. A young community requires protection and guidance, and if it is possible to secure a corresponding advantage as the price of protection and direction, the mother ought not to let the child go alone, for her own as well as for the child's sake. It is one thing to leave the weak to themselves, another to leave them at the mercy of those who will use them to the harm of the home state. Otherwise it is hard to make out a strong case for the retention of a grown colony able and anxious

¹ See Mill *On Representative Government*, ch. xviii.

to take care of itself. Emigration is more successful if left to take its own channels, and if we believe in the ultimate triumph of free trade, trade will improve as protection diminishes and the colonies learn for themselves the truth "buy in the cheapest, sell in the dearest, market." Further, independence is the essential condition of development. A loose heterogeneous unity is both vulnerable and unmanageable; and no working scheme of federation has been proposed. Advocates of separation rather lay stress on this objection, and chuckle as they pick the different schemes to pieces. It is an obvious fallacy to condemn the end for want of suitable means. It is however true that when empires become unwieldy from their size, disintegration and decay supervene.

iv. It is almost impossible to mark the line between imperial and local interests. If Australia, on her own responsibility, occupies New Guinea as a protection against the French *récidivistes*, England may refuse to admit New Guinea as an integral part of the British empire. A *casus belli* might easily arise between France and Australia in her independent capacity. England might easily be embroiled. If, on the other hand, England accepted the responsibility under colonial pressure, Australia should contribute to the expenses of the imperial army,—a condition not warmly welcomed by colonial governments. Yet the unwillingness to contribute is not ascribable either to meanness or want of sympathy with the mother country, as is proved by the offer of Australia at the time of the Crimean war. It proceeds from the natural repugnance to be taxed without a voice in the expenditure, and various ways of meeting this objection might be suggested.

v. Besides all this, the colonies themselves show small desire for independence, and the idea of separation is altogether premature. The proposed federation of all the Australian colonies, probably a prelude to disintegration, has broken down. England's greatness and expansive power is based on her colonial empire; colonial expansion was the political fact of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The great nations of the world have been the colonizers; and colonial decay means national decay. Those who lead the van of civilization must maintain

their influence by drawing tighter the connection. If England relinquishes her birthright, a Jacob will soon be found. As population increases, the competition for unoccupied land will grow keener ; each community will more rigorously protect its own, and before long nations will sing a "*beati possidentes.*"

vi. The great mistake of our present system is "the contortion of colonial politics upon the rack of party feeling in England." The colonies are not sickly plants pining in dependence, but sensible, bold, self-reliant communities which have shown no eagerness for dismemberment. In the case of those colonies which cannot take care of themselves, it would be ungenerous as well as inexpedient to leave the weak to their own resources, to expose, so to speak, Englishmen, as an unnatural parent exposes children.

vii. Different schemes have been suggested to promote a closer connection between colony and mother country. Sir Bartle Frere has suggested "that the Secretary of State for the Colonies should be enabled to form into a body for his guidance the Agents-General of the different self-governing colonies." This is practically done at present as far as circumstances permit. The Canadian representatives could have nothing to say about the affairs of New Zealand. Others propose the formation of a council formed from members of both parties experienced in colonial affairs, with powers to advise and even control the Secretary of State for the Colonies. A third proposal is that rejected by Franklin twenty years before the War of Independence, that "seats should be given to colonial representatives in the British Parliament." Waiving geographical difficulties, the exact place of these representatives in party-politics is not *primâ facie* evident. It would be manifestly unfair that the colonists should legislate on matters of taxation of which they do not share the burden ; and the British Parliament has enough to do without identifying itself with colonial politics. Moreover, the new legislature would have no cohesion. The colonial representatives, as a body, would be more ignorant of the needs of any given colony, than the present English assembly. A fourth solution is seen in some kind of federation. There is to

be a federal council for the empire, and separate legislatures for each state. Federations are essentially a *pis aller*, and such a federation would combine all the worst faults of its kind. "What," asks Mr. Morley, "is the common bond that is to bring the various colonies into a federal union?" The two prime difficulties of the dividing line between imperial and local interests, and the share of each state in the imperial burdens, would be still untouched. The geographical difficulties are almost insurmountable. A war with Russia would mean quite different things to Australia, Canada, and England. A fifth scheme is that "a representative council of Australia should sit in London to transact all the business between the Federation and the Imperial Government." At present, all that is necessary is done by the Agent-General without expense, delay, or complication.

viii. It will probably suggest itself to some that too many side issues are thrust into the question. The bogey of taxation unnecessarily frightens reformers. The colonies, as Sir Henry Parkes asserts,¹ have done much in the way of militia and national defences. The Cape Government has undertaken to contribute to the protectorate in Basutoland. The deficit can easily be supplied by a moderate hut tax which the natives will gladly pay. Of the past, present, and future of philanthropy, little need be said. England has done much more than others; she might perhaps have done still more. Christianity, the greatest civilizer, has failed to mediate between a savage and civilized race. In the opinion of many, the question of colonial connection is bound up with the question of emigration. Here doctors differ. One school of politics assert that emigration is only a postponement of the evil, that State-subsidized emigration is a form of socialism, and a sure means of pauperizing a nation,² and that the true remedies for over-population are to sweep away all feudal restrictions on fair rent, fixity of tenure, and free sale. Their opponents maintain³ that it is possible

¹ Speech, Feb. 25, 1884.

² Mr. Fawcett says, "Such an arrangement would give additional encouragement to reckless living and imprudent marriages."

³ See J. S. Mill's *Political Economy*, p. 589.

to frame a scheme which shall help, yet not pauperize; that at present the better and more prudent classes emigrate, and leave the dregs at home to increase recklessly; that the only way to keep pace with population is to take paupers out of the country and to give them a new start in life; that poor-rates would sensibly diminish, and that to keep the pauper is more costly than to give him help in a colony; and, lastly, that the sale of Crown lands would recoup the Government. It is hard at present to decide the best form of emigration, and the exact nature of the connection between colony and mother country, but the matter has only been approached tentatively and half-heartedly. Dropping a load of paupers and then sailing away is not desirable, and has been justly and practically rebuked by the American Government. The Imperial Government may fairly be called upon to incur some expense for the valuable possession of waste lands and the outlet for superfluous population. New South Wales, Canada, Queensland, and South Australia are holding out their hands to welcome the emigrant. It is not true, as things now are, that only the most capable leave the country. Those who emigrate are the medium workmen. A very slight sum of money will provide means for a start, and there need be no bad feeling against the land left behind. An Emigration Committee, in 1883, for the sum of £500, sent out nearly four hundred superfluous workers to a new life.

ix. The transplantation of criminals to penal settlements has, in the case of England, ceased. Such action is tantamount to the wholesale and systematic production of crime. The expulsion of political convicts is not open to the same objections. Heterodoxy may be the hardier and more natural growth for a new soil. Still, the boasted outlets for French *émeutiers* have not freed France from instability of government and revolutionary tendencies. A colony of political and religious discontents may not inconceivably be the nursery of future enmity between nations.

x. Really the solution of the whole question may be easier than at first sight appears probable. The difficulty is, in a measure, sentimental. The colonies would be satisfied if specially delegated representatives were allowed to advocate colonial views in Parliament, without a vote.

XXXIV. Of Riches.

I CANNOT call riches better than the Baggage of Virtue. The Roman word is better, *Impedimenta*. For as the baggage is to an army, so is riches to Virtue. It cannot be spared nor left behind, but it hindereth the march. Yea, and the care of it sometimes loseth or disturbeth the victory.

Of great riches there is no real use, except it be in the distribution; the rest is but conceit. So saith Salomon, "*Where much is, there are many to consume it; and what hath the owner but the sight of it with his eyes?*" The personal fruition in any man cannot reach to feel great riches: there is a custody of them, or a power of dole and donative of them, or a fame of them, but no solid use to the owner. Do you not see what feigned prices are set upon little stones and rarities, and what works of ostentation are undertaken, because there might seem to be some use of great riches? But then, you will say, they may be of use to buy men out of dangers or troubles; as Salomon saith, "*Riches are as a stronghold in the imagination of the rich man.*" But this is excellently expressed, that it is in imagination, and not always in fact. For certainly, great riches have sold more men than they have bought out.

Seek not proud riches, but such as thou mayest get justly, use soberly, distribute cheerfully, and leave contentedly. Yet have no abstract nor friarly contempt of them: but distinguish, as Cicero saith well of

Rabirius Posthumus, "*In studio rei amplificandæ, 30 apparebat, non avaritiæ prædam, sed instrumentum bonitati quæri.*" Hearken also to Salomon, and beware of hasty gathering of riches: "*Qui festinat ad divitias, non erit insons.*" The poets feign that when Plutus (which is riches) is sent from Jupiter, he limps, 35 and goes slowly, but when he is sent from Pluto, he runs, and is swift of foot; meaning that riches gotten by good means and just labour pace slowly, but when they come by the death of others (as by the course of inheritance, testaments, and the like), they come 40 tumbling upon a man. But it mought be applied likewise to Pluto, taking him for the Devil. For when riches come from the Devil (as by fraud, and oppression, and unjust means) they come upon speed.

The ways to enrich are many, and most of them 45 foul. Parsimony is one of the best, and yet is not innocent; for it withholdeth men from works of liberality and charity. The improvement of the ground is the most natural obtaining of riches; for it is our great mother's blessing, the earth's; but it is slow. 50 And yet, where men of great wealth do stoop to husbandry, it multiplieth riches exceedingly. I knew a nobleman in England that had the greatest audits of any man in my time, a great grazier, a great sheep-master, a great timber-man, a great collier, a great 55 corn-master, a great lead-man, and so of iron, and a number of the like points of husbandry; so as the earth seemed a sea to him in respect of the perpetual importation. It was truly observed by one, that himself came very hardly to little riches, and very easily 60 to great riches. For when a man's stock is come to

that, that he can expect the prime of markets, and overcome those bargains which for their greatness are few men's money, and be partner in the industries of younger men, he cannot but increase mainly.

The gains of ordinary trades and vocations are ⁶⁵ honest, and furthered by two things chiefly ; by diligence, and by a good name for good and fair dealing. But the gains of bargains are of a more doubtful nature, when men shall wait upon others' necessity ; broke by servants and instruments to draw them on ; put off ⁷⁰ others cunningly that would be better chapmen ; and the like practices, which are crafty and naught. As for the chopping of bargains, when a man buys not to hold, but to sell over again ; that commonly grindeth double, both upon the seller and upon the buyer. ⁷⁵ Sharings do greatly enrich, if the hands be well chosen that are trusted. Usury is the certainest means of gain, though one of the worst, as that whereby a man doth eat his bread *in sudore vultus alieni* and, besides, doth plough upon Sundays. But yet, certain though ⁸⁰ it be, it hath flaws : for that the scriveners and brokers do value unsound men, to serve their own turn.

The fortune in being the first in an invention, or in a privilege, doth cause sometimes a wonderful overgrowth in riches ; as it was with the first sugar-man in ⁸⁵ the Canaries. Therefore if a man can play the true logician, to have as well judgment as invention, he may do great matters ; especially if the times be fit. He that resteth upon gains certain, shall hardly grow to great riches ; and he that puts all upon adven- ⁹⁰ tures, doth oftentimes break and come to poverty : it is good, therefore, to guard adventures with cer-

tainties that may uphold losses. Monopolies, and co-emption of wares for resale, where they are not
95 restrained, are great means to enrich ; especially if the party have intelligence what things are like to come into request, and so store himself beforehand.

Riches gotten by service, though it be of the best rise, yet when they are gotten by flattery, feeding
100 humours, and other servile conditions, they may be placed amongst the worst. As for fishing for testaments and executorships (as Tacitus saith of Seneca, *Testamenta et orbos tanquam indagine capi*), it is yet worse, by how much men submit themselves to meaner
105 persons than in service.

Believe not much them that seem to despise riches : for they despise them that despair of them ; and none worse, when they come to them. Be not penny-wise : riches have wings, and sometimes they fly away of
110 themselves, sometimes they must be set flying to bring in more.

Men leave their riches either to their kindred, or to the public ; and moderate portions prosper best in both. A great estate left to an heir, is as a lure to
115 all the birds of prey round about to seize on him, if he be not the better stablished in years and judgment. Likewise, glorious gifts and foundations are like sacrifices without salt, and but the painted sepulchres of alms, which soon will putrefy and corrupt inwardly.
120 Therefore measure not thine advancements by quantity, but frame them by measure. And defer not charities till death. For, certainly, if a man weigh it rightly, he that doth so is rather liberal of another man's than of his own.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. They despise riches who have no hope of them.

2. Envy of riches has made virtue a goddess.

3. While philosophers are disputing whether all conduct is to be referred to virtue and pleasure, do you lay in store of both.

4. Virtue is turned by riches into a common good.

5. All other goods hold subordinate commands; riches alone have a supreme one.

Against.

1. Men may keep, give away, or win fame from riches, but never use them.

2. Do you not see what fanciful prices are set upon small stones and such rarities, only that there may be some use for great riches?

3. Many, while thinking that everything has a price, have been first sold themselves.

4. I cannot call riches other than the baggage of virtue, for they are both needful to virtue and in the way.

5. Riches make a good servant, but a bad master.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

"If thou art rich, be great, but let it be in considering riches as they are, as talents committed to an earthen vessel; that thou art but the receiver, and that to be obliged and to be vain too is but the old solecism of pride and beggary, which, though they are often met, yet ever make but an absurd society."—Sterne.

i. Wealth is not money. Moreover wealth is a relative term expressing the means of gratifying wants. Desires grow faster than income. The rich man, if not master of himself, is poorer in happiness than one who has less.

So with nations, a thrifty, temperate race is richer than a luxurious and effete nation. Wealth used productively, and as a means to the gratification of refining and ennobling desires, is a good. There is truth in Johnson's remark to Garrick, when he visited his fine house at Twickenham: "Ah! Davy, it is these things that make us fear to die." But the man who limits his aspiration to moderate riches may be as selfish as any millionaire; and the man who wisely administers a great fortune may be as hard-working and self-denying as any mechanic. If wealth were more diffused, each might find excuse to say that he has only just enough for his necessary wants. It is hardly true to say with Swift, that "nothing is so hard for those who abound in riches as to conceive how others can be in want."

ii. Other aspects of the millionaire should not be forgotten. He can afford to lend his capital at a low interest, and in forms which the man with the nest egg would avoid. If a foreign power requires, the large capitalist can advance the first payments, while his credit and wealth give confidence to smaller men; and he has numerous facilities for extending and attracting commerce. The millionaire is likely also to patronize art; the lower desires soon pall and are stifled, their place being supplied by refining pleasures. The rich man can use a thousand influences impossible for the poor; he can moreover wait and make his own terms. On the other hand, if wealth were more evenly distributed, there would be more energy, personal superintendence, and motives for success.

iii. The two great dangers of wealth are a tendency to lose sight of humanitarian in economical principles and money-worship. The selfish theory of Adam Smith was a reaction against feudalism and protection. The great truth grasped was that the work of the world should be done well and quickly, without red-tapeism, interference, or etiquette. The simple test of material utility was applied to trade. Two facts are now staring us in the face, that wealth has not increased as fast as population, and that wealth is not fairly distributed. The former difficulty threatens to make any remedy for the latter simply a postponement of the evil day. Socialistic schemes have never succeeded. The best remedy for

wrong distribution is perhaps to be found in the application of Christian principles¹ to the problems of capital and labour. Experience warns us that competition alone is an unsafe principle, and logic demonstrates that it is a fallacy to abstract one cause from a number of others with which it intermingles. It is not merely a question of moral responsibility, but also of practical utility.

iv. Money-worship is degrading. The idea that money can buy everything leads to the depreciation of virtue either as purchasable or sour grapes. *Omnia Romæ cum pretio*;—friendship, love, morality, and principle lose their sanction when reduced to dollars. Purse-pride like Mr. Dombey's had to learn the value of virtues which cannot be bought. Again, justice is too expensive in England, though it is obtainable. The American will buy ruins, but cannot buy their associations.

v. Money-worship leads to dishonesty. Monopolies are unjustly created and cruelly used. The-speculator who "corners" grain ruins many, whether he succeeds or fails. The *bonâ fide* buyer exercises judgment, foresight, and intends to pay, if he loses. Lucky hits, prophetic insight into fashion, and even the creation of wants are not necessarily immoral. The clever inventor is worthy of his hire. But the maker of "corners," the modern phase of might is right, is the bane of modern trade. Great profits, honestly obtained, are in these days of competition almost impossible.

vi. Man makes the money, not the money, man. It is true that wealth is a practical, though rough test of a certain sort of merit. The men who get on are in the main the best men, though many, like Heine, only get dents in the head while the children of Israel merrily gather the golden shower. But the hatred of culture to money-making, even the continental *Juden-hetze*, is not merely jealousy. Money wins undue respect, in spite of the questionable methods of money-making. On the other hand, what is to be substituted for the monetary test? The move from an aristocracy of birth to a timocracy was distinctly an advance, though ancient legislators intended wealth to be identical with landed property, then

¹ This is the position of the so-called "Christian socialism."

a considerable test of merit.¹ In the Middle Ages, England contrasted favourably with the rest of Europe in respect to the position of the wealthy. On the Continent the robber-lord sweated the money bags of the Jew or Christian. The richest lord could have the most accomplished cut-throats in his pay, but an impecunious lord could borrow or steal to pay them. Still there were numerous rallying points for the wealthy traders. The confederacies of the free cities, and notably the Hanseatic union in the middle of the fourteenth century, were the first systematic checks to the depredations of the nobles. The commercial guilds were centres of organized resistance to feudal oppression. In Florence, as early as 1266, the chief power, magisterial or otherwise, was thrown into the scale of the middle class. The nobles enrolled themselves in commercial companies, and after some ineffectual resistance, the *populoni grandi* entirely superseded the old nobility. Later, the people condescended "to elevate five hundred and thirty nobles to the rank of commoner, and several unpopular commoners were ennobled in order to disfranchise them."² The constitution of Venice was plutocratical. As early as 1530 the Fugger family, sprung from an Augsburg weaver, had countships and princeships. "In 1613 there were forty-seven counts and countesses belonging to it."³ The nephew of Charles V. married Philippine Welser daughter of a merchant of Augsburg. In many parts of Germany and the Netherlands, "peaceful abundance was everywhere conspicuous." In England the impulse given to commerce by the Hanseatic union and the establishment of a wool market for the north was increased by the establishment of guilds, and the liberal enactments of the sovereigns from Edward III. to Elizabeth. The burghers had long been *de jure* enfranchised, though his political power did not become a reality until much later. The extinction of nobility by tenure dealt a new blow to the feudalism, which had never been excessively strong in

¹ "*Sedilibusque magnus in primis eques,
Othone contempto sedet.*"

² Hallam, *Middle Ages*, i. 428.

³ Carlyle, *Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. ii., *On German Literature*.

England, and opened out nobility to the rich merchant. Nowadays wealth gives coronets. In France, before the Empire, the wealthy *roturier* could hardly become noble, while the enfranchisement of the middle class has come very slowly.

vii. The growth of wealth is of course the result of scientific discoveries and inventions. The advance was hastened when war ceased to absorb the best talent. Perhaps further impetus was given by the fact that politics were almost monopolized by a limited number of great houses, like the Greys and the Russells. The perfection of the machinery of banking, the introduction of a paper-currency, and the extension of credit, acted beneficially in two ways. The merchant was enabled to transfer his capital from England to Australia, or elsewhere, whenever an opening was seen; and this, without disturbing pre-existing industry. In the next place the theory that money is wealth, with its foolish result of protective legislation to keep coin in the country, was gradually weakened. Credit has revolutionized the whole system of investments.

viii. From the Elizabethan age downwards, the rapid influx of wealth acted beneficially in gradually substituting a nobility of commerce for a nobility of birth. The tendency has been carried to excess in modern times. In *Martin Chuzzlewit* the editor of the *New York Rowdy Journal* speaks of an aristocracy of virtue and intellect, and of their natural consequence—dollars. There are breaks in the gloomy horizon of American politics as painted by Dickens. The great “rings” are comparatively powerless. Municipal government is purer than it was. Through a curious combination of causes, one of which is an undercurrent of morality, the American President has rarely been a rich man. But the great political wire-pullers and social leaders are the rich and influential; while the evil is so aggravated by the connection of civil appointments with the tenure of office, that the best Americans still hold aloof from the corruption of political life.

ix. The modern theory of manhood suffrage is humanitarian and unselfish, and opposed to the older theory connecting franchise with a share in the pecuniary burdens of the State. Generally there is a distinct move towards a

reconciliation of morality and politics. On the other hand, the monetary test has many advantages; wealth puts a representative above mere office-hunting. The rich man has time, inclination, and other advantages for political life. The tendency of the times is to require only practical common sense in the politician. A member is rather chosen for his capacity to express and forward the wishes of his constituency. The great thinker is better employed in moulding, or correcting public opinion outside the House. Mr. H. Spencer has wisely refused to limit his powers of doing good by a seat in that House where John Stuart Mill won only a *succès d'estime*. It is all very well to represent a constituency, if there is no other platform from which to influence others, but the position of an independent publicist is more secure and valuable. There is moreover a growing dislike to "Caves" and seceders, as the benefits of party government are more fully recognized. Further, the nation or individual that wins wealth exhibits many noble qualities. A restless desire for independence, shrewd invention and creative energy, untiring purpose and undaunted warfare against adversity are all necessary, if wealth is to be won honestly and for good.¹

x. The need of the age is not to relax the struggle to develop natural capacities of the earth to the utmost, but to grow more humanitarian, to restrain the wants of self, and to minister wisely and unselfishly to the wants of others. It is only when wealth is obtained by vicious means, to minister to vicious ends, that it harms the nation or individual. Poverty is not an essential condition of high thinking, though it has the blessing assigned it by Wordsworth—

"These times strike monied worldlings with dismay;
 Ev'n rich men, brave by nature, taint the air
 With words of apprehension and despair;
 While tens of thousands looking on the fray,
 Men unto whom sufficient for the day,
 And minds not stinted or untill'd are given,
 Sound healthy children of the God of heaven,
 Are cheerful as the rising sun in May."

¹ Emerson, in his essay *On Wealth*, traces English prosperity to these sources.

xi. Bacon's own view is distinctly utilitarian. He allows full play to purely commercial principles, and does not hint at the responsibilities of wealth when gotten ; but sham companies and stock-jobbing were unknown arts, and monopolies were in keeping with the spirit of the times. In the *Advancement*¹ "on the morigeration of learned men to men of fortune," he quotes the answer of Diogenes, that the learned men know that they need riches, whereas the rich men do not know what they require. Bacon's own unscrupulous modes of making money can find no excuse saving his weak physique, his contempt for riches except as a means to an end,² and his desire to exchange the hardships of active life for scientific investigation. He had money anxieties in a great measure through his own carelessness, and his difficulties led him to seek preferment and increase of income too eagerly. At first his brother Anthony helped him with ungrudging generosity. He married "to his liking," but for money. In 1608 he was a wealthy man with £4500 a year. His punishment for taking bribes brought the pecuniary troubles which lasted to his death.

[See also Essays on *Adversity*, *Expense*, *Nobility*.]

XXXV. Of Prophecies.

I MEAN not to speak of divine prophecies, nor of heathen oracles, nor of natural predictions ; but only of prophecies that have been of certain memory, and from hidden causes. Saith the Pythonissa to Saul, "*To-morrow thou and thy sons shall be with me.*"⁵ Homer hath these verses :

"*At domus Æneæ cunctis dominabitur oris,
Et natî natorum, et qui nascentur ab illis ;*"

¹ *Advancement*, i., iii., 10.

² *Essay* 15. "Money is like muck, not good except it be spread."

a prophecy, as it seems, of the Roman empire. Seneca, the tragedian, hath these verses :

“ . . . *Venient annis*
Sæcula seris, quibus Oceānus
Vincula rerum laxet, et ingens
Pateat tellus, Tiphysque novos
Detegat orbes ; nec sit terris
Ultima Thule : ”

a prophecy of the discovery of America. The
 10 daughter of Polycrates dreamed that Jupiter bathed
 her father, and Apollo anointed him. And it came
 to pass that he was crucified in an open place, where
 the sun made his body run with sweat, and the rain
 washed it. Philip of Macedon dreamed he sealed
 15 up his wife's belly ; whereby he did expound it, that
 his wife should be barren : but Aristander the sooth-
 sayer told him his wife was with child, because men
 do not use to seal vessels that are empty. A phantasm
 that appeared to M. Brutus in his tent, said to him,
 20 “ *Philippis iterum me videbis.* ” Tiberius said to Galba :
 “ *Tu quoque, Galba, degustabis imperium.* ” In Ves-
 pasian's time, there went a prophecy in the East, that
 those that should come forth of Judea should reign
 over the world ; which, though it may be was meant
 25 of our Saviour, yet Tacitus expounds it of Vespasian.
 Domitian dreamed, the night before he was slain, that
 a golden head was growing out of the nape of his
 neck, and indeed, the succession that followed him
 for many years made golden times. Henry VI. of
 30 England said of Henry VII. when he was a lad, and
 gave him water, *This is the lad that shall enjoy the*
crown for which we strive. When I was in France, I
 heard from one Dr. Pena, that the Queen Mother,

who was given to curious arts, caused the king her husband's nativity to be calculated under a false 35 name, and the astrologer gave a judgment that he should be killed in a duel; at which the queen laughed, thinking her husband to be above challenges at duels: but he was slain upon a course at tilt, the splinters of the staff of Montgomery going in at his 40 beaver. The trivial prophecy which I heard when I was a child, and Queen Elizabeth was in the flower of her years, was :

*“ When hempe is spun,
England's done : ”*

whereby it was generally conceived that, after the princes had reigned which had the principal letters of 45 that word *hempe* (which were Henry, Edward, Mary, Philip, and Elizabeth) England should come to utter confusion: which, thanks be to God, is verified in the change of the name; for that the king's style is now no more of England, but of Britain. There 50 was also another prophecy before the year of eighty-eight, which I do not well understand :

*“ There shall be seen upon a day,
Between the Baugh and the May,
The Black fleet of Norway.
When that that is come and gone,
England build houses of lime and stone,
For after wars shall you have none.”*

It was generally conceived to be meant of the Spanish fleet that came in eighty-eight; for that the king of Spain's surname, as they say, is Norway. The predic- 55 tion of Regiomontanus,

“ Octogesimus octavus mirabilis annus,”

was thought likewise accomplished in the sending of that great fleet, being the greatest in strength, though not in number, of all that ever swam upon the sea.

60 As for Cleon's dream, I think it was a jest. It was, that he was devoured of a long dragon; and it was expounded of a maker of sausages, that troubled him exceedingly. There are numbers of the like kind, especially if you include dreams, and predictions of

65 astrology; but I have set down these few only of certain credit, for example.

My judgment is, that they ought all to be despised, and ought to serve but for winter-talk by the fireside. Though when I say despised, I mean it as for belief:

70 for otherwise the spreading or publishing of them is in no sort to be despised. For they have done much mischief, and I see many severe laws made to suppress them. That that hath given them grace, and some credit, consisteth in three things. First, that

75 men mark when they hit, and never mark when they miss; as they do, generally, also of dreams. The second is, that probable conjectures, or obscure traditions, many times turn themselves into prophecies; while the nature of Man, which coveteth divination,

80 thinks it no peril to foretell that which indeed they do but collect: as that of Seneca's verse. For so much was then subject to demonstration, that the globe of the earth had great parts beyond the Atlantic, which might be probably conceived not to be all sea: and

85 adding thereto the tradition in Plato's *Timæus* and his *Atlanticus*, it mought encourage one to turn it to a prediction. The third and last (which is the great one) is, that almost all of them, being infinite in

number, have been impostures, and by idle and crafty brains, merely contrived and feigned, after the event 90 passed.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

"A great man . . . comes to us first-hand. A messenger he, sent from the infinite unknown, with tidings to us. We may call him poet, prophet, god; . . . really his utterances, are they not a kind of 'revelation'?"—Carlyle.

"The oracles are dumb."—Milton.

i. "Coming events cast their shadows before," but it requires a wise man to see them; prophetic power is the most striking mark of genius. Common sense says the future will resemble the past; genius, which is nothing but intensified common sense, sees further and clearer than other people. This second sight may be quickened, if not actually engendered, by strong emotion, religious concentration, and also by training. Animals, savages, and sailors can see signs in nature which are hidden from men in cities. "Poets," says Shelley, "are hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration, the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present." The daring hypothesis of the *savant* is a prophecy. But in all cases the power to foretell is limited by the power to see signs which have escaped the notice of others. In the youth of the world, when phenomena were neither attentively marked nor arranged, and the realm of the supernatural indefinitely extended, the superior knowledge of the few pre-historic men of science was referred to prophetic inspiration. Thales seemed to many "a prophet new-inspired" when he bought up the olives. Ordinary inductions from clear prognostics were the work of a mind able to read the manifestations of the gods. Bacon, throughout his *Natural History*, insists on the importance of prognostics.

ii. Ignorance of the future is the *locus operandi* of false prophets. The richest harvest is reaped from fear of death, greediness for riches, and national or domestic calamity. In dealing with an ignorant and credulous

people, solemn meaningless platitudes are sufficient for most cases. Unfortunately for the prophet, language does not often allow ambiguities like *Aio te, Æacida, Romanos vincere posse*, though, even there, prudence might have suggested that a further explanation was necessary. The more vague and meaningless the better the prophecy, and the greater the opportunities for the prophet of "hedging." The composer of the doggerel couplet was often saved the trouble of explaining his nonsense by the credulity of his believers. Merlin, Mother Shipton, and Robert Nixon, the original of Mr. Weller's red-faced Nixon in the *Pickwick Papers*, had not even to mark when they hit. Several of Nixon's prophecies have never found an interpreter, even among his most devoted admirers, such is—

"Between seven, eight, and nine
In England wonders shall be seen;
Between nine and thirteen
All sorrow shall be done.

"Through our own money and our men
Shall a dreadful war begin.
Between the sickle and the sick
All England shall have a pluck."

This might mean anything or nothing. Some, like Poor Robin, Francis Moore, Matthew Laensbergh, and others, turned their attention chiefly to the weather.

iii. To deceive some minds more is necessary than the simple utterances of Mother Shipton. The professors of the so-called occult sciences dealt in more highly spiced wares. The fortune-teller, from the strolling gipsy to the sublime Paracelsus, delights in astrological or other gibberish. "The centuries of Nostradamus," writes C. Mackay, in his *History of Extraordinary Popular Delusions*,¹ "are written in obscure and almost unintelligible language." Where he uses the language of everyday life his words are so vague as to suit, with a little ingenuity, many events which really happened. In the fifteenth century an astrologer was a necessary appendage to most of the petty Italian, as well as to more important, courts.

¹ Vol. i., p. 247.

Catharine de Medici and Louis XI. rarely acted without a prophet. Like Marius, Wallenstein kept an astrologer in his service. Among the pseudo-sciences of the period were *cephalonoman*cy, or prophecy by asses' heads; *koskinoman*cy, or prophecy from sieves; *alectryoman*cy, or prophecy by cocks. Mackay gives a list of more than fifty species of divination. In Lilly's *Astrological Predictions*¹ there is a good example of pseudo-scientific jargon and deceptive ambiguity. "In the year 1656 the *Aphelium* of *Mars*, who is the generall significator of England, will be in *Virgo*, which is assuredly the ascendant of the English monarchy, but *Aries* of the kingdom. When this *Absis*, therefore, of Mars shall appear in *Virgo*, who shall expect less than a strange catastrophe of human affairs in the commonwealth, monarchy, and kingdom of England? *There will then either in or about these times or near that year or within ten years more or less of that time or after, appear in this kingdom so strange a revolution of State,*" etc. The revolution, so accurately predicted, is to be accompanied or preceded by a plague and a fire.

iv. Prophets have made most capital out of times of national disturbance or calamity. In the general confusion people are not careful to mark the exact utterance, and failure is easily kept out of sight. There is a feverish desire for supernatural help, and a general appeal to authority. The ordinary course of nature seems to be suspended, and a ready belief is given to the marvellous. Men do not take the trouble to inquire whether the so-called prophecy is before or after the event, and it is easy to tamper with dates. In times of plagues and earthquakes the mental and moral atmosphere is affected by physical disturbances. Then men's minds are unstrung and catch more easily, as it were, the delusion which is in the air. Every one suffers the reflex action of his own mental state. Brutus and his fellow conspirators were troubled with concrete images of their own forebodings; the social atmosphere gets charged with electricity, and the portent-monger drives a busy trade. Any abnormal phenomenon, alike a comet or sudden death, is enlisted in the service of quackery. Prophecy ran riot

¹ Published 1648.

before the plague at Athens. Ghosts and portents warned the Jews that the destruction of their city was near. Bacon did not live to see his own remarks verified in England; but before the Great Plague of London, Lilly, Poor Robin, and Gadbury were charged with prophetic utterances. Prophets pervaded the streets foretelling the destruction of the city within forty days.

v. Modern prophets devote themselves most exclusively to religion. Science has driven them step by step from the physical world; their last stronghold has been the realm of the supernatural. Dr. Cumming, with his millennium, is the last serious impostor, who, perhaps, imposed even on himself, and largely attracted admiring believers. The fear of death and ignorance of the future are motives which affect all alike, and with the uneducated and excitable can be exaggerated and perverted. One advantage of the supremacy of authority in matters of religion is to check the wild utterances of excitable amateurs seeking for notoriety or gain. The prophet may know little about earth, but he is on familiar terms with heaven; and the religious impostor is on sure, because unknown, ground. Absolute subjectivity is unassailable. Munzer, the German prophet, claimed to be in direct communication with the Deity, to be able to raise the dead or to slay by an exertion of his will. Most prophets, from Munzer to Joe Smith, have claimed for themselves or their believers, or both, a plurality of wives. Munzer's successor in the business was John Buckholt, of Leyden, who was defeated and put to death for attempting to seize Amsterdam in obedience to a prophetic inspiration. Richard Brothers, like Dr. Cumming, prophesied that London and the "Armageddon," by which name he signified the Houses of Parliament, would come to an end in 1791. He died in a lunatic asylum. Robert Matthews, a carpenter, called himself Matthias, and styled Mr. Pierson, a revivalist monomaniac, John the Baptist. He called his followers "the kingdom," and advocated feasting and fine clothes. He was imprisoned for attacking his daughter with a horsewhip. John Nicholls Thoms, a cellarman at Truro, claimed to be a direct envoy from heaven. Ann Lee said that she was the woman spoken of in the Book of Revelation as "clothed with the sun, and the moon

under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars." The church of Joanna Southcott still expects its Joanna's reappearance. Lady Hester Stanhope, in whom Lamartine half believed, withdrew to Syria to wait for the advent of the Messiah, whose bride she imagined herself to be. In his "Judicial Charge upon the Commission of the Verge," Bacon writes, "Because the vulgar people are sometimes led with vain and fond prophecies ; if any such shall be published to the end to move stirs or tumults, this is not felony, but punished by a year's imprisonment and loss of goods." Adventurous prophets are a continual danger in Oriental politics.

vi. Not less amusing than the fancies of the prophets are the arguments to prove their truth. Too many men are ready to lean on the judgment of others, and to endorse statements without verification. Cicero gravely accepts the numerous forms of the soothsayer's and augur's art because some custom or relic is referred, in want of a better origin, to a miracle. Mark Twain laughs at the proofs given of some of the mediæval miracles.¹ Men are too apt to argue—I have read the inscription, I have seen the prophet's tomb ; therefore the legend must be true. Bacon, in the *Advancement*,² has judiciously and temperately exposed the foolish facility of credit yielded to arts and opinions. Alchemy, however, and astrology have done some good. The former, by initiating chemical analysis, through its experiments in search for gold ; the latter, by its attempts to reduce all nature to a unity.

vii. There are very few cases of reading the future which have not been fully accounted for by physical facts. Dreams and the whole paraphernalia of modern spiritualism can be easily explained by the conditions of the nervous system.³ The imagination overpowers the reason, and in its morbid state will see and believe anything. In the few cases where such explanation fails, the miracle is due to a coincidence. No one will deny that, as the drowning man sees in a moment of time his whole life, so the mind may be so elevated or depressed as to form combinations

¹ *Innocents Abroad*, ch. xxvii., *ad fin.*

² *Advancement*, I. iv. 9, *et seqq.*

³ See O. W. Holmes' *Mechanism in Thought and Morals*.

impossible in its normal state. Mesmerism, clairvoyance, and second-sight, are cases of hyper-æsthesia, physically explainable. Men will not ask themselves in dealing with prophets, Is this true? but ought I to believe it? There is a great deal of vanity in credulity. One slight success, one happy guess or fortunate coincidence, will make the fortune of a spiritualist or prophet.

[See also Essay on *Superstition*.]

XXXVI. Of Ambition.

AMBITION is like choler; which is an humour that maketh men active, earnest, full of alacrity, and stirring, if it be not stopped. But if it be stopped, and cannot have his way, it becometh adust, and
5 thereby malign and venomous. So ambitious men, if they find the way open for their rising, and still get forward, they are rather busy than dangerous. But if they be checked in their desires they become secretly discontent, and look upon men and matters
10 with an evil eye, and are best pleased when things go backward; which is the worst property in a servant of a prince or State. Therefore, it is good for princes, if they use ambitious men, to handle it so as they be still progressive and not retrograde; which because
15 it cannot be without inconvenience, it is good not to use such natures at all. For if they rise not with their service, they will take order to make their service fall with them.

But since we have said, it were good not to use
20 men of ambitious natures, except it be upon necessity, it is fit we speak in what cases they are of necessity. Good commanders in the wars must be taken, be

they never so ambitious ; for the use of their service dispenseth with the rest ; and to take a soldier without ambition is to pull off his spurs. There is also ²⁵ great use of ambitious men in being screens to princes in matters of danger and envy ; for no man will take that part unless he be like a seeled dove, that mounts and mounts, because he cannot see about him. There is use also of ambitious men in pulling down the ³⁰ greatness of any subject that overtops ; as Tiberius used Macro in the pulling down of Sejanus.

Since, therefore, they must be used in such cases, there resteth to speak how they are to be bridled, that they may be less dangerous. There is less danger of ³⁵ them if they be of mean birth, than if they be noble : and if they be rather harsh of nature, than gracious and popular ; and if they be rather new raised, than grown cunning and fortified in their greatness. It is counted by some a weakness in princes to have ⁴⁰ favourites, but it is, of all others, the best remedy against ambitious great ones. For when the way of pleasuring and displeasuring lieth by the favourite, it is impossible any other should be over-great. Another means to curb them, is to balance them by others as ⁴⁵ proud as they. But then there must be some middle counsellors to keep things steady ; for without that ballast the ship will roll too much. At the least a prince may animate and inure some meaner persons to be, as it were, scourges to ambitious men. As for ⁵⁰ the having of them obnoxious to ruin, if they be of fearful natures it may do well ; but if they be stout and daring, it may precipitate their designs, and prove dangerous. As for the pulling of them down, if the

55 affairs require it, and that it may not be done with safety suddenly, the only way is, the interchange continually of favours and disgraces, whereby they may not know what to expect, and be, as it were, in a wood.

60 Of ambitions, it is less harmful the ambition to prevail in great things, than that other, to appear in everything ; for that breeds confusion, and mars business. But yet it is less danger to have an ambitious man stirring in business, than great in dependencies.

65 He that seeketh to be eminent amongst able men, hath a great task, but that is ever good for the public. But he that plots to be the only figure amongst cyphers, is the decay of an whole age.

Honour hath three things in it ; the vantage ground
70 to do good, the approach to kings and principal persons, and the raising of a man's own fortunes. He that hath the best of these intentions, when he aspireth, is an honest man ; and that prince that can discern of these intentions in another that aspireth, is
75 a wise prince. Generally, let princes and States choose such ministers as are more sensible of duty than of rising, and such as love business rather upon conscience than upon bravery ; and let them discern a busy nature from a willing mind.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

" Ah," said the fox to himself after a moment's thought, " it is convenient to be wicked, but it is a misfortune to be altogether without a moral sense. Unless you understand the difference between good and evil, you will miss half the joke of life."—Modern Apologue.

" ' La France, c'est moi,' disoit Louis XIV. Mais son

ambition n'étoit que médiocre, car 'le monde c'est moi,' dit tout le monde."

i. Ambition, like revenge, is a stimulus to action where pure morality might prove wanting in motive power. Love for humanity is generally too weak and vague an emotion to produce great results. It is the ambitious man rather than the philanthropist who makes his way. Ambition, as a selfish or at best a self-regarding quality, is an infirmity, but as a striving for excellence (Homer's αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν) it is an infirmity of *noble* minds, the spur of the *clear* spirit. St. Paul was no less ambitious than the Olympic victor with whom he compared himself, or than Napoleon. The commonplaces of Juvenal and Johnson do not touch the real difficulty.

ii. It is commonly said that ambition has benefited the world more than humility, one of the cardinal virtues of the mediæval Church. Christianity, in exalting the opposite virtue of humility, uttered a protest against Greek self-sufficiency, and Roman exclusiveness. It taught to the one that man must seek a motive power outside of self; it taught to the other that "Alle Menschen gleich geboren sind ein adliges Geschlecht." Moreover, the sense of imperfection, even in our best work, is a valuable quality and a useful check on self-assertion, even in modern times, when the physical virtues are not so exclusively valued. The best form of ambition is that which teaches a man to deem himself worthy of great things, being worthy. In this sense ambition is the vague instinct of a noble nature.

iii. Against this view it is argued that the impulse is too vague; and, further, that a man may not be the best judge of his own powers. Vanity is a fatal bias. Men with missions are apt to be bores. The ambitious man often gets into the wrong place through an excessive estimate of his powers. It may also be urged that "there is some limit to avarice, none to ambition." Ambition in its best forms brings self forward too prominently. Scientific ambition should be the purest and best. Here it is possible to harmonize egoism and altruism. Yet Bacon says "*ambitio professorum impedit progressum scientiæ.*" Science is hindered because scientific

truth is lost sight of in selfishness—personal success is the only standard of attainment—and secondly, because ambition is first cousin to envy. Even where there is room for rivals, the ambitious man would have a monopoly of success. The quietist would say that the term “noble ambition” is altogether a misnomer. At first the noble aspirations of youth, or the divine discontent of riper years are vague, shadowy feelings which may be determined in the direction of philanthropy or self-seeking. Unfortunately the noble impulse, “*I must do great work,*” often degenerates into the selfish desire to get a front place in the world. It is safer to say, “there is great work to be done.” Philanthropy implies noble instincts, sense of personal dignity and desire for a higher life ; but the moving principle is moral responsibility. A good beginning is half the whole ; most depends on the first conception of the end of life. The philanthropist may be both self-confident and self-assertive. But there is a difference between the rough shouldering of Mr. Stryver and the sturdy resolution of Mr. Plimsoll. In Napoleon, as opposed to Cromwell, “an element of blamable ambition shows itself, gets the victory over him at last ; involves him and his work in ruin.” Ambition soon becomes careless of the means employed. Imposture or dishonesty are practised, and personal vanity increases by constant gratification. It is an unfortunate characteristic of some great minds that they can bear no rival near the throne. It is a mistake to suppose that great place is necessary for great work. All men, indeed, require a career, a sphere of action, but the cry of the ambitious is “*occupet extremum scabies.*” “How astonished,” says the “Guesser at Truth,” “people will be when they arrive in heaven to find the angels, who are so much wiser, laying no schemes to be made archangels !” In the case of Macbeth ambition completely swallowed up morality. It is not impossible to divert ambition into the paths of philanthropy. The lesson of life is that self-sacrifice is the truest gain, but the standpoint of ambition is non-moral, and many of the great reformers have, like Cincinnatus, gone back to their plough, having entered upon great work rather from a sense of obligation than from personal interests.

iv. There is a spontaneity about great work different from the calculating scheming of selfishness, however enlightened. The poet "sings because he must," not because he has definitely set before his mind's eye the honourable position of "Poet Laureate." Enthusiasm and a strong feeling of justice suggest and carry out works like the emancipation of the negroes.

"O, I see the crescent promise of my spirit hath not set,
Ancient founts of inspiration well through all my fancy yet."

The reformer need have no personal ambition, except in so far as he feels that the work has to be done, and has been put on him. Then when all is over, he may go back to his farm. The great man knows his powers, but only uses them for the sake of others. George Eliot, in an unpublished letter to a friend at Algiers, writes, "The reward of the artist is removed from everything that is narrow and personal; I go on writing from my inward promptings, writing what I love and believe, what I feel to be good and true, if only I can render it worthily, and then leave all the rest to take its chance. So it ever shall be with those who are to produce any act that will lastingly touch the generations of men."

v. It may be answered that the love of fame, posthumous or otherwise, is the motive of all great work; and that the desire to be a fact in history is selfish though noble. The position of morality is, however, not altered. If the motive is not moral the action is less valuable than if it is moral. The personal motive of fame may coexist by the side of the sense of responsibility. Aristotle kept clear of the utilitarian fallacy of confusing the result with the motive. The formation of a virtuous state is known by the resultant pleasure, yet pleasure is not the motive. The moral law is consciously followed even by perfect virtue, although virtue has become pleasurable. Great work is a call, often resisted and dreaded, but, luckily for humanity, sweetened by the spur of fame which stimulates men to "shun delights and live laborious days." More than this: it would not be hard to connect this so-called desire for glory, *i.e.* to be known as a universal benefactor, with the sense of personal responsibility and dignity which is the essence of morality.

vi. Bacon's ambition is utilitarian. The time for philanthropy had not yet fully come. Ambition is self-seeking, and the question is how far the ambitious may be profitably used by the prince. The answer is shrewd and politic, but not elevated. Ambition is to be used only so far as there is no danger of overtopping the monarch ; *i.e.* only so far as there is an identity between the interests of the minister and sovereign. Mazarin is a better instrument than Richelieu ; Thomas Cromwell than Wolsey. Bacon lived in times when the danger to the throne from ambitious favourites or rivals was a real one. Little is said of the effects of ambition on the ambitious, except that it is liable to degenerate into envy. There is, however, a strong connection between ambition and vain-glory,¹ which springs from the desire for ostentatious publicity as well as from an over-estimate of self.

[See also Essays on *Great Place, Empire, Envy, Vain-Glory*, and *Wisdom for Self*.]

XXXVII. Of Masques and Triumphs.

THESE things are but toys, to come amongs' such serious observations. But yet, since princes will have such things, it is better they should be graced with elegancy than daubed with cost.

5 Dancing to song is a thing of great state and pleasure. I understand it that the song be in quire, placed aloft, and accompanied with some broken music, and the ditty fitted to the device. Acting in song, especially in dialogues, hath an extreme good
 10 grace—I say acting, not dancing (for that is a mean and vulgar thing)—and the voices of the dialogue would be strong and manly (a bass and a tenor, no treble), and the ditty high and tragical, not nice or

¹ *Essay 47.*

dainty. Several quires placed one over against another, and taking the voice by catches, anthem-¹⁵ wise, give great pleasure. Turning dances into figure is a childish curiosity. And generally let it be noted, that those things which I have here set down, are such as do naturally take the sense, and not respect petty wonderments. It is true, the alterations of²⁰ scenes, so it be quietly and without noise, are things of great beauty and pleasure; for they feed and relieve the eye before it be full of the same object. Let the scenes abound with light, especially coloured and varied; and let the masquers, or any other that²⁵ are to come down from the scene, have some motions upon the scene itself before their coming down; for it draws the eye strangely, and makes it with great pleasure to desire to see that it cannot perfectly discern. Let the songs be loud and cheerful, and not³⁰ chirpings or pulings. Let the music likewise be sharp and loud, and well placed. The colours that show best by candlelight are: white, carnation, and a kind of sea-water green; and oes, or spangs, as they are of no great cost, so they are of most glory. As³⁵ for rich embroidery, it is lost and not discerned. Let the suits of the masquers be graceful, and such as become the person when the vizards are off, not after examples of known attires, Turks, soldiers, mariners, and the like. Let anti-masques not be long; they⁴⁰ have been commonly of fools, satyrs, baboons, wild men, antiques, beasts, sprites, witches, Æthiopes, pigmies, turquets, nymphs, rustics, Cupids, statuas moving, and the like. As for angels, it is not comical enough to put them in anti-masques; and anything⁴⁵

that is hideous, as devils, giants, is, on the other side, as unfit. But chiefly, let the music of them be recreative, and with some strange changes. Some sweet odours suddenly coming forth, without any drops
50 falling, are, in such a company, as there is steam and heat, things of great pleasure and refreshment. Double masques, one of men, another of ladies, addeth state and variety. But all is nothing, except the room be kept clear and neat.

55 For jousts, and tourneys, and barriers ; the glories of them are chiefly in the chariots, wherein the challengers make their entry, especially if they be drawn with strange beasts, as lions, bears, camels, and the like ; or, in the devices of their entrance, or in
60 the bravery of their liveries, or in the goodly furniture of their horses and armour. But enough of these toys.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. The *masque* was an invertebrate drama. It was written for special occasions and for special actors. Like the "morality" with which it is sometimes confused, and with which it has much in common, it sank into a by-growth of dramatic representation, and, properly speaking, scarcely has a history. The prominence of the dialogue or monologue gives it a close resemblance to the morality. The dramatic element, however, was slighter ; the spectacular and mythological conditions more decided. It was the lineal descendant of the religious processions of Catholic Europe. The masquerading show was diversified in many cases by a "pedantic allegory" taken in many cases from the "Romaunt of the Rose." These two elements, pageant and allegory, and with a motive not distinctly moral, but rather historical or amorous, were welded together into the masque. The dramatic side of the masque

is with the addition of other elements,¹ brought out in the morality and interlude. Skelton's morality *Magnificence* has been identified with a masque. The *mise-en-scène* of the morality *The Castle of Perseverance* is not dissimilar from that of the masque *La Forteresse Dangereuse*. On the other hand, the spectacular element, under secular conditions, alone appears in the so-called *pageant*, the successor to the *riding*, which has survived in the Carnival at Rome, in our own Lord Mayor's Show, and the Coventry celebration of the legend of Godiva. The most important constituents of the masque may briefly be characterized as allegory, love, humour, and spectacle. The motive was humorously rather than seriously moral, and not unfrequently amorous; the treatment allegorical or mythological; and the effect spectacular. Mr. Morley says that in the masque proper there was only dumb show and dancing. This is an exaggeration; the unrestrained revelry which is associated with this species of entertainment, and which was regulated by "a Lord of Misrule," was from the beginning more than a mere *tableau vivant* with appropriate movement. The speaking in a pure masque like that of *La Forteresse Dangereuse*, where Henry VIII. and five knights besiege six ladies, was necessarily slight, but the dialogue element grew, and what was at first the mere spectacle came into closer resemblance with the morality, and later even with comedy itself. Mr. Morley tells us how, as early as 1348, Edward III. kept Christmas with a mumming in masks and fancy dresses at Guildford. The more elaborate form of the entertainment came from Italy, at the period when the Italian influence was predominant in English as well as continental literature. The splendid extravagance of Francis I. of France and Henry VIII. of England gave a great impulse to this form of entertainment. There was a court *magister Revellorum Jocorum et Mascorum*. Though Elizabeth retrenched somewhat on the lavish expenditure of Mary, she was always pleased when a subject held a masque in her honour, with delicately complimentary allusions to her beauty and sagacity. The festivities of the Inner Temple were often

¹ Under the influence of the *Jongleurs* (Joculatores) of Trouvère literature.

the occasion of a masque, and we learn that *Gorboduc*, the first English tragedy, was preceded by one.

ii. Shakespeare, though not a professed writer of masques, embodied entertainments of like complexion in his less serious works. The "Vanity of Prospero's Art," and the glimpses of fairyland given in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, are of this description. (The masque in *Cymbeline* is the work of some inferior playwright.) It was not, however, till the reign of James that the masque was developed into a more dramatic form, possessing unity of design, and, as Warton points out, more worthy of royal patronage than "the dull and unnatural allegories of the metaphysical romance."

iii. The development of the masque was mainly the work of Ben Jonson, who was deeply imbued with an antiquarian spirit. His classical learning, his love of show and scenic effects, his reflective and moralizing vein predisposed him to the composition of masques.¹ The accession of James was favourable to this class of composition; for the king, besides being more liberal to literary merit than the frugal Elizabeth, was a fair classical scholar, and fond of pageants and flattery. Gratified by the poet's *Panegyre*, on the first meeting of Parliament, and subsequently by his *Entertainment* in welcome of the queen and Prince Henry, he was received into royal favour, pensioned as "Poet Laureate," and in 1621 granted the reversion of the office of "Master of the Revels," an advantage he never enjoyed, as Sir John Astley survived him. Gifford says that no public entertainment was complete without his aid. In its highest perfection the masque included dialogue, singing, and dancing; and while scenic apparatus was still deficient on the regular stage, the most costly scenery was here employed. The taste of the queen encouraged and improved these entertainments, and the highest lords and ladies, and even princes themselves, took part in the dialogue and dancing, if not in the singing and playing.

iv. Besides masques, Jonson provided anti-masques,

¹ A would-be critic is quoted by Gifford. "While Drayton was adopting a style that the present age may peruse, Jonson, unable to digest the mass of his reading, peopled his pages with the heathen mythology."

which Gifford describes as "parodies or opposites of the main masque, borrowed from the old masquerade and already familiar to the people. The poet here was tied by no rules ; he might be as wild and extravagant as he pleased ; . . . these were probably played by the menials from the palace, assisted by actors from regular theatres."¹ The object was partly to rest the principal performers, partly to relieve the now formal masque by a free use of raillery and jesting. In Jonson's hands the anti-masque had a seriously satirical vein, and served to illustrate the original, instead of indulging in fantastic extravagance with no bearing of the main story.

v. Jonson claims that Fletcher and Chapman are the only capable writers of masque, but Dekker and Ford deserve mention as casual contributors to court entertainments. The *Sun's Darling* is probably the joint production of the two poets, and is based on Dekker's *Phaëton*. It contains rather forced compliments to Charles I. on his accession. Bacon himself, according to Fletcher, "spared no time nor travel, in the setting forth, ordering, and furnishing" of his (Fletcher's) masque, *The Marriage of the Thames and the Rhine*, performed by the gentlemen of the Inner Temple, which celebrated the marriage of the Princess Elizabeth to the Elector Palatinate.¹ The masque itself told how "Jupiter and Juno, willing to do honour to the marriage of the two famous rivers, the Thames and the Rhine, employ their messengers, Mercury and Iris, for that purpose." Mercury produces an anti-masque of spirits, divine natures ; Iris, "in scorn of this high-flying device," brings in Flora and a merry country dance. The two deities then join their forces, and, as the main masque, the Olympian games are revived. It is noteworthy that the chief motive of *Histrionastix* was a masque performed by Queen Henrietta and her court in 1632.

vi. Marston is known for his composition of masques. His most celebrated attempt in this form of composition was given at Lord Huntingdon's seat at Ashby-de-la-Zouch, on the occasion of the visit, in 1607, of the Countess-Dowager of Derby, whose youngest daughter, Lady Eliza-

¹ Ben Jonson, *Works*, vol. i. ccxxvii.

² The masque was performed in 1613.

beth Stanley, was to be married to the Young Lord Huntingdon. Mr. Masson says, "The masque is a poor affair to read now, but Marston appears to have done his best." The Countess-Dowager had, with her daughter, performed in Ben Jonson's *Masque of Queens*; and it was in her honour that, in 1630 or 1631, some of her younger relatives got up a masque at *Harefield*. The music was entrusted to Henry Lawes, gentleman of the Chapel Royal, and one of his Majesty's private musicians. The composition itself was entrusted to Milton.

vii. We are now brought to Milton's *Comus*, which is the masterpiece of its kind, and shows that the masque might have had a literary future, if it had engaged the attention of other great minds. *Comus* is not a regular drama, and must not be criticised as such. The pastoral-dramatic treatment is non-essential, but is striking evidence of the elasticity of this form of composition. The *Comus* was "*presented at Ludlow Castle, 1634, before the Earl of Bridgewater, Lord President of Wales.*" "The Court," says Mr. Masson, "had become masquemad. . . . Prynne's famous attack on theatres (1633) had just then caused a reaction at Court, and among families of rank, in favour of theatrical entertainments." Especially magnificent was Shirley's masque, *Triumph of Peace*, got up by the Four Inns of Court," as an expression of their love and duty to their majesties. In the general enthusiasm for masques, it was resolved to astonish the Welsh and all the West of England by a masque on a grand scale, to celebrate the entry of the Earl of Bridgewater on his Welsh Presidency. Some say that Milton "dramatized a real incident in the life of the Lady Alice Egerton and her two younger brothers," others that it was the creation of the poet's brain. The masque must have been a great success, and worthy of the praise of Sir Henry Wotton, Provost of Eton, who writes to the author: "A dainty piece of entertainment, wherein I should much commend the tragical part (*i.e.* the dialogue), if the lyrical did not ravish me with a certain Doric delicacy in your songs and odes; whereunto I must plainly confess to have seen yet nothing parallel in our language." After Milton, no masque deserves notice. The meagre, lame specimen which Dryden has left, with

its absurdly fantastical transference of scene from the haunts of the gods to a madhouse, is evidence that the old allegorical spirit had passed away. The continuation of the masque must be looked for rather in some features of the pastoral poem, and in the modern pantomime, while its higher life is to be found in operas, both comic and serious, such as Oberon, the Zauberflöte, and Tannhäuser.

XXXVIII. Of Nature in Men.

NATURE is often hidden, sometimes overcome, seldom extinguished. Force maketh nature more violent in the return; doctrine and discourse maketh nature less importune; but custom only doth alter and subdue nature.

5

He that seeketh victory over his nature, let him not set himself too great nor too small tasks; for the first will make him dejected by often failings and the second will make him a small proceeder, though by often prevailings. And, at the first, let him practise with helps, as swimmers do with bladders or rushes; but after a time, let him practise with disadvantages, as dancers do with thick shoes; for it breeds great perfection if the practice be harder than the use.

Where nature is mighty, and therefore the victory hard, the degrees had need be, first to stay and arrest nature in time (like to him that would say over the four-and-twenty letters when he was angry); then to go less in quantity (as if one should, in forbearing wine, come from drinking healths to a draught at a meal); and, lastly, to discontinue altogether. But

20

if a man have the fortitude and resolution to enfranchise himself at once, that is the best :

“ *Optimus ille animi vindex, lædentia pectus
Vincula quæ rupit, dedoluitque semel.*”

Neither is the ancient rule amiss, to bend nature as
25 a wand, to a contrary extreme, whereby to set it
right ; understanding it where the contrary extreme
is no vice.

Let not a man force a habit upon himself with a
perpetual continuance ; but with some intermission.
30 For both the pause reinforceth the new onset ; and
if a man that is not perfect be ever in practice, he
shall as well practise his errors as his abilities, and
induce one habit of both : and there is no means to
help this but by seasonable intermission.

35 But let not a man trust his victory over his nature
too far ; for nature will lay buried a great time, and
yet revive upon the occasion or temptation. Like as
it was with Æsop's damosel, turned from a cat to a
woman, who sat very demurely at the board's end
40 till a mouse ran before her. Therefore, let a man
either avoid the occasion altogether, or put himself
often to it, that he may be little moved with it.

A man's nature is best perceived in privateness ;
for there is no affectation : in passion ; for that putteth
45 a man out of his precepts : and in a new case or
experiment ; for there custom leaveth him.

They are happy men whose natures sort with their
vocations ; otherwise they may say, *Multum incola
fuit anima mea*, when they converse in those things
50 they do not affect. In studies, whatsoever a man

commandeth upon himself, let him set hours for it ; but whatsoever is agreeable to his nature, let him take no care for any set times : for his thoughts will fly to it of themselves, so as the spaces of other business or studies will suffice. 55

A man's nature runs either to herbs or weeds ; therefore let him seasonably water the one, and destroy the other.

[Annotations and hints on Essay 39 apply also to Essay 38.]

XXXIX. Of Custom and Education.

MEN'S thoughts are much according to their inclination ; their discourse and speeches according to their learning and infused opinions ; but their deeds are after as they have been accustomed. And, therefore, as Machiavel well noteth (though in 5 an evil-favoured instance), there is no trusting to the force of nature, nor to the bravery of words, except it be corroborate by custom. His instance is, that for the achieving of a desperate conspiracy, a man should not rest upon the fierceness of any man's 10 nature, or his resolute undertakings, but take such a one as hath had his hands formerly in blood. But Machiavel knew not of a friar Clement, nor a Ravailac, nor a Jaureguy, nor a Baltazar Gerard. Yet his rule holdeth still, that nature, nor the engagement of words, 15 are not so forcible as custom. Only superstition is now so well advanced, that men of the first blood are as firm as butchers by occupation ; and votary reso-

lution is made equipollent to custom, even in matter
20 of blood. In other things, the predominancy of
custom is everywhere visible, insomuch as a man
would wonder to hear men profess, protest, engage,
give great words, and then do just as they have done
before, as if they were dead images and engines moved
25 only by the wheels of custom.

We see also the reign or tyranny of custom, what it
is. The Indians (I mean the sect of their wise men)
lay themselves quietly upon a stack of wood, and so
sacrifice themselves by fire. Nay, the wives strive to
30 be burned with the corpses of their husbands. The
lads of Sparta, of ancient time, were wont to be
scourged upon the altar of Diana, without so much
as queching. I remember, in the beginning of Queen
Elizabeth's time of England, an Irish rebel condemned,
35 put up a petition to the deputy that he might be
hanged in a withe, and not in a halter, because it had
been so used with former rebels. There be monks in
Russia, for penance, that will sit a whole night in a
vessel of water, till they be engaged with hard ice.

40 Many examples may be put of the force of custom,
both upon mind and body : therefore since custom is
the principal magistrate of man's life, let men by all
means endeavour to obtain good customs. Certainly
custom is most perfect when it beginneth in young
45 years. This we call education ; which is, in effect,
but an early custom. So we see in languages, the
tone is more pliant to all expressions and sounds, the
joints are more supple to all feats of activity and
motions in youth than afterwards. For it is true that
50 late learners cannot so well take the ply ; except it

be in some minds, that have not suffered themselves to fix, but have kept themselves open and prepared to receive continual amendment, which is exceeding rare.

But if the force of custom, simple and separate, be 55 great, the force of custom, copulate and conjoined and collegiate, is far greater. For there example teacheth, company comforteth, emulation quickeneth, glory raiseth ; so as in such places the force of custom is in his exaltation. Certainly, the great multiplica- 60 tion of virtues upon human nature resteth upon societies well ordained and disciplined. For commonwealths and good governments do nourish virtue grown, but do not much mend the seeds. But the misery is, that the most effectual means are now 65 applied to the ends least to be desired.

ANTITHETA ON NATURE IN MËN.

For.

1. Custom moves by arithmetical progression, nature by geometrical.

2. As common laws are related to customs in public bodies, so is nature to custom in individuals.

3. Custom, when against nature, is a kind of despotism which is overthrown speedily and from slight causes.

Against.

1. We think according to nature ; we speak according to education ; but we act according to custom.

2. Nature is a pedantic schoolmaster ; custom a magistrate.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

"All men are better than their ebullitions of evil, but also worse than their ebullitions of good."—Richter.

i. The word "nature" bristles with fallacies. It is used to mean the physical as opposed to the spiritual, the actual as opposed to the ideal, and the ideal as opposed to the actual. Human nature, according to Bishop Butler, is a hierarchy with conscience at the head. To Rousseau, man, in his original state, was a mixture of Arcadian simplicity and divine intelligence; while, according to Hobbes, primitive life was "nasty, brutish, and short." Human nature is used to denote what man is, has been, and might be. Bacon sensibly restricts its meaning to man as he is, and though he hardly perceived the correlation between nature and custom, he is aware that the former is not a "fixed term." Really the term *human nature* is a vague and somewhat metaphysical confession of ignorance. Primitive man was virtually helpless; his wants have developed certain activities of body and mind. The real questions for the moral philosopher are, How have these activities been developed? how far may further activities be developed? and how far is it possible to stamp out or change the direction of an activity when once developed? Nature is man's past, present, and future history.

ii. There are three factors in human life. First, those actions which are performed automatically or mechanically. By habitual performance an activity can become mechanical or independent of volition. Spiritualism is merely an advantage taken of so-called unconscious cerebration. An absorbing excitement will render activities unconscious which are usually not so. The nerve-centre plays itself. Digestion, breathing, and many of the purely physical activities are carried on mechanically. Next come those cases where the appropriate circumstances lead to the conscious performance of actions which are adaptive in character, but pursued without necessary knowledge of the relation between the means employed and the ends obtained. The suitable muscular stimulus will cause an instinctive though conscious closing of the

eyes. Both kinds of actions are explained partly by the survival of actions which were beneficial to the continuance of the individual or race, but not intelligently performed with the special objects which caused their survival, but more generally they represent actions once intelligently performed, but which, by frequent repetition in the individual, have become stereotyped and virtually automatic. Thirdly come actions done intelligently, with a conscious adaptation of means to ends.

iii. Both instincts and faculties are susceptible of modification from without. Judicious training, if applied when the organism is young and plastic, will, within certain limits, work marvels. In animal life instincts are almost infinitely variable. A breeder has absolute power, and can experiment at will on his stock. How far is this the case with man? The schoolmaster is more impersonal than the parent, and as interested in successful results as the stock-breeder, but he cannot experiment like the father in Herodotus. Mr. F. Galton, in *Hereditary Genius*, proves that a man's natural abilities are derived by inheritance, under exactly the same limitations as are the form and physical features of the whole organic world. Against heredity we have four weapons—physical and intellectual training, religion, and morality. It is not possible to separate these in practice. Probably there is much more in common between them than many suppose. The real difficulty lies in a nutshell. Can the experience of one life successfully oppose the congenital experience of generations? Can Nature as it is, be recast? As to curing defects, much that is left to the schoolmaster is possibly the province of the doctor; but education should be physical as well as intellectual, and parents and educators should understand the first principles of health. Doubtless, as a tendency to disease, if noticed, may be checked, so a tendency to special lines of action may be modified. At the same time, little can be done by purely physical means. Bend as far as possible in a contrary direction to the vicious bias, begin young, apply punishment and reward judiciously, are the commonplace remedies of educationalists from Aristotle to Mr. Galton. Unfortunately, tendencies are often invisible and latent. They appear when least expected, and in the most baffling

form. Moreover, there is so close a connection between the different phenomena of human life that, cauterize as thoroughly as you please, the cancer lurks in the system, affecting other springs of action. A liar may be whipped into speaking the truth, but not often into acting truly. Nature is a Proteus, and, bind her as you will, slips from the grasp of Nurture.

iv. A distinction between physical and mental powers must always be somewhat arbitrary, and it is quite true that the bent of mind is no less inherited than the constitution of the body. Yet there is a fundamental difference between the training of an animal and the education of a child. Jules Simon has well defined the word, "*L'Education est une opération par laquelle un esprit forme un esprit et un cœur forme un cœur.*" Education, as far as possible, trains the mind to analyze an action into its remote as well as nearer consequences. Practical intelligence is occupied by the consideration of utility. Scientific intelligence analyzes phenomena into a causal relation, the object being truth and human progress. Education should, as far as possible, aim at reconciling practical and scientific intelligence, and at teaching man to contemplate ends impersonally. Advantage to self is a relative term, and necessarily dependent on the physical instincts of the individual. The great power of the intellect lies not so much in absolutely opposing a vicious determination of the will, as in evoking and calling into play other volitions, by a judicious composition of stops in the human organ. It is not possible to reform a kleptomaniac by the mere knowledge of the folly of crime; but by the constant suggestion and production of other activities the mind may recover its lost balance. Idleness may be temporarily cured by fear; permanently, only by supplying motive for work. The value, however, of reform depends largely on the character of the motives used as antidotes. Above all, the most practical and best education is the association of the happiness of self with the happiness of society. The efficacy of such a course of training, however, greatly depends on the susceptibility of the volitions to better motives, and, above all, on the freedom of the reason from sensual bias. The conception of the main end, as well as of the subordinate

ends, brought to bear on the training of character, is largely dependent on physical tendencies. It is often impossible to know, not only whether the means employed should be physical or intellectual, whether argument or a strait-waistcoat is required; but also to determine whether the applied stimulus is really physical or intellectual, and, further, whether an avowedly intellectual antidote is really working. In the latter case, however, it is to be noticed that the skill of the trainer is shown by the way in which he pieces new elements with the old, artfully playing on those tendencies which may be moved in the required direction.

v. But it must be confessed that the power of education to make a man a free intellectual agent is very limited. The best results are often obtained rather through self-development and the play of circumstance than through the discipline of the school and the direct influence of the master. A number of unseen causes will work upon unseen springs of action. "We call ourselves free agents; was this slight delicate boy a free agent, with a mind and spirit so susceptible, that the least breath affected them: around whom the throng of national contention was about to close; on whom the intrigue of a great religious party was about to seize, involving him in a whirlpool of party strife and religious rancour?"¹ Difficulties crowd round the educator; on the one hand, as Bacon says in the *Antitheta* on *Nature*, custom is a tyranny and only short lived unless founded on natural tendencies, while at the same time reform should often aim at producing a habit at variance with physical states. "Not only do men follow their own habits, but they follow other men's habits. Human nature is wonderfully imitative. One dies because it is the fashion." All men are akin; we know others best, from our knowledge of self; instincts are common to the race as well as peculiar to the individual. Fashion, of which Bacon takes no separate account, is a powerful motive. The fear of stepping out of the ranks, public opinion, literature, art, and generally social atmosphere, all operate in producing uniformity. Yet at the bottom lies the fact, *He that comes of a hen, must scab*. A practical lesson

¹ *John Ingiesant*, i., 45.

from the imitative tendencies of men is to show the necessity of righteousness in the so-called leaders of society. There is also danger that the cure may become the disease, that intelligence may lapse, and a temporary activity be stereotyped into a habit. The mind must always be kept open, not directed exclusively in one particular line. In this respect, perhaps, the so-called liberal education is more valuable than the specialized or technical. It is more profitable to equip the mind with powers than to strengthen it abnormally in one direction. Many-sidedness, readiness, activity, should be the objects of education, else there is danger of atrophy, or a narrow, though powerful one-sidedness.

vi. What is the right relation of the State to education is a question that can only be glanced at here. In the ancient world the State was the universal educator (using education in the widest sense); it prescribed the training and discipline of each citizen. In this respect Sparta may be called the ideal ancient State. In modern England the theory has rather been that the less the State meddles with education the better. This theory has within the last fifty years been modified if not undermined by the proviso that no child shall be allowed to grow up without the rudiments of learning. How far the consequences of this admission may lead it is impossible to foresee. Knowledge grows, and the rudiments of one generation are the beggarly elements of the next. Again, the division of classes tends to disappear. To give a gratuitous education to the labourer's child and let the shopkeeper shift for himself becomes a growing hardship. Again, the State is bound to have a voice in charitable endowments, and the organizing and regulating of these is a first step towards organizing the whole of middle-class education. On the other hand, Herbert Spencer would have us retrace our steps, and leave even primary education to private enterprise as beyond the province of the State.

vii. Even if we allowed complete liberty for every kind of psychological experiment; if weaklings might be eliminated and vivisection practised on human subjects if the State should assume the power to limit marriage and every board schoolmaster be compelled to apply

physiological tests to his pupils ; in other words, if the legislator converted the schoolmaster and doctor into stock-breeders, it would still be true that "*Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.*" Physiology as well as daily experience shows this. The child is father to the man, and the child is conditioned by the recollection of previous ideas received when pre-existent in its ancestors. Mr. Huxley holds that thought is "the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." If so, we may some day be able to trace the genesis of an essay on reform to a well-cooked mutton chop ; the brain being supplied with sulphates and phosphates from the blood.¹ Every one knows the intimate connection of the brain with the nerves of sight and hearing. A physical stimulus enables us to remember incidents which the will is powerless to recall, and physical exhaustion will produce temporary loss of memory. Much action of the brain is unconscious and distinct from so-called thought ; it is well said, "Let him who would know how far he has changed the old Adam consider his dreams." While the intellect is presumably at work, really a physical stimulus is in possession of the nerve-centres. Exactly similar physical conditions will produce similar mental states ; identity of thought not necessarily plagiarism. On the other hand, the educator may take heart, when he learns how high thinking is inseparable from plain living ; logically as well as actually the best education is ascetic in its tendencies, and leans on the fact that, in spite of the intimate connection of body and mind, the mind can assert its supremacy over the body and convert what in the uneducated man is the master into the willing slave and faithful minister.

viii. The educator has also morality and religion to work with. Failing the intellectual motive of advantage, a strong influence may be found in the imperative commands of duty and religion. The perception of that quality of actions which is called virtue and holiness is the result of training as much as the power to distinguish delicate colours or notes. The intellect views actions in

¹ The whole question is admirably treated by O. W. Holmes in *Mechanism in Thought and Morals.*

reference to absolute utility, a definite quality of actions, as form and shape of figures. The moralist refers actions to their relation with man's dignity and estate as man; while religion looks for a supernatural sanction seen through revelation and the eye of faith. The development of a moral sense goes side by side with the formation of virtuous habits; the student in morals must have been doing what is moral. The motives of human sympathy and divine love easily appeal to the emotions and are of an absorbing character. They are also simple, and a child can understand them. No education is worthy the name which is not moral and religious, which does not teach the conduct of life, the duties a man owes to himself and to his neighbours, and at the same time point to an ideal, a something beyond and above ourselves.

ix. There is a further danger that morality may lapse," and the activity become mechanical. The volitions may be overtrained in any given direction. "The children," says the story, "instinctively put out their tongues on the arrival of the family doctor." For morality, there must always be, if not a struggle, at any rate a conscious choice of one end before another, and an equally deliberate resolution of the end into its appropriate means. On the other hand, as Aristotle is constantly noticing, "virtue is *a formed state*;" and the test of the formation of a state is the resultant pleasure. So Pascal, "*La vertu d'un homme ne doit pas se mesurer par ses efforts, mais par ce qu'il fait d'ordinaire.*" Human freedom rather consists in the power to strengthen the most valuable end so that the volitions obey, and in the facility with which the reason can suggest an appropriate end sufficiently forcibly to stimulate the necessary motive power. Otherwise man is not free, as he *must* follow the stronger motive.

In remedying purely physical defects, the difficulties come from the physical bias. But to correct vice and ignorance by intellect more is wanted than a mere conception of an end or resolution of an end into appropriate means.¹ The judgment must be realized by the volition, and the volition is to a great extent inherited and physical; not only does the volition colour the judgment, but also suggests ends. "Poor human nature! She must have

¹ See Essay on *Delay*.

something to tickle her fancy." Fortunately, however, morality and the human heart step well together. "Rightness" can enlist in its services every feeling from the lowest sensual pleasure to the highest emotions of poetry and religion.

XL. Of Fortune.

IT cannot be denied but outward accidents conduce much to fortune; favour, opportunity, death of others, occasion fitting virtue. But chiefly, the mould of a man's fortune is in his own hand. "*Faber quisque fortunæ suæ*," saith the poet. And the most frequent 5 of external causes is, that the folly of one man is the fortune of another. For no man prospers so suddenly as by others' errors. "*Serpens nisi serpentem comederit non fit draco*."

Overt and apparent virtues bring forth praise; but 10 there be secret and hidden virtues that bring forth fortune, certain deliveries of a man's self, which have no name. The Spanish name *disemboltura* partly expresseth them—when there be not stonds nor restiveness in a man's nature, but that the wheels of 15 his mind keep way with the wheels of his fortune. For so Livy (after he had described Cato Major in these words, "*in illo viro, tantum robur corporis et animi fuit, ut quocunque loco natus esset, fortunam sibi facturum videretur*") falleth upon that, that he had 20 *versatile ingenium*. Therefore, if a man look sharply and attentively, he shall see fortune; for, though she be blind, yet she is not invisible. The way of fortune

is like the milken way in the sky ; which is a meeting
25 or knot of a number of small stars, not seen asunder,
but giving light together. So are there a number of
little and scarce-discerned virtues, or rather faculties
and customs, that make men fortunate. The Italians
note some of them, such as a man would little think.
30 When they speak of one that cannot do amiss, they
will throw it into his other conditions, that he had
Poco di matto. And, certainly, there be not two
more fortunate properties than to have *a little of the*
fool, and not too much of the honest. Therefore
35 extreme lovers of their country, or masters, were
never fortunate ; neither can they be. For when a
man placeth his thoughts without himself, he goeth
not his own way.

A hasty fortune maketh an enterpriser and remover
40 (the French hath it better, *entreprenant*, or *remuant*) ;
but the exercised fortune maketh the able man.
Fortune is to be honoured and respected, and it be
but for her daughters, Confidence and Reputation.
For those two felicity breedeth : the first within a
45 man's self, the latter in others towards him.

All wise men, to decline the envy of their own
virtues, use to ascribe them to Providence and
Fortune ; for so they may the better assume them ;
and besides, it is greatness in a man to be the care of
50 the higher powers. So Cæsar said to the pilot in the
tempest, "*Cæsarem portas, et fortunam ejus.*" So Sylla
chose the name of *felix*, and not of *magnus*. And it
hath been noted, that those who ascribe openly too
much to their own wisdom and policy, end infortu-
55 nate. It is written that Timotheus the Athenian,

after he had, in the account he gave to the state of his government, often interlaced this speech, *And in this fortune had no part*, never prospered in anything he undertook afterwards.

Certainly there be, whose fortunes are like Homer's 60 verses, that have a slide and an easiness more than the verses of other poets ; as Plutarch saith of Timoleon's fortune, in respect of that of Agesilaus, or Epaminondas. And that this should be, no doubt, it is much in a man's self.

65

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. Apparent virtues win praise, but hidden ones fortune.

2. Virtues consisting in right actions get praise ; virtues that lie in faculties get fortune.

3. Fortune is a kind of milky way ; that is to say, a cluster of certain hidden and nameless virtues.

4. Fortune is meet for honour, if only for her daughters confidence and authority.

Against.

1. One man's folly is another's fortune.

2. The best part of fortune is that, though she makes no choice, she never remains constant.

3. Great men, in shrinking from the envy which their virtues excite, are professedly courtiers of fortune.

The antitheta on *Preparation* are—

1. He who attempts a great work with slight resources only makes room for hope.

1. The earliest opportunity for action is the best time to cease preparation.

2. Experience, not fortune's favour, is bought by scanty preparations.

2. Let no one hope to bind fortune by preparation.

3. To interchange¹ action and preparation is politic; to part them is vain and unlucky.

4. Great preparation wastes time and material.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

"This is the excellent foppery of the world, that when we are sick in fortune we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon, and the stars, as if we were villains of necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves, and treachers by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars, and adulterers by a forced obedience of a planetary influence; and all that we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on."—Shakespeare.

*"The wind does blow as it lists alway;
Canst thou change this world to thy mind?
The world will wander its own wise way;
I also will wander mine,
I also will wander mine."*

Carlyle.

i. "Chance," says Mill, "is usually spoken of in direct antithesis to law; whatever (it is supposed) cannot be ascribed to any law is attributed to chance. It is, however, certain that whatever happens is the result of some law; is an effect of causes, and could have been predicted from a knowledge of the existence of those causes, and from their laws. If I turn up a particular card, that is in consequence of its place in the pack. Its place in the pack was a consequence of the manner in which the cards were shuffled, or of the order in which they were played in the last game, which again were effects of prior causes. . . . It is incorrect to say that any phenomenon is produced by chance; but we may say that two or more phenomena are conjoined by chance, that they co-exist or succeed

¹ Reading *alternatio* for *alteratio*.

one another only by chance ; meaning that they are in no way related through causation." Fortune is a somewhat misleading term ; it may merely mean worldly success obtained by deliberate action, or, what is virtually beyond human knowledge, luck. Bacon rather confuses these two uses of the word. The great point to be noticed is that much which is set down to chance is really within the range of deliberate action. Bacon sets fortune down to certain overt virtues, to a sort of unconscious delivery of self. It is, however, possible to analyze further than he does.

ii. Belief in fortune is virtually a confession of an ignorance which may be either culpable or unavoidable. It is culpable if it is the result of a fatalistic laziness, but unavoidable when the causes are so slight as to escape notice or when science is in its infancy and phenomena have not been classified into laws. We blame the man who misses his opportunity because he is prevented by faults of character from keeping his eyes open, but not one who does not happen to be passing when the princess faints, or the millionaire drops his pocket-book. Those who leave all to fortune are as ready to dread bad luck as to hope for good luck. "Our worst misfortunes are those which never befall us." "Every substantial grief," says Sydney Smith, "has twenty shadows, and most of them shadows of your own making."

iii. Fortune is, in fact, conterminous with ignorance. The wider a man's knowledge, the less is he exposed to fortune. The successful are called fortunate, because the world cannot understand the causes of success. Success, apart from greater depth of insight, largely depends on several indeterminates. The man who catches the light first, knows in what direction to look for the light. Success often implies a comprehensive as well as far-seeing knowledge, and genius almost intuitively takes in the whole environment with a comprehensive gaze. Knowledge of character and self are important factors in success, and these are qualities which cannot be apprized like knowledge of Latin or Euclid. The successful man himself hardly knows how he has become possessed of these qualities, and himself half believes in his luck, reassuring the common herd by telling them that they are as clever

as he. The greatest genius may make shipwreck by neglect of trifles, and those who have been most careful to notice the smallest source of danger or means of preferment have generally climbed highest. "Fortune favours fools." The cunning knave despises trivial incidents, and trusts to his shrewdness to set all right, while the fool often knows his own folly and, like Uriah Heep, refuses to learn Latin, preferring to trust to his watchful humility. In the world qualities of character must be combined with qualities of intellect for the most brilliant successes; but, if they are separated, the tortoise has the best chance. Patient mastery of details always treads securely and "*Hans geht durch seine Dummheit fort.*" Folly is doubly secure; for the hare despises the tortoise, and leaves him in possession of the field while he takes a nap. Weaker intellects often have just sense enough to get into a groove, and then to jog along without friction.

iv. Fortune, however, also means luck—the incalculable element in human affairs; and there are certain under-currents, and sudden turns in affairs which apparently defy prediction. In these the fool and the knave are often on a vantage ground. Not that versatility has no connection with genius; but true greatness implies an end steadily held in view, and a character not at the mercy of cross currents and side eddies. Genius keeps its mind open, but assimilates rather than is assimilated, while it knows well that what passes for luck in the world, may only be a flash in the pan, not a definite line of advancement. Genius holds knowledge beyond that of others, but rarely and only under exceptional circumstances makes a plunge of which the consequences are unseen. If Napoleon had found a buried treasure he would have gone to look for it, or, if it had been due to the incalculable, would have used it skilfully, while the fool and knave often drift aimlessly about until the luck falls into their mouths. The over-versatile nature, however, rarely profits by his opportunity. He is like the peasant who wins the great prize in the lottery. Luck is a relative term; a small success seems great in the case of the man who is the sport of circumstances. He is equally at the mercy of bad luck, and a small misfortune seems proportionately large. He is always ready for a windfall,

because he has no settled bent of mind, no definite career ; but really good fortune is lost to him.

v. So-called luck is a bad training ; it turns the mind away from steady self-help. The gambler who has once broken the bank is ruined ; he cannot turn his mind to the humdrum monotony of professional toil, and he clings with desperate hope to the luck of the gambling table. So the man who finds a nugget or diamond is rarely benefited ; he goes through life hoping for a second windfall. Further, the lucky man is rarely scrupulous ; as the very words "happy-go-lucky," "casual" show. A reckless speculator succeeds in a shady transaction ; the world worships success, and overlooks much in a lucky man. Bacon himself, in the *Advancement of Learning*, quotes the advice given by Charles V. to his son : "Fortune has somewhat of the nature of a woman, that, if she be too much wooed, she is further off." This may mean that, for worldly success, a man may be too keen and have his eye too unbendingly fixed on the main chance,¹ wanting elasticity and "ploughing on the sabbath ;" but it is also capable of the interpretation that chance comes when least expected, and that *fortuna fortibus favet*.

vi. Greatness is not at the mercy of fortune, good or bad ; but the force of circumstances cannot be exactly determined. Here we must contrast the wise with the wise, not with the fool or knave. A flaw in the marble is fatal to artistic perfection, yet the use of imperfect material may have been unavoidable. So life is rough-hewn for many, and only the artistic evolution is left to the human agent. Nothing goes right with some, nothing wrong with others, in parallel, if not absolutely identical, circumstances. Often the hardest circumstance to surmount is our own nature. The master of self is *fortuna suæ faber*. Moreover, circumstances may be avoided where they cannot be overcome ; we may be able to go by some other road. Carlyle writes in the *Sartor Resartus*, "It is maintained by Helvetius and his set that an infant of genius is quite the same as any other infant, only that certain surprising favourable influences accompany him through life, especially through childhood, and expand

¹ Cf. Essay on *Ambition*.

him, while others lie close-folded and continue dunces. . . . 'With which opinion,' cries Teufelsdröckh, 'I should as soon agree as with this other, that an acorn might by favourable or unfavourable influences of soil and climate, be nursed into a cabbage, or the cabbage-seed into an oak.'" Carlyle, however, is apt to build sand-castles to demolish; the question is not whether the cabbage could grow into the oak, or the monkey into the man; but rather why one cabbage has no heart, and some oaks get stunted. Some men get chances and let them slip by, while others never get them at all. It is all very well to say "make your chances;" but making bricks without straw is heartbreaking. Though it is allowed that most men have at least *one* chance in their lives, yet if their character is such that they fail to see it, and they are not responsible for their characters, what becomes of the chance? The word "chance" has become so misused that instead of meaning the whole set of circumstances, it is used only of one. Some cannot take their chance through poverty or illness, and so on to infinity. Christianity is a confession that the world is hard, and offers a future life to redress the inequalities of fortune in this. The lesson of life is that evil brings suffering, but the lesson may be learnt too late for worldly success. Adversity need not destroy morality and religion, but it often crushes genius and prevents worldly success.

vii. Proverbial philosophy confirms this diagnosis of fortune. "Misfortunes never come singly," for a man has got into a wrong groove and cannot right himself at once; besides, the world is not too kind to misfortune. "Fortune favours the brave," for confidence begets confidence, and nothing succeeds like success. Many succeed through an almost superstitious belief in their own destiny. "Lightly come, lightly go;" for so-called luck is the foe to prudence.

XLI. Of Usury.

MANY have made witty invectives against Usury. They say that it is pity the devil should have God's part, which is the tithe: that the usurer is the greatest Sabbath-breaker, because his plough goeth every Sunday: that the usurer is the drone that 5 Virgil speaketh of:

“ *Ignavum fucos pecus a præsepibus arcent ;* ”

that the usurer breaketh the first law that was made for mankind after the fall, which was, *In sudore vultus tui comedes panem tuum*, not *In sudore vultus alieni*: that usurers should have orange-tawny bonnets, 10 because they do judaize: that it is against nature for money to beget money; and the like. I say this only, that usury is a *concessum propter duritiem cordis*: for since there must be borrowing and lending, and men are so hard of heart as they will not lend freely, 15 usury must be permitted. Some others have made suspicious and cunning propositions of banks, discovery of men's estates, and other inventions. But few have spoken of usury usefully. It is good to set before us the incommodities and commodities of 20 usury, that the good may be either weighed out or culled out; and warily to provide, that, while we make forth to that which is better, we meet not with that which is worse.

The discommodities of usury are, first, that it 25 makes fewer merchants. For were it not for this lazy trade of usury, money would not lie still, but it would

in great part be employed upon merchandising, which is the *vena porta* of wealth in a State. The second, 30 that it makes poor merchants. For, as a farmer cannot husband his ground so well if he sit at a great rent, so the merchant cannot drive his trade so well if he sit at great usury. Third is incident to the other two ; and that is, the decay of customs of kings, or 35 estates, which ebb or flow with merchandising. The fourth, that it bringeth the treasure of a realm or State into a few hands. For the usurer being at certainties, and the other at uncertainties, at the end of the game most of the money will be in the box ; and ever a 40 State flourisheth when wealth is more equally spread. The fifth, that it beats down the price of land. For the employment of money is chiefly either merchandising, or purchasing ; and usury waylays both. The sixth, that it doth dull and damp all industries, 45 improvements, and new inventions, wherein money would be stirring, if it were not for this slug. The last, that it is the canker and ruin of many men's estates ; which in process of time breeds a public poverty.

On the other side, the commodities of usury are, 50 first, that howsoever usury in some respects hindereth merchandising, yet in some other it advanceth it. For it is certain that the greatest part of trade is driven by young merchants upon borrowing at interest. So as, if the usurer either call in or keep 55 back his money, there will ensue presently a great stand of trade. The second is, that, were it not for this easy borrowing upon interest, men's necessities would draw upon them a most sudden undoing, in that they would be forced to sell their means (be it

lands or goods) far under foot ; and so, whereas usury 60
 doth but gnaw upon them, bad markets would swallow
 them quite up. As for mortgaging, or pawning, it
 will little mend the matter, for either men will not
 take pawns without use, or if they do, they will look
 precisely for the forfeiture. I remember a cruel 65
 moneyed man in the country, that would say, "*The
 devil take this usury, it keeps us from forfeiture of
 mortgages and bonds.*" The third and last is, that it is
 a vanity to conceive that there would be ordinary
 borrowing without profit, and it is impossible to con- 70
 ceive the number of inconveniences that will ensue,
 if borrowing be cramped. Therefore to speak of the
 abolishing of usury is idle ; all states have ever had it
 in one kind or rate, or other. So as that opinion
 must be sent to Utopia. 75

To speak now of the reformation and reiglement of
 usury, how the discommodities of it may be best
 avoided, and the commodities retained. It appears
 by the balance of commodities and discommodities
 of usury, two things are to be reconciled ; the one 80
 that the tooth of usury be grinded, that it bite not
 too much ; the other that there be left open a means
 to invite moneyed men to lend to the merchants, for
 the continuing and quickening of trade. This cannot
 be done, except you introduce two several sorts of 85
 usury, a less and a greater. For if you reduce usury
 to one low rate, it will ease the common borrower, but
 the merchant will be to seek for money. And it is
 to be noted, that the trade of merchandise being the
 most lucrative, may bear usury at a good rate ; other 90
 contracts not so.

To serve both intentions, the way would be briefly thus: that there be two rates of usury, the one free and general for all, the other under licence only to
95 certain persons, and in certain places of merchandising. First, therefore, let usury in general be reduced to five in the hundred, and let that rate be proclaimed to be free and current, and let the State shut itself out to take any penalty for the same. This will preserve
100 borrowing from any general stop or dryness. This will ease infinite borrowers in the country. This will, in good part, raise the price of land, because land purchased at sixteen years' purchase will yield six in the hundred, and somewhat more, whereas this rate
105 of interest yields but five. This, by like reason, will encourage and edge industrious and profitable improvements, because many will rather venture in that kind, than take five in the hundred, especially having been used to greater profit. Secondly, let there be
110 certain persons licensed to lend to known merchants upon usury, at a high rate, and let it be with the cautions following. Let the rate be, even with the merchant himself, somewhat more easy than that he used formerly to pay; for by that means all bor-
115 rowers shall have some ease by this reformation, be he merchant or whosoever. Let it be no bank, or common stock, but every man be master of his own money. Not that I altogether mislike banks; but they will hardly be brooked, in regard of certain suspicions. Let the State be answered some small
120 matter for the licence, and the rest left to the lender for if the abatement be but small, it will no whit discourage the lender. For he, for example, that tool

before ten or nine in the hundred, will sooner descend to eight in the hundred, than give over this trade of ¹²⁵ usury, and go from certain gains to gains of hazard. Let these licensed lenders be in number indefinite, but restrained to certain principal cities and towns of merchandise. For then they will be hardly able to colour other men's moneys in the country, so as the ¹³⁰ licence of nine will not suck away the current rate of five. For no man will lend his moneys far off, nor put them into unknown hands.

If it be objected that this doth in a sort authorize usury, which before was in some places but per- ¹³⁵ missive; the answer is, that it is better to mitigate usury by declaration than to suffer it to rage by connivance.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. There is no valid distinction between usury and interest. "Usury" is "interest" used *in malam partem*. What to the minor with large needs and small expectations, or to the deeply involved merchant seems usury, will appear to the prudent money-lender fair interest, only adequate payment for the risk he is running. What is a fair rate of interest in Australia would in England be extortionate usury. This commonplace of political economy would have appeared to Bacon's age a monstrous paradox. Bentham was the first publicist who fully grasped and clearly enunciated the truth that free trade in money follows as a necessary corollary on free trade in goods, that any State restriction on the rate of interest, if effectual, is robbing the lender and making a gratuitous present to the borrower.

ii. In the ancient world the need for borrowed money arose out of a one-sided system of land-owning; and worked the ruin of the poor by taking advantage of the necessities produced by oppression; while the mischief

was aggravated by the law, which gave the creditor the body of the debtor. Obviously borrowing on such terms implied reckless insolvency on the one hand, and on the other a loan where there was little or no hope of repayment. Indeed, other security, save the person of the debtor, was almost valueless ; for besides the difficulties of bad seasons, and want of capital, the free citizen, who at best held his land on a precarious tenure, was hurried off to war at harvest-time, or exposed to the raids of a marauding enemy.

iii. The weak point of the system of small holdings is that the balance between solvency and credit is too finely adjusted, and the "small man" goes to the wall at the first blow. There is every argument for enabling the free labourer to hold a small piece of ground in his own right or otherwise, but to return to hand looms from cotton mills is a long step backwards. When bad weather, or disease, or any other unforeseen misfortune comes, the usurer steps in and finishes the work, while his victim has not the means for an appeal to equity against his rapacity. Some systems of small holdings are worse than others. Where there is a superabundant population, easily fed with a plentiful and satisfying food, the balance between debt and solvency is more easily disturbed by bad times, especially when there is a part ownership, and the cultivator is virtually a residuary legatee. The Irish cottier and the Indian ryot suffer from a complication of untoward circumstances till the usurer ends the misery of those whom famine and pestilence have spared. There have been important, but easily explainable exceptions to the evil consequences of peasant proprietors, as in Holland, Switzerland, parts of France, and Lombardy. Before the rise of the industrial spirit and the rapid increase of the population, it might be said that "large estates had ruined Italy." But there is no further need for a race of burgher soldiers ; other channels of labour are open besides agriculture ; and the possession of capital is more and more a necessity. The success of small owners does not even prove the value of the system ; the large capitalist might do even better, while industrial development may be checked by "land-hunger." We hear more of the successes than the

failures; the usurer has plenty to do, as he may be wanted to supply necessary capital, or to avert instant ruin. There was, however, legitimate borrowing in Palestine, Rome, and Greece, but rather for commercial enterprise than agricultural operations. The large farmer ought not to have to borrow; his results are precarious, and he finds a peculiar difficulty in realizing; the small farmer is driven to borrow under peculiarly unfavourable circumstances. In antiquity interest was high, owing to the greater risks run and the smaller number of capitalists, while the trader would look for ready-money payment, or bring back a cargo of produce.¹ Luxury was undeveloped; if a merchant had to borrow, he could afford to pay highly, for profits were large. The spendthrift had to "pay for his whistle," and deserved his punishment.

iv. In antiquity the idea of free contract scarcely existed; the dealings of man with man depended on *status*. This system of society involved a man in difficulties, and legislation from time to time staved off ruin. The political difficulties in which borrowing involved a community, where the debtor could become the property of the lender, will explain the objection of the ancients to interest in any shape. The repayment of principal was in old Roman law insisted on, while the payment of interest was not. It was unnatural that barren money should breed money. The Jews were forbidden to take loans from their own countrymen, and at certain periods debts were to be remitted. Nehemiah caused it to be enacted that all lands, vineyards, olive-yards, and houses should be released which had been mortgaged for debts. The *σεισάχθeta* of Solon absolutely forbade the debtor to mortgage his person or land. At Rome the legal rate of interest was continually lowered. The ancient Germans had no acquaintance with interest; and the Koran altogether forbids it.² Such restrictions on interest were doubly bad; they refused to recognize contracts made for the mutual benefit of borrower and lender; and by

¹ At Athens, however, the practice of lending money on vessels engaged in commercial speculations was frequent.

² Grote, ii., pp. 467-486.

increasing the risk of the lender, raised the rate, whether of interest or usury. Grote points out that they acted in a dubiously beneficial way in accustoming men's minds to legitimate interest,¹ and confining "the odious name of usury to loans lent above the fixed rate." The prejudice, however, remained among philosophers, and Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Plutarch discourage all interest. The superior commercial activity of Athens placed interest in a new but exceptional light.² The fault really lay in society, not in lending on interest.

v. With the industrial progress of society the need and facilities for borrowing increased. The money-lender, and soon the banking company, were recognized necessities of national life, whether to enable princes to carry on wars, or nations to develop their resources, or merchants to place the markets of foreigners at the service of home consumers. The necessities of commerce developed the idea that the contract between lender and borrower was advantageous to both parties. The development of mercantile insurance and the use of bills of exchange familiarized men with the idea that money is a medium of exchange, and as such has its regular value which cannot be interfered with without detriment to commerce. We no longer find whole states eaten up by usury, though there were plenty of isolated cases where imprudence in all shapes was driven to desperate remedies, and small traders were the victims of rich usurers.

vi. Even when a more liberal spirit was growing up, though the legitimate rates were as a rule high, the lowest being seven per cent. at Genoa, the highest, twenty per cent. after the first year of the loan, as allowed by an ordinance of Philip the Fair in 1311,³ there were many vexatious restrictions on free contracts. The various edicts against the Jews helped to transfer banking business into the hands of the merchants of Lombardy, and benefited commerce by removing the stigma on money-lending which existed as long as it was almost exclusively in the hands of the Jews. In England

¹ Solon's measure was final ; no further restrictions were laid on interest.

² Grote, ii., 484, 485.

³ Hallam, *Middle Ages*, iii., 337.

Chancellor Morton speaks to parliament of "repressing the bastard and barren employment of moneys to usury and unlawful exchanges;"¹ and Bacon mentions among the wise laws of Henry VII., "The good and politic laws against usury which is the bastard use of money, and against unlawful chievances and exchange, which is bastard usury."¹ Acts were passed in the reign of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth, against usury, and the thunders of the Church and denunciations of the moralist were hurled against interest by Latimer and Jewell;² while the tone of Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice* conclusively proves the popular antipathy against money-lending. Mr. Macdonell writes, "The fathers combated the practice; Calvin's defence of it sounded strange to men who had heard Luther's invectives against interest. Popes and councils thundered against it, and Dante peoples a round of the *Inferno* with usurious sinners."

vii. The value of money is a curiously complicated result which requires absolute freedom of contract. The phenomena of the money market are well summed up by Mr. Macdonell.³ "The ultimate determinant of interest is profit, which itself depends on the cost of labour; this profit varies according to the character of the Government, the security of property, the certainty as to the future, and the national character. Vast public debts and railway debentures yielding dividends calculated according to the conditions of some former period, tend to keep up the rate of interest below the current scale of profits; at the same time the rate of interest affects the price of securities. Interest varies with the amount of disposable capital, not with the gold reserve, for this is the determinant only in a crisis, but with the amount of gold and its equivalents in the market; which amount is itself determined by the rate of profit. Short loans can be obtained at a lower rate than those for a longer period. Trade in money differs from trade in capital; in the case of the former, which usually consists in short loans, the actual amount of the gold reserve is the one determinant

¹ Bacon, *Henry VII.*

² Quoted by Mr. Ruskin in his philippic against the Bishop of Manchester, *Contemporary Review*, 37.

³ *Survey of Political Economy*, ch. xxiii.

of value ; but in the case of the latter an influx of gold need not affect the rate of interest. The tendency of profits is to become lower because capital increases faster than labour, rather than because increase of population drives men to cultivate worse soils. The rate of interest varies in different countries according to the expense of transmission of bullion to or from other countries, or the general economic conditions of each country, such as scarcity of capital, solvency, and national character." Bentham was the first who fully demonstrated the folly of artificial interference with this delicate organism ; his defence of usury was written in 1787 ; but it was not until 1854 that the usury laws were repealed, and the charge of interest upon interest, or compound interest, has only lately been recognized by law. The progress of industrialism is a practical illustration of the wisdom of the change, the only victims being the infant, who is in England protected by law, and the profligate, who deserves punishment.

viii. At the same time a plea may be urged for the humanitarian and scriptural view of interest. If a man could withdraw himself awhile from the fierce struggle of commercial competition, and contemplate the mixed passions in full play, he might well be shocked at the sight. "Neither a borrower nor a lender be" is true wisdom for the private individual. Mr. Ruskin, insisting on the value of the precept, "Take not up that thou layest not down," objects to all interest. "Usury is any money paid, or other advantage given for the loan of anything which is restored to the possessor uninjured and undiminished . . . I lent one of my servants, a few years ago, eleven hundred pounds to build a house with, and stock its ground. After some years he paid me the the eleven hundred pounds back. If I had taken eleven hundred pounds and a penny, the extra penny would have been usury." All interest is usury, for "those delicate adjustments of the balance by which we strive to weigh to a grain the relative quantities of devotion which we may render in the service of Mammon and of God are wholly of recent invention and application." The abolition of the usury laws has not checked the monopoly of riches in the hands of a few. Men live on

borrowed capital, and rashly speculate to the ruin of the dupes whose property they have borrowed. Luxury seeks means to gratify its desires.¹ It is well to have ideals, but consumption is not necessarily unproductive, and it is only through industrial development that the philanthropy is possible for which Mr. Ruskin has so true and unselfish a love.

ix. Bacon's own position as to usury is a compromise, and marks a transition ; he has shaken himself free from the philanthropic, moral, and religious objections, but he would only legalize a low rate and license in special circumstances a higher one, while he objects to large banks, like those of Antwerp. It must be remembered that in Bacon's time rates were high, while the causes of high rates were not understood ; lenders made the most of "land rats and water rats ;" while public loans to develop national resources had not familiarized men with some of the most important phenomena of borrowing. In modern times there is a strong line between the money-lender who preys on fast undergraduates or reckless subalterns, and the banker, financier, or stockbroker who, by lending on security, doubles the trader's capital, and renders large undertakings such as railroads possible. Capital is plentiful, and there is no temptation for all capitalists to be lenders, and none purchasers of land ; rather the value of land has become unduly inflated from the social prestige its possession confers, from the so-called "land-hunger," and from hopes of an unearned increment. Competition and increase of capital have reduced all profits to a level, and no sphere of human industry is likely to be unoccupied.

The word "interest" was first used in an act of James I., passed in 1623, to denote a lawful payment for use of capital, when the rate allowed was eight per cent. Shortly after this act Bacon sent a brief tractate on usury to Secretary Conway, which is practically identical with the *Essay on Usury*. The rate was lowered in 1650 to six per cent., and in 1713 to five per cent.

Mr. Reynolds (Clarendon Press Edition) points out how far Bacon's views on usury fall short of the sound economical doctrines set forth by his contemporary Mun in "England's Treasure by Foreign Trade."

¹ *Contemporary Review*, 37.

XLII. Of Youth and Age.

A MAN that is young in years may be old in hours, if he have lost no time. But that happeneth rarely. Generally, youth is like the first cogitations, not so wise as the second, for there is a youth in thoughts as well as in ages. And yet the invention of young men is more lively than that of old, and imaginations stream into their minds better, and, as it were, more divinely.

Natures that have much heat, and great and violent desires and perturbations, are not ripe for action till they have passed the meridian of their years; as it was with Julius Cæsar and Septimius Severus, of the latter of whom it is said, *Juventutem egit erroribus, imo furoribus, plenam*; and yet he was the ablest emperor almost of all the list. But reposed natures may do well in youth, as it is seen in Augustus Cæsar, Cosmus Duke of Florence, Gaston de Foix, and others.

On the other side, heat and vivacity in age is an excellent composition for business. Young men are fitter to invent than to judge, fitter for execution than for counsel, and fitter for new projects than for settled business; for the experience of age, in things that fall within the compass of it, directeth them, but in new things abuseth them.

The errors of young men are the ruin of business; but the errors of aged men amount but to this—that more might have been done, or sooner. Young men, in the conduct and manage of actions, embrace more than they can hold; stir more than they can quiet;

ly to the end, without consideration of the means and 30
degrees ; pursue some few principles which they have
chanced upon absurdly ; care not to innovate, which
draws unknown inconveniences ; use extreme remedies
at first ; and (that which doubleth all errors) will not
acknowledge or retract them ; like an unready horse 35
that will neither stop nor turn.

Men of age object too much, consult too long,
adventure too little, repent too soon, and seldom drive
business home to the full period, but content them-
selves with a mediocrity of success. 40

Certainly it is good to compound employments of
both. For that will be good for the present, because
the virtues of either age may correct the defects of
both ; and good for succession, that young men may
be learners, while men in age are actors ; and, lastly, 45
good for extern accidents, because authority followeth
old men, and favour and popularity youth.

But, for the moral part, perhaps, youth will have the
pre-eminence, as age hath for the politic. A certain
Rabbin, upon the text, *Your young men shall see visions,* 50
and your old men shall dream dreams, inferreth that
young men are admitted nearer to God than old,
because vision is a clearer revelation than a dream.
And, certainly, the more a man drinketh of the world,
the more it intoxicateth ; and age doth profit rather 55
in the powers of understanding, than in the virtues
of the will and affections.

There be some have an over-early ripeness in their
years, which fadeth betimes. These are, first, such as
have brittle wits, the edge whereof is soon turned ; 60
such as was Hermogenes the rhetorician, whose books

are exceeding subtle, who afterwards waxed stupid. A second sort is of those that have some natural dispositions which have better grace in youth than in
65 age ; such as is a fluent and luxuriant speech, which becomes youth well, but not age. So Tully saith of Hortensius "*Idem manebat, neque idem decebat.*" The third is of such as take too high a strain at the first, and are magnanimous more than tract of years can
70 uphold. As was Scipio Africanus, of whom Livy saith in effect, *Ultima primis cedebant.*

XLIII. Of Beauty.

VIRTUE is like a rich stone, best plain set ; and surely virtue is best in a body that is comely, though not of delicate features, and that hath rather dignity of presence than beauty of aspect. Neither is
5 it almost seen that very beautiful persons are otherwise of great virtue ; as if nature were rather busy not to err, than in labour to produce excellency. And therefore they prove accomplished, but not of great spirit ; and study rather behaviour than virtue. But
10 this holds not always ; for Augustus Cæsar, Titus Vespasianus, Philip le Bel of France, Edward IV. of England, Alcibiades of Athens, Ismael the Sophy of Persia, were all high and great spirits, and yet the most beautiful men of their times. In beauty, that
15 of favour is more than that of colour, and that of decent and gracious motion more than that of favour. That is the best part of beauty which a picture cannot express, no, nor the first sight of the life. There is

no excellent beauty that hath not some strangeness in the proportion. A man cannot tell whether Apelles or Albert Durer were the more trifler; ²⁰ whereof the one would make a personage by geometrical proportions, the other by taking the best parts out of divers faces to make one excellent. Such personages, I think, would please nobody but the ²⁵ painter that made them. Not but I think a painter may make a better face than ever was, but he must do it by a kind of felicity (as a musician that maketh an excellent air in music), and not by rule. A man shall see faces that, if you examine them part by part, ³⁰ you shall find never a good, and yet all together do well. If it be true that the principal part of beauty is in decent motion, certainly it is no marvel though persons in years seem many times more amiable: *Pulchrorum autumnus pulcher*. For no youth can be ³⁵ comely but by pardon, and considering the youth, as to make up the comeliness. Beauty is as summer-fruits, which are easy to corrupt, and cannot last; and for the most part, it makes a dissolute youth, and an age a little out of countenance; but yet certainly ⁴⁰ again, if it light well, it maketh virtues shine, and vices blush.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

“ How vainely then do ydle wits invent
 That Beautie is naught else but mixture made
 Of colours faire, and goodly temp’rment
 Of pure complexions that shall quickly fade
 And passe away, like to a sommer’s shade;
 Or that it is but comely composition
 Of parts well measured, with meet disposition !

“ Thereof it comes that these fair soules, which have
 The most resemblance of that heavenly light,
 Frame to themselves most beautifull and brave
 Their fleshly bowre, most fit for their delight,
 And the grosse matter by a soveraine might
 Temper so trim, that it may well be seene
 A pattern fit for such a virgin queene.”

Spenser, *An Hymne in honour of Beauty*.

i. No essay of Bacon reminds us so forcibly of the original and proper sense of the word “essay”—the rough draft, tentative jottings, thoughts thrown out at random. Beauty is arbitrarily confined to the single meaning of beauty of the human form, and the treatment of this one phase does not pretend to be exhaustive. The whole conclusion of the matter, according to Bacon, is that personal beauty is a more than doubtful advantage, though (as Dean Ramsay’s Scotchwoman said of swearing) it does add a certain grace to the possessor if virtuous; “gratior et pulcro veniens in corpore virtus,” as Vergil has it. One cannot help being reminded of the Oxford examinee’s safe answer to a question on the article of good works: “he thought a little of them could not do a man any harm.” Yet even in this essay we have pregnant hints, as that a combination of beautiful features will not produce a beautiful face, that the ideal beauty that the painter comes by—a sort of inspiration—“he must do it by a kind of felicity”—in other words, it defies analysis.

If Bacon fails to analyze the beauty of a portrait, it would be presumptuous for us, notwithstanding all the side-lights that psychology, physiology, and natural science have thrown on the subject of æsthetics, to attempt a definition of beauty, still more to essay a complete analysis. All we can here hope to do is to clear up some vulgar confusions of language and thought, to show what the problem is and where the difficulties lie, and to summarize the principal theories of recent writers. A philosophy of beauty is yet to seek.

ii. No word in the language has so wide a connotation, or is used so loosely in common parlance. We talk of a beautiful face, a beautiful character, a beautiful landscape, a beautiful poem, a beautiful sonata; the mathematician

will talk of a beautiful proof in algebra, the engineer of a beautiful piece of mechanism, the cricketer of a beautiful hit, and the alderman of a beautiful plate of turtle. In some of these instances there is a conscious use of metaphor, but after these are eliminated it is a question whether we can find a common factor for the rest of the series, and if so whether this factor contains the whole essence of beauty. Let us try. In each case we have something that pleases. It follows that pleasure is an element of beauty, but the converse of the proposition will obviously not hold good. A dinner off turtle soup may be pleasurable, but it is an abuse of language to call it beautiful. Let us proceed, then, to analyze further and discover what kind of pleasure is common to all objects of beauty, or, more accurately, what kind of pleasure do we experience, either directly through the senses or indirectly through the memory or imagination, from those objects to which we agree to attach the epithet beautiful. First, then, we may safely lay down that the pleasure though sensuous, or ultimately traceable to a sensation, is never purely sensual, at any rate never appeals solely to the lower senses, taste, touch, or the muscular sense. Secondly, beauty seems "primarily connected with the sense of sight" (cf. German *schön*). Thirdly, that when extended to moral or intellectual qualities, actions, or productions, the predominant idea that all have in common is fitness, the harmonious combination of parts to form a whole, the adaptation of means to an end. Fourthly, that this end is an end in itself, immediate gratification, not any ulterior good. This last distinction clearly marks off the pleasure we get from a fine picture or poem and that we get from an ingenious machine or a scientific demonstration.

iii. To attempt to carry our analysis farther is a hopeless task. The search for objective beauty, for some one property or essence that is common to all objects we call beautiful, is as idle as the search for the philosopher's stone. To ask what is subjective beauty, what is the nature of the emotions or ideas that have beauty for their object, is a more fruitful inquiry. Yet even this inquiry must be narrowed. After all, it is only by analogy that we call a poem or an heroic action beautiful, and we

must restrict the sense of beauty to the æsthetic emotions produced by sights and sounds, and mainly to them as represented by the Fine Arts. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that though the emotions excited by each of the Fine Arts are closely correlated, each Art, as Lessing pointed out in his *Laocoon*, has definite objects and definite limits. The laws of beauty which guide the painter cannot be transferred to sculpture, still less to poetry.

iv. Let us look at a fine picture, and try to analyze what we mean by calling it beautiful. 1. There are certain forms and colours which produce pleasurable sensations. Physiology can in some cases explain the reason, but for our purpose it is enough to accept this as an ultimate fact. It would seem at first sight that this sense-pleasure can count for little, being at highest but a pale reflection of the pleasure derived from a direct view of the objects represented. But this is not really so. In looking at a natural object the perception of colour and form is mostly vague and ill-defined; the associations it calls up overpower, as it were, the visual perception. Show a child an apple, and he thinks not of gradations of reds and yellows, but of eating it; take a sportsman to a river, and he will see nothing but that the trout are on the rise. In looking at a picture of an apple or a river the attention is concentrated on the outward show, and the child perceives, perhaps for the first time, that the apple is not only good for food, but pleasant to the eyes. 2. But the lines and colours, viewed apart, are, after all, comparatively indifferent. It is mainly the combination of lines, the harmony or contrast of colours, that pleases. The artist is more than an imitator; he is an interpreter. The copy, it is true, can never approach the original, but the artist places us *zu der rechten Stunde* and *an dem rechten Ort*; and, in one sense, he improves on nature—he seizes the spirit of the spot, suppresses unmeaning or ugly details, and adds “the light that never was on sea or land.” This is why, even to the cultivated eye, a landscape painting may give more pleasure than the landscape itself. 3. Besides what we may call the purely pictorial pleasure, there is the pleasure of sympathy with the imitation and creative power of the artist. 4. Lastly, the

picture may by association call up endless other emotions—love, pity, terror, etc.; and emotions painful in themselves may become pleasurable in the representation.

v. When we speak of a beautiful picture we use the word in a subjective sense; the beauty is relative both to the object represented and to the skill of the artist. In speaking of personal beauty we use the word in the objective sense; we imagine to ourselves an absolute standard of beauty. The analysis in this case is more difficult. The beauty of figure may be resolved into fitness of organs for their functions or the harmonious proportions of the whole on the one hand, and on the other an agreeable combination of opposite curves—delicate gradations of tints, light and shade, etc. But beauty of face cannot be resolved into these elements. First, as to features, individual tastes differ widely; those of various nations and various ages differ still more widely; and though we may safely assert that the European is a higher type than the Negro, no satisfactory objective standard has been discovered. Then as to expression, though we may roughly describe a benevolent, sullen, fierce, brutish expression, and so forth, and show how by association one is called ugly and the other beautiful, yet the subtler expressions—a far-away look, a tender glance, a clever face, defy analysis, or at least have not yet been analyzed. Notice that as culture advances beauty of feature, regularity, symmetry, delicate curves, etc., is less and less considered, and what we may call the secondary beauty of expression, as the reflection of intellectual or moral qualities is more and more appreciated, so that we see beauty in the irregular features of George Eliot or the rugged wrinkles of Carlyle.

vi. This consideration will help in some measure to explain Bacon's low estimate of personal beauty. He is thinking of the Apollo Belvidere, or Antinous type of beauty, and the massive features of a Trajan or the bar of Michael Angelo would be reckoned by him as deformities. Of looks conversing with the skies, of beauty born of murmuring sound that passes into the face, he takes no account. It is this exclusion of the higher type that leads him to doubt whether beauty is a help or hindrance in running the race of life. "*Mens cujusque,*"

he says with Cicero, "is est quisque, non ea figura quæ digitis tangi potest." But in another sense the face is the mind; the features and expression are actually moulded by our thoughts and emotions.

vii. We may note very briefly some of the chief theories of the beautiful, ancient and modern. Socrates identified the beautiful with the good, and the good with the useful. Plato refutes his master's theory, and without propounding any definite theory of his own, includes beauty among his ideas—sensible objects are beautiful as they imitate or partake of the archetype. In Aristotle we first touch solid ground. He defines beauty as "that which springs from the harmonious effect of various parts which may be at once contemplated." The good consists in action (*ἐν πράξει*), the beautiful in passive objects (*ἐν ἀκινήτοις*); it stands higher than the fit or useful, and its main elements are order, symmetry, and determinateness. Sir Joshua Reynolds, following Père Buffier, found beauty in the typical. "Perfect beauty in any species must combine all the characters that are beautiful in that species." Hogarth resolves beauty into six elements—fitness, variety, symmetry, simplicity (as far as is consistent with variety), intricacy (as interesting the mind), and quantity or magnitude. Burke, in his *Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful*, is a materialist. Objects which produce an agreeable relaxation of the fibres are called beautiful. Smoothness, according to Burke, is the *idée mère* of beauty. Alison refers our sense of beauty entirely to association. Objects are beautiful because their sensible qualities are signs which suggest utility, design, wisdom, etc. Kant, distinguishing beauty from the agreeable and the good, defined it as that which pleases us without our having any interest in the existence of the object. A picture is not more beautiful to us because we possess it. Dugald Stewart is mainly destructive. He combats the unwarrantable assumption of any ultimate property or essence by virtue of which things are beautiful. Mr. Ruskin, in his *Modern Painters*, distinguishes typical beauty, "the external quality of bodies that typifies some divine attribute," and vital beauty "the appearance of felicitous fulfilment of function in living things." He distinguishes six *types* of beauty—infinity, unity, repose,

symmetry, purity, moderation. Mr. Herbert Spencer carrying out a happy thought of Schiller's, traces an analogy between the love of beauty and the love of play. Æsthetic activities yield to the higher powers of perception and emotion the substituted exercise which play yields to the lower impulses. The pleasures are sought for themselves, and do not directly serve any processes conducive to life.

XLIV. Of Deformity.

DEFORMED persons are commonly even with nature. For as nature hath done ill by them, so do they by nature ; being for the most part (as the Scripture saith) *void of natural affection*. And so they have their revenge of nature. Certainly there is a consent between the body and the mind, and where nature erreth in the one she ventureth in the other. *Ubi peccat in uno, periclitatur in altero*. But because there is in man an election touching the frame of his mind, and a necessity in the frame of his body, the stars of natural inclination are sometimes obscured by the sun of discipline and virtue. Therefore it is good to consider of deformity, not as a sign (which is more deceivable) but as a cause which seldom faileth of the effect.

15

Whosoever hath anything fixed in his person that doth induce contempt, hath also a perpetual spur in himself to rescue and deliver himself from scorn. Therefore, all deformed persons are extreme bold, first, as in their own defence, as being exposed to scorn, but in process of time by a general habit. Also, it stirreth in them industry, and especially of

20

this kind, to watch and observe the weakness of others, that they may have somewhat to repay. Again, in
25 their superiors, it quencheth jealousy towards them, as persons that they think they may at pleasure despise ; and it layeth their competitors and emulators asleep, as never believing they should be in possibility of advancement, till they see them in possession. So
30 that upon the matter, in a great wit, deformity is an advantage to rising.

Kings in ancient times (and at this present, in some countries) were wont to put great trust in eunuchs, because they that are envious towards all are obnoxious
35 and officious towards one. But yet their trust towards them hath rather been as to good spials and good whisperers than good magistrates and officers. And much like is the reason of deformed persons. Still the ground is, they will, if they be of spirit, seek to
40 free themselves from scorn ; which must be either by virtue or malice. And therefore, let it not be marvelled, if sometimes they prove excellent persons ; as was Agesilaus, Zanger the son of Solyman, Æsop, Gasca, president of Peru ; and Socrates may go likewise
45 amongst them ; with others.

XLV. Of Building.

HOUSES are built to live in, and not to look on ; therefore let use be preferred before uniformity, except where both may be had. Leave the goodly
fabrics of houses for beauty only, to the enchanted
5 palaces of the poets, who build them with small cost

He that builds a fair house upon an ill seat, committeth himself to prison. Neither do I reckon it an ill seat only where the air is unwholesome, but likewise where the air is unequal. As you shall see many fine seats set upon a knap of ground, environed with higher hills ¹⁰ round about it ; whereby the heat of the sun is pent in, and the wind gathereth as in troughs : so as you shall have, and that suddenly, as great diversity of heat and cold as if you dwelt in several places. Neither is it ill air only that maketh an ill seat, but ill ¹⁵ ways, ill markets, and, if you will consult with Momus, ill neighbours. I speak not of many more ; want of water, want of wood, shade, and shelter, want of fruitfulness, and mixture of grounds of several natures, want of prospect, want of level grounds, want of places ²⁰ at some near distance for sports of hunting, hawking, and races ; too near the sea, too remote ; having the commodity of navigable rivers, or the discommodity of their overflowing ; too far off from great cities, which may hinder business, or too near them, which ²⁵ lurcheth all provisions, and maketh everything dear ; where a man hath a great living laid together, and where he is scanted : all which, as it is impossible perhaps to find together, so it is good to know them, and think of them, that a man may take as many as ³⁰ he can ; and, if he have several dwellings, that he sort them so, that what he wanteth in the one he may find in the other. Lucullus answered Pompey well, who, when he saw his stately galleries and rooms so large and lightsome in one of his houses, said “ *Surely, ³⁵* an excellent place for summer, but how do you in winter ? ” Lucullus answered, “ *Why, do you not*

think me as wise as some fowl are, that ever change their abode towards the winter?"

40 To pass from the seat to the house itself, we will do as Cicero doth in the orator's art, who writes books *De Oratore*, and a book he entitles *Orator*; whereof the former delivers the precepts of the art, and the latter the perfection. We will therefore describe a princely
45 palace, making a brief model thereof; for it is strange to see, now in Europe, such huge buildings as the Vatican and Escorial and some others be, and yet scarce a very fair room in them.

First therefore, I say, you cannot have a perfect
50 palace, except you have two several sides; a side for the banquet, as is spoken of in the book of Hester, and a side for the household; the one for feasts and triumphs, and the other for dwelling. I understand both these sides to be not only returns, but parts of
55 the front; and to be uniform without, though severally partitioned within; and to be on both sides of a great and stately tower in the midst of the front, that as it were joineth them together on either hand. I would have, on the side of the banquet, in front, one only
60 goodly room above stairs, of some forty foot high; and under it a room for a dressing, or preparing place, at times of triumphs. On the other side, which is the household side, I wish it divided at the first into a hall and a chapel (with a partition between) both of
65 good state and bigness; and those not to go all the length, but to have at the further end a winter and a summer parlour, both fair. And under these rooms a fair and large cellar sunk under ground; and likewise some privy kitchens, with butteries and pantries, and

the like. As for the tower, I would have it two stories, 70
of eighteen foot high a-piece above the two wings ;
and a goodly leads upon the top, railed, with statuas
interposed ; and the same tower to be divided into
rooms, as shall be thought fit. The stairs likewise to the
upper rooms, let them be upon a fair and open newel, 75
and finely railed in with images of wood cast into a brass
colour, and a very fair landing-place at the top. But
this to be, if you do not point any of the lower rooms
for a dining place of servants. For otherwise you
shall have the servants' dinner after your own ; for the 80
steam of it will come up as in a tunnel. And so much
for the front. Only, I understand the height of the
first stairs to be sixteen foot, which is the height of
the lower room.

Beyond this front is there to be a fair court, but 85
three sides of it of a far lower building than the front ;
and in all the four corners of that court fair staircases,
cast into turrets on the outside, and not within the
row of buildings themselves. But those towers are
not to be of the height of the front, but rather pro- 90
portionable to the lower building. Let the court not
be paved, for that striketh up a great heat in the
summer, and much cold in winter, but only some side
alleys with a cross, and the quarters to graze, being
kept shorn, but not too near shorn. The row of return 95
on the banquet side, let it be all stately galleries ; in
which galleries let there be three or five fine cupolas
in the length of it, placed at equal distance, and fine
coloured windows of several works. On the household
side, chambers of presence and ordinary entertainments 100
with some bed-chambers ; and let all three sides be a

double house, without thorough lights on the sides, that you may have rooms from the sun, both for forenoon and afternoon. Cast it also that you may
105 have rooms both for summer and winter ; shady for summer and warm for winter. You shall have sometimes fair houses so full of glass, that one cannot tell where to become to be out of the sun or cold. For embowed windows, I hold them of good use (in cities,
110 indeed, upright do better, in respect of the uniformity towards the street), for they be pretty retiring places for conference, and, besides, they keep both the wind and sun off. For that which would strike almost through the room, doth scarce pass the window.
115 But let them be but few, four in the court, on the sides only.

Beyond this court let there be an inward court, of the same square and height ; which is to be environed with the garden on all sides ; and in the inside,
120 cloistered on all sides upon decent and beautiful arches, as high as the first story. On the under story, towards the garden, let it be turned to a grotto, or place of shade, or estivation ; and only have opening and windows towards the garden ; and be level upon
125 the floor, no whit sunk under ground, to avoid all dampishness. And let there be a fountain, or some fair work of statuas in the midst of the court, and to be paved as the other court was. These buildings to be for privy lodgings on both sides, and the end for
130 privy galleries. Whereof you must foresee that one of them be for an infirmary, if the prince or any special person should be sick, with chambers, bed-chambers, *antecamera* and *recamera* joining to it. This upon the

second story. Upon the ground story, a fair gallery, open, upon pillars. And upon the third story likewise ¹³⁵ an open gallery upon pillars, to take the prospect and freshness of the garden. At both corners of the further side, by way of return, let there be two delicate or rich cabinets, daintily paved, richly hanged, glazed with crystalline glass, and a rich cupola in the midst, ¹⁴⁰ and all other elegancy that may be thought upon. In the upper gallery, too, I wish that there may be, if the place will yield it, some fountains running in divers places from the wall, with some fine avoidances. And thus much for the model of the palace; save that ¹⁴⁵ you must have, before you come to the front, three courts—a green court plain with a wall about it; a second court of the same, but more garnished with little turrets, or rather embellishments, upon the wall; and a third court, to make a square with the front, ¹⁵⁰ but not to be built, nor yet enclosed with a naked wall, but enclosed with terraces leaded aloft, and fairly garnished, on the three sides, and cloistered on the inside with pillars, and not with arches below. As for offices, let them stand at distance, with some ¹⁵⁵ low galleries to pass from them to the palace itself.

XLVI. Of Gardens.

GOD ALMIGHTY first planted a garden. And, indeed, it is the purest of human pleasures. It is the greatest refreshment to the spirits of man; without which building and palaces are but gross handyworks: and a man shall ever see, that when 5

ages grow to civility and elegancy, men come to build stately, sooner than to garden finely ; as if gardening were the greater perfection. I do hold it, in the royal ordering of gardens, there ought to be gardens for all
10 the months in the year, in which, severally, things of beauty may be then in season. For December and January, and the latter part of November, you must take such things as are green all winter ; holly, ivy, bays, juniper, cypress-trees, yew, pine-apple-trees, fir-trees,
15 rosemary, lavender, periwinkle, the white, the purple, and the blue ; germander, flags, orange-trees, lemon-trees, and myrtles, if they be stoved ; and sweet marjoram, warm set. There followeth, for the latter part of January and February, the mezerion-tree, which then
20 blossoms ; crocus vernus, both the yellow and the gray ; primroses, anemones, the early tulippa, hyacinthus orientalis, chamaïris, frettellaria. For March there come violets, especially the single blue, which are the earliest ; the early daffodil, the daisy, the almond-tree
25 in blossom, the peach-tree in blossom, the cornelian-tree in blossom, sweetbriar. In April, follow the double white violet, the wall-flower, the stock-gilliflower, the cowslip, flower-de-lices, and lilies of all natures, rosemary flowers, the tulippa, the double
30 peony, the pale daffodil, the French honeysuckle, the cherry-tree in blossom, the damascene, the plum-trees in blossom, the whitethorn in leaf, the lilac-tree. In May and June come pinks of all sorts, especially the blush pink ; roses of all kinds, except the musk, which
35 comes later ; honeysuckles, strawberries, bugloss, columbine, the French marigold, flos Africanus, cherry-tree in fruit, ribes, figs in fruit, rasps, vine

flowers, lavender in flowers, the sweet satyrian, with the white flower, herba muscaria, lilium convallium, the apple-tree in blossom. In July come gilliflowers 40 of all varieties, musk roses, the lime-tree in blossom, early pears, and plums in fruit, ginnitings, quadlins. In August come plums of all sorts in fruit, pears, apricocks, berberies, filberds, musk melons, monks-hoods of all colours. In September come grapes, 45 apples, poppies of all colours, peaches, melocotones, nectarines, cornelians, wardenes, quinces. In October and the beginning of November come services, medlars, bullaces, roses cut or removed to come late, hollyoaks, and such like. These particulars are for 50 the climate of London; but my meaning is perceived, that you may have *ver perpetuum*, as the place affords.

And because the breath of flowers is far sweeter in the air (where it comes and goes, like the warbling of music) than in the hand, therefore nothing is more fit 55 for that delight than to know what be the flowers and plants that do best perfume the air. Roses, damask and red, are fast flowers of their smells; so that you may walk by a whole row of them, and find nothing of their sweetness, yea, though it be in a morning's 60 dew. Bays likewise yield no smell as they grow, rosemary little, nor sweet marjoram. That which, above all others, yields the sweetest smell in the air, is the violet; especially the white double violet, which comes twice a year, about the middle of April and 65 about Bartholomew-tide. Next to that is the musk rose. Then the strawberry leaves dying, which yield a most excellent cordial smell. Then the flower of the vines: it is a little dust like the dust of a bent,

70 which grows upon the cluster in the first coming forth. Then sweetbriar. Then wall-flowers, which are very delightful to be set under a parlour or lower chamber window. Then pinks and gilliflowers, especially the matted pink and clove gilliflowers. Then the flowers
75 of the lime-tree. Then the honeysuckles, so they be somewhat afar off. Of bean-flowers I speak not, because they are field flowers. But those which perfume the air most delightfully, not passed by as the rest, but being trodden upon and crushed, are three,
80 that is, burnet, wild thyme, and water-mints. Therefore, you are to set whole alleys of them, to have the pleasure when you walk or tread.

For gardens (speaking of those which are, indeed, prince-like, as we have done of buildings), the con-
85 tents ought not well to be under thirty acres of ground, to be divided into three parts ; a green in the entrance, a heath or desert in the going forth, and the main garden in the midst, besides alleys on both sides. And I like well that four acres of ground be assigned
90 to the green, six to the heath, four and four to either side, and twelve to the main garden. The green hath two pleasures ; the one, because nothing is more pleasant to the eye than green grass kept finely shorn ; the other, because it will give you a fair alley in the
95 midst, by which you may go in front upon a stately hedge, which is to enclose the garden. But, because the alley will be long, and in great heat of the year or day, you ought not to buy the shade in the garden by going in the sun through the green, therefore you are,
100 of either side the green, to plant a covert alley, upon carpenters' work, about twelve feet in height, by which

you may go in shade into the garden. As for the making of knots or figures, with divers coloured earths, that they may lie under the windows of the house on that side which the garden stands, they be but 105 toys : you may see as good sights many times in tarts. The garden is best to be square, encompassed on all the four sides with a stately arched hedge. The arches to be upon pillars of carpenters' work, of some ten foot high, and six foot broad ; and the spaces 110 between of the same dimension with the breadth of the arch. Over the arches let there be an entire hedge of some four foot high, framed also upon carpenters' work ; and upon the upper hedge, over every arch, a little turret with a belly enough to receive a cage of 115 birds : and over every space between the arches, some other little figure, with broad plates of round coloured glass, gilt, for the sun to play upon. But this hedge I intend to be raised upon a bank, not steep, but gently slope, of some six foot, set all with flowers. Also, I 120 understand that this square of the garden should not be the whole breadth of the ground, but to leave on either side ground enough for diversity of side alleys, unto which the two covert alleys of the green may deliver you. But there must be no alleys with hedges 125 at either end of this great enclosure—not at the hither end, for letting your prospect upon this fair hedge from the green, nor at the further end, for letting your prospect from the hedge through the arches upon the heath.

130

For the ordering of the ground within the great hedge, I leave it to variety of device ; advising, nevertheless, that whatsoever form you cast it into, first it

be not too busy, or full of work. Wherein I, for my
135 part, do not like images cut out in juniper or other
garden stuff: they be for children. Little low hedges,
round like welts, with some pretty pyramids, I like
well; and in some places, fair columns, upon frames
of carpenters' work. I would also have the alleys
140 spacious and fair. You may have closer alleys upon
the side grounds, but none in the main garden. I
wish also, in the very middle, a fair mount, with three
ascents and alleys, enough for four to walk abreast;
which I would have to be perfect circles, without any
145 bulwarks or embossments: and the whole mount to
be thirty foot high, and some fine banqueting-house,
with some chimneys neatly cast, and without too
much glass.

For fountains, they are a great beauty and refresh-
150 ment; but pools mar all, and make the garden un-
wholesome, and full of flies and frogs. Fountains I
intend to be of two natures, the one that sprinkleth or
spouteth water; the other a fair receipt of water, of
some thirty or forty foot square, but without any fish,
155 or slime, or mud. For the first, the ornaments of
images, gilt or of marble, which are in use, do well:
but the main matter is so to convey the water as it
never stay, either in the bowls or in the cistern; that
the water be never by rest discoloured, green, or red,
160 or the like, or gather any mossiness or putrefaction.
Besides that, it is to be cleansed every day by the
hand. Also some steps up to it, and some fine pave-
ment about it, doth well. As for the other kind of
fountain, which we may call a bathing-pool, it may
165 admit much curiosity and beauty, wherewith we will

not trouble ourselves : as, that the bottom be finely paved, and with images ; the sides likewise ; and withal embellished with coloured glass, and such things of lustre, encompassed also with fine rails of low statuas. But the main point is the same which we 170 mentioned in the former kind of fountain, which is, that the water be in perpetual motion, fed by a water higher than the pool, and delivered into it by fair spouts, and then discharged away underground, by some equality of bores, that it stay little. And for 175 fine devices, of arching water without spilling, and making it rise in several forms (of feathers, drinking glasses, canopies, and the like), they be pretty things to look on, but nothing to health and sweetness.

For the heath, which was the third part of our plot, 180 I wished it to be framed, as much as may be, to a natural wildness. Trees I would have none in it, but some thickets made only of sweetbriar and honeysuckle, and some wild vines amongst ; and the ground set with violets, strawberries, and primroses ; for these 185 are sweet and prosper in the shade ; and these are to be in the heath here and there, not in any order. I like also little heaps, in the nature of mole-hills (such as are in wild heaths), to be set, some with wild thyme, some with pinks, some with germander, that gives a 190 good flower to the eye ; some with periwinkle, some with violets, some with strawberries, some with cowslips, some with daisies, some with red roses, some with liliū convallium, some with sweet-williams red, some with bear's-foot, and the like low flowers, being 195 withal sweet and sightly. Part of which heaps to be with standards of little bushes pricked upon their

top, and part without. The standards to be roses, juniper, holly (berberries but here and there, because
200 of the smell of their blossom), red currants, gooseberries, rosemary, bays, sweetbriar, and such like. But these standards to be kept with cutting, that they grow not out of course.

For the side grounds, you are to fill them with
205 variety of alleys private, to give a full shade ; some of them, wheresoever the sun be. You are to frame some of them likewise for shelter, that, when the wind blows sharp, you may walk as in a gallery. And those alleys must be likewise hedged at both ends to keep
210 out the wind ; and these closer alleys must be ever finely gravelled, and no grass, because of going wet. In many of these alleys, likewise, you are to set fruit-trees of all sorts, as well upon the walls as in ranges. And this would be generally observed, that the borders
215 wherein you plant your fruit-trees be fair, and large, and low, and not steep, and set with fine flowers ; but thin and sparingly, lest they deceive the trees. At the end of both the side grounds I would have a mount of some pretty height, leaving the wall of the enclosure
220 breast-high, to look abroad into the fields.

For the main garden, I do not deny but there should be some fair alleys ranged on both sides with fruit-trees ; and some pretty tufts of fruit-trees and arbours with seats, set in some decent order ; but
225 these to be by no means set too thick, but to leave the main garden, so as it be not close, but the air open and free. For as for shade, I would have you rest upon the alleys of the side-grounds, there to walk, if you feel disposed, in the heat of the year or day ; but

to make account, that the main garden is for the ²³⁰
 more temperate parts of the year, and, in the heat of
 summer for the morning and the evening, or overcast
 days.

For aviaries, I like them not, except they be of that
 largeness, as they may be turfed, and have living ²³⁵
 plants and bushes set in them, that the birds may
 have more scope and natural nestling, and that no
 foulness appear in the floor of the aviary.

So I have made a platform of a princely garden,
 partly by precept, partly by drawing, not a model, but ²⁴⁰
 some general lines of it : and in this I have spared for
 no cost. But it is nothing for great princes, that, for
 the most part, taking advice with workmen, with no
 less cost set their things together, and sometimes add
 statuas, and such things, for state and magnificence, ²⁴⁵
 but nothing to the true pleasure of a garden.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

*" Annihilating all that's made
 To a green thought in a green shade."*

Marvell.

*" To me there is an advantage in a place at some distance
 from the city. Having by no means the full possession
 of my faculties where I hear unwelcome and intrusive
 voices or unexpected and irregular sounds that excite me
 involuntarily to listen, I assemble and arrange my
 thoughts with freedom and with pleasure in the fresh air,
 under the open sky ; and they are more lively and vigorous
 and exuberant when I catch them as I walk about and
 commune with them in silence and seclusion."*—Landor.

*" Not wholly in the busy world nor quite
 Beyond it blooms the garden that I love."*

*News from the humming city comes to it
In sound of funeral or of marriage bells ;
And sitting muffled in dark leaves, you hear
The windy clanging of the minster clock."*

Tennyson.

"Your makers of parterres and flower-gardens are epigrammatists and sonneteers ; contrivers of bowers and grottos, treillages and cascades, are romance writers."—
Addison.

i. Johnson boasted that he did not know a cabbage-rose from a cabbage, and asked whether landscape gardening demanded any great powers of mind. His world terminated at Temple Bar, and in the *Idler*¹ he draws an amusing sketch of the troubles of Dick Shifter, a London barrister, who, persuaded by the praises of the country which he read in his favourite authors, determined to enjoy the pleasures of nature. Yet all men are lovers of gardens, from the artisan with a box of mignonette at his attic window to Lucullus with his pineries and orchids. Even Iceland has its Georgics.

Kinglake celebrates the gardens of Damascus in *Eöthen*. The gardens of the Mandarins in the city of Ning-po, in China, and the *Chinampas*, or floating gardens of Mexico, are well known to travellers. Monarchs, from Solomon to Charles II., have laid out, enjoyed, and even given their personal superintendence, to gardens. Tiberius forced cucumbers by means of the *lapis specularis* which could be split into thin plates. The French proverb *aller planter ses choux* takes us back to Diocletian and his garden at Salonica. The rose-trees in the *Trianon* which Marie Antoinette planted are still growing, and Shakespeare so accurately describes the operations of gardening that some have supposed him to be a professed horticulturist.

ii. Gardening has been thought worthy of attention by many great minds. Evelyn's *Sylva* and *Kalendarium Hortense* mark an important epoch in the history of gardens. His garden at Wotton with the oval circle up the laurel grove is well known, and hard by is "the Rookery," laid out by Mr. David Malthus, the father of

¹ No. 71.

population-Malthus. Cowley tells his readers, "I never had any desire so strong and so like covetousness as that one which I have had always, that I might be master at last of a small house and a large garden,

And there, with no design beyond my wall,
Whole and entire to lye,
In no inactive ease and no inglorious poverty."

Temple wrote an exhaustive essay on flower gardens. Shenstone spent his time and fortune on Leasowes. Cowper found at Olney "the best seclusion from a jarring world." Horace Walpole contributed a short essay on the same subject. Pope celebrates Canons, Sir Walter Scott is enthusiastic on his hobby, Hervey's meditations bring out a somewhat dismal, though real, aspect of nature, and Wordsworth paid particular attention to winter gardening at his grounds at Rydal.

"Those native plants,
The holly and the yew endear the hours
Of winter, and protect that pleasant place."

Flowers are so engrossing as to have had their special manias, of which the best known is the so-called "tulipomania," which reached its height in 1637. The highest price ever given for a single bulb in Holland was five thousand two hundred gulden. At present choice orchids command fanciful prices, and are only less ruinously extravagant than race-horses.

iii. Probably Johnson regarded gardens as for ornament rather than use ; but the value of the garden for scientific investigation cannot be exaggerated. Goethe studied the metamorphosis of plants in his Garten-haus in the park at Weimar. Darwin and Sir John Lubbock practically proved the value of such "open-air laboratories," especially to study the connection of the vegetable and animal kingdom. The use of flowers for patterns, though less important, deserves to be noticed, while the culture of economic plants can be most thoroughly studied in carefully arranged botanic gardens. It is, perhaps, curious that Bacon lays no stress on the importance of the garden to the physiologist and chemist. Certainly these studies were in their infancy, but Bacon was fully alive to the

importance of observation and experiment in the vegetable kingdom, and, especially in his *Natural History*, collected instances to serve as material for future inductions.

iv. "God made the country but man made the town," writes Cowper, and the value of country life in all its forms is undoubtedly to apply to the mind a number of healthy emotional influences. Poetry, religion, romance, and natural philosophy flourish best among a people constantly alive to the physical world. In cities life is strained, nervous, sceptical, positive, and hedonistic. The pleasure which follows feverish toil must be gathered up into a concentrated essence by all the resources of art and amusement. The influences at work throw men towards politics and satire, exact science, legal preciseness, and matter-of-fact shrewdness. There is little time for dreamy contemplation and wise passiveness. Unless town influences are tempered by the healthy air of country life, the study of man by the study of nature, literature and art are likely to take hyper-sensitive, and artificial forms. The so-called Augustan period of English literature contrasts with the literary movement begun by Crabbe, and perfected by Wordsworth; it is polished, precise, formal, satirical, epigrammatic. The descriptions of country life given by the pastoral school and town poets are monotonous and artificial, producing an effect like a clipt garden at Versailles.

v. Systematic gardening is first known to us through the Romans. The Greeks were certainly not systematic gardeners. They planted roses and violets by the side of leeks and pot herbs, and cultivated window-gardening; but their knowledge of flowers was very limited, and may partly explain the want of definiteness in the Greek words denoting colour. Xenophon speaks of the gardens of Sardis, and gardening was cultivated by the Ptolemies in Egypt. On the other hand, the Romans were professed gardeners, though they mixed up a great deal of superstition with the occupation, and had peculiar notions about grafting. They introduced the *ars topiaria*, or the cutting and training of shrubs into figures of animals, ships, etc. The garden was a necessary extension of the villa, and, if it was too small, the garden wall was painted to look like a garden. A more natural style was not

utterly ignored, for Pliny speaks of his parterres "*velut illati ruris imitatio.*"

vi. The rough military age which succeeded Roman civilization could give little care to gardening. Modern gardening begins later. "The garden, at first intended merely for producing esculent vegetables, fruits, and flowers," writes Sir Walter Scott, "began to assume another character, so soon as the increase of civilization tempted the feudal baron to step a little way out of the circuit of his fortifications and permitted his high dame to come down from her seat upon the castle walls, so regularly assigned to her by ancient minstrels, and tread with stately pace the neighbouring precincts which art had garnished for her reception." Gardening has not a regular history with a definite line of progress, except in so far as it moves with vegetable physiology and chemistry. The caprices of taste and fashion help to determine what flowers, fruit, and vegetables shall be especially cultivated. There are certain fairly well accentuated lines, marked by national character, climate, and experience of various forms of horticulture ; but all gardening was empirical before the days of vegetable physiology and chemistry of soils.

vii. "Nothing," says Sir Walter Scott, "is more completely the child of art than the garden." There is only a thin line of demarcation between the three great continental schools. The Italian, the father of modern styles, is itself the descendant of the Roman *xystus* and *quincunx*. The garden was an extension of the house, and the house of the garden. In an Italian garden you walk up and down stairs in the open air. The main idea is basking in the sun or resting in the shade. Vases, statues, marble-work relieved by trees and sweetened by perfumed flowers, form a picture of classic sensualism. Examples of this style occur in the gardens of the Visconti at Milan and the Este at Ferrara.

viii. If graceful but formal art is the key-note of Italian gardening, French gardeners rejoice in theatrical display, scenic effect, artifice, and ornament. The sculptural element is not so prominent as in the Italian school. Shaded masses of colour, elaborate patterns, geometrical exactness, "grove nodding to grove," hedge and tree symmetrical with hedge and tree, every *bizarre* ornament

which caprice and fashion can suggest, fanciful toys and clever puzzles—all find a place in a French garden. A French garden is not a place for contemplation or the study of nature, but a stage for the comedy of life ; a place to fill with living figures, fine ladies and gentlemen, love and dancing, all the pleasures and vanities of Parisian life, compliments, minuets, scandal, intrigues, and the whole paraphernalia of the world of fashion. In France set music goes side by side with sweet flowers, waving trees, and singing birds—though in a French garden the bird need not be real. Painted copper figures of birds and beasts make up a logically complete figure in the gardens of Versailles. Paintings and illusive perspectives are sometimes used to complete the effect. The flowers must blend with the costumes, and the costumes suit the flowers. There are right points of view, and the whole is an open-air *salon* or promenade. The phrase “*cabinets de verdure*” is a good illustration of French ideas on horticulture. Trees were green parasols, and turf a green velvet sofa. When the French, under the influence of the revolutionary principles, reason and nature, adopted the English natural style, they adopted it as the French would, too logically and intelligently. The Directory went further, and turned the Tuileries into potato grounds.

ix. A Dutch garden is a French garden on a small scale. If a French garden is a spectacle, a Dutch garden is a plaything, a degenerate copy of French models adapted to national temperament. A Dutchman would have no love, or music, or dancing ; his enjoyment lies in vegetating with pipe and beer, and gravely admiring the effect of his misplaced ingenuity. “There is a profusion of ornament, only on a smaller scale

‘Trees cut to statues, statues cut to trees,’

with stagnant and muddy canals and ditches, purposely made for the bridge that is thrown over them ; but they abound also in the pleasanter accompaniments of grassy banks and slopes, green terraces, caves, water-works, banqueting houses set on mounds, with a profusion of trellis-work and green paint ‘furnished,’ in the words of Evelyn, ‘with whatever may render the place agreeable, melancholy, and country like.’” Indispensable is the

brilliantly painted *lust-huis* adorned with mottoes, where the family take their pleasure, and contemplate trees cut into peacocks and lions. A general air of comfort pervades a Dutch garden.

x. Gardening was first introduced into England by the Romans, but to a very limited extent. Though the Saxon gentleman had his *garth* for pleasure, and his *ort-garth* for vegetables, horticulture from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries was in its infancy and chiefly in the hands of the religious houses, when use rather than ornament was considered. We hear of kitchen gardens before the culture of flowers. Previous to Henry VIII. vegetables had been obtained from Holland, but the king introduced at Nonsuch many varieties from the continent. The "trim garden" of the Elizabethan period borrowed different features from the different continental styles. It continued the house by its terraces and steps. It was in the highest degree artificial, with promenades, clipped hedges, alleys, and shapely flower-beds, and there was an air of snug comfort in its shaded nooks and arbours which made it a pleasant after-dinner resort for our hard-drinking forefathers. Dutch influences were undoubtedly strong in English horticulture, through the migration of the Flemish who had been driven away by the persecution of Philip II. Books on horticulture began early in the sixteenth century with a translation by Bishop Grosseteste, but it was not until the middle of the same century that the English soil was thought to be sufficiently fertile to grow vegetables. The progress of kitchen gardening may be dismissed with a short account of its main features. James I. formed or improved a garden at Theobalds and another at Greenwich. Charles I. brought over Wadescant, a celebrated Dutch gardener, and under the Stuarts many fruits and vegetables were introduced from the continent. Charles II. introduced the French style of dwarf fruit trees at Hampton Court and Marlborough House. Evelyn published *Acetaria, or a Discourse of Sallets*, and translated a treatise of a French gardener, Quintiney, the chief director of the gardens of the French king. We have the first authentic instances of hot-houses in the reign of Charles II. Pine-apples were first grown by Sir Mathew Decker at Richmond. The establishment of the

Botanic Gardens at Chelsea, and the dictionary of their curator, Mr. Philip Miller, gave a great impetus to horticulture. Ireland did little before the union, except where Cromwell's soldiers improved matters. The Dublin Horticultural Society was founded in 1749, but it cannot compete with its sister societies, the English and the Caledonian, under whose auspices gardening has thriven apace. Gardening ceased to be empirical when it was subordinated to the rapidly growing sciences of physiology and chemistry.

xi. To return to the flower garden. In the Elizabethan period gardening made great progress under the fostering influences of peace and wealth. England, too, was the refuge from continental persecution, and the Huguenots from the Low Countries brought with them their horticulture and choice flowers. It has been said that the best forms of Elizabethan gardening belong to no school. Though English gardening was, as all good gardening must be, the result of the careful application of art, it has in a great measure kept free from the artificiality of continental styles. On the one hand, the sculpturesque and ornamental elements have been reduced to a minimum; and on the other, nature has not been lost sight of. Bacon protests against the art "topiarian," and adds a heath or wilderness to his garden. Spenser's lines describe a garden free from all the excessive application of art—

"There the most dainty paradise on ground
 Itself doth open to his sober eye,
 In which all pleasures plenteously abound,
 And none doth other's happiness envy;
 The painted flowers; the trees upshooting high;
 The dales for shade; the hills for breathing space;
 The trembling groves; the crystal running by;
 And that which all fair works doth most aggrace,
 The art which all that wrought appeared in no place."

The chief points aimed at by the Elizabethan garden were
 (i.) the graceful continuity of the architecture of the house
 (ii.) "Forth-rights," or straight walks, broken by "knots mæanders, and mazes," a feature of gardening so well described by Shakespeare's "curiously knotted garden;"

¹ *Love's Labour Lost*, i. 1.

iii.) a rich and natural blending of colour ; (iv.) the use of the garden for the whole year, instead of a blaze of colour for two months only ; (v.) the disregard of weather by means of covered walks and arbours ; (vi.) the sense of smell never sacrificed to that of colour ; (vii) the union without confusion of the garden proper and the chase or park, of which one of the earliest and best instances is to be found in the house of Wharnccliffe which was built in the time of Henry VIII. by Sir Thomas Vortley, "that he might hear the buck *bell* in the summer season ; and (viii.) the pleasance as a connecting link between the garden and chase.

xii. A picture of the English garden in the Elizabethan period is given by Sir Walter Scott : " If the reader will imagine a house in the irregular form of architecture which was introduced in Elizabeth's time, its varied front, graced with projecting oriels, and its angles ornamented with turrets, its columnar chimneys, so much adorned as to make that a beauty which is generally a deformity ; its fair halls, banqueting rooms, galleries, and lodgings for interior accommodation—it will afford no uncomfortable notion of the days of good Queen Bess. In immediate and close connection with the mansion lie its gardens, with their terraces, urns, statues, staircases, screens, alcoves, and summer-houses ; its dry paved or turfed walks leading through a succession of interesting objects, the whole line of architecture corresponding with that of the house, with its gothic labels and entablature, but assuming gradually a plainer and more massive character as the grounds extended and seemed to connect themselves with the open country."

Bacon's Essay at times reminds us of Perdita's list of flowers in *The Winter's Tale*. He has left some interesting memoranda of improvements to be made at Gorhambury in 1608.¹ "Causing the waulkes about y^e wall to be sanded and made handso(me) against Hickeys comyng. So the old waulkes wth rayles and swept. Plott to be made of my poole ; and the waulk through Pray wood and y^e stand thear on the hill for prospect." And again, "To give directions of a plott to be made to turn y^e pond yard into a place of pleasure." In

¹ Ellis and Spedding, *Life and Letters*, vol. iv. 28, 52, 76, 77.

another memorandum he purposes to have "A fyne littell stream made . . . which shall make the whole residue of the ground an Iland; the bank to be turfed and kept cutt." The ground is to be enclosed "Square with a brick wall and fruit-trees plashed upon it; on the owtside of it to sett fayre strait byrches on 2 sides, and lyme trees on 2 sides, some x foote distant from the wall so that the wall may hide most of the shaft of the tree and only the tuft appear above." Within the stream above-mentioned he intends "Upon a lower levell to make another waulk of 25 foote, the border to be set wth flagges of all sortes of flower de luces and lylies." Round the walk there is to be "a fayre raile with images gilt round about it, and some low flowres, specially violettts and strawberries along." Then there is to be "a fayre hedg of tymber worke till it towch the water wth some glasses coloured here and there for the eye." "In fitt places Ilands more are to be sett," and especially "In y^e middle of the laque where the house now stands to make an Iland of 100 broad; An in the middle thereof to build a house for freshnes, with an upper galery open upon the water; a terrace above that; and a supping room open under that," etc.

xiii. Under the Stuarts no fusion was attempted between the garden and the park, and the former remained "a sort of chapel of ease to the apartments indoors." The cavaliers were too impoverished by the civil wars to keep up the parks, but the garden could be transferred to a smaller house. New and rare plants were imported, and different styles followed by monarchs and landed proprietors with a taste for gardening. James, Evelyn, and Temple were each in their different ways lovers of the art. Charles II. followed French models, but on the whole the Dutch school was the favourite. The "topiarian art" was largely used in the reign of William, when the rise of a new school, the English or "natural school" begins—a style of gardening which some rather fancifully suppose to have been suggested by Milton's description of Paradise.

xiv. Loudon and Wise broke through the traditions of the Dutch school in laying out Kensington Gardens, and are praised by Addison in the *Spectator*. The idea of

naturalizing and simplifying the garden first struck Sir John Vanbrugh, who was consulted by the Duke of Marlborough about the laying out of Blenheim. Kent first carried out the principle, by doing away with the pleasance, and breaking down the distinction between the park and the garden. The garden proper was, with great want of taste and judgment, placed at a distance from the house, and the park brought up to the doors. Kent introduced the "haha," and made nature poor, jejune, and artificial, with formal clumps of trees, artificial lakes, and spade-erected hills, instead of correcting the excess of art by the infusion of nature. He swept away mythology, but erected temples, obelisks, and gazabos. Brown succeeded Kent with a more magnificent, but still unnatural style. His best work was done at Blenheim, where he constructed a fine lake from the small river flowing through the grounds.

xv. A better school was founded by Payne, Knight, and Sir Uvedale Price, who used the spade and shovel less. Stone masonry was reduced to a minimum; glens, groves, hills, lakes, and waterfalls were utilized as given by nature not constructed *à la nature*. Price recognized the terrace and flower-garden in connection with the house; the shrubbery or pleasure-ground, to be treated in natural style, and to serve as a link between the flowers and the trees; and the park, which was to be "landscaped." The phrase "picturesque" gardening is unfortunate; the original idea was that the garden should conform to the principles of painting; but the result was the reduction of gardening to pedantic rules, and the gardener in vain attempted to play the artist. However, the follies of the natural school have gradually been corrected, and it is true that "we Englishmen talk of planting a garden, the modern Italians and ancient Romans talk of building one.¹ Ours, the most beautiful in the universe, are not exempt from absurdities, but in the shadiness of the English garden it is the love of retirement that triumphs over taste and over a sense of the inconvenience."² The great drawback of landscape gardening, that "no artist

¹ *Cicero ad Atticum*, ix. 16.

² W. S. Landor, *Imaginary Conversations*.

could hope to see the perfection of his labour," was first in a measure overcome by Sir Henry Stewart of Allanton, who has practically illustrated on his own estate his essay "On the best way of giving immediate effects to wood." Sir Walter Scott insists too much on the artificial character of the garden proper; but grass and trees untouched by the spade and pruning-knife should correct the formalism of beds and hedges, walks and terraces. England is peculiarly favourable to natural gardening from her green grass, luxuriant foliage, and temperate climate admitting great variety of vegetation. The garden should neither be a mathematically exact figure nor a fanciful introduction to an artificial landscape. The landscape gardener rarely endeavours to make the garden *en suite* with the house, and often has a few narrow principles which he rigorously applies.

xvi. A writer in the *Quarterly Review* well sums up the progress of gardening. "We first had the herbalist with his simples—'temperature' of every plant given, hot or cold in the second or the third degree—and 'a table of virtues' for both mind and body, 'against the falling sickness,' 'to glue together greene wounds,' 'to comfort the heart, to drive away care, and increase the joy of the mind'¹ and the like. Then came the kitchen-gardener with his sallet-herbs and fruit trees,² then the botanist³ with his orders and classes, then the florist⁴ with his choice bulbs; meanwhile sprung up the critical school of essayists which produced the landscape-gardener; the modern march of intellect has added the vegetable physiologist, and latest of all the agricultural chemist.⁵ All these seem at the present moment to have centred their exertions in a single point, and to be giving in each his contributions to make up the perfection of the flower-gardener."

xvii. In laying out a small garden it may be suggested,

(i.) That a small piece of ground may be adapted to the cultivation of a considerable variety of plants, under conditions favourable to their development and conveniently arranged for observation.

¹ Chiefly through religious houses (Italy).

² Holland and France.

³ Linnæus.

⁴ Holland.

⁵ England and Germany.

(ii.) That rockwork and irregular lines in borders and paths add greatly to the general effect ; light and shade vary continually, instead of the monotony of the formal gravel walk.

(iii.) That the cultivation of “ Alpine Plants ” and other hardy perennials—many of them evergreen—offers advantages over the established bedding-out system. The garden retains its attractions throughout the year, no annual re-stocking is needful and the conventional digging over, to the destruction of roots, bulbs, and seeds, is avoided. The contrary and prevailing custom furnishes a lavish display of colour during a few months, but for the remainder of the year it leaves the garden practically an unoccupied waste.

XLVII. Of Negotiating.

IT is generally better to deal by speech than by letter, and by the mediation of a third than by a man's self. Letters are good, when a man would draw an answer by letter back again ; or when it may serve for a man's justification afterwards to produce his own letter ; or where it may be danger to be interrupted, or heard by pieces. To deal in person is good, when a man's face breedeth regard, as commonly with inferiors ; or in tender cases, where a man's eye upon the countenance of him with whom he speaketh may give him a direction how far to go ; and generally, where a man will reserve to himself liberty, either to disavow or to expound.

In choice of instruments, it is better to choose men of a plainer sort, that are like to do that that is committed to them, and to report back again faithfully the success, than those that are cunning to con-

trive out of other men's business somewhat to grace themselves, and will help the matter in report, for
20 satisfaction sake. Use also such persons as affect the business wherein they are employed (for that quickeneth much), and such as are fit for the matter ; as, bold men for expostulation, fair-spoken men for persuasion, crafty men for inquiry and observation,
25 froward and absurd men for business that doth not well bear out itself. Use also such as have been lucky, and prevailed before in things wherein you have employed them ; for that breeds confidence, and they will strive to maintain their prescription.

30 It is better to sound a person with whom one deals, afar off, than to fall upon the point at first, except you mean to surprise him by some short question. It is better dealing with men in appetite than with those that are where they would be. If a man deal
35 with another upon conditions, the start or first performance is all ; which a man cannot reasonably demand, except either the nature of the thing be such which must go before ; or else a man can persuade the other party that he shall still need him in some
40 other thing ; or else that he be counted the honestest man.

All practice is to discover, or to work. Men discover themselves in trust, in passion, at unawares, and of necessity—when they would have somewhat done,
45 and cannot find an apt pretext. If you would work any man, you must either know his nature or fashions, and so lead him ; or his ends, and so persuade him ; or his weakness and disadvantages, and so awe him ; or those that have interest in him, and so govern him.

In dealing with cunning persons, we must ever consider their ends to interpret their speeches ; and it is good to say little to them, and that which they least look for. In all negotiations of difficulty, a man may not look to sow and reap at once, but must prepare business, and so ripen it by degrees. 55

XLVIII. Of Followers and Friends.

COSTLY followers are not to be liked ; lest, while a man maketh his train longer, he make his wings shorter. I reckon to be costly, not them alone which charge the purse, but which are wearisome and importune in suits. Ordinary followers ought to challenge no higher conditions than countenance, recommendation, and protection from wrongs. Factious followers are worse to be liked, which follow not upon affection to him with whom they range themselves, but upon discontentment conceived against some other ; whereupon commonly ensueth that ill intelligence that we many times see between great personages. Likewise glorious followers, who make themselves as trumpets of the commendation of those they follow, are full of inconvenience. For they taint business through want of secrecy ; and they export honour from a man, and make him a return in envy. There is a kind of followers, likewise, which are dangerous, being indeed espials ; which inquire the secrets of the house, and bear tales of them to others. Yet such men many times are in great favour ; for they are officious, and commonly exchange tales. The 20

following by certain estates of men, answerable to that which a great man himself professeth (as of
25 soldiers to him that hath been employed in the wars, and the like), hath ever been a thing civil, and well taken even in monarchies ; so it be without too much pomp or popularity. But the most honourable kind of following is to be followed as one that apprehen-
30 deth to advance virtue and desert in all sorts of persons. And yet, where there is no eminent odds in sufficiency, it is better to take with the more passable than with the more able. And, besides, to speak truth, in base times active men are of more use than
35 virtuous. It is true, that in government it is good to use men of one rank equally : for to countenance some extraordinarily is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent, because they may claim a due. But contrariwise in favour, to use men with much
40 difference and election, is good : for it maketh the persons preferred more thankful, and the rest more officious ; because all is of favour. It is good discretion not to make too much of any man at the first, because one cannot hold out that proportion.
45 To be governed (as we call it) by one, is not safe, for it shows softness, and gives a freedom to scandal and disreputation ; for those that would not censure or speak ill of a man immediately, will talk more boldly of those that are so great with them, and thereby
50 wound their honour. Yet to be distracted with many, is worse ; for it makes men to be of the last impression, and full of change. To take advice of some few friends, is ever honourable ; for lookers-on many times see more than gamesters ; and the vale best

discovereth the hill. There is little friendship in the 55 world, and least of all between equals, which was wont to be magnified. That that is, is between superior and inferior, whose fortunes may comprehend the one the other.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

[See also Essays on *Factions* and on *Suitors*.]

i. The weakness and early decay of feudal principles and of the military spirit in England, and the comparative security of the subject had rendered the armed followings of mighty lords useless or impossible; but instead of disappearing, the armed vassal and rapacious mercenary reappeared in a mischievous form as the great lords surrounded themselves with paid retainers instead of feudal followers, to whom they granted liveries.¹ "Quite in the beginning of Richard II.'s reign the commons petitioned against these liveries and the bands of maintainers who upheld each other in illegal actions as forcible *deseisin*. Thus great houses, and by degrees factions, were formed, and things were ready for the great outbreak of faction fighting which ended in the destruction of the old nobility in the wars of the Roses."² Mr. Stubbs gives an interesting account of the household economy of mediæval lords, and, speaking of its evil effects, says,³ "Livery . . . was thus a bond between the great men who indulged their vanity, and the poorer who had need of their protection, sometimes by force of arms, but generally in the courts of law. It was a revival, or possibly a survival, of the ancient practice by which every man was bound to have a lord, and every lord had to represent his men or be answerable for them in the courts." Maintenance, or the practice of the strong up-

¹ Livery is *liberatio*, "the allowance made in provisions and clothing for the servants and officers of the great household whether baron, prelate, monastery, or college."

² Bright, *English History for Public Schools*, vol. i. p. 270.

³ *Constitutional History*, vol. iii. p. 531.

holding the causes of the weak in the law courts, in return for dependence and personal service, was attacked by legislation as early as the reign of Edward I., who "forbad the sheriffs and other officers of his courts to take any part in quarrels depending in the courts." . . . "By a statute of 1327 it is forbidden that any member of the king's household, or any great man of the realm, by himself or by another, by sending letters or otherwise, or any other in the land, great or small, shall take upon him to maintain quarrels or parties in the country to the let and disturbance of the common law." In the reign of Edward III. the evil had grown, and was attacked in 1346 by an absolute veto on taking up other men's quarrels. The climax is reached when Alice Perrers, the king's mistress, takes her seat in the law courts and urges the quarrels of her clients. In the condemnation of maintainers pronounced by the Good Parliament, ladies as well as lords are mentioned. The great lord often shared in the profits of the suits which he maintained, and gathered round himself a lawless following whom he could not control and had to respect. So the law suffered on all sides. "The livery of a great lord was as effective security to a malefactor as was the benefit of clergy to a criminous clerk." Besides, maintenance repeated in a pernicious form all the disruptive influences of feudalism, and provided centres for insurrection and internal broils, as well as perverted justice and promoted crime. The evil was again attacked in Parliament in 1381, and by a statute of Henry IV. not even the king's servants could wear his livery except in attendance on court.

ii. The practical outcome of maintenance was to give material and organization in the wars of the Roses. A statute against liveries was passed in the reign of Edward IV.; and Bacon in his history of the reign of Henry VII. gives us much information in reference to the growth of the mischief. He tells us how that politic monarch revived a special court¹ for the strengthening of the central government. "That which was principally aimed at by this act was force, and the two chief supports of force, combination of multitudes and maintenance or

¹ Afterwards known as the Court of the Star Chamber.

headship of great persons." A heavy fine of 15,000 marks was exacted from the Earl of Oxford for receiving the king with an excessive retinue of liveried servants at Herningham. "By my faith, my lord," said the king, "I thank you for your good cheer, but I may not endure to have my laws broken in my sight. My attorney must speak with you." It is likely that avarice as well as policy imposed this heavy penalty, but Bacon tells us that the king took every means to repress the evil. "As for riots and retainers, there passed scarce any Parliament in this time without a law against them, the king ever having an eye to might and multitude." The number of discharged retainers thrown upon the world by the laws against maintenance was one of the chief causes of the increased pauperism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

iii. In the reign of Elizabeth powerful lords like Surrey and Leicester broke the law by the crowd of retainers which they excused as necessary for their private establishments, but really gathered together to fight their battles, extend their influence, and display their grandeur. Bacon himself was a sinner, though through extravagant display and thoughtless carelessness, not from the desire to strengthen himself by a large retinue, nor to pervert justice. His household consisted of two chaplains, six gentlemen of the chamber, twenty-six gentlemen waiters, four pages, two gentlemen ushers, three yeomen of the wardrobe, three yeomen of the ewry and pantry, and four butlers, besides many more whose names are wanting, but would bring the number up to nearly a hundred.¹ Lady Bacon, we are told by Mr. Spedding, strongly reprobated the extravagance of her son, and his indulgence towards his servants.² Immediately after his appointment to the office of Lord Chancellor, in deference to the opinions of the king, he cashiered sixteen of his gallants,³ but stories are told of his extravagant indulgence at Gorhambury, and how he kept his money in open drawers, that his servants might help themselves at will.⁴

iv. Abolition of privilege and class distinction has

¹ Ellis and Spedding, *Life*, vol. vi. pp. 336, 337.

² *Ibid.*, vol. vi. pp. 224, 246. ³ *Ibid.*, vol. vi. p. 287.

⁴ See also Essay on *Expense*.

made most of Bacon's counsels obsolete. The nearest approach to the "follower" in the Baconian sense is to be found in the private secretaries of public men, the confidential clerks of financiers and other men of business, and in the agents of large landowners. The same character, under different aspects, appears in the factotum of the high official or great lord. Lord Steyne's Mr. Wagg, the Marquis of Farintosh's faithful henchman, Sir Francis Clavering's Captain Strong, are well-known types of the modern follower. We may also compare the modern "devil" who helps the successful barrister or author, and profits indirectly as well as directly by the connection, like *Memory Carton*, the jackal of Mr. Stryver. But the follower proper has been supplanted by the competitor.

[Compare also Essay on *Suitors*.]

XLIX. Of Suitors.

MANY ill matters and projects are undertaken ; and private suits do putrefy the public good. Many good matters are undertaken with bad minds : I mean not only corrupt minds, but crafty minds, 5 that intend not performance. Some embrace suits which never mean to deal effectually in them ; but if they see there may be life in the matter, by some other mean, they will be content to win a thank, or take a second reward, or, at least, to make use in the mean- 10 time of the suitor's hopes. Some take hold of suits only for an occasion to cross some other, or to make an information, whereof they could not otherwise have apt pretext, without care what become of the suit when that turn is served ; or, generally, to make other 15 men's business a kind of entertainment to bring in their own. Nay, some undertake suits with a full

purpose to let them fall, to the end to gratify the adverse party or competitor.

Surely there is, in some sort, a right in every suit : either a right of equity, if it be a suit of controversy, 20 or a right of desert, if it be a suit of petition. If affection lead a man to favour the wrong side in justice, let him rather use his countenance to compound the matter than to carry it. If affection lead a man to favour the less worthy in desert, let him do it without 25 depraving or disabling the better deserver. In suits which a man doth not well understand, it is good to refer them to some friend of trust and judgment, that may report whether he may deal in them with honour ; but let him choose well his referendaries, for else he 30 may be led by the nose.

Suitors are so distasted with delays and abuses, that plain dealing in denying to deal in suits at first, and reporting the success barely, and in challenging no more thanks than one hath deserved, is grown not only 35 honourable, but also gracious. In suits of favour, the first coming ought to take little place. So far forth consideration may be had of his trust, that, if intelligence of the matter could not otherwise have been had but by him, advantage be not taken of the note, but the 40 party left to his other means, and in some sort recompensed for his discovery. To be ignorant of the value of a suit is simplicity, as well as to be ignorant of the right thereof is want of conscience.

Secrecy in suits is a great mean of obtaining ; for 45 voicing them to be in forwardness may discourage some kind of suitors, but doth quicken and awake others. But timing of the suit is the principal

Timing, I say, not only in respect of the person who
 50 should grant it, but in respect of those which are like
 to cross it. Let a man, in the choice of his mean,
 rather choose the fittest mean than the greatest mean,
 and rather them that deal in certain things, than those
 that are general. The reparation of a denial is some-
 55 times equal to the first grant, if a man show himself
 neither dejected nor discontented. *Iniquum petas,
 ut æquum feras* is a good rule where a man hath
 strength of favour; but otherwise, a man were better
 rise in his suit: for he that would have ventured at
 60 first to have lost the suitor, will not, in the conclusion,
 lose both the suitor and his own former favour.

Nothing is thought so easy a request to a great
 person, as his letter; and yet, if it be not in a good
 cause, it is so much out of his reputation. There are
 65 no worse instruments than these general contrivers of
 suits; for they are but a kind of poison and infection
 to public proceedings.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. In Bacon's view suitors are an integral class of society, and he neither inquires into their origin nor discusses the possibility of getting rid of them. Accepting them as a necessary growth, like animal or vegetable parasites, he is content to give some practical rules for turning them to the best account. So completely has society changed that the very word in this special sense is obsolete, and it is not easy for us to picture a world divided between havers and beggars. Let us attempt in brief outline to trace the rise and fall of suitors. The essay, it will be seen, raises the large question of patronage.

ii. In the ancient world the problems of government were simple. Interests were few, and representation was

unknown. Government rested on military force, and left as little to the civil officials as was possible. The Oriental monarchy employed court officials, provincial governors, and a crowd of tax-gatherers, who, like the modern Pasha, made their incomes as they could. In Athens the public service was rather a communistic burden on property than an object of ambition. In Rome plunder or ambition was the incentive to hold office. The central government had little power over the bestowal or administration of the most valuable public appointments. The lower and less desirable appointments were accepted as a training and necessary stepping-stone to the higher and more lucrative ones. The chief governmental machinery was concerned with the collection of taxes and the carrying on of war. The taxes were farmed out ; war was made self-supporting by plunder and confiscation. The public treasury was easily managed by the Quæstors. The catering for public amusements was left to the ambition of private citizens. As difficulties arose, honorary commissions without salaries were appointed. The tendency of republican times was to choose all officers of the executive by popular election, but the numerous laws against *ambitus* reveal the sinister influence of bribery. Under Augustus the old forms and names were maintained, but the executive were virtually nominees of the emperor, and the empire became a vast bureaucracy. Outside Rome centralization sucked away the vigour of public life, and municipal office was not eagerly sought for by the provincial men of note. Bonuses were offered as an inducement to hold office, and we hear of laws passed to compel unwilling provincials to serve ; indeed, many ran away to avoid the odious burden. To sum up, we may say that ancient government had but a limited system of appointments at its disposal to reward its supporters, to carry on the public service, and to unite all the threads of administration into one centralized and organized whole ; and that such offices as existed were not paid for by the public money.

iii. Feudalism was the first definite attempt after the disruption of the Roman empire to re-organize society. Government was still the will of the stronger, but by a judicious system of wheels within wheels, the various

classes of society were co-ordinated and grouped round a single centre, as in England under the Plantagenets, or round several centres, as in contemporary France. There were few departments of government that the suzerain or feudal lord did not himself supervise ; he was the fountain of honour and the dispenser of office. The highest official was the servant of the king rather than the public minister, and to the bottom of the scale the lowest hanger-on depended on the interest and favour of some superior.

iv. The rival of feudalism was the Church, which at one time threatened to subordinate the temporal power to its authority. The Church had at one time a larger amount of patronage at its disposal than any monarch ; and it was to Rome that the ambitious suitor, especially if he was low-born, looked. The cardinal doctrine of the English Reformation is the royal supremacy. It consummated the transference of patronage from the pope to the king.

v. Bacon wrote when the social organism was becoming more centralized, and the power of feudalism had been finally weakened by the wars of the Roses. The " motive " of Bacon's politics is absolute monarchy, and monarchy with a nobility of office as opposed to a nobility of war. As far as possible, all titles to office rest with the king, and secondarily with the great officials of which he was the centre and origin. At the same time the immense impetus given to trade, the gradual rise of the middle class under the shelter of monarchy, the extension of England in foreign lands, and the rapid development of intelligence in all classes of subjects, called for a more thorough, intricate, and stable administration of all the departments of government.¹ Justice had long since ceased to be the will of the stronger, and as such to be administered by the feudal lord in his own interests. There was a growing need for a centralized and as far as possible impersonal system of government. We can see the germs of modern departmental supervision roughly foreshadowed in the Elizabethan age.

vi. Bacon was a man of the new type, a suitor himself from his coming of age to his death, a man of peace and politics, who saw, perhaps too dimly, that the old order was changing, and that new factors were entering

¹ See Essay on *Counsel, Nobility*.

into the national existence. He has no wish to play the feudal lord or even the court favourite, but would be the high functionary who has the ear of the king, and an official income sufficient for dignity, comfort, and scientific investigation.

vii. Elizabeth used her large powers wisely ; but her judicious choice of ministers was not imitated by her successors. The Stuarts promoted unworthy favourites, who dispensed the patronage committed to them to yet more unworthy creatures. But with the restoration and the rapid growth of constitutional government, the choice of ministers depended on the politics of the majority of parliamentary representatives, who in their turn strengthened their position by the power which was given by patronage. Politics, however, were a game played exclusively by the upper classes, and the political chiefs promoted only those who could help to establish their monopoly, the best men *from their* point of view. The excellent organization and extended patronage of great houses like those of the Bentincks, Cavendishes, Russells, Grenvilles, etc., placed political predominance in the hands of the Whigs, so that it was practically a monopoly.

viii. The personal element in politics began to disappear with the first Reform Bill. However patriotic and disinterested statesmen may be, they cannot, when there are several competent applicants for an office, avoid favouring friends, and the danger is not so much that an unsuitable candidate will be nominated, as that discontent will be created and personal influence increased. The death blow to the old system of nomination was dealt by Lord Macaulay's arguments in 1853, and the democratic wave which has during the last thirty years been, with slight intervals, spreading over the country, has caused the disappearance of official patronage in England. It must be remembered that the growth of population has made competition more and more necessary, and patronage more unfair and impossible. Popular government insists that the public work, paid for by public money, shall be done by the best men, that personal power shall not be strengthened by the bestowal of office, and that the official can only be independent if he receives an appointment for his merits,

not as a favour ; and lastly, that all favouritism is demoralizing to public and private morality.

ix. We are thus brought to the burning question of competitive examinations for the civil service and the army. It is fair to say that, though there has of late been a reaction against them and they have been accused with some show of reason of promoting over pressure and favouring cram, no alternative scheme has yet been proposed, and even their most violent assailants would not wish to restore the old system of patronage. The practical problem is how to work the present system with the least harm to the physically feeble and the unsuccessful competitor and the greatest gain to the State. It is enough to indicate the problem without attempting a solution. A fruitful suggestion is to limit the competition by putting the selection in the hands of accredited bodies, such as the universities and public schools. Such a plan has worked well in Holland, but secondary education must be organized before it could be introduced to any extent in England.

x. The American system of connecting all public appointments, from the heads of departments to the village postmaster, with the result of the presidential elections, is a curious anomaly and contrary to the usual tendency of democracy, which is favourable to competition. It is condemned by most American publicists as degrading politics into a scramble for office and breeding a race of hungry office-seekers. The only plea in its favour is that it discourages bureaucracy, and encourages versatility. In the higher ranks of office this may be true, and the diplomatic service in America, which is thus recruited, numbers as distinguished members as any European state.

L. Of Studies.

STUDIES serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief use for delight, is in privateness and retiring ; for ornament, is in discourse ; and

for ability, is in the judgment and disposition of business. For expert men can execute, and perhaps ⁵ judge of particulars, one by one ; but the general counsels, and the plots and marshalling of affairs, come best from those that are learned. To spend too much time in studies, is sloth ; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation ; to make judgment ¹⁰ wholly by their rules, is the humour of a scholar. They perfect nature, and are perfected by experience. For natural abilities are like natural plants, that need proynng by study ; and studies themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be ¹⁵ bounded in by experience. Crafty men contemn studies ; simple men admire them ; and wise men use them. For they teach not their own use ; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. ²⁰

Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested. That is, some books are to ²⁵ be read only in parts ; others to be read, but not curiously ; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of them by others ; but that would be only in the less important argu- ³⁰ ments, and the meaner sort of books : else distilled books are, like common distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man ; conference a ready man ; and writing an exact man. And, therefore, if a man write little, he had need have a great memory ; if he ³⁵

confer little, he had need have a present wit ; and if he read little, he had need have much cunning, to seem to know that he doth not.

Histories make men wise ; poets, witty ; the mathematics, subtle ; natural philosophy, deep ; moral, grave ; logic and rhetoric, able to contend. *Abeunt studia in mores.* Nay, there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought out by fit studies, like as diseases of the body may have appropriate exercise :
 40 bowling is good for the stone and reins, shooting for the lungs and breast, gentle walking for the stomach, riding for the head, and the like. So, if a man's wits be wandering, let him study the mathematics ; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so
 50 little, he must begin again. If his wit be not apt to distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoolmen, for they are *cymini sectores*. If he be not apt to beat over matters, and to call up one thing to prove and illustrate another, let him study the lawyers' cases.
 55 So every defect of the mind may have a special receipt.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. The first book of the Advancement of Learning should be read in connection with this essay, of which it is mainly an expansion. Bacon thus enlarges on the three chief vanities in studies which have brought disgrace on learning—(1) Fantastical learning, the hunting more after words and phrases than after the weight of the matter. (2) Contentious learning, the minute distinctions of the schoolman. (3) Delicate learning, the classicalities of the Renaissance. He then analyzes the peccant humours, or defects of learned men. The chief of these is, “a kind of adoration of the mind and

understanding of men ; by means whereof men have withdrawn themselves too much from the contemplation of nature, and the observations of experience, and have tumbled up and down in their own conceits." In language which is almost a rescript of the essay he describes the false ends for which men have sought learning, and shows the rich harvest that would follow from the conjunction of the two highest planets—Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action ; in other words, if contemplation and action are conjoined and combined.

ii. "Studies," as Bacon uses the word, is almost synonymous with reading, and a second title of the essay might run "What to read and how to read." It would betray a want of historical perspective to criticise Bacon from a modern standpoint, but we may fairly point out that the founder of experimental philosophy only half realized the scope and bearing of his own principles, and was still half in bondage to the idol of the book. "Weigh what you read, put your reading to use, and test it by experience," is the gist of Bacon's counsel. Excellent advice, but we might surely have expected him to add the still more important precept, "When possible, get your facts at first hand ; the highest and best study is the study of nature ; books are banks for storing wealth, and they may yield large interest, but they are not the gold fields or factories where fortunes are made." Locke may have had this essay in his mind when he wrote, "I will only say this one thing concerning books, that however it has got the name, yet in my opinion converse with books is not the principal part of study."

iii. Confining ourselves to Bacon's restricted meaning, we will add a few additional hints on reading. Even in Bacon's time it was possible for a man to be an encyclopedist. If no one of that age can be said, like Dante, to have mastered all existing knowledge, yet the attempt was not obviously absurd as it would be nowadays. Now the most omnivorous reader must specialize, and the only question is how far specialization should be carried and at what stage it should begin. There is wisdom in the old definition of a liberal education

attributed to Dr. Whewell, "a little of everything and everything of some one thing." Wide knowledge is not necessarily shallow knowledge; it may be sound and thorough as far as it goes. A literary man should know the methods of scientific investigation and the latest results of science; a scientific man will find not only relaxation but stimulus in literature. The important thing is to have *points de repère*, centres round which to group the knowledge collected from all sides. A living interest in any one subject enables the student to turn to account whatever he reads, and the most irrelevant matter will yield him hints and illustrations. Reading without a definite end is a mere dissipation, as idle and profitless as smoking. "A man," says Jeremy Collier, "may as well expect to grow stronger by always eating as wiser by always reading." Burke writes to his son, "Reading and much reading is good; but the power of diversifying infinitely the matter in your own mind and of applying it to every occasion that arises is better; so don't suppress the *vivida vis*." In an age of magazines and circulating libraries such a caution is most needed, and a man who determined to read no book that was not a year old would gain more than he would lose. But in avoiding frivolous and desultory reading some people fall into an opposite error. They set themselves as a task to read solid books and plod through them without interest or profit. Such discipline may be necessary for those *in statu pupillari*, though even with children it is questionable how far the natural bent can be strained and twisted with advantage, but with adults it is no good forcing the natural inclination. The mind assimilates only what it fancies, and, as Locke well puts it, "that seldom digests well in the stomach, or adds much strength to the body that nauseates the palate, and is not recommended by it." Much time and energy is wasted in mastering facts which however important are not fruitful. We continue to educate as in the days when there were no encyclopædias or dictionaries of reference. With many sorts of knowledge it is enough to know where to turn for information when we want it. The lawyer's memory should be more cultivated. With literature proper the case is different. The matter is inseparable from the manner,

and Bacon's sneer at distilled books will apply to most of our modern primers of literature, epitomes of history, and so forth. Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of a classical against a modern education is that the pupil is forced to study the original author, not what is said of him by critics and bookmakers.

LI. Of Faction.

MANY have an opinion not wise, that for a prince to govern his estate, or for a great person to govern his proceedings according to the respect of factions, is a principal part of policy. Whereas, contrariwise, the chiefest wisdom is, either in ordering those things which are general, and wherein men of several factions do nevertheless agree, or in dealing with correspondence to particular persons one by one. But I say not that the consideration of factions is to be neglected. Mean men, in their rising, must adhere; but great men, that have strength in themselves, were better to maintain themselves indifferent and neutral. Yet even in beginners, to adhere so moderately, as he be a man of the one faction which is most passable with the other, commonly giveth best way. The lower and weaker faction is the firmer in conjunction; and it is often seen, that a few that are stiff, do tire out a greater number that are more moderate.

When one of the factions is extinguished, the remainder subdivideth; as the faction between Lucullus and the rest of the nobles of the Senate (which they called *optimates*) held out awhile against the faction of

Pompey and Cæsar ; but when the Senate's authority
25 was pulled down, Cæsar and Pompey soon after
brake. The faction or party of Antonius and Oc-
tavius Cæsar against Brutus and Cassius, held out
likewise for a time ; but when Brutus and Cassius
were overthrown, then, soon after, Antonius and
30 Octavius brake, and subdivided. These examples
are of wars, but the same holdeth in private factions.
And, therefore, those that are seconds in factions, do
many times, when the faction subdivideth, prove
principals. But many times also they prove cyphers
35 and cashiered ; for many a man's strength is in
opposition, and, when that faileth, he groweth out
of use.

It is commonly seen, that men once placed, take
in with the contrary faction to that by which they
40 enter : thinking, belike, that they have the first sure,
and now are ready for a new purchase. The traitor
in faction lightly goeth away with it ; for when matters
have stuck long in balancing, the winning of some
one man casteth them, and he getteth all the thanks.
45 The even carriage between two factions proceedeth
not always of moderation, but of a trueness to a
man's self, with end to make use of both. Certainly,
in Italy, they hold it a little suspect in popes, when
they have often in their mouth, *Padre commune* ; and
50 take it to be a sign of one that meaneth to refer all
to the greatness of his own house.

Kings had need beware how they side themselves,
and make themselves as of a faction or party ; for
leagues within the State are ever pernicious to
55 monarchies : for they raise an obligation paramount

to obligation of sovereignty, and make the king *tanquam unus ex nobis*; as was to be seen in the League of France. When factions are carried too high and too violently, it is a sign of weakness in princes, and much to the prejudice both of their authority and business. The motions of factions under kings ought to be like the motions (as the astronomers speak) of the inferior orbs, which may have their proper motions, but yet still are quietly carried by the higher motion of *primum mobile*. 60 65

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. "Faction" is "party" used in a bad sense, but we cannot consider the subject adequately without including its good side. Party spirit as embodied in guilds, clubs, trades unions, etc., is a protest against individual helplessness and individual selfishness. Men are naturally disposed to hunt in packs, and a common object or a common sentiment generates a force of sympathy which swallows up minor differences. Especially in troublous times, when politics is the question of questions, political agreement (Cicero's *idem sentire de republica*) is a great forger of friendship.

ii. Party spirit is often opposed to public spirit, and croakers point back to the good old days "when none was for a party, and all were for the State." In small communities surrounded by hostile neighbours and struggling for bare existence, absence of party may have been a realizable ideal, but with the complex forces and contending interests which are welded together in a modern nationality, such uniformity is neither possible nor desirable. We must agree to differ, and the common weal is best served by each fighting for the party which he has joined. The poco-curante philosopher who boasts that "he has no influence, belongs to no party," or, like Horace, that he drifts with the tide, is regarded with suspicion as unpatriotic. The philosopher might defend

himself by pleading that the critic who stands aloof from the narrowness of party is the salt of a nation. He might further urge that the many join a party to save themselves the trouble of thinking and acting for themselves. The fact remains, that party government is inevitable. Party organization is the necessary machinery for determining public opinion. It is the only safeguard against the tyranny of a minority, but it may lead to an evil no less real if less obvious, the tyranny of the majority, the suppression of originality and independence.

iii. Such combinations of men at first were rather religious and commercial than political. Factions, dangerous to a small state, were particularly active at Athens, where clubs, or "hetaeries," were formed among the leading citizens to stand by each other for the acquisition of public office, for mutual help in political trials, for carrying measures through the assembly, and for impeaching or defending ex-magistrates. But little is known of their constitution and influence; they were thoroughly oligarchical in constitution, and largely used by Nikias and Alkibiades. Peisander visited all the "hetaeries" in B.C. 242 to exhort them to join action against the democracy. There were similar institutions at Carthage holding perpetual banquets to keep the proletariat in good humour. At Rome the "*collegia*" and "*sodalicia*" exercised a similar influence. As early as B.C. 314 "*coitiones*," or associations to carry elections were attacked, but the clubs were too strong for the government.¹ In B.C. 56 the "*lex Licinia de sodaliciis*" attempted to check the undue use of club organization in elections, which had grown to an alarming extent in the hands of Clodius through the revival of the street clubs (*collegia compitalicia*), a formal organization with an almost military arrangement of the whole population of Rome into streets.² Mommsen tells us that, in B.C. 53, "the elections were essentially in the power of the different clubs into which the aristocracy had grouped themselves." They were generally used to prevent the masses from using that power, which they scarcely knew that they possessed.

¹ Livy, ix. 26.

² Mommsen, vol. iv. pt. ii. p. 296.

iii. In the Middle Ages the ruling classes formed themselves into associations to defend their privileges, or attack their rivals. The commons were too weak to combine of themselves, and ranged themselves under the monarch against the nobles, or *vice versâ*. Commerce found protection in powerful guilds ; the Church extended her power by the formation of religious orders and houses, working with different degrees of power and secresy, but rarely antagonistic to the central ecclesiastical power. For some time the Church, through her superior organization and the absence of disruptive agencies, seemed likely to prevail over the State, which was exposed to the factions which every powerful noble was able to form against the government, and was constantly in unstable equilibrium, as one or the other feudal lord became disproportionately strong. The prime necessity was a stable government. The friends of order, and generally the oppressed commons, rallied round the monarchy or the Church, either centre struggling to absorb the other. The politic monarch, as Bacon, following Machiavelli, hints, would endeavour to play off one faction against another, or, failing this, to crush, conciliate, or cajole the leaders. When antipathies were too strong to be reconciled, and the sword was drawn to cut the knot that policy could not untie, common interests and dangers drew the various factions into wider unities. We see Guelf opposed to Ghibeline, France to Burgundy ; York was pitted against Lancaster ; court and nobles ranged themselves together to oppose Frondeurs and Puritans ; Catholic Europe united against the spread of the principles of the reformation. From the seventeenth century all differences became gradually merged in the division into people against king and nobles, and the popular party, now no longer in need of protection, learnt the new art of combining against privilege and vested interests. In the age which preceded the French revolution, the people began to organize itself by the choice of popular leaders, and the formation of those societies which played so important a part in the France of 1792, while this century has seen the repeal of protective legislation in England, the freedom and unification of Italy, the legitimate development of mass agitation and co-operation,

and the illegitimate growth of fenianism and nihilism. The struggle was at first nominally against the absolute monarchy, but king and noble, with many common interests, made common cause, and met the attack with combined forces.

iv. In this way there grew up that distinction between the people and the privileged which has remained to the present day, and will remain while society is divided into those who have and those who want. Before 1688 the king was supreme, and chose his own ministers from the most approved members of the Privy Council, the object being rather to be absolute through ministers than to govern for the people. After 1688 the balance of power between the privileged and the people was becoming more equal, and the development of representative institutions sent a respectable minority to parliament to advocate the claims of the people. At the same time legislation was becoming more complex and cumbrous as interests became more varied, and social problems more intricate. To adapt government to this altered state of things, the machinery of combined and organized action has been applied to parliamentary procedure. Following out the distinction between Whig and Tory, and taking advantage of the gregarious or cohesive instincts of man, the political world has divided itself into two great camps, each embodying a great principle, each with its own organization, resources, influence, leaders, and following. By the admission of the people to political power, this had become the only feasible form of government, and Marlborough's was the last attempt to govern England, except on party principles.

v. Party government assumes with a practical amount of truth that there are two, and only two, lines of thought, that there are two capable leaders, two capable cabinets, and that all the acts of the party in office can and ought to be criticised by the opposition party, which must be ready at any time to assume the responsibilities of office, when commanded to do so by a sovereign, whose choice of ministers is limited to the leaders of one or the other party. The advantages of this system are numerous. The essence of party government is moderation. Concession must be made on all sides to ensure uniformity,

and there will always be a number of moderate men, independent of party obligations and feelings, to throw their weight on the better side. Party organization, moreover, gives to the political soldier a general, and to the great statesman an army. The rank and file are kept together by the enthusiasm and *esprit de corps* which are produced by a common cause, with an honourable history and a definite creed. The leader has his recognized followers who are bound to him by party ties, and on whose co-operation he can count. Crotchets and class interests are subordinated to wider ends, and cohesion is given to the numerous factors of modern life. Further, the virulence of opposition is checked by the sense of responsibility, and political free-lances whose hand is against every man are brought under the discipline of organized opposition. Parties are responsible to the people, and especially to the moderate sensible middle-class which is not likely to sympathize with or to encourage excesses of party zeal, and in England the danger of factious strife between parties is lessened by the *de jure* existence of an ultimate appeal to the monarch, who is theoretically ready to take up the reins of government and actually moderates and balances the opposite parties. The wisdom of the Hanoverian line of sovereigns, with the exception of George III., has lain in non-interference. The line drawn round a party ought not, and, indeed, is not too definitely marked to prevent a fair amount of individuality, but the difficult problem, at present almost insoluble in other European states than England, of uniting a number of different ideas under one banner must involve some surrender of independence. If the electors are to take a real interest in their affairs, there must be an intimate connection between their representative and that party whose simple creed they understand and uphold. Political secession both on the part of leader and representative is only legitimate if the principles of a party are forgotten in the effort to continue in power, and then only perhaps after an appeal to a constituency. A number of non-essential points *are* always left to the individual judgment. Many measures are brought forward which are not identified with party politics and the fate of ministries, but a politician must to

a certain extent merge his personal identity in that of his party, or government will be impossible. The great defect of party politics is not so much the impersonality it demands of its members, as its general want of adaptiveness and elasticity. Changes come quickly, more quickly than a party can move. It takes time to infuse a new idea into a majority whether conservative or liberal, and many reforms are hindered by party traditions and precedents, when a single mind or a more centralized form of government would move without delay. So truth is sacrificed to party. A liberal government, for instance, fails to see that coercion must be used, while a conservative one would unduly prolong its application.

vi. Side by side with the growth of party politics the political club, or formal recognition of faction by a legitimate and open association, begins in the seventeenth century. The club, originally for social, convivial, or literary purposes, gradually changed from "an assembly of good fellows meeting under certain conditions" to a gigantic political caravanserai. The process began in the reign of Anne, grew vigorously under William and Mary and the first two Georges, and has since become a part of national life. The *Spectator*, *Tatler*, and *World* are full of interesting reminiscences of club life in all its forms. The "Kitcat Club," founded by the grasping Tonson, avowedly to promote literature, was the first club which became a political institution of great power, and later on among its members were "the patriots who saved Britain." Among clubs with a decidedly political motive were the Rota, where Harrington spoke, "a club-debating society for the dissemination of republican opinions," the "October Club," of which Swift was a frequenter, with entirely Tory views; the "Calves' Head Club," which ridiculed by its name the memory of Charles I.; while the "Mug-House Club" kept up the spirit of loyalty to the Protestant succession. The closer connection of club life with party politics begins with the Reform Bill, and at the same time the club became a centre for that political squibbing of which we have a good instance in the *New Whig Guide*. Brooks's, called after its founder, a wine merchant, and friend of Charles Fox, was conducted on Whig principles, while White's inclined to the

Tory interest. It must not, however, be supposed that either club was formally identified with a party. There were Tories at Brooks's and Whigs at White's. After the Reform Bill became law, Brooks's was too aristocratic for the rising professional and commercial men, and the Reform Club was formed by Liberals and Radicals, in which political creed was the condition of membership. During the last thirty years the majority of the Conservative party have migrated to the Carlton and Junior Carlton, both, like the Reform Club, formidable influences at elections. Nowadays every interest has its club, and poor and rich meet to discuss the affairs of the nation as well as their own, while political success is to a great measure a question of club organization.

vii. Party spirit has been further applied to politics in the *caucus*, an institution borrowed from America, and the bugbear or admiration of modern statesmen. It is manifest that as the constituency increases, it is harder to prepare the soil for a majority. To secure uniformity and prevent the disruption of the party by a large field of outsiders, a standing committee of the whole body of electors is formed to formulate an election creed and to work the majority up to the desired unity. The accurate formulation of a political creed and its acceptance by the majority act in two ways, the masses are trained to the consideration of political questions, but elasticity and independence is sacrificed both in the electors and the elected. The cobbler is taught, but the original mind is limited, and the representative by becoming a delegate loses in elasticity what the common weal may presumably gain by a clearly defined line of progress. Modern government is essentially government by majorities, and the steady onward march of the masses involves some sacrifice of individual eminence. With monarchical forms of government, and to some extent with oligarchy, the difficulty does not arise.

viii. Bacon lived in the days of absolute monarchy. He does not consider the advantage and disadvantage of parties as the necessary machinery of government and democratic progress, but their relation to the monarch who is the State. Factions represent private interests, good or bad, not principles. The king plays off faction

against faction, but must not identify himself with the one nor the other ; he uses faction as his motive power, or balances one set of interests by another ; factions can thus be made elements of stability. Modern political philosophy takes a position which is exactly the reverse of this. The State is the people ; faction or party is necessary for good government ; the monarch is necessary to hold the balance between the different factors, to lessen the friction of party strife, and to act as an element of stability in the constitution.

LII. Of Ceremonies and Respects.

HE that is only real had need have exceeding great parts of virtue, as the stone had need to be rich that is set without foil. But if a man mark it well, it is in praise and commendation of men as
5 it is in gettings and gains. For the proverb is true, *That light gains make heavy purses*, for light gains come thick, whereas great come but now and then ; so it is true, that small matters win great commendation, because they are continually in use and in note,
10 whereas the occasion of any great virtue cometh but on festivals. Therefore it doth much add to a man's reputation, and is (as Queen Isabella said) like perpetual letters commendatory, to have good forms.

To attain them, it almost sufficeth not to despise
15 them ; for so shall a man observe them in others, and let him trust himself with the rest. For if he labour too much to express them, he shall lose their grace, which is to be natural and unaffected. Some men's behaviour is like a verse, wherein every syllable is
20 measured. How can a man comprehend great matters, that breaketh his mind too much to small

observations? Not to use ceremonies at all, is to teach others not to use them again, and so diminish respect to himself (especially they are not to be omitted to strangers and formal natures); but the dwelling upon them, and exalting them above the moon, is not only tedious, but doth diminish the faith and credit of him that speaks. And certainly, there is a kind of conveying of effectual and imprinting passages amongst compliments, which is of singular use, if a man can hit upon it. 25 30

Amongst a man's peers a man shall be sure of familiarity, and therefore it is good a little to keep state. Amongst a man's inferiors one shall be sure of reverence, and therefore it is good a little to be familiar. He that is too much in anything, so that he giveth another occasion of satiety, maketh himself cheap. To apply one's self to others is good; so it be with demonstration that a man doth it upon regard and not upon facility. It is a good precept generally in seconding another, yet to add somewhat of one's own; as, if you will grant his opinion, let it be with some distinction; if you will follow his motion, let it be with condition; if you allow his counsel, let it be with alleging further reason. 40 45

Men had need beware how they be too perfect in compliments: for be they never so sufficient otherwise, their enviers will be sure to give them that attribute, to the disadvantage of their greater virtues. It is loss also in business to be too full of respects, or to be too curious in observing times and opportunities. Salomon saith, "*He that considereth the wind shall not sow, and he that looketh to the clouds*"

shall not reap." A wise man will make more opportunities than he finds. Men's behaviour should be like their apparel, not too strait or point device, but free for exercise or motion.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. A graceful control of face and mien is the true seasoning of virtue.

2. If even in words we obey the majority, why not in bearing and mien?

3. He that forgets decorum in trifling matters of everyday life, though he be a great man, you may be sure is only a wise one on special occasions.

4. Virtue and wisdom without forms are like foreign tongues which are not understood of the people.

5. He who does not learn¹ the feelings of the people by sharing them, if he fails to learn them by observance, is of all men most foolish.

6. Ceremony is but a translation of virtue into the vulgar tongue.

Against.

1. What is more unsightly than to transfer the stage to life?

2. The natural is graceful. The artificial is hateful.

3. Rather give me painted cheeks and curled hair than painted and curled manners.

4. The man that devotes his mind to petty observances, is incapable of great thought.

5. Affectation of naturalness is a whited sepulchre.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. That control of conduct which we distinguish as ceremony precedes the civil and ecclesiastical controls.

¹ Some read *movit* for *novit* with questionable sense.

Ceremony is found among otherwise ungoverned savages ; it is often highly developed where the other kinds of rule are little developed ; it is ever being spontaneously generated afresh between individuals in all societies ; and it envelops the more definite restraints which State and Church exercise. The primitiveness of ceremonial government is further shown by the fact that at first political and religious governments do little more than maintain systems of ceremony, directed towards particular persons living or dead.¹

ii. Ceremonialism springs from the instinctive recognition by man of superiority, and the corresponding desire to propitiate power by acts of courtesy. The first government was the government of ceremony, which preceded all law, moral, religious, and civil. A breach of ceremony was the gravest fault. Primitive ceremony centred round the god-king, and though at first wholly spontaneous was soon deliberately used by the ruler to confirm and strengthen his power. When a separation was made between human and divine power, the king was honoured by many expressions of respect which originally belonged to him as divine or as descended from a deity. As the divinity of kings gained less credence, ceremony became more and more artificial, and a code of court etiquette was evolved. The grandees who stood in the closest connection with the king were honoured by special marks of respect, and many of the royal titles were applied to all of noble birth. The king lost power as the nobles became more powerful, and the latter usurped many of the most important marks of honour which originally belonged to the king as divine.

iii. In primitive society a similar ceremoniousness was observed among equals. Man was rather a source of danger than help to his fellows. Samoans, Australian aborigines, wild Comanche Indians, and lawless Bedouins are ceremonious in their dealings with each other as well as with strangers. The observances of social ceremony were the first glimpses of social order, as court ceremony was the beginning of civil and religious government.

iv. Ceremony implies submission of the governed and absolute power on the part of the ruler. Wherever a

¹ Herbert Spencer.

government is despotically strong and the people submissively weak, a vigorous and excessive formalism pervades government, Church, law, and society. In China "previously to presentation at court, ambassadors pass many days in practising the required forms." In India and in the East, the same servile forms are observed in every part of life as in the time of Herodotus. In the Middle Ages the strength of feudalism, the power of the Church, the rigorous code of punishment, the division of society into classes were each supported by every device of ceremonialism—court etiquette, ceremonious methods of address, heraldry, laws of dress, regulation of domestic establishment, an imposing ritual and a formal legal procedure. So the revival of absolute forms of government is generally attended by a revival of ceremoniousness. The court of Napoleon I. was marked by a frigid etiquette. The official ceremonies of the German empire are conservatively impressive and numerous. The revival of the title and insignia of empire has strengthened the English government in India.

v. Life gets less ceremonious as law, religion, morality, and manners command the obedience of mankind from their own intrinsic influence. Ceremony is the taskmaster that enforces habits of order and righteousness. At first the ceremony is more important than the law, but after a time the ceremony becomes a positive hindrance to the law. The mutilations and obeisances of primitive life have dwindled down to a formal visit to the White House to shake hands with the President. The present dynasty of English sovereigns has won popularity by the unaffected simplicity of its members. Ceremony lost much of its force by dilution. Thus esquire once implied birth or landed property; now it is applied to all above the rank of artisan or shopkeeper. Spain is the most ceremonious and the most backward nation of Europe.

vi. It is not, however, likely that ceremony will cease to exist. Its use is to serve as a safeguard against impertinence; it is a sort of manual of polite behaviour, a code of the minor moralities. "Ceremony," writes Selden, "keeps up all things; it is like a penny glass to a rich spirit or some excellent water; without it the water would be spilt, the spirit lost. There are some

mathematicians that could with one fetch of their pen make an exact circle, and with the next touch point out the centre. Is it therefore reasonable to banish all use of compasses? Set forms are a pair of compasses." Religion, government, law, and society can hardly exist without suitable symbols. The decorum of the House of Commons is (or was) maintained by the observance of the traditional forms of address and conduct.

vii. Ceremony exists chiefly in aristocratic forms of society, and implies superiors and inferiors ; politeness is rather a democratic virtue, and is the outward form of that mutual respect and good feeling which unites a society of equals. The Latin has one word for manners and morals, which shows how closely the two are connected. The higher a man's morality, the more he can afford to dispense with formal rules of behaviour, and conversely the ill-bred or underbred man needs a social code to prevent him from annoying and offending his neighbours. Etiquette is a sort of freemasonry to exclude interlopers from a privileged circle. Bohemianism is the protest of the individual against *das allgemeine das uns alle bündigt*. Eccentricity, however, is more often a sign of weakness than of strength, and the Elijah Pograms who suck their knives in order to assert their equality against all comers are a commoner type than the Mussets and George Sand.

viii. Forms are as necessary to society as style is to literature. Carlyle forcibly insists upon this when he writes : " It is meritorious to insist on forms. Religion and all else naturally clothes itself in forms. Everywhere the formed world is the only habitable one. The naked formlessness of Puritanism is not the thing I praise in the Puritans ; it is the thing I pity,—praising only the spirit which had rendered that inevitable ! All substances clothe themselves in forms : but there are suitable true forms, and then there are untrue, unsuitable. As the briefest definition, forms which *grow* round a substance, if we rightly understand that, will correspond to the true nature and purport of it, will be true, good ; forms which are consciously *put* round a substance, bad. I invite you to reflect on this. It distinguishes true from false in Ceremonial Form, earnest solemnity from empty

pageant, in all human things." ¹ Carlyle well recognizes a distinction, which H. Spencer virtually ignores, between the artificial and spontaneous in form. H. Spencer fails to see that protest against form as form is the folly of the child who kicks against all rule. If a truth is too great for formal utterance, it is useless, except to the possessor who feels it. Often, by the concrete symbolism of ceremony, the truth is seen through a glass darkly, or is the best that can be offered. Puritanism revolted against the pedantry of Laud and his party, but soon lost its hold on the mind because it presented truths in their savage and naked reality. So there is always a danger in over-abstraction in religion as elsewhere. Symbolism enlists the emotions in the service of truth, only the shadow must never be promoted above the substance. "Given the living *man*, there will be found *clothes* for him, he will find himself clothes. But the suit of clothes pretending that it is both clothes and man!" Curiously enough ceremony, the stronghold of power, has been turned to the protection of the weak. The action of society is extremely valuable in protecting by ceremonial observances those who are undefended by law, or by nature, or by both. The position of women has almost entirely been fixed by men, and, to protect the weak from the consequences of one-sided legislation, in the first case chivalry, and afterwards society, have insisted on an unwritten system of rules regulating the behaviour of the stronger to the weaker. But when Lamb laments the decay of gallantry, and conservatism mournfully compares the profuse attentions of an eighteenth-century *beau* with the nonchalance of a modern exquisite, we must not suppose that the present age is less forbearing to weakness, but rather that the necessity has past for the compulsory enforcement of good conduct, and that the distinctions between the weak and the strong, legal and physical, are being broken down.

¹ Carlyle, *Hero Worship*, vi.

LIII. Of Praise.

PRAISE is the reflection of virtue. But it is as the glass or body which giveth the reflection. If it be from the common people, it is commonly false and naught, and rather followeth vain persons than virtuous: for the common people understand 5 not many excellent virtues. The lowest virtues draw praise from them, the middle virtues work in them astonishment or admiration; but of the highest virtues they have no sense or perceiving at all. But shows, and *species virtutibus similes* serve best with them. 10 Certainly, fame is like a river, that beareth up things light and swollen, and drowns things weighty and solid. But if persons of quality and judgment concur, then it is (as the Scripture saith) *Nomen bonum instar unguenti fragrantis*. It filleth all round about, and 15 will not easily away; for the odours of ointments are more durable than flowers.

There be so many false points of praise, that a man may justly hold it a suspect. Some praises proceed merely of flattery: and if he be an ordinary flatterer, he 20 will have certain common attributes, which may serve every man; if he be a cunning flatterer, he will follow the arch-flatterer, which is a man's self, and wherein a man thinketh best of himself, therein the flatterer will uphold him most; but if he be an impudent flatterer, 25 look wherein a man is conscious to himself that he is most defective, and is most out of countenance in himself, that will the flatterer entitle him to, perforce, *spretā*

conscientia. Some praises come of good wishes and
30 respects, which is a form due in civility to kings and
great persons, *laudando præcipere*; when by telling
men what they are, they represent to them what they
should be. Some men are praised maliciously to
their hurt, thereby to stir envy and jealousy towards
35 them; *pessimum genus inimicorum laudantium*; inso-
much as it was a proverb amongst the Grecians, that
*he that was praised to his hurt, should have a push rise
upon his nose*; as we say, that *A blister will rise upon
one's tongue that tells a lie*. Certainly, moderate praise,
40 used with opportunity, and not vulgar, is that which
doeth the good. Salomon saith, "*He that praiseth his
friend aloud, rising early, it shall be to him no better
than a curse*." Too much magnifying of man or
matter doth irritate contradiction, and procure envy
45 and scorn.

To praise a man's self cannot be decent, except it
be in rare cases; but to praise a man's office or pro-
fession, he may do it with good grace, and with a
kind of magnanimity. The cardinals of Rome, which
50 are theologues, and friars, and schoolmen, have a
phrase of notable contempt and scorn towards civil
business: for they call all temporal business of
wars, embassages, judicature, and other employments,
sbirrerie, which is *under-sheriffries*, as if they were but
55 matters for under-sheriffs and catch-polls; though
many times these under-sheriffries do more good than
their high speculations. St. Paul, when he boasts of
himself, he doth oft interlace, *I speak like a fool*; but
speaking of his calling, he saith, *Magnificabo aposto-*
60 *latum meum*.

ANTITHETA.

For.

1. Praise is the reflection of virtue.

2. Praise is the honour awarded by a spontaneous suffrage.

3. Honours are bestowed by various governments, but praises are everywhere the peculiar gift of liberty.

4. The voice of the people is the voice of a god. How else could so many heads join for one purpose?

5. No marvel if the many speak more truthfully than the great, seeing that they speak more safely.

Against.

1. Fame is a bad messenger and a worse judge.

2. What has a good man to do with the slaver of a mob?

3. Fame, like a river, bears up what is light, and lets the solid sink.

4. The many have praise for the lowest virtues, admiration for middle virtues, but for the highest no sense at all.

5. Praise depends more on ostentation than on deserts, and prefers a bubble reputation to solid worth.

LIV. Of Vain-Glory.

IT was prettily devised of Æsop:—the fly sat upon the axle-tree of the chariot wheel, and said, *What a dust do I raise!* So are there some vain persons, that, whatsoever goeth alone, or moveth upon greater means, if they have never so little hand ⁵ in it, they think it is they that carry it. They that are glorious must needs be factious; for all bravery stands upon comparisons. They must needs be violent, to make good their own vaunts. Neither can they be secret; and therefore not effectual: but, ¹⁰ according to the French proverb, *beaucoup de bruit,*

peu de fruit: much bruit, little fruit. Yet, certainly, there is use of this quality in civil affairs. Where there is an opinion and fame to be created, either
15 of virtue or greatness, these men are good trumpeters. Again, as Titus Livius noteth in the case of Antiochus and the Ætolians, there are sometimes great effects of cross lies; as, if a man that negotiates between two princes, to draw them to join in a war
20 against a third, doth extol the forces of either of them above measure, the one to the other. And sometimes he that deals between man and man raiseth his own credit with both, by pretending greater interest than he hath in either. And in these, and the like kinds, it
25 often falls out, that somewhat is produced of nothing; for lies are sufficient to breed opinion, and opinion brings on substance.

In military commanders and soldiers, vain-glory is an essential point; for as iron sharpens iron, so by
30 glory one courage sharpeneth another. In cases of great enterprise upon charge and adventure a composition of glorious natures doth put life into business; and those that are of solid and sober natures, have more of the ballast than of the sail. In fame of
35 learning, the flight will be slow without some feathers of ostentation. *Qui de contemnenda gloria libros scribunt, nomen suum inscribunt.* Socrates, Aristotle, Galen, were men full of ostentation. Certainly vain-glory helpeth to perpetuate a man's memory; and
40 virtue was never so beholding to human nature, as it received his due at the second hand. Neither had the fame of Cicero, Seneca, Plinius Secundus, borne her age so well, if it had not been joined with some

vanity in themselves ; like unto varnish, that makes ceilings not only shine, but last. 45

But all this while, when I speak of vain-glory, I mean not of that property that Tacitus doth attribute to Mucianus, *Omnium, quæ dixerat feceratque, arte quadam ostentator*. For that proceeds not of vanity, but of natural magnanimity and discretion ; and in 50 some persons is not only comely but gracious. For excusations, cessions, modesty itself well governed, are but arts of ostentation. And amongst those arts there is none better than that which Plinius Secundus speaketh of, which is to be liberal of praise and com- 55 mendation to others, in that wherein a man's self hath any perfection. For, saith Pliny, very wittily, "*In commending another, you do yourself right ; for he that you commend is either superior to you in that you commend, or inferior. If he be inferior, if he be to be com- 60 mended, you much more : if he be superior, if he be not to be commended, you much less.*"

Glorious men are the scorn of wise men, the admiration of fools, the idols of parasites, and the slaves of their own vaunts. 65

LV. Of Honour and Reputation.

THE winning of honour is but the revealing of a man's virtue and worth without disadvantage. For some in their actions do woo and affect honour and reputation ; which sort of men are commonly much talked of, but inwardly little admired. And 5 some, contrariwise, darken their virtue in the show of it, so as they be undervalued in opinion.

If a man perform that which hath not been attempted before, or attempted and given over, or
10 hath been achieved but not with so good circumstance, he shall purchase more honour than by affecting a matter of greater difficulty or virtue, wherein he is but a follower. If a man so temper his actions, as in some one of them he doth content
15 every faction or combination of people, the music will be the fuller. A man is an ill husband of his honour that entereth into any action, the failing wherein may disgrace him more than the carrying of it through can honour him. Honour that is gained
20 and broken upon another hath the quickest reflection, like diamonds cut with facets ; and, therefore, let a man contend to excel any competitors of his in honour in outshooting them, if he can, in their own bow. Discreet followers and servants help much to reputa-
25 tion : *Omnis fama a domesticis emanat*. Envy, which is the canker of honour, is best extinguished by declaring a man's self in his ends rather to seek merit than fame ; and by attributing a man's successes rather to divine Providence and felicity, than
30 to his own virtue or policy.

The true marshalling of the degrees of sovereign honour are these. In the first place are *conditores imperiorum*, founders of states and commonwealths ; such as were Romulus, Cyrus, Cæsar, Ottoman,
35 Ismael. In the second place are *legislatores*, law-givers ; which are also called second founders, or *perpetui principes*, because they govern by their ordinances after they are gone ; such were Lycurgus, Solon, Justinian, Eadgar, Alphonsus of Castile the

Wise, that made the *Siete partidas*. In the third ⁴⁰ place are *liberatores*, or *salvatores*; such as compound the long miseries of civil wars or deliver their countries from servitude of strangers and tyrants; as Augustus Cæsar, Vespasianus, Aurelianus, Theodoricus, King Henry the Seventh of England, King Henry ⁴⁵ the Fourth of France. In the fourth place are *propagatores*, or *propugnatores imperii*; such as in honourable wars enlarge their territories, or make noble defence against invaders. And in the last place are *patres patriæ*, which reign justly, and make the times ⁵⁰ good wherein they live. Both which last kinds need no examples, they are in such number.

Degrees of honour in subjects are, first, *participes curarum*, those upon whom princes do discharge the greatest weight of their affairs; their right hands, as ⁵⁵ we may call them. The next are *duces belli*, great leaders; such as are princes' lieutenants, and do them notable services in the wars. The third are *gratiosi*, favourites; such as exceed not this scantling, to be solace to the sovereign, and harmless to the ⁶⁰ people. And the fourth, *negotiis pares*; such as have great places under princes, and execute their places with sufficiency. There is an honour likewise, which may be ranked amongst the greatest, which happeneth rarely; that is, of such as sacrifice themselves to death ⁶⁵ or danger for the good of their country; as was M. Regulus, and the two Decii.

LVI. Of Judicature.

JUDGES ought to remember that their office is *jus dicere*, and not *jus dare*; to interpret law, and not to make law or give law. Else will it be like the authority claimed by the Church of Rome, which, under
 5 pretext of exposition of Scripture, doth not stick to add and alter, and to pronounce that which they do not find, and by show of antiquity to introduce novelty. Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more advised than con-
 10 fident. Above all things, integrity is their portion, and proper virtue. *Cursed* (saith the law) *is he that removeth the landmark.* The mislayer of a mere stone is to blame. But it is the unjust judge that is the capital remover of landmarks, when he defineth amiss
 15 of land and property. One foul sentence doth more hurt than many foul examples. For these do but corrupt the stream, the other corrupteth the fountain. So saith Solomon, "*Fons turbatus et vena corrupta est justus cadens in causa sua coram adversario.*"

20 The office of judges may have reference unto the parties that sue, unto the advocates that plead, unto clerks and ministers of justice underneath them, and to the sovereign or state above them.

First, for the causes or parties that sue. *There be*
 25 (saith the Scripture) *that turn judgment into wormwood*; and surely there be also that turn it into vinegar; for injustice maketh it bitter, and delays make it sour. The principal duty of a judge is to suppress force and

fraud, whereof force is the more pernicious when it is open, and fraud when it is close and disguised. Add 30 thereto contentious suits, which ought to be spewed out as the surfeit of courts. A judge ought to prepare his way to a just sentence, as God useth to prepare his way, by raising valleys and taking down hills. So, when there appeareth on either side an high hand, 35 violent persecution, cunning advantages taken, combination, power, great counsel, then is the virtue of a judge seen to make inequality equal; that he may plant his judgment as upon an even ground. *Qui fortiter emungit, elicit sanguinem*; and where the wine-press 40 is hard wrought, it yields a harsh wine, that tastes of the grape-stone. Judges must beware of hard constructions and strained inferences; for there is no worse torture than the torture of laws. Specially in case of laws penal, they ought to have care, that that 45 which was meant for terror be not turned into rigour: and that they bring not upon people that shower whereof the Scripture speaketh, *Pluet super eos laqueos*. For penal laws pressed, are a shower of snares upon the people. Therefore let penal laws, if they have 50 been sleepers of long, or if they be grown unfit for the present time, be by wise judges confined in the execution:

“Judicis officium est, ut res, ita tempora rerum,” etc.

In causes of life and death, judges ought (as far as the law permitteth) in justice to remember mercy, and to 55 cast a severe eye upon the example, but a merciful eye upon the person.

Secondly, for the advocates and counsel that plead.

Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of
60 justice ; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned
cymbal. It is no grace to a judge first to find that
which he might have heard in due time from the bar,
or to show quickness of conceit in cutting off evidence
or counsel too short, or to prevent information by
65 questions, though pertinent. The parts of a judge in
hearing are four : to direct the evidence ; to moderate
length, repetition, or impertinency of speech ; to re-
capitulate, select, and collate the material points of
that which hath been said ; and to give the rule or
70 sentence. Whatsoever is above these is too much,
and proceedeth either of glory and willingness to
speak, or of impatience to hear, or of shortness of
memory, or of want of a staid and equal attention. It
is a strange thing to see that the boldness of advocates
75 should prevail with judges ; whereas they should
imitate God, in whose seat they sit, who represseth the
presumptuous, and giveth grace to the modest. But
it is more strange that judges should have noted
favourites ; which cannot but cause multiplication of
80 fees and suspicion of by-ways. There is due from
the judge to the advocate some commendation and
gracing, where causes are well handled and fair
pleaded, especially towards the side which obtaineth
not ; for that upholds in the client the reputation of
85 his counsel, and beats down in him the conceit of his
cause. There is likewise due to the public a civil
reprehension of advocates, where there appeareth
cunning counsel, gross neglect, slight information,
indiscreet pressing, or an over-bold defence. And let
90 not the counsel at the bar chop with the judge, nor

wind himself into the handling of the cause anew, after the judge hath declared his sentence : but, on the other side, let not the judge meet the cause half-way, nor give occasion to the party to say his counsel or proofs were not heard. 95

Thirdly, for that that concerns clerks and ministers. The place of justice is an hallowed place ; and therefore not only the bench, but the footpace and precincts and purprise thereof ought to be preserved without scandal and corruption. For, certainly, *Grapes* (as the 100
Scripture saith) *will not be gathered of thorns or thistles* ; neither can justice yield her fruit with sweetness amongst the briars and brambles of catching and polling clerks and ministers. The attendance of courts is subject to four bad instruments. First, 105
certain persons that are sowers of suits, which make the court swell, and the country pine. The second sort is of those that engage courts in quarrels of jurisdiction, and are not truly *amici curiæ*, but *parasiti curiæ*, in puffing a court up beyond her bounds for 110
their own scraps and advantage. The third sort is of those that may be accounted the left hands of courts : persons that are full of nimble and sinister tricks and shifts, whereby they pervert the plain and direct courses of courts, and bring justice into oblique lines 115
and labyrinths. And the fourth is the poller and exacter of fees ; which justifies the common resemblance of the courts of justice to the bush, whereunto while the sheep flies for defence in weather, he is sure to lose part of his fleece. On the other side, an 120
ancient clerk, skilful in precedents, wary in proceedings, and understanding in the business of the court,

is an excellent finger of a court, and doth many times point the way to the judge himself.

- 125 Fourthly, for that which may concern the sovereign and estate. Judges ought, above all, to remember the conclusion of the Roman twelve tables, *Salus populi suprema lex*; and to know that laws, except they be in order to that end, are but things captious, 130 and oracles not well inspired. Therefore it is an happy thing in a state, when kings and states do often consult with judges: and again, when judges do often consult with the king and state; the one, when there is matter of law intervenient in business of state; the 135 other, when there is some consideration of state intervenient in matter of law. For many times the things deduced to judgment may be *meum* and *tuum*, when the reason and consequence thereof may trench to point of estate. I call matter of estate, not only the 140 parts of sovereignty, but whatsoever introduceth any great alteration or dangerous precedent, or concerneth manifestly any great portion of people. And let no man weakly conceive that just laws and true policy have any antipathy; for they are like the spirits and 145 sinews, that one moves with the other. Let judges also remember, that Salomon's throne was supported by lions on both sides: let them be lions, but yet lions under the throne, being circumspect they do not check or oppose any points of sovereignty. Let not 150 judges also be so ignorant of their own right as to think there is not left them, as a principal part of their office, a wise use and application of laws. For they may remember what the Apostle saith of a greater law than theirs, "*Nos scimus quia lex bona est,* 155 *modo quis ea utatur legitime.*"

ANTITHETA.

*For.**Against.*

1. Once quit the letter of the law, and you change interpretation for guess-work.

2. Quitting the letter of the law the judge makes himself a law-giver.

1. The sense of single words must be gathered from the context.

2. The worst tyranny is the tyranny that tortures law.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Judges in Bacon's time were servants of the king rather than of the nation, appointed by the king, and dismissed at his pleasure. Under such conditions independence was impossible. To give a single instance among hundreds, in the case of Sir John Eliot the Admiralty Judge acknowledges the receipt of instructions from James, "by which I understand his Majesty's resolution to continue Sir John Eliot in prison. I am glad I did forbear to deliver my opinion of the state of his cause, lest perhaps it might have differed somewhat."

ii. Judges, according to Bacon's theory, held their office from the monarch, and were bound in return to support the monarchy. When any constitutional question arose between king and commons they were, indeed, to act as arbiters, but their weight would naturally incline to the side of the sovereign. Thus, in his speech to Justice Hutton, he says, "Above all, you ought to maintain the king's prerogative; the king's prerogative is law, the principal part of law." It is obvious that Bacon's theory, if conceded, would render the monarchy absolute and reduce Parliament to a purely deliberative body. No matter what statutes Parliament passed, they would be interpreted and practically overruled by judge-made law directed by the monarch.

iii. The independence of the bench was first secured by the Act of Settlement, in 1702. It enacted that the commissions of judges should be made *quam diu se bene gesserint*, or during good behaviour; that they could only

be dismissed from office if convicted of some offence or upon an address of both Houses of Parliament. By an Act of George I. it was further provided that judges should continue in office notwithstanding the demise of the sovereign. The final severance of judges from politics was effected when judges (with the single exception of the Lord Chancellor) ceased to be raised to the peerage and to sit in the House of Lords. Lord Ellenborough was the last judge who has been a member of the cabinet. One more abuse of Bacon's time, which has only been abandoned in this century, must be noted. Judges are never now consulted by the crown for extra-judicial opinions. The law officers of the crown, the attorney-general and the solicitor-general, are the *ex officio* advisers of the ministry.

LVII. Of Anger.

TO seek to extinguish anger utterly is but a bravery of the Stoics. We have better oracles: *Be angry, but sin not; let not the sun go down upon your anger.* Anger must be limited and confined, both in race and in time. We will first speak how the natural inclination and habit to be angry may be attempered and calmed; secondly, how the particular motions of anger may be repressed, or, at least, refrained from doing mischief; thirdly, how to raise anger, or appease anger in another.

For the first; there is no other way but to meditate and ruminate well upon the effects of anger, how it troubles man's life. And the best time to do this, is to look back upon anger when the fit is thoroughly over. Seneca saith well, that *Anger is like ruin, which breaks itself upon that it falls.* The Scripture exhorteth us to possess our souls in patience. Whosoever is out of

patience, is out of possession of his soul. Men must not turn bees :

—*animasque in vulnere ponunt.*

Anger is certainly a kind of baseness ; as it appears ²⁰ well in the weakness of those subjects in whom it reigns—children, women, old folks, sick folks. Only men must beware that they carry their anger rather with scorn than with fear, so that they may seem rather to be above the injury than below it ; which is a ²⁵ thing easily done, if a man will give law to himself in it.

For the second point ; the causes and motives of anger are chiefly three. First, to be too sensible of hurt ; for no man is angry that feels not himself hurt ; and, therefore, tender and delicate persons must needs ³⁰ be oft angry, they have so many things to trouble them, which more robust natures have little sense of. The next is, the apprehension and construction of the injury offered, to be, in the circumstances thereof, full of contempt. For contempt is that which putteth an ³⁵ edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself. And therefore, when men are ingenious in picking out circumstances of contempt, they do kindle their anger much. Lastly, opinion of the touch of a man's reputation doth multiply and sharpen anger, ⁴⁰ wherein the remedy is, that a man should have, as Consalvo was wont to say, *telam honoris crassioorem*. But in all refrainings of anger, it is the best remedy to win time, and to make a man's self believe that the opportunity of his revenge is not yet come, but that ⁴⁵ he foresees a time for it, and so to still himself in the mean time and reserve it.

To contain anger from mischief, though it take hold of a man, there be two things whereof you must have
 50 special caution. The one, of extreme bitterness of words, especially if they be aculeate and proper (for *communia maledicta* are nothing so much); and again, that in anger a man reveal no secrets: for that makes him not fit for society. The other, that you do not
 55 peremptorily break off in any business in a fit of anger: but howsoever you show bitterness, do not act anything that is not revocable.

For raising and appeasing anger in another, it is done chiefly by choosing of times when men are
 60 frowardest and worst disposed, to incense them. Again, by gathering (as was touched before) all that you can find out to aggravate the contempt. And the two remedies are by the contraries. The former to take good times, when first to relate to a man an angry
 65 business; for the first impression is much. And the other is, to sever, as much as may be, the construction of the injury from the point of contempt; imputing it to misunderstanding, fear, passion, or what you will.

ANNOTATIONS AND HINTS.

i. Anger is a natural emotion, and to seek to extinguish it is not only quixotic, as Bacon says, but suicidal. Anger, it is true, is anti-social, and the tendency of society is to suppress it by tabooing all manifestations of anger; but it has its use, and like the sting of the bee or the fang of the serpent, serves to protect the individual against aggression. It is a sort of latent force, which, however seldom it is actively displayed, each man from his own consciousness accredits his neighbour with.

ii. Aristotle defines anger as a painful desire of avenging one's self for a slight on one's self or one's friend, and he

founds the distinction between anger and hatred on this sense of personal wrong. Thus we hate a class ; we are angry only with an individual. A more essential distinction is that anger is momentary and compatible with love ; hatred is lasting and deadly. The righteous anger of the New Testament to which Bacon refers (Bishop Butler's resentment) would be classed by Aristotle under hatred. It is aroused by wrong *quâ* wrong, not by wrong as it affects ourselves. It is the θυμοειδές of Plato's Republic—the spirited element which sides with the reason and keeps in check the unruly desires.

iii. As to the causes of anger, it may be noted that Bacon's analysis hardly covers some common cases, as of a child with a broken toy or a tyrant with a stupid servant. Here there is no contempt, and the hurt may be very slight. The cause of anger in both cases is the sense of opposition, the inability to control external circumstances at will and pleasure. The angry man is the ἀκρατής, the man who has not been schooled to measure his powers against nature and against his fellow-men. A public school is the best cure for a passionate child, and a man who mixes freely with his equals must learn to curb his anger. The country squire, the sea captain, the rich old bachelor are the stock angry characters of the stage.

LVIII. Of Vicissitude of Things.

SALOMON saith, “ *There is no new thing upon the earth.*” So that as Plato had an imagination that *All knowledge was but remembrance*, so Salomon giveth his sentence, that *All novelty is but oblivion*. Whereby you may see that the river of Lethe runneth 5 as well above ground as below. There is an abstruse astrologer that saith : “ *If it were not for two things that are constant (the one is, that the fixed stars ever stand at like distance one from another, and never come nearer together, nor go further asunder ; the other, that* 10

the diurnal motion perpetually keepeth time), no individual would last one moment." Certain it is that the Matter is in a perpetual flux, and never at a stay. The great winding-sheets that bury all things in
15 oblivion are two ; deluges and earthquakes. As for conflagrations and great droughts, they do not merely dispeople or destroy. Phaeton's car went but a day ; and the three years' drought, in the time of Elias, was but particular, and left people alive. As for the
20 great burnings by lightnings, which are often in the West Indies, they are but narrow. But in the other two destructions, by deluge and earthquake, it is further to be noted, that the remnant of people which hap to be reserved, are commonly ignorant and
25 mountainous people, that can give no account of the time past ; so that the oblivion is all one, as if none had been left. If you consider well of the people of the West Indies, it is very probable that they are a newer or a younger people than the people
30 of the old world. And it is much more likely that the destruction that hath heretofore been there, was not by earthquakes (as the Egyptian priest told Solon, concerning the island of Atlantis, that *it was swallowed by an earthquake*), but rather, that it was desolated
35 by a particular deluge. For earthquakes are seldom in those parts. But, on the other side, they have such pouring rivers, as the rivers of Asia and Africk and Europe are but brooks to them. Their Andes likewise, or mountains, are far higher than those
40 with us. Whereby it seems, that the remnants of generations of men were in such a particular deluge saved. As for the observation that Machiavel hath,

that the jealousy of sects doth much extinguish the memory of things; traducing Gregory the Great, that he did what in him lay to extinguish all heathen 45 antiquities—I do not find that those zeals do any great effects, nor last long; as it appeared in the succession of Sabinian, who did revive the former antiquities.

The vicissitudes or mutations in the superior globe 50 are no fit matter for this present argument. It may be, Plato's great year, if the world should last so long, would have some effect, not in renewing the state of like individuals (for that is the fume of those that conceive the celestial bodies have more accurate in- 55 fluences upon these things below, than indeed they have), but in gross. Comets, out of question, have likewise power and effect over the gross and mass of things; but they are rather gazed upon, and waited upon in their journey, than wisely observed in their 60 effects, especially in their respective effects; that is, what kind of comet, for magnitude, colour, version of the beams, placing in the region of heaven, or lasting, produceth what kind of effects.

There is a toy, which I have heard, and I would 65 not have it given over, but waited upon a little. They say it is observed in the Low Countries (I know not in what part), that every five and thirty years the same kind and suit of years and weathers comes about again; as, great frosts, great wet, great droughts, 70 warm winters, summers with little heat, and the like; and they call it the prime. It is a thing I do the rather mention, because, computing backwards, I have found some concurrence.

75 But to leave these points of nature, and to come to men. The greatest vicissitude of things amongst men is the vicissitude of sects and religions. For those orbs rule in men's minds most. The true religion is built upon the rock ; the rest are tossed
80 upon the waves of time. To speak therefore of the causes of new sects, and to give some counsel concerning them—as far as the weakness of human judgment can give stay to so great revolutions.

When the religion formerly received is rent by
85 discords, and when the holiness of the professors of religion is decayed and full of scandal, and withal the times be stupid, ignorant, and barbarous, you may doubt the springing up of a new sect ; if then also there should arise any extravagant and strange
90 spirit to make himself author thereof. All which points held when Mahomet published his law. If a new sect have not two properties, fear it not ; for it will not spread. The one is the supplanting, or the opposing of authority established ; for nothing is more
95 popular than that. The other is the giving licence to pleasures and a voluptuous life. For as for speculative heresies (such as were in ancient times the Arians, and now the Arminians), though they work mightily upon men's wits, they do not produce any
100 great alteration in states, except it be by the help of civil occasions. There be three manner of plantations of new sects. By the power of signs and miracles ; by the eloquence and wisdom of speech and persuasion ; and by the sword. For martyrdoms,
105 I reckon them amongst miracles, because they seem to exceed the strength of human nature ; and I may

do the like of superlative and admirable holiness of life. Surely there is no better way to stop the rising of new sects and schisms than to reform abuses; to compound the smaller differences; to 110 proceed mildly, and not with sanguinary persecutions; and rather to take off the principal authors, by winning and advancing them, than to enrage them by violence and bitterness.

The changes and vicissitudes in wars are many, 115 but chiefly in three things, in the seats or stages of the war, in the weapons, and in the manner of the conduct. Wars, in ancient time, seemed more to move from East to West, for the Persians, Assyrians, Arabians, Tartars (which were the invaders), were all 120 eastern people. It is true the Gauls were western; but we read but of two incursions of theirs, the one to Gallo-Græcia, the other to Rome. But East and West have no certain points of heaven; and no more have the wars, either from the East or West, any 125 certainty of observation. But North and South are fixed; and it hath seldom or never been seen that the far Southern people have invaded the Northern, but contrariwise. Whereby it is manifest that the Northern track of the world is in nature the more 130 martial region: be it in respect of the stars of that hemisphere; or of the great continents that are upon the north (whereas the South part, for aught that is known, is almost all sea); or (which is most apparent) of the cold of the Northern parts, which is that 135 which, without aid of discipline, doth make the bodies hardest, and the courage warmest.

Upon the breaking and shivering of a great State

and empire, you may be sure to have wars. For
140 great empires, while they stand, do enervate and
destroy the forces of the natives which they have sub-
dued, resting upon their own protecting forces, and
then when they fail also, all goes to ruin, and they
become a prey. So was it in the decay of the Roman
145 empire, and likewise in the empire of Almaine, after
Charles the Great, every bird taking a feather; and
were not unlike to befall to Spain, if it should break.
The great accessions and unions of kingdoms do like-
wise stir up wars. For when a State grows to an
150 over-power, it is like a great flood, that will be sure
to overflow, as it hath been seen in the States of
Rome, Turkey, Spain, and others. Look when the
world hath fewest barbarous people, but such as com-
monly will not marry, or generate, except they know
155 means to live (as it is almost everywhere at this day,
except Tartary), there is no danger of inundations of
people. But when there be great shoals of people,
which go on to populate, without foreseeing means of
life and sustentation, it is of necessity that once in an
160 age or two they discharge a portion of their people
upon other nations; which the ancient northern
people were wont to do by lot; casting lots what
part should stay at home, and what should seek their
fortunes. When a warlike State grows soft and
165 effeminate, they may be sure of a war. For com-
monly such States are grown rich in the time of their
degenerating; and so the prey inviteth, and their
decay in valour encourageth a war.

As for the weapons, it hardly falleth under rule and
170 observation; yet we see even they have returns and

vicissitudes. For certain it is, that ordnance was known in the city of the Oxidrakes in India, and was that which the Macedonians called thunder and lightning, and magic. And it is well known that the use of ordnance hath been in China above 175 two thousand years. The conditions of weapons and their improvements are, first, the fetching afar off; for that outruns the danger, as it is seen in ordnance and muskets. Secondly, the strength of the percussion, wherein likewise ordnance do exceed all 180 arietations and ancient inventions. The third is, the commodious use of them, as, that they may serve in all weathers, that the carriage may be light and manageable, and the like.

For the conduct of the war: at the first, men 185 rested extremely upon number; they did put the wars likewise upon main force and valour, pointing days for pitched fields, and so trying it out upon an even match; and they were more ignorant in ranging and arraying their battles. After, they grew to rest 190 upon number rather competent than vast; they grew to advantages of place, cunning diversions, and the like; and they grew more skilful in the ordering of their battles.

In the youth of a state, arms do flourish; in the 195 middle age of a state, learning; and then both of them together for a time; in the declining age of a state, mechanical arts and merchandise. Learning hath his infancy, when it is but beginning, and almost childish; then his youth when it is luxuriant and 200 juvenile; then his strength of years, when it is solid and reduced; and, lastly, his old age, when it waxeth

dry and exhaust. But it is not good to look too long upon these turning wheels of vicissitude, lest we become giddy. As for the philology of them, that is but a circle of tales, and therefore not fit for this writing.

A Fragment of an Essay of Fame.

THE poets make Fame a monster. They describe her in part finely and elegantly, and in part gravely and sententiously. They say, look how many feathers she hath, so many eyes she hath underneath; so many tongues; so many voices; she pricks up so many ears.

This is a flourish; there follow excellent parables: as that she gathereth strength in going; that she goeth upon the ground, and yet hideth her head in the clouds; that in the day-time she sitteth in a watch-tower, and flieth most by night; that she mingleth things done with things not done; and that she is a terror to great cities. But that which passeth all the rest is, they do recount that the earth, mother of the giants that made war against Jupiter and were by him destroyed, thereupon in anger brought forth Fame. For certain it is that rebels (figured by the giants) and seditious fames and libels, are but brothers and sisters, masculine and feminine. But now if a man can tame this monster, and bring her to feed at the hand, and govern her, and with her fly other ravening fowl and kill them, it is somewhat worth. But we are infected with the style of the poets. To speak now in a sad and serious manner, there is not

in all the politics a place less handled, and more ²⁵ worthy to be handled, than this of fame. We will therefore speak of these points ; what are false fames, and what are true fames, and how they may be best discerned ; how fames may be sown and raised ; how they may be spread and multiplied ; and how they ³⁰ may be checked and laid dead ; and other things concerning the nature of fame.

Fame is of that force, as there is scarcely any great action wherein it hath not a great part, especially in the war. Mucianus undid Vitellius by a fame that he ³⁵ scattered, that Vitellius had in purpose to move the legions of Syria into Germany, and the legions of Germany into Syria ; whereupon the legions of Syria were infinitely inflamed. Julius Cæsar took Pompey unprovided, and laid asleep his industry and pre- ⁴⁰ parations by a fame that he cunningly gave out, how Cæsar's own soldiers loved him not, and, being wearied with the wars, and laden with the spoils of Gaul, would forsake him as soon as he came into Italy. Livia settled all things for the succession of ⁴⁵ her son Tiberius, by continually giving out that her husband Augustus was upon recovery and amendment. And it is a usual thing with the bashaws to conceal the death of the Great Turk from the Janizaries and men of war, to save the sacking of Con- ⁵⁰ stantinople, and other towns, as their manner is. Themistocles made Xerxes, King of Persia, post apace out of Grecia, by giving out that the Grecians had a purpose, to break his bridge of ships, which he had made athwart the Hellespont. There be a ⁵⁵ thousand such like examples ; and the more they

are, the less they need to be repeated, because a man meeteth with them everywhere. Therefore let all wise governors have as great a watch and care over
50 fames, as they have of the actions and designs themselves.

[*The rest was not finished.*]

NOTES.

ANALYSIS OF ESSAY I.

Jesting Pilate, and the sceptics, and in more modern times giddy wittlings, affect to despise truth. The lie is often preferred for its own sake, perhaps as having in it more variety. Indeed, our minds would be poor shrunk things if all unreality was removed from them. The lie sinks into and becomes part of the soul. Truth, when wooed, won, and enjoyed, is the light of the world, the sovereign good of human nature. There is also a certain pleasure (but not rightly without pity) in gazing on error from the vantage ground of truth. Our minds should turn upon the poles of truth, as controlled and regulated thereby. Truth in the actions of daily life is the honour of man's nature. The liar faces God, but shrinks from man.

NOTES TO ESSAY I.

[1] **Truth**: the original meaning of *truth* is the honesty or integrity of persons, subjective truth (*cf.* Dogberry's "Are you good men and true?") This meaning is preserved in the doublet of "truth," *troth*. The secondary meaning is the conformity of notions or statements to things, objective truth, the truth of philosophy or science. Bacon uses the word in both senses. **What is truth**: (John xviii. 38). Pilate was not jesting; his question is rhetorical, and does not expect an answer. He says in other words: Truth has nothing to do with the question of kingship. But (1) Bacon constantly uses the words of Scripture apart from the context; and (2) Pilate may fairly be taken as a type of the *pococurante*, sceptical philosopher. [3] **Giddiness**: L.V. *cogitationum vertigine*. A dizziness or whirl of thoughts.

"Our fancies are more giddy and infirm,
More longing, wavering, sooner lost and won
Than women are."

Twelfth Night, Act ii. sc. 4.

[4] **Affecting**: claiming, aspiring to. *Cf.* "Have I affected wealth or honour?" (2 *Hen. VI.*, Act iv. sc. 7). **Free-will**: irresponsibility, not used here in the philosophical sense as the opposite of necessity. The word "freethinking" is later than Bacon. "Atheist is an old-fashioned word: I'm a freethinker, child." Addison's *Spectator*. [5] **Sects**: especially Sceptics and their formal founder Pyrrho, B.C. 300. But also their predecessors, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Gorgias, and later on the Empirics. **Sceptics**: *i.e.* the Inquirers, those who would neither affirm nor deny the certainty of human knowledge, not positive unbelievers as the word is now used. To these sects we may add the *New Academy*, famous by the name of Cicero, whose chief dogma was that we cannot know things in themselves, that all our knowledge is of phenomena. [7] **Discoursing**: discursive, rambling intellects. **Veins**: Vein, (1) what carries the blood, from *where*; (2) by analogy, the streak of ore; (3) metaphorically of that which marks, distinguishes the character or intellect. *Cf.* "in the vein," in "King Cambyzes' vein," "a vein of humour." This sense is now confined to the singular. Bacon brings out the latent metaphor. *Cf.* Shakespeare, *Henry V.*, Act ii. sc. 3, "Rouse thy vaunting veins" (Pistol to Nym). [11] **Imposeth**: referring to the bondage spoken of above. So Shakespeare uses the substantive, "according to your ladyship's *impose*." (*Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act iv. sc. 3, 8.) [13] **One of**, etc.: Lucian (160 A.D.) in his *Philopseudes*, (the lover of lies), speaks of those who greatly prefer lying to the truth for the lie's own sake. [16] **Make for**: promote; Lat. *facere ad*. Used in a slightly different sense in Essay 16: "None deny there is a God, but those for whom it maketh that there were no God." [18] **I cannot tell**: L.V. *nescio quomodo*, somehow or other, whatever the cause may be. [21] **Triumphs**: triumphal procession, shows. *Cf.* Essay 37. **Stately**: when the adjective ends in -ly, it often serves both for adjective and adverb, the second -ly not being added on account of the cacophony. *Cf.* Their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed (Jude 15). [22] **Candle-lights**: *cf.* Essay 37, l. 33. Bacon is not justifying lying, though his language is ambiguous. All he says is that most men live in a fool's paradise, and refuse to look at things in the dry light of reason. But he confounds the healthy play of the imagination "that bodies forth the form of things unknown" with morbid self-illusion and self-deceit. [25] **A Mixture**, etc.: a lie is used here not in the strict sense of a wilful false statement, but for any departure from the truth—fancy, fiction, self-deception. [28] **As one would**: L.V. *ad libitum*. Wild, random. [29] **Doubt that . . . but**: the sentence is virtually negative (equal to "no one doubts"), and so followed by *but*, like the Latin *non*

dubito quin. The *that* is interposed because of the intervening hypothesis. [31] **Indisposition**: L.V. *languor*. [33] **Vinum Dæmonum**: St. Augustine (*Confession*, i. 16) calls poetry *vinum erroris*: and Jerome (*Ep.* 146) calls it *cibus dæmonum*. As Mr. Wright suggests, Bacon probably combined the two phrases. In *Adv. of L.*, ii. 22, 13, when the phrase recurs the explanation is added, "because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions." [37] **Such**: refers not to "hurt" but "the lie that sinketh in." Bacon's distinction misses the mark. The *Tale of Troy* or *Paradise Lost* may "sink in and settle in" our minds, and yet do us nothing but good; and conversely, fact—say the *Newgate Calendar*—may have pernicious effects. **Howsoever**: whatever the reason may be why men prefer the admixture of a lie. [39] **Truth**: as embodied in the reason. According to Plato's psychology the reason is the highest faculty in man by which he partakes of the eternal verities, or, as Aristotle puts it, truth is (not Horne Tooke's "What each man troweth") but *ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσσειεν*, as the men of sense would judge it. [40] **Love-making**: *φιλοσοφία*, according to the proper sense of the word as first used by Pythagoras. [42] **Belief of truth**: the three degrees are—the pursuit of truth, the attainment of truth, and belief, which, like faith in the religious sense, is something higher than knowledge—knowledge which inspires the will and affections, just as Mr. Arnold defines religion as morality tinged with emotion. [44] **Creature**: created thing or being. [48] **The matter**: the article as with "the earth" "the air" of objects unique of their kind. [51] **The poet**, etc.: Lucretius, who shed lustre on the Epicurean sect. [52] **Yet**: in spite of the mean sect to which he belonged. [53] A paraphrase of Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, ii. 1-10: in the *Adv. of L.*, i. 8. 4., Bacon gives a free translation: "It is a view of delight to stand or walk upon the seashore side, and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon the sea; or to be in a fortified tower, and to see two battles join upon a plain. But it is a pleasure incomparable for the mind of man to be settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth; and from thence to descry and behold the errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up and down of other men." [58] **Not to be commanded**: a specular mount that overlooks all the country round. [63] **Move in charity**, etc.: charity is the *primum mobile* (the highest sphere, which carries round with it in its revolutions the lower heavens). (See on Essay 17.) Providence, the universal element in which it rests—a knowledge that we are in His hands gives us rest; and Truth, the conformity of our beliefs and actions to things as they are, to the laws of Nature, is the regulating and controlling power. To drop metaphor, Charity (the Christian *ἀγάπη*,

Bacon's *inservire humano generi*) should be the motive of action ; faith in Providence should give calm and peace to the soul ; science should guide and regulate the conduct. Cf. Goethe :

“ Wie ein Gestirn
Ohne Hast
Aber ohne Rast
Drehe sich jeder
Um seine eigne Last.”

[66] **Truth of civil business** : truth in conduct : faithfulness, as opposed to scientific truth. [68] **Round** : straightforward, from the notion of a smooth sphere as contrasted with an irregular body with twists and turns, ups and downs. So Shakespeare (*Henry V.*, iv. 1, 216), playing with the word, “ Am I so round with you and you with me, that like a football you do spurn me thus ? ” [69] **Alloy**, or allay (as Bacon spelt it) ; French, *aloi* ; Latin, *ad legem*. That proportion of base metal that is allowed by law to be mixed with gold or silver coinage, hence applied to the base metal itself. [75] **Montaigne** : (Essay 2, 18). A remark borrowed from Plutarch. [84] **Peal** : a shortened form of *appeal*. Old French, *apel*. Skeat suggests that the *a* may have been mistaken for the indefinite article. [86] **He shall not** : (Luke xviii. 8). But *πίστις* is theological truth, faith, not truth of civil business. A second instance of Bacon's fanciful application of Scripture.

NOTES TO ESSAY II.

[4] **Wages of sin** : Romans vi. 23. [5] **Religious** : binding on us as a religious duty. [6] **As a tribute** : not “ as being,” but “ seeing that it is.” [8] **You shall read** : *shall* for *will* of certainty. So Shakespeare constantly, “ You shall find there a man who is the abstract of all faults ” (*Antony and Cleopatra*, Act i. sc. 4, 8). [9] **Mortification** : cf. Sir Thomas Brown's *Vulgar Errours*, “ We mortify ourselves therefore with fish, and think we fare coarsely, if we abstain from flesh ; ” Colossians iii. 5, *νεκρώσατε τὰ μέλη* ; Shakespeare, *Henry V.*, Act i. sc. 1, 26, “ His wildness mortified in him seemed to die too.” The word comes to us through the Vulgate *mortificatio*. [17] **Natural man** : opposed to the inspired writer. **Pompa mortis** : probably Seneca (Ep. iii. 3, 14), “ *Tolle istam pompam sub qua lates et stultos territas : mors es, quam nuper servus meus, quam ancilla contempsit.* ” Montaigne in his essay, *Que philosophe c'est apprendre à mourir*, has, “ *Il faut oster le masque aussi bien des choses que des personnes : osté qu'il sera, nous ne trouverons au dessous que cette mesme*

mort, qu'un valet ou simple chambriere passerent dernièrement sans peur." [19] **Blacks**: mourning garb; cf. Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, i. 2, 131, "But they were false as o'er-dyed blacks." [20] **Obsequies**: first, observances of any sort, then, funeral ceremonies. [22] **Mates**: French *mater*, to stupify, deaden; hence to overpower. [25] **Of him**: from death. [27] **Pre-occupateth it**: forestalls it by suicide. [28] **Otho**: from Tacitus, *Hist.*, ii. 49, "Some of the soldiers killed themselves near the funeral pile, not moved by remorse or fear, but by the desire to emulate his glory, and *by affection for their prince.*" [29] **Tenderest**: the weakest, most delicate. [32] **Niceness**: fastidiousness. **Seneca**: from Ep. x. 1, 6; Bacon, as usual, quotes loosely, "*Cogita quamdiu jam idem facias; cibis, somnus, libido; per hunc circulum curritur. Mori velle non tantum prudens aut fortis aut miser, etiam fastidiosus potest.*" (Bethink you how long you have been doing the same thing; eating, sleeping, chambering, the same dull round; the desire for death may come, not only from wisdom, or courage, or misery, but from fastidiousness). [35] **To do**: of doing. [37] **Good spirits**: L. V. *in animo generoso et forti.* [40] **Livia**: from Suetonius, *Augustus*, ch. 99. [42] **Jam**, etc.: "Tiberius' strength and life were fast ebbing, but not his powers of dissimulation." [43] **Ut puto**: Suetonius, *Vespasian*, c. 23, "As I suppose I am becoming a god." [44] **Feri**: Tacitus, *Histories*, i. 41, "*Agerent ac ferirent, si ita e republica videretur.*" (Let them haste and strike, if it seemed to be for the good of the state.) [46] **Despatch**: execution of business, with a notion of haste. **Adeste**: Dion Cassius, 76, "Be quick, if anything remains for me to do." [47] **The Stoics**, etc.: this is a perversion of the doctrine of Plato, who merely said that philosophy was a preparation for death (*μελέτην θανάτου*). Stoicism had little in common with monastic asceticism, though it might be described as philosophic quietism. Their doctrine was indifference, not mortification. The sentiment that follows, as Abbott well observes, is purely Stoic. [50] **Qui finem**: from Juvenal Sat. x. 358—

"A soul that can securely death defy,
And count it Nature's privilege to die."

DRYDEN'S Translation.

The original has *spatium* for *finem*. [61] **Extinctus**: Horace, Ep. ii. 1, 14.

"He that outshines his age is like a torch,
Which, when it blazes high, is apt to scorch;
Men hate him while he lives, at last no doubt
He wins affection—when his light is out."

CONINGTON'S Translation.

NOTES TO ESSAY III.

[1] **Band** : Religion is the bond that keeps society together, but this bond requires an outer bond, unity, to contain *it*, *i.e.* to hold it together. But the metaphor will hardly bear thus pressing. *Bond* is a bye-form of *band*. [9] **The poets** : Bacon is thinking solely of Greece and Rome ; the modern study of comparative religion would not bear out his distinction. [21] **Solution of continuity** : an external wound, opposed to a corrupt humour or hidden sore. [26] **Ecce in deserto** : Matt. xxiv. 26, Vulgate : "the desert" corresponds to the "conventicles of heretics," "the secret chambers" to "the outward face of a Church." When we remember that the writ *de heretico comburendo* was not abolished till 1667, and that heretics were burned on five occasions in Elizabeth's and on two in James's reign, the first comparison will seem apt enough. The second does not seem so pertinent ; apparently it is a warning against the Church of Rome, which presents a fair outside, and *Nolite exire* is a warning not to leave the Church of England. [31] **Doctor of the Gentiles** : St. Paul, Acts xxii. 21, εἰς ἔθνη μακρὰν ἐξαποστελῶ σε. **Priestly** : special character. [33] **If a heathen** : 1 Corinthians xiv. 23 (wrongly quoted). [40] **Vouched** : adduced. [41] **Master of scoffing** : Rabelais, from *Pantagruel*, ii. 7. [43] **Morris dance** : called a morisco in Beaumont and Fletcher, a corruption of Moorish dance, survives in the May-day dance ; L.V. *saltationes florales*. [46] **Politics** : politicians. [49] **It establisheth** : *i.e.* peace. [53] **Treaties** : treatises, if not a misprint. [56] **Zelants** : zealots. [57] **Is it peace** : 2 Kings ix. 18. [60] **Laodiceans** : from Rev. iii. 14, a synonym for the lukewarm, as in Mr. Hardy's novel, *A Laodicean*. [62] **Witty** : ingenious. [66] **Cross clauses** : statements which *seemingly* (so the L.V.) contradict each other ; as Matt. xii. 30, Mark ix. 40. [69] **Points fundamental** : these are elsewhere defined by Bacon as "one faith, one baptism, and not one ceremony, one policy." [71] **Merely** : exclusively. [72] **Good intention** : what Roman Catholics would call "counsels of perfection." [74] **Less partially** : more impartially. If the Church insisted only on fundamentals and waived non-essential points in the case of every sect, sectarians would be ready to join it. [82] **One of the fathers** : St. Bernard, though the words are Bacon's. The allusion is to Psalm xlv. 14, "the queen in a vesture of gold wrought about with divers colours," is a type of the Church. [91] **Those which** : *which* is constantly used of persons in Elizabethan English. [93] **That distance of judgment** : the comparatively small difference in capacity of judging which distinguishes man from man. [96]

Doth not discern: the superfluous *not* arises from a natural confusion, as though the sentence had begun, "We cannot think," etc. [100] **Devita**: 1 Tim. vi. 20, from the Vulgate. [103] **So fixed as**: *as = that, passim*. For the sentiment cf. Hobbes' *Leviathan*, "For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them, but they are the money of fools;" and Bacon's own comparison of words to Parthian arrows. Such misleading words are "right," "nature," "duty," etc. [106] **Grounded, but upon**: the agreement seems to go to the bottom of the matter, but the foundations are rotten, they rest on mutual ignorance. Some editors remove the comma, in that case "but" is "only." [107] **Implicit**: properly, bound up with them, "inherent though unperceived." [114] **Muniting**: fortifying. [121] **To propagate**: "the propagation of" really in apposition to "Mahomet's sword." In "much less to nourish," we have a slight irregularity, "much less may we encourage the nourishment of." [123] **Intermixture of practice**: "where plots against the government are combined with religious dissent." Bacon is alluding to the Catholic conspiracies in Elizabeth's and James's reigns. [129] **To dash**, etc.: "so to enforce the first table of the decalogue, men's duty towards God, as to do away with the second, their duty towards man." [134] **Tantum**: *Lucr., De Rerum Natura*, i. 95, "To such ill deeds could religion prompt." [136] **Massacre**: of St. Bartholomew's, August 24, 1572. [137] **Epicure**: epicurean. [142] **Anabaptists**: the sect of Protestant fanatics in Germany, whose wild extravagances were stamped out when Münster, their stronghold, was taken in 1535, and their leader, John of Leyden, executed. [145] **Bring Him in**: as on the stage. [150] **The likeness of**: like the Latin *instar* almost equivalent to a preposition. [156] **Mercury rod**: learnings, *i.e.* learned men are compared to Mercury, the cunning god, and the *ψυχοπομπός*, the god who conducts souls to Hades with his *virga* or *caduceus*. [157] **Facts**: deeds. [160] **Would be**: should be. [161] **Ira**: James i. 20. Elsewhere Bacon gives the correct quotation, *Ira viri non operatur*. [162] **A wise father**: even *Notes and Queries* have failed to identify him. [165] **Interested**: the correct form of the word "Interested" is really a duplicated perfect, through confusion with the substantive "interest."

NOTES TO ESSAY IV.

[1] **Wild**: L.V. *agrestis*, a weed, not trained like legal punishment. Cf. Jedwood justice, Lynch law. **Which**, etc.: notice the freer use of the relative. Modern English would require "and the more a man's nature runs to it." [8] **Salomon**:

Proverbs xix. 11. **I am sure**: equal to 'at any rate.' [13] **No man doth a wrong**: but *cf.* Essay 13. "On the other side there is a natural malignity; for there be that in their nature do not affect the good of others." The explanation of the apparent contradiction is that though *at starting* no man doth a wrong for the wrong's sake, yet by constant wrong-doing for ulterior motives a mind may become so perverted as to rejoice in harming others for its own sake, as the Greek word *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*, and the German *Schadenfreude* show. [18] **Merely**, etc.: "out of pure spite." [20] **Other**: used as an adverb, so Shakespeare, "to think other." [25] **It is two for one**: against the one revenge must be set the original injury and the legal punishment of the revenge. [26] **The party should know**: so Macduff, when vowing vengeance against Macbeth, says:

"If thou be slain, *and with no sword of mine,*
My wife's and children's ghosts will haunt me still."

Bacon's use of the word "party" shows the transitional stage between the proper legal use of the word—a party or side in a suit—and the modern vulgarism, "an elderly party in a shovel hat." [30] **The arrow**: a combination of "the arrow that flieth by day," and "the pestilence that walketh in darkness," of Psalm xci. 5, 6. [32] **Cosmus**: Cosmo de' Medici, made Duke of Florence in 1537. **Desperate**: reckless, immoral. [34] **You shall read**, etc.: embodied in the proverb: "Da chi mi fido guarda mi Dio, da chi mi non fido mi guardero io." (From them I trust God preserve me, from them I do not trust I will preserve myself). [37] Job ii. 10. [39] **In a proportion**: in a proportionate degree. [41] **Green**: like the Latin *crudum vulnus*, "active," "in a state of irritation." [42] **Public revenges**: acts of vengeance undertaken on public grounds, as the war against Brutus undertaken by Augustus to avenge the murder of his great uncle. [44] The army mutinied against Pertinax, being incensed at his economical reforms, and slew him, A.D. 193. Septimius Severus put the mutineers to death. Henri III. of France was assassinated by a friar, Jacques Clement, in 1589. See Essay 39. [47] **Witches**: Bacon believed in witchcraft, and as a judge condemned several who practised against the king. [48] **Unfortunate**: so we can say, "to live happy," as well as "to live happily."

NOTES TO ESSAY V.

[1] **High**: "noble," but the word conveys an under-meaning of boastfulness. In the *Adv. of L.*, 2, xx. 5, where the second passage is also quoted, Seneca's "height of style" is opposed

to "sobriety and truth." See Seneca, *Ep. ad Lucilium*, 66. Seneca died A.D. 65. The following quotation is from the same Epistle, 53, sec. 12. [2] **Stoics**: So Milton speaks of—

"Those budge doctors of the Stoic fur,
Praising the lean and sallow abstinence."

Comus, 707.

And *cf.* Par. R. iv. 300. "The Stoic last in philosophic pride, by him called virtue," etc. Even here Bacon is not quite fair to the Stoics. [5] **Miracles** almost a play on words, as if *mirabilia* meant miracles, the control over the laws of nature by a higher power. [8] **Too high**: Bacon seems to imply that Seneca had access to Christian literature or teaching. See Farrar's *Seekers after God*, where the question is discussed. [9] **Security**: the Elizabethans still kept the true Latin meaning, "freedom from care." *Cf.* Shakespeare, "Page is a secure fool." Notice the connection. Frailty is looked upon as the opening for adversity. [11] **Poesy**: this and the more modern word "poetry" both come to us from the French *poésie* and *poëterie*. The older word survives in prose only in the contracted form of posy (on a ring). [12] **Transcendencies**: hyperboles, exaggerations. [14] **Fiction**: from Apollodorus, *De deor. orig.*, ii. cap. 5; but there it is a golden cup, and the earthen pot seems Bacon's own variation. [16] **Mystery**: a hidden meaning. [20] **Lively**: see note on Essay I, l. 21. **Christian resolution**: certainly not equal to "the resolution of Christ," as Abbott suggests, though elsewhere (*De Sap. Vet.*, c. 26) Bacon suggests this interpretation with an apology for "the licence of speculation." By the unbinding of Prometheus, Bacon may hint at the setting free of human nature from its lower passion, but the myth will not "go on all fours." [23] **In a mean**: moderately, soberly, leaving the extravagances of the poets. **Prosperity**, etc.: contrast the "land flowing with milk and honey" of the Pentateuch, with the "blessed are those that mourn" of the Beatitudes. But Mark x. 30, Luke xviii. 30, show that the adversity of the New Testament is only praised in so far as it is a preparation for future happiness; that it is not *unhappiness* in this life which is regarded as an essential condition of eternal blessedness. [27] **Which carrieth**: it is indifferent to the sense whether we make "adversity" or "blessing" the antecedent. The L.V. rather favours the latter. "Blessing" may be either temporal or spiritual. "Benediction," coming from the Vulgate, is confined to the higher sense. To "bless" is by derivation to make "blithe." [34] **Distastes**: annoyances. [36] **Sad**: sober, dark-coloured; so Spenser, "in comely sad attyre." [41] **Incensed**: burnt. [42] **Discover**: uncover, reveal. **Prosperity is the**

blessing : this passage (to end of Essay) is quoted by Macaulay, *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 426, to illustrate the remark that Bacon's style was constantly growing richer and softer as he grew older ; but see Essay L., *ad fin.* Cf. Antitheta on Essays x. and xi.

NOTES TO ESSAY VI.

[1] **Dissimulation** : Bacon sufficiently explains in the course of the Essay the sense in which he uses the word, but it may be well to recall the useful doggerel of T. K. Arnold, "*Quod non es simulas, dissimulasque quod es.*" [2] **Wit** : "head," "understanding." [6] **Tacitus** : *Annals*, v. 1. **Sorted well** : in Tacitus, *bene composita* = "was a match for." *Arts* in a good sense, "the diplomacy." [10] **He saith** : Tac. Hist. ii. 76. [14] **Several** : from low Latin *separale*, "distinct." [15] **That . . . as**, for "such . . . that." [17] **Secretted** : "kept secret." [19] **Arts of state** : Tacitus uses *artes* as above for arts of state, and *bonas domi artes* for arts of life (private virtues), but I know of no phrase that exactly combines the two. [21] **A poorness** : a minus quantity ; it detracts from his genius. **Obtain to** : "attain." So Essay 56, "to obtain a cause," equal to "to gain." [22] **Generally** : as a general rule of action, not as the word is loosely used now for "in most cases." If a man must be *always* frank or *always* reserved, he had better choose the latter course. [29] **Managed** : trained, broken in, manage (Fr. *manège*), in this sense common in Shakespeare, "Wanting the manage of unbroken steeds." *Richard II.*, Act iii. sc. 3. [39] **What he is** : depends both on "observation" and "hold to be taken." [43] **Industriously** : L.V. *de industria*, "purposely." [49] **As the more close air** : the opposite would seem nearer the truth, but Bacon is thinking probably of the air in a chimney or in an exhausted receiver. [53] **In that kind** : "in the same way," as in the confessional men tell secrets to close men, not to impart information, but to relieve their own minds. [58] **Futile** : "leaky," Lat. *futilis* for *fud-tilis* (root of *fundo*), generally of those who cannot retain knowledge, here of those who cannot keep from talking. Cf. Essay 20. "*Plenus rimarum sum*, one futile person," etc. [59] **Vain** : like the Latin *vanus*, rather "empty-headed" than conceited. The argument is, that a man who always tells all he knows is sure occasionally to overstep the line—to pretend he knows more than he does (vanity), and to draw on his imagination (credulity). [62] **In this part** : "under this head." [63] **A man's face**, etc. : "That a man have not such a tell-tale face that he leaves nothing to be revealed by his words." [65] **Tracts** : "traits." [66] **By how much** : cf. *Adv. of L.*, 2, 23, sec. 16. "We will begin therefore

with this precept, . . . that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to words." [75] **Absurd**: L.V. *obfirmato et absurdo silentio*, an obstinate and unreasonable silence. [78] **Oraculous**: oracular, ambiguous. [91] **Ure**: obsolete except in compounds "inure," "manure," from old Fr. *eure*, *uevre*; Lat. *operam*, "work," "operation," so nearly = use, though etymologically distinct. [95] **Alarum**: in the strict sense the cry *all'arme*, as in Horace, *ad arma cessantes ad arma concitet*. [98] **Take a fall**: acknowledge himself beaten as a wrestler. [100] **Men will hardly**, etc. : if a man speaks his mind plainly and roundly, men will not care to contradict him, but let him have his say, and, because they cannot express their dissent, will store it up in their minds. [101] **Fair**: "quietly," "simply." The nearest parallel I can find is—

"Thus *fair* they parted till the morrow's dawn,
For each had laid his plighted faith to pawn."

DRYDEN.

[105] **To set it even**: to balance the advantages. [108] **Round**: L.V. *perniciter*, directly. [110] **Conceits**: "notions." [115] **Composition and temperature**: "combination of qualities or gifts," "temperament." [116] **Openness in fame**: "to enjoy the credit of openness."

NOTES TO ESSAY VII.

[1] **The joys**: because they are instinctive, incommunicable in words; the griefs, from *amour propre*, on the principle that it's an ill bird that fouls its own nest. [3] The double negative, so common in Elizabethan English, adds emphasis. [5] **Remembrance**: thought. Cf. Essay xi., "Be not too remembering of thy place;" *i.e.* mindful. Bacon writes as a childless man. With most races it is not the thought of living in their children after death, but present affection that constitutes "the joys of parents," but in the case of the Jews, Bacon's observation holds good. [6] Cf. Bacon, *Discourse in praise of Queen Elizabeth*, "Let them leave children that leave no other memory in their times." [9] **Foundations**: such as schools, colleges, hospitals; but the word is doubtless meant to include the works of philosophers, legislators, etc. In the next Essay, l. 4, "the best works" is used as a synonym. [10] Cf. *Discourse*, etc. "Revolve in histories the memories of happy men, and you shall not find any of rare felicity, but either he died childless, or his line spent soon after his death, or else was unfortunate in his children." We might add the names of the greatest modern philosophers,

Newton, Locke, Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoso, Hume, Kant, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer. On the other hand, Plato, Aristotle, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Milton, Cromwell, Luther, Napoleon, Goethe, Burke, Darwin—and the list might be indefinitely extended—were not childless men. In enforcing the celibacy of the clergy, the Catholic Church was in part actuated by Bacon's view. See also next Essay, l. 3. [20] **Unworthy**: undeserved, unreasonable. [22] Proverbs x. 1. For a wise and prudent son is of most comfort to the father, who knows the value of virtue better than the mother. But the mother has most sorrow and discomfort at the ill-fortune of her son, both because the affection of a mother is more gentle and tender, and because she is conscious, perhaps, that she has spoiled and corrupted him by her indulgence. [23] **Respected**: attended to, favoured. [24] **Made wanton**: spoilt. Wanton is *wan-towen*, equal to lack-educated (Cf. German *ungezogen*), the opposite of *well i-towene*, well-educated, modest. [27] If Bacon were writing now, he would be more likely to dwell on the opposite error. [29] **Sort**: consort. For two other meanings of the word, see *infra* and Essay 6. [31] **Proof**: result of experience, a proved fact. "'Tis a common proof that lowliness is young ambition's ladder," Shakespeare, *Julius Cæsar*, ii. 1, 21. [36] **Sorteth**: turns out, ends in. Cf. Essay 27, "Which many times sorteth to inconvenience." [39] **Kinsfolk**: in the first edition Bacon wrote *kinsfolkes*. Shakespeare uses *folk* ten times in the plural and only twice in the singular. Bacon's practice varies. [42] **Inasmuch that**: inasmuch as. For the fact, and its partial explanation, see Galton, *Hereditary Genius*. [44] **The blood**: according to the physiology of the day, the blood is the most essential element on which difference of temperament and physique depend. [47] **Apply themselves to**: study. [51] **Affection**: inclination, bent. Cf. Shakespeare, *Othello*, iv. 3, 101. "And have not we affections, desires for sport?" [53] "Choose what is best; habit will make it easy and pleasant." A saying of Pythagoras, quoted by Plutarch. [54] This, of course, only applies to rich men's sons. The latter statement is very questionable, and only holds in those cases where the younger brother has supplanted the elder by intrigue, or by taking advantage of his misdoings.

NOTES TO ESSAY VIII.

[1] **Hostages**: as to a victorious enemy who can avenge on the wife and children any attempt at rebellion. Compare the dialogue in Heine's *Two Grenadiers*. [2] **For**: the previous sentence implies, "and therefore has his hands tied, cannot

undertake any great enterprise." [3] **Certainly**: compare Bacon's *In felicem memoriam Elizabethæ*. "Childless she was and left no issue behind her, which was the case of many of the most fortunate princes—Alexander the Great, Julius Cæsar, Trajan, and others. And this is a case which has been often controverted and argued on both sides." [7] **It were great reason**: "we might reasonably expect," though facts prove that it is otherwise. [10] **Pledges**: like the Latin *pignora*, pledges of the mutual love of the parents. [11] **Who**: an anacoluthon; for "think only of themselves," is substituted "yet their thoughts end with themselves." [13] **Impertinences**: "what does not concern them." Like Talleyrand's "Après moi le déluge." [17] **Because they may**: a combination of "because they will" and "that they may." [23] **Humorous**: "eccentric," "fanciful." A humorous man is one who gives way to his predominant humour, *i.e.* his natural bent or bias. [28] **Light**: implies both readiness and absence of encumbrances. [30] **Churchmen**: in the matter of the celibacy of the clergy, Bacon, like Elizabeth, held to the old religion. Remember the snub that Mistress Parker, the archbishop's wife, got from her. [31] **A pool**: the married clergyman's family. **Indifferent**: a matter of no consequence. [34] **For soldiers**: in the case of soldiers. To fight *pro aris et focis* is the common watchword of the Roman soldier. [42] **Exhaust**: "exhausted." [47] **Vetulam**: from Cic., *De Or.* i. 44, "He preferred his old woman to immortality," *i.e.* Penelope to the goddess Calypso. But Cicero has *Ithicam* instead of *vetulam*. Cf. *Adv. of L.*, I, viii. 7, "Ulysses, etc., being a figure of those which prefer custom and habit before all excellency." [55] **Quarrel**: Lat. *querella*, "a cause of complaint," so "a plea," "a pretext." [56] **Wise man**: Thales of Miletus. [60] **It raiseth**: *sc.*, the badness of the husband. Women who have married bad husbands are encouraged to be good in order to win over their husbands, whose affection will be all the more highly valued because of its rarity. For instance, the patient Griselda. [64] **Make good**: justify.

NOTES TO ESSAY IX.

[2] **To fascinate**: to exercise a magical influence through the eye. Bacon seems himself to have held to this old superstition, though both here and in his *Natural History*, where the subject is more fully treated, he is careful not to commit himself:—"Fascination is ever by the eye. But yet if there be any such injection from spirit to spirit, there is no doubt but that it worketh by presence, and not by the eye alone; yet most

forcibly by the eye." Contrast with this the theory, in its crudest form, as given by John Baptista Porta :—"The lightest and finest spirits ascending into the highest part of the head do fall into the eyes, and so are from thence sent forth, as being of all parts of the body the most clear, and fullest of veins and pores, and with the very spirit or vapour proceeding thence is conveyed out as it were by beams and streams a certain fiery force, whereof he that beholdeth sore eyes shall have good experience. For the poison and disease in the eye infecteth the air next unto it, and the same proceedeth further, carrying with it the nature and infection of the corrupted blood, with the contagion whereof the eyes of the beholders are most apt to be infected." (Quoted by Wright from Reginald Scot.) A similar superstition is current in our own day, and some modern Bacons believe in the fascination of thought-reading. [9] **An evil eye** : ὀφθαλμος πονηρός, St. Mark vii. 22. **Influences** : the rays flowing from the stars to the earth, which have power over the destinies of men. Cf. Job xxxviii. 31, "Canst thou bind the sweet influences of the Pleiades." And for the decay of this faith in astrology, Fletcher's lines :

"Man is his own star, and the bond that can
Render an honest as a perfect man,
Commands all light, all influence, all fate ;
Nothing to him falls early or too late."

[10] **Still** : "always," "in each case ;" in L.V., "*ut agnos. i ab omnibus videatur.*" [11] **Ejaculation** : "a darting forth." [12] **Curious** : "careful," with the notion of subtilty, ingenuity. So "curiosity," (below) equal to ingenious speculations ; a sense which, as Mr. Arnold has pointed out, survives in the French. [16] **The spirits** : the subtile essence supposed to pervade all bodies, and to cause in animals the motions, secretions, etc. Cf. the quotation from Porta above. [29] **To come at even hand** : "to be even with ;" cf. "to keep of even hand" (Essay 28) ; "to keep an even balance." Goodness or virtue and good fortune are curiously mixed up in this passage. He who lacks good, *i.e.* goodness in himself, gloats over evil, *i.e.* evil fortune in another, and seeks to ruin him. [32] **For to know**, etc. : the meaning is clear though loosely expressed, "All the fuss and trouble that men take in prying into their neighbours' affairs cannot be due to the belief that such knowledge may possibly concern their own fortunes." [35] **Play-pleasure** : the same pleasure as in seeing a play. [39] **Non est** : "Every busybody is malevolent !" Plautus, *Stichus*, i. 3, 54. [43] **A deceit of the eye** : as when the train you are in is stationary, and a train alongside

of it moves on. [45] **Deformed persons** : as Richard III., Byron, and in fiction, Rashleigh Osbaldistone, Madame Walravens in *Villette*, and Quilp in the *Old Curiosity Shop*. For bastards compare the bastard in *King Lear*. [50] **Wants** : a synonym of "defects" above. [53] **Narses** : The general of Justinian and rival of Belisarius, exarch of Italy from 553 to 565, A.D. **Agesilaus** : Agesilaus II., King of Sparta from 398 to 361 B.C. **Tamerlane** : 1335-1405, a descendant of Genghis Khan, the conqueror of Bajazet. The name is said to be a corruption of Timerlenk, the lame Timur. The lameness was the result of a wound in the thigh received in an early engagement. [55] **Rise after calamities** : as it is said that the worst bully is the boy who has been bullied himself. [61] **Want work** : be without occasions to exercise their envy. [63] **Adrian** : Emperor A.D. 117. Spartian, in his *Life*, says that he banished the architect Apollodorus for criticizing some plans of the emperor's. [65] **Vein** : "an inclination." [71] **It . . . incurreth** : the rise of their kinsfolk, etc., forces itself on the notice of others, and so provokes the envy of those who are stationary. [81] **Liberality** : L.V. *largitioni supra meritum*. [87] **Persons of worth**, etc. : like Aristides. [91] **Darken it** : throw it into the shade. [100] **Joined with their honour**, etc. : whose public office or position has entailed great labours. [106] **Bemoaning themselves** : a mixed construction ; "bemoaning themselves for the life they lead," and "bemoaning what a life." [112] **Engrossing** : literally, buying in the gross, "monopolizing." [128] **In a more crafty**, etc. : *i.e.* by disguising or concealing his power. [130] **Disavow fortune** : "own that his success is not his rightly." [136] **Remove the lot** : the wise man or witch conjured the disease of the lunatic or epileptic into some stick or fetish (*the lot*), and with the lot the disease was passed on to whoever next touched it. [139] **Derive** : "to turn aside" as a stream. [144] **Undertaking** : "enterprising." [146] **Yet** : "after all." [159] **Plausible** : "deserving applause," "praiseworthy." In Elizabethan English the word did not, as now, connote imposture. [162] **Them** : added because of the clause which separates the relative from the verb that governs it. [165] **Estates** : parliaments. [169] **State** : the king or the sovereign power. So in Essay xi., "the sovereign or state." [174] **Importune** : "importunate." Cf. Essay 48, those which are wearisome and importune in suits." [177] **Invidia** : "Envy keeps no holiday." So Lamb talks of Sabbathless Satan. [183] **The envious man** : St. Matthew xiii. 25 and 39, where $\delta \epsilon \chi \theta \omicron \delta \varsigma \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \upsilon$ is explained to be $\delta \delta \iota \alpha \beta \omicron \lambda \omicron \varsigma$, the accuser, the slanderer.

NOTES TO ESSAY X.

[1] **Beholding** : "beholden," "indebted." Cf. "lading" for "laden." [9] **Great spirits** : noble natures. **Marcus Antonius** : see Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* and Tennyson's *Dream of Fair Women* :

"O the dalliance and the wit,
The flattery and the strife ;
And the wild kiss when fresh from war's alarms,
My Hercules, my Roman Antony,
My mailed Bacchus leapt into my arms,
Contented there to die."

[12] **Appius Claudius** : Livy calls him the leading spirit of the Decemvirs, and thus as being the chief author of the Ten Tables, he may perhaps merit the epithet "wise." For the story of Virginia, see Livy, Book iii., and Macaulay's *Lays*. [19] **Satis** : "Man to man is an ample theatre." [22] **A little idol** : the image on the pupils of the eye, and, the object of his love. A play on words. Compare the double meanings of *κόρη* and *pupilla*. [23] **Subject of the eye** : "a slave to his eye." See Essay 9, where love and envy are said "to come easily into the eye, especially upon the presence of the objects." [26] **Braves** : "flies in the face of," "contradicts." [29] **Phrase** : this exaggeration is not confined to language, but extends to thoughts and feelings. [30] **Arch-flatterer** : by Plutarch, *De Adulat. et Amico*, ii. αὐτὸς αἰτοῦ κόλαξ ἕκαστος ὢν πρῶτος καὶ μέγιστος, and Horace, *Ars*, p. 444, "Quin sine rivali teque et tua solus amares." La Fontaine, *Fables* i. ii. "Un homme qui s'aimoit sans avoir de rivaux." [31] **Have intelligence** : "have an understanding," "play into the hands of." [35] **It is impossible** : *amare et sapere vix deo conceditur*, Pub. Syrus. [38] **Reciproque** : stands both for "reciprocal" and "reciprocity." [43] **The poet's relation** : the moral of the story is well drawn out in Tennyson's *Ænone*. [54] **Keep quarter** : "keep its proper place." So the Jews' *quarter* is the part (strictly the fourth part) of the town set apart for the Jews. In Essay 21, "kept good quarter between them," = "each kept strictly to his own ground," "kept the peace." [55] **Check with** : "interfere with." To check (from the game of chess) is first "to bring to a stand," then, as an intransitive verb, "to be brought to a stand." [57] **No ways** : a genitival adverb, like "once," "needs," etc. [59] **Perils** : Shakespeare's *Othello* is a good illustration. The explanation is rather an alternation of action and inaction. [65] **Friars** : cf. Essay 8, "a single life doth well with churchmen," etc.

NOTES TO ESSAY XI.

[1] **Great place** : "high office." In the L.V., *de magistratibus et dignitatibus*. [2] **Fame** : "public opinion." [3] **So as** : so that. For the double negative see Essay 7, l. 3. Notice that "persons," "actions," "times," correspond to "state," "fame," "business." [6] **Or** : explanatory, "in other words." Abbott quotes Goethe—

"Wollen alle Herren seyn,
Und keiner ist Herr von sich."

[8] **Pains** : almost a play on words. [9] **Indignities** : seems to combine the objective and subjective, meaning "unworthy acts," and "unworthy treatment." [11] **Eclipse** : notice the confusion of metaphors. [12] **Cum non sis** : Cic. *Ep. ad Fam.*, vii. 3, 4. *Vetus est enim ubi*, etc. "For it is an old proverb that when you cease to be what you were there is nought to make you wish for life." [15] **Privateness** : "private life." [16] **The shadow** : the shade of retirement opposed to the "fierce light that beats upon a throne." As in Latin *umbratilis philosophus*. [17] **Still** : "always," as in Shakespeare *passim*. [18] **Had need** : subjunctive, "they would have need." [26] **Griefs** : "The heart knoweth its own bitterness." The wearer knows best where the shoe pinches. [27] **Faults** :

"Il fit pour nos défauts la poche de derrière
Et celle de devant pour les défauts d'autrui."

LA FONTAINE, *La Besace*.

[28] **Puzzle** : spelt by Bacon *puse*, "perplexity," "entanglement." [30] **Illi** : "Death falls heavily on him who, to others too well known, dies a stranger to himself." Seneca, *Thyestes*, xi. 401. [34] **To can** : originally the preterite of a verb meaning to bring forth, so I can, = I have produced, I am able. Even in early English it was restricted to its use as an auxiliary. In Chaucer we still find the infinitive "I shall not conne answe." [39] **Vantage** : qualifies ground as a compound noun. [41] **Conscience** : "consciousness." A. quotes Milton, "The conscience to have lost them (his eyes) overplied in liberty's defence." [43] **Theatre** : "operation," "activity," the scene of action being used for the action itself. [44] **Et conversus** : Gen. i. 31. Bacon quoting from memory uses more barbarous Latin even than the Vulgate. This parallel from the Old Testament is misleading. Consciousness of doing good must accompany a

good man's action, not follow it only. A closer parallel to Bacon's thought is supplied by Cicero's *De Senectute*: "Est etiam quiete et pure et eleganter actae aetatis placida et lenis senectus." "Fructus autem senectutis est ante partorum bonorum memoria et copia." [48] **Globe**: "a complete and compact body." We have the same metaphor in "encyclopedia." The love of brevity has made Bacon express himself somewhat loosely. His meaning is obvious—the statesman may find in the past sufficient examples or models whereby to regulate his conduct; but it is not strictly accurate to say that the imitation itself is a *vade mecum*. [53] **Taxing**: "censuring." [55] **Bravery**: "bravado," "flying in the face of." [57] **Reduce**, etc.: "trace back institutions, etc., to their first origin." [60] **Best**: by tracing any institution to its original and simplest form the statesman may best discover the purpose it was intended to serve, and explain seeming anomalies. Maine has done this admirably in his *Ancient Law*, *Village Communities*, etc. But such research is the province of the antiquary or sociologist rather than of the practical statesman. Thus a statesman who in bringing in a measure of parliamentary reform looked to the constitution of the Witenagemot for "what is best" would expose himself to Lord Beaconsfield's jibe against those who attempted to restore the heptarchy. Bacon takes no account of the necessity of political growth and development. In politics the fittest is the best. [61] **Regular**: a master, for instance, who is always strict, is sure to be more popular than one who is generally lenient, and severe by fits and starts. [64] **Express thyself well**: "give fully the reasons." [67] **De facto**: as a fact, not to be questioned. **Voice**: "proclaim." [71] **Execution**: "administration." [77] **Interlace**: "mix not different businesses." [81] **Integrity used**: a Latinism. "The use or practice of integrity," "he who practises integrity." [83] **Suspicion**: without entering here on the difficult question of Bacon's guilt or innocence in the matter of bribery, we cannot avoid the obvious remark that he did not carry out this precept. In the notes prepared by him for an interview with the king we find, "for the first of them (bribery of bargain or reward to prevent justice *pendente lite*), I take myself to be as innocent as any born upon St. Innocents' day, in my heart. And yet, perhaps, in some two or three of them the proof may stand pregnant to the contrary." [89] **Steal**: "to do so unperceived." "'Twere good, methinks, to steal our marriage," *Taming of Shrew*, iii. 2. Cf. Greek κλέπτειν, Latin *furari*. [90] **Inward**: "intimate." Cf. "inward counsellors," Essay 20. **No other**, etc.: an absolute construction. [91] **Close**: "secret." Cf. "fraud when it is close and disguised," Essay 56. [95] **Facility**: "pliability."

Cf. Essay 52. "To apply one's self to others is good ; so it be with demonstration that a man doth it upon regard, and not upon facility," and *Adv. of L.*, ii. 23, 6. "A judge were better be a briber than a respector of persons ; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a facile." [95] **Bribery** : "taking bribes ;" not, as above, "giving bribes." [97] **Respects** : "respecting of persons," "personal considerations." *Cf.* Essay 14, "For utility is their bond, and not respects," where the Latin has *dignitas*. [98] **Salomon** : Prov. xxviii. 21. [101] **A place** : Ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν δείκνυσιν. A saying attributed to several of the Greek sages. [104] **Tacitus** : *Hist.*, i. 49. "By common consent he would have been pronounced equal to empire, had he never been emperor." [105] **Solus** : "Vespasian alone of all the emperors was improved by empire," *Hist.*, i. 50. [107] **Sufficiency** : "ability." **Manners and affection** : "morals and general disposition. [108] **Whom** : "if honour (office) amends him," the relative "who" is used because "spirit" stands for a person. [110] **As in nature** : Bacon is always finding "sermons in stones," and is sometimes led astray by a fanciful analogy. Virtue in so far as it is violent, ill-regulated, ceases to be virtue. It is but rarely that the naturally ambitious man is satisfied. The ambitious lawyer who gets a judgeship might be quoted as a case in point. On the other hand, the ambitious statesman, even when he has obtained the premiership is often as eager to keep his place as he was to get it. [115] **To side a man's self** : the L.V. has *alteri parti adhaerere* "to take a side." So Essay 51, "Kings had need beware how they side themselves and make themselves a faction or party." Wright, however, says, "the translator seems to have missed the point," and interprets "to stand aside." In Essay 51 Bacon says, "Mean men, in their rising, must adhere (join a faction) ; but great men, that have strength in themselves, were better to maintain themselves indifferent and neutral. Yet even in beginners, to adhere so moderately, as he be a man of the one faction, which is most passable with the other, commonly giveth best way." Whichever interpretation we take, the two passages are not quite consistent, but the absence of any parallel for the meaning "to stand aside," seems decisive in favour of the L.V. [118] **It is a debt** : "the same scant measure that you meted out to your predecessor will be paid you by your successor." [120] **Call them** : "call them in." [122] **Sensible** : "sensitive," like the French. *Cf.* Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, ii. 8, 48.

NOTES TO ESSAY XII.

[1] **Trivial**: "trite," "well-known," not as now "petty." **Text**: originally a *woven* or continuous discourse, opposed to fragmentary notes. Then used in the pulpit sense for a part or sentence of the whole Bible. So text-hand is writing where the letters are joined. **It**: refers to the following anecdote. [4] **Action**: Cicero, *De Orat.*, iii. 56, 21, and Plutarch, *Life of Demosthenes*, 17, 18. The Latin word is *actio*, meaning "delivery," the tone, looks, and gestures of an orator or actor. Sir H. Wotton (*Remains*, p. 559) applies the same anecdote: "When you consult me about the personage that should first, or second, or tertiate your business with the king, I must answer as Demosthenes did of action, My lord treasurer, My lord treasurer, and so again." [6] **No advantage**: the apocryphal story of Demosthenes declaiming with pebbles in his mouth is well known. [10] **Elocution**: but this would be included in action, as Demosthenes understood the word. [12] **More of the fool**: like Carlyle's cynical description of Englishmen, "twenty-five millions, mostly fools." [15] **Wonderful**: adverb for adjective, as "passing rich," etc. **Boldness**: compare Danton's *De l'audace, de l'audace et toujours de l'audace*. [18] **Baseness**: here used rather in an intellectual than a moral sense. Cf. "base swain," Essay 29. [23] **Popular states**: "democracies." [28] **Mountebank**: from the Italian *montambanco*, one who mounts on a bench like a cheap Jack, a quack doctor, or any charlatan. [32] **Grounds**: L.V. *principia*. **Mohammed**: the story is taken from a Spanish proverb of Moorish origin. [43] **Slight**: "slur it over," "make light of it." [44] **Make a turn**: "try a new tack." **Ado**: equal to "to do," a verbal phrase used as a substantive; "there is," must be supplied. [48] **Absurdity**: a play on the double meaning of the word "want of sense," and "ridiculousness." So colloquially, "How absurd you are!" [50] **A bold fellow**: Falstaff, when his story of the men in buckram has been exploded, is a good instance. [53] **In bashfulness**: bashful people are readily put out of countenance, but soon recover themselves; but impudent people, though not easily abashed, when they are so, collapse utterly, are driven into a corner and stale-mated, like a king in chess. [54] **Stand at a stay**: L.V. *attoniti haerent*. [62] **Seconds**: as for instance the Napiers, Lord Gough, Marshal Ney.

NOTES TO ESSAY XIII.

[1] **Goodness**: as Bacon defines it, is active and habitual kindness. **Goodness of nature**: implies more than the modern word *good-natured*. *Good-nature*, as Archbishop Trench shows, is properly a theological word, expressing the genial preparedness for the reception of spiritual truths, nearly representing the *εὐφροία* of Aristotle. **The affecting**: "aiming at," "seeking."

[3] **Philanthropia**: in classical Greek meant the kindly feelings which any well-constituted nature possessed. Demosthenes constantly appeals to the "philanthropy" of the jury. Bacon attaches to it a higher sense approaching the modern "philanthropy." What has been called by a modern writer "the enthusiasm of humanity," is distinctively a Christian virtue.¹ The word "philanthropy" was hardly yet naturalized. It does not occur in Cotgrave, 1611, but is found in Minsheu, 1627.

Humanity: as the Latin equivalent of *φιλανθρωπία*, is used in two senses, "kindliness," and "culture." The latter meaning is preserved in the Scotch universities, where "the humanities" = *litterae humaniores*, polite letters. In Shakespeare *humanity* means only "human nature."

[7] **Character**: the word still retained its original meaning of outward mark or expression. Cf. Milton's "unmoulding reason's mintage charactered in the face."

[8] **Busy**: "restless." All virtue in authority, according to Essay xi., is settled and calm.

[10] **Charity**: rendered in the New Version "love."

[17] **Other living creatures**: as Count Fosco and his white mice in Wilkie Collins' *Woman in White*, and Krook the Lord Chancellor and his cat in Dickens' *Bleak House*.

[19] **Busbechius**: or Busbec, a Flemish diplomatist sent as ambassador to Solyman about the middle of the sixteenth century. The story is more correctly given in the Latin Version -- "A certain Venetian goldsmith, as Busbechius tells us, scarce escaped the rage of the populace for extending the mouth of a certain long-billed bird by inserting a stick."

[21] **In a waggishness**: "as a joke." Bacon's sympathies are rather with the Christian boy than the Turks.

[27] **Machiavel**: from *Disc. sopra Livio*, ii. 2. "So that, it seems to me, this way of living, so contrary to the ancients, has rendered the Christians weak and effeminate, and left them as a prey to those who are more wicked and may

¹ Yet we find the rudiments of it in Greece and Rome, *ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλῳ*. Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, viii. 1. "Societatem tolle, et unitatem generis humani qua vita continetur scindes." Seneca, *De Benef.* iv. 18.

order them as they please." But Abbott shows that Machiavelli is misrepresented by Bacon's garbled quotation. Machiavelli goes on to argue *against* this Quaker doctrine as a perversion of the Christian doctrine, "love your enemies," etc. [36] **Faces**: "their whims and humours as expressed by their faces." [43] **Shine honour**: used in a causative sense on the analogy of "rain." [46] **Beware**, etc.: self-love (thou shalt love thy neighbour, as thyself) is the pattern, and we are warned in copying this pattern, *i.e.* in bestowing the same love on our neighbours, not to ruin ourselves. Neglect of the self-regarding virtues is a real danger though a rare one, and rarely considered by the moralist, who needs rather to enforce Portia's doctrine, "The quality of mercy is not strained," etc. [Bacon would reckon mercy under "common benefits."] Compare what Clough, one of the most unselfish of moderns, says in a letter: "It is a good deal forgotten that we came into this world not to do kindness to others, but our own duty, to live soberly, righteously, and godly, not benevolently, philanthropically and tender-heartedly." [49] **Sell all**: Bacon subtilizes and expounds the text rather as a lawyer than a theologian. Christ's command was doubtless intended to apply to *all* his disciples. Primitive Christians were communists, but it does not follow that communism is an essential part of Christianity. [60] **Crossness**: "perversity," "love of contradiction" as "cross-grained," not confined, as now, to a fault of temper. [61] **Difficileness**: "stubbornness." *Cf.* the French *difficile*, "hard to get on with." [62] **Mere mischief**: "actual injury." [64] **Are on the loading part**: "put their weight on the laden side of the ship," "make bad worse." *Loading* for *laden*, as *beholding* for *beholden*. The loading side is the side which is laden or weighs down the ship. [66] **Still**: "ever." For the simile, *cf.* "Like flies that haunt a wound," Tennyson, *Aylmer's Field*. [67] **Misanthropi**: the form of the word shows that *misanthrope* was not yet naturalized. *Cf.* *philanthropia*, *Sybilla*, *statua*. [68] **And yet**, etc.: "and yet they do not openly profess their misanthropy like Timon." **A tree**: from Plutarch's *Life of Marc Antony*. "My lords of Athens, I have a little yard in my house where there groweth a fig-tree, on the which many citizens have hanged themselves; and because I meant to make some building on the place, I thought good to let you all understand it, that before the fig-tree be cut down, if any of you be desperate, you may there in time go hang yourselves." See the same speech versified by Shakespeare, *Timon*, v. I, 208. [70] **Very errors**: L.V. *humanae naturæ vomicas et carcinomata*, "the sores and ulcers." [71] **Politiques**: politicians. [72] **Knee-timber**: bent like a knee. [81] **The noble tree**: the balsam tree or bal-

samodendron which furnishes the myrrh of commerce, an aromatic bitter gum-resin. [86] **Trash**: properly broken sticks, firewood; *cf.* to trash = to lop: hence a cant word for money. [87] **Anathema**: Rom. ix. 3. Accursed from Christ, E.V.

NOTES TO ESSAY XIV.

[2] **Estate**: state, commonwealth. [9] **Stirps**: a false plural: Latin *stirpes*, stock, family. [12] **Flags**: L.V. *insignia*, coats of arms. [15] **Respects**: "regard for persons." [16] **Low Countries**: *cf.* Bacon's *Discourse in praise of his sovereign*. "Then shall you find no new taxes, impositions nor devices; but the benevolence of the subject freely offered by assent of parliament according to ancient rates, and with great moderation in assessment." [18] **Indifferent**: "impartial." [25] **Broken upon them**; a metaphor from a breakwater. [39] **Virtuous**: "vigorous," not "moral." In Essay 24 "more worthy" is substituted. [42] **Arts**: like the Latin *artes* "qualities." **It is reason**: but compare *Julius Caesar*, Act iii. sc. 2—

"The evil that men do lives after them,
The good is oft interrèd with their bones."

[48] **Motions**: stirrings. [49] **The passive envy**: "being envied." *Cf.* Essay 9. "Persons of noble blood are less envied in their rising." [53] **A better slide**: "greater smoothness (coming) into their business, the transaction of state affairs." L.V. *negotia sua mollius fluere sentient*.

NOTES TO ESSAY XV.

[1] **Shepherds of people**: ποιμένες λαῶν, the Homeric phrase for kings. [2] **Kalendars**: L.V. *prognostica*, like Poor Robin's Almanac, or Zadkiel's, which still survives. [3] **Grow to equality**: where parties in the state or classes are equally balanced. [4] **Æquinoctia**: the word "equinox," though invented, was still struggling for naturalization. [5] **Hollow**: an instance of transferred epithet, properly the sound the wind makes in a hollow or confined place, but the word is also onomatopoeic, the sound has helped the sense. [8] **Ille**: Virg., *Georg.*, i. 465. "The sun too often gives warning that lurking rebellions are threatening, that plots and secret wars are brewing." [14]

Illam: Virg. *Æn.*, iv. 179, "Her mother earth, incensed against the gods, brought forth; she (so goes the tale) was her latest progeny, sister of Cœus and Enceladus." [16] **Seditious tumults**: figured by Cœus and Enceladus, the earth-born giants who tried to scale Olympus. See *Adv. of L.*, 2, iv. 4; where the same myth is more fully expounded. [19] **If it come to that**: if discontent has reached such a pitch that the best measures of a government are abused. [22] **Conflata**: altered from Tac., *Hist.*, i. 7. *Inviso semel principe, seu bene seu male facta premunt.* "When once a ruler is unpopular, he is condemned for good and bad actions alike." [25] **That**: repeated because of the intervening causal clause. [31] **Erant**: Tac., *Hist.*, ii. 39, has *Miles alacer, qui tamen jussa ducum interpretari quam exsequi mallet.* The soldiers were keen for action but more inclined to canvass than to carry out their generals' orders. [34] **Assay**: essay, attempt. [38] **Machiavel**: Wright refers to *Disc. sopr. Livio*, iii. 27. If in France any man should pronounce himself of the king's party, he would be sure to be punished, because it would imply that there is a party against the king. [42] **Henry the Third**: put himself at the head of the Holy League founded by the house of Guise to crush the Huguenots; afterwards attempting to temporize between Catholics and Protestants he was cast off by both, and the people of Paris turned him out of the capital after the "day of barricades," May, 1588. [46] **A cause**: a faction in the state. **That**: like the French *que*, used instead of repeating "when." [51] **Carried**: carried on. [54] **Primum mobile**: the tenth sphere, crystalline and starless, which revolves from east to west in twenty-four hours, carrying with it all the other spheres in the same time. Each of the other spheres has a revolution of its own in a contrary direction, shorter or longer according to their nearness to or distance from the *primum mobile*. [55] **The old opinion**: Bacon in astronomy was a sceptic, neither resting in the old Ptolemaic opinion, nor accepting the Copernican system—"the new carmen who drive the world about." [59] **Liberius**: Tacitus has, *Ann.*, iii. 4, *Promptius apertiusque quam ut meminisse imperitantium crederes.* "More readily and openly than is compatible with subordination." [61] **Reverence**: majesty, that which commands reverence, as of God it is said in the Psalms, "Thou guidest thyself with reverence." Cf. Shakespeare's "There's such divinity doth hedge a king." The doctrine of the divine right of kings, borrowed from the Jewish monarchy, was first formulated and expounded by Filmer. [63] **Solvam**: Job xii. 18, "He looseth the bond of kings." [65] **Mainly**: forcibly, violently. [68] **Of predictions**: a definitive or appositive use of the preposition, "this part, namely predictions." [79] **So many . . . so many**, *quot, tot.* [80] **Lucan**: *Pharsalia*, i. 181.

The true reading is *avidumque in tempora fenus et*, etc. "Hence rapacious interest, and usury greedy for the reckoning day, and blasted credit, and war that profits many." [82] **This same**, etc.: the fact that many find war profitable is a sure sign that many are unprosperous and therefore ready for any change. Elsewhere ("Of the true greatness of the kingdom of Britain") Bacon, quoting the phrase, draws a distinction between a civil and a foreign war. Of the latter he approves, "for except there be a spur in the state that shall incite and prick them on to wars, they will but keep their own and seek no further." Doubtless the same distinction is intended here, though Wright thinks otherwise. [84] **Poverty**: is relative, and therefore applies to the better sort, the rich who feel themselves impoverished. Want is absolute, the lower classes are actually starving. [87] **The belly**: referring to the famous fable of Menenius Agrippa, where the belly typifies the commons. [90] **Preternatural**: unnatural, morbid. [94] **Griefs**. "grievances," like the Fr. *grief*. [97] **Dolendi**: Plin., Ep., viii. 17. For it makes little difference whether you suffer a calamity or expect it, except that indeed there is a limit to pain but none to fear; for your pain is proportionate to what has happened, your fears to all that might have happened. [99] **Mate**: stupefy. [101] **Secure**: careless. [106] **Spanish proverb**: cf. the English "'Tis the last straw that breaks the camel's back," "The pitcher may go to the well once too often." [117] **Just**: exact. [121] **Material cause**: the same which is at the bottom and furnishes the matter or ground of the sedition. [123] **Well balancing of trade**: "care being taken that the exportation exceed in value the importation; and then the balance of trade must of necessity be returned in coin or bullion." Bacon's advice to Villiers. [124] **Cherishing**, etc. By prohibiting the introduction of foreign manufactures. [125] **Banishing**, etc. By the legislation which culminated in the famous poor law, 43rd Elizabeth. [126] **Sumptuary laws**: especially relating to dress. A number were passed in Henry VIII.'s reign. The last were not abolished till 1856. [132] **Stock**: produce. [142] **Preferments**: L.V. *vocationes civiles*. [144] **Upon the foreigner**: at the expense of. [151] **Materiam**: Ovid, *Met.*, ii. 5, *materiam superabat opus*, "the workmanship was richer than the materials," (of the palace of the sun). [154] **Mines**: "But their (the low countries) chief loadstone, which draws all manner of commerce and merchandise, which maintains their present estate, is not fertility of soil, but industry that enricheth them: the gold mines of Peru or Nova Hispania may not compare with them. They have neither gold nor silver of their own, wine nor oil, or scarce any corn growing in those limited provinces, little or no wood, tin,

lead, iron, silk, wool, any stuff almost or metal, and yet Hungary, Transylvania, that brag of their mines, fertile England cannot compare with them." Burton, *Anat. of Mel.* (quoted by Wright.) [158] **Like muck**: a saying of Mr. Bettenham. [161] **Engrossing**: buying up large quantities of provisions with intent to monopolize the trade and so sell at starvation prices. Bacon, in a letter to Buckingham, calls monopolies the canker of all trading, and would not have them encouraged under specious colour of public good. The statutes against forestalling, engrossing, and regrating were not abolished till 1844. [161] **Great pasturages**: see on Essay 29. [164] **There is**: singular like the French *il y a*. [176] **Pallas**: in Homer, *Il.*, i. 403, Thetis sends for Briareus. [178] **Safe**: L.V. *salutare*. [182] **Bravery**: *bravure*, defiance. [185] **Imposthumation**: or impostumes, a corruption of *apostume*, *aposteme*, Gr. ἀπόστημα, "a standing away or separation of corrupt matter," "an abscess." [186] **The part**, etc.: statesmen might well adopt by forethought what in the myth was done by afterthought. **Mought**: past tense of may. [197] **Satisfaction**: so of their demands. [200] **Particular persons**: individuals, opposed to collective bodies. [202] **To brave**: L.V. *ostentare in gloriam suam*, "to parade," "faire bonne mine à mauvais jeu." [210] **Particular**: cf. Hooker, "Our wisdom must be such as doth not propose to itself τὸ ἴδιον our own particular . . . but the public and common good. [225] **Sylla**: Suetonius, *Jul. Cæs.*, 77. *Syllam nescisse litteras qui dictaturam deposuerit*, rendered elsewhere by Bacon, "Sylla could not skill of letters, and therefore knew not how to dictate." [228] **Galba**: Tacitus, *Hist.*, i. 5, "He was in the habit of levying soldiers, not buying them," implying that he would refuse the usual donation to the Praetorians. [230] **Probus**: Flavius Vopiscus, *Probus*, 20., "If I live the Roman Empire shall have no more need of soldiers." [234] **Tender**: delicate. [238] **Flat**: cf. Hamlet's "weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable." [245] **Atque**: Tacitus, *Hist.*, i. 28., "And such was the temper of men's minds that the foul crime (the murder of Galba) was ventured by few, desired by more, and tolerated by all." [248] **Assured**: trustworthy. Cf. "an assured sign." Essay xi. [249] **Popular**: in a bad sense of demagogues, as in Essay 12, it is used for "democratic."

NOTES TO ESSAY XVI.

[1] **The Legend**: the *Legenda Aurea*, or *History of Lombardy*, is a collection of lives of saints and other stories, compiled by Jacobus De Voragine in the thirteenth century. It has been

translated by Sainte-Beuve. [2] **The Talmud**: the book, or rather books, of unwritten Jewish law and legend as distinguished from the written Scriptures. It was compiled between the seventh and third centuries B.C. For a brilliant account of it, see the article by Emmanuel Deutsch in *Quarterly Review*, October, 1867. **The Alcoran**: more correctly the Koran, *al* is the Arabic article. [4] **Convince**: "refute." [7] **Bringeth about**: in the replica of this passage (*Adv. of L.*, i. 1, 3) we have "bring back again." [9] **Second causes**: in the same passage is added, "which are next unto the senses;" the second or efficient causes are those which immediately produce phenomena; the wind, moisture, change of temperature, are the second causes of rain; the first or final cause is God. [15] **Leucippus**: (date uncertain), a pupil of Parmenides, the father of the Atomic philosophy. Through a boundless void atoms infinite in number and diversified in figure eternally wandered, their wanderings governed by Necessity, the negation of Law and Supreme Intelligence. Democritus, born 465 B.C., developed the theory, and Epicurus, born 345 B.C., carried it into the region of morals. [17] **Fifth essence**: the Aristotelian *quinta essentia* (πεντητή οὐσία), out of which the heavenly bodies are formed. [19] **Seeds**: Lucretius, *semina*, a synonym of atoms. **Unplaced**: "unmarshalled," "moving at random." [22] **The fool**: Ps. xiv. 1. [24] **So as**: "So that he rather says it by rote, as what he wishes to be true than because," etc. [27] **It maketh**: "it is for the interest of." Cf. Essay I, "It maketh for pleasure." [40] **Blessed Natures**: the gods of his follower and exponent Lucretius, who *securum agunt ævum*. Cf. Tennyson, *Lotus Eaters*, "For they lie beside their nectar," etc. [45] **Non deos**: "Profanity consists not in denying the existence of the popular gods, but in applying to these gods the popular belief." Diogenes Laertius, x. 123. [46] **Plato**: whose idea of God is so sublime that the fathers generally held either that he was inspired or that he borrowed from the Hebrew Scriptures. [48] **The administration**: government of the world. [49] **Indians of the West**: the West Indies owe their name to the mistake made by Columbus, who on sighting one of the Bahamas, the first land he reached in the New World, thought he had reached an outlying part of India. For the latest account of the savage notion of God, see Tyler's *Anthropology*, p. 358. The two chief forms of savages' religion are worship of nature-spirits and of ancestors. [57] **Contemplative**: "speculative" as opposed to the practical atheist, who lives as if there were no God. **Diagoras**: of Melos, a reputed atheist. Hence Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 756, calls Socrates "the Melian." [58] **Bion**: a sophist of Scythia, died about B.C. 240. **Lucian**: the Voltaire of the second century A.D. [62] **Indeed**:

"that are really atheists." [64] **Cauterized**: "seared in conscience." [68] **Of priests**: "about priests." [69] **Non est**: we can no longer say, "As is the people so is the priest, for not even the people are as the priest," i.e. as bad. St. Bernard, *Sermo ad pastores*. [85] **Confidence of**: "belief in." [95] **Cicero**: *De Haruspicum Responsis*, 9. "However great our self-esteem, fathers and conscripts, yet we cannot match the Spaniards in numbers, nor the Gauls in bodily strength, nor the Carthaginians in cunning, nor the Greeks in art nor the Italian and Latin races themselves in the domestic and natural affections which mark this land and nation; but our piety and religion, and our perception of the one great truth of the Divine government of the universe, these are the qualities in which we surpass every nation and tribe."

NOTES TO ESSAY XVII.

[1] **No opinion**: that is to be a sceptic, or, in modern phrase, an agnostic. "No opinion of God" is distinct from "an opinion that there is no God," i.e. atheism, as defined at the beginning of the previous essay "the belief that this universal frame is without a mind." But later on in this essay Bacon would seem to use "atheism" loosely in the former sense, else there is an obvious contradiction between the two essays. [4] **Reproach of**: "reproach against." **Plutarch**: *De Superstitione*. [12] **Natural piety**: "observance of the laws of nature, especially of human nature," almost "natural religion." Cf. Wordsworth:

"And O that all my days might be
Bound each to each by natural piety!"

[14] **Though religion were not**: "even in the absence of revealed religion." [15] **Absolute monarchy**: atheism leaves the mind a *tabula rasa* on which the laws of nature can be graven. Superstition sets up an idol which "bears no rival near the throne;" like the *religio* of Lucretius:

"*Terribili super aspectu mortalibus instans.*"

476 [20] **Civil**: "orderly," "peaceful." [22] **Primum mobile**: "motive power;" see Essay 15, l. 54. **Ravisheth**: "hurries along." [26] **Reversed**: the opposite to the true order. **It was**, etc.: from Sarpi, *Ist del Conc. Trid.* "It was said by some wits that if the astrologers, in ignorance of the real cause of the heavenly motions, have taken refuge in eccentrics and epicycles to save appearances, it was no marvel if eccentricities of opinion were

resorted to in order to save the appearances of supra-celestial phenomena." [27] **Council of Trent:** 1545 to 1563. The famous council which so rigidly defined the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church and tightened the bonds of the scholastic system. [28] **Schoolmen:** a general name given to the philosophers of the Middle Ages, roughly from the ninth to the fifteenth century, because their philosophy was universally taught in the schools. Scholasticism was not one system of philosophy, but a method. It was an attempt to apply the dialectics of Aristotle, first to theology, and then to all human knowledge. It was metaphysical; it argued deductively from assumed first principles, and the great work of Bacon's life was to undermine it by his inductive experimental philosophy. Among the chief schoolmen may be mentioned Erigena, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, Duns Scotus. [30] **Eccentrics:** in the Ptolemaic system the planets were supposed to move in small circles (epicycles), the centre of which described a larger circle about the earth. As, in order to account for the varying velocity of their motion and for their progression and regression the earth was assumed not to be at the centre of their circles, they were called *eccentrics*. **Engines of orbs:** "contrivances of orbits." [31] **To save the phenomena:** to invent a plausible hypothesis which preserves, does not do violence to, the phenomena. Hence we get the phrase "to save appearances." Cf. Milton, *Paradise Lost*, viii. 82 (and Masson's very clear note):

"How they will wield
The mighty frame, how build, unbuild, contrive,
To save appearances, how gird the sphere
With centric and eccentric scribbled o'er,
Cycle and epicycle, orb in orb."

For Bacon's own views on astronomy see Essay 23. [39] **Stratagems of prelates;** glancing at Popish relics and the sale of indulgences. [41] **Good intentions:** probably refers to the Anabaptists or other Antinomian sects who held that for Christians the law was abolished, each man being a law to himself. [42] **Taking an aim:** "guessing at by analogy." [50] **Corrupteth:** according to the proverb, *corruptio optimi fit pessima*. [55] **Would:** "should," L.V. *curae esse debet*.

NOTES TO ESSAY XVIII.

[1] **Travel:** in the older editions the word is printed *travaile*. The two words are doublets, and were hardly desynonymized in Shakespeare's and Bacon's time. Travelling is regarded

throughout the essay as a luxury of the few, not a relaxation of the many. [4] **Entrance into**: "elementary knowledge of." [6] **I allow well**; L.V. *probo*. [12] **Hooded**: a metaphor from falconry. Cf. Shakespeare, *Henry V.*, Act iii. sc. 7: "'Tis a hooded valour." [18] **Chance**: a science of meteorology or weather predictions, not dreamt of even in Bacon's *New Atlantis*. [23] **Consistories**: any august assembly, especially used of the College of Cardinals. The place of the adjective is due to the French origin, as in "heir-apparent." [30] **Exchanges, burses**: two names of the same thing. The Royal Exchange was formerly Britain's Burse. [37] **Triumphs**: "public shows." See Essay 37. [47] **Card**: cf. Essay 29: "And the number and greatness of cities and towns may appear by cards and maps." [53] **Adamant**: "loadstone," "magnet;" like the French *aimant*, a contracted form. Adamant originally meant any hard rock or metal. Cf. *Discourse in Praise of the Queen*. "Though her wit be as the adamant of excellences which draweth out of any book, ancient or new, the best." [55] **Diet**: "to take one's meals." [65] **Employed men**: "*employés*," in the sense of confidential servants. [72] **Healths**: see the scene in *Cymbeline* where Posthumus pledges his mistress's health, Act i. sc. 4. **Place**: precedence. [73] **Words**: L.V. *verba contumacia*. [81] **Apparel**: see *Merchant of Venice*, i. 2, 74 *seq.* where Portia describes the travelled Englishman. [82] **Advised**: "deliberate." [85] **Prick in**: Wright and Abbott give "plant," quoting, as parallel, Essay 46, l. 197; but is not the metaphor rather from embroidery? Cotgrave has "*aiguille*"—wrought or pricked with a needle.

NOTES TO ESSAY XIX.

[5] **Representations**: "vivid fancies." [8] **The king's**: Prov. xxv. 3. [9] **Jealousies**: *vellétés*, "petty desires," opposed to "one ruling passion." [18] **Nero**: cf. Juvenal, viii. 198, *citharædo principe*, and the story in *Dion Cassius* that he played the harp while Rome was burning. **Domitian**: Suetonius tells us he was such a skilled archer that he could plant an arrow between each of the fingers of a boy holding his outstretched hand as a target. [19] **Commodus**: *Dion Cassius*, lxxii. 10, 22. [20] **Caracalla**: *Dion Cassius*, lxxvii. 10. [23] **Profiting**: "making progress." Cf. Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, i. 1. 6: "My brother Jaques he keeps at school, and report speaks goldenly of his profit." [27] **But that they must have**: "without having." [29] **Alexander**: who wept, not, as the common story goes, because there were no more worlds to conquer, but because, there being

worlds' innumerable, he had not yet conquered one. [30] **Dioclesian**: abdicated A.D. 305, not from melancholy or superstition, but from desire for rest and retirement. His occupation at Salona is the origin of the French proverb, *planter ses choux*. **Charles V.**: resigned successively the Netherlands, Spain, and the imperial crown, 1555-6. Of Bacon's three instances he is the only one really in point. The story of his later penances and the celebration of his own funeral is familiar to all. [34] **Temper of empire**: "the way in which qualities should be combined to make a ruler." *Temper* is hitting the happy mean between sovereignty and liberty; *distemper* is passing from one extreme to the other. [38] **Apollonius**: the Cagliostro of the first century A.D. His life was written by Philostratus, whence Bacon gets the anecdote. [48] **Fine deliveries**: "brilliant schemes for getting out of difficulties." Cf. Dryden's character of Achitophel (Shaftesbury):

"A daring pilot in extremity,
Pleased with the danger, when the storms went high,
He sought the storms; but, for a calm unfit,
Would steer too nigh the sands to boast his wit."

[51] **To try masteries**: to try which is master. Cf. "to try a fall." [52] **Neglect**: used absolutely. [57] **Tacitus**: a slip of memory. The passage is rightly referred, in the *Adv. of L.*, ii. 22, 5, to Sallust, (*Bell. Jug.* c. 113). [59] **Solecism of power**: "the gross error that rulers make;" properly of an error of language. [64] **Second**: "inferior." [72] **Embracing of**: "monopolizing." [73] **Approaches**: "encroachments." [82] **Take up**: properly, "to borrow," so to purchase peace by surrendering rights or territories. [84] **League**: A.D. 1480. Guicciardini's great history of his times extends from 1480 to 1534. [88] **Schoolmen**. Wright traces the reference to St. Thomas Aquinas. [94] **In-famed**: "infamous." The slander comes from Dion Cassius, who wrote two centuries after the event. There is absolutely no foundation for it. [95] **Roxolana**: the favourite, and afterwards the wife, of Soliman the Magnificent. To secure the succession for her own son, Bajazet, she caused Mustapha, Soliman's son by a Circassian, to be strangled, A.D. 1553. [97] **Edward the Second his queen**. This form, originally a pleonasm, but perpetuated by a false theory of the origin of the genitive ('s = his), is common from Elizabeth to Anne. Thus we find it (rarely) in Shakespeare, in the Book of Common Prayer, Sir Thomas Browne, etc. [102] **Advoutress**: "adultrous." The vocalized "l" is due to the French. [110] **Selymus**: Selim II., surnamed the Drunkard, son of Soliman, became sultan A.D. 1566, and

was defeated at the great battle of Lepanto, 1571. [112] **Crispus**: eldest son of Constantine by Minervina, poisoned or executed by order of his father, A.D. 326, for what cause is unknown. **Constantinus II.** was betrayed into an ambush and slain by Constans, A.D. 340. Constans was murdered, B.C. 350, by a domestic traitor. Constantius died of fever, "thus delivering the Roman empire from the calamities of civil war," A.D. 361. [118] **Demetrius**: falsely accused by his brother Perseus of conspiring against his father, and poisoned B.C. 181. [133] **That state**: "that order of men," *i.e.* the clergy. **But where**: "except when it is supported by." [135] **Collation**: "appointment." [141] **Henry VII.**: "He kept a strait hand on his nobility, and chose rather to advance clergymen and lawyers, which were more obsequious to him, but had less interest in the people; which made for his absoluteness, but not for his safety. In so much as I am persuaded it was one of the causes of his troublesome reign." [155] **Vena porta**: or *gate-vein*, which distributes blood to the liver, having first (according to the physiology of the time) taken up the chyle. [157] **Nourish**: a neuter verb, "get nourishment." [168] **Janizaries**: from two Turkish words meaning "new soldiers," a body formed of young prisoners trained to arms in the beginning of the fourteenth century; lasted till 1826. [170] **Several**: "separate."

NOTES TO ESSAY XX.

[4] **Their children**: so edition of 1625. The edition of 1612 reads *their child*. [6] **They are obliged**: "counsellors are bound." The grammar is loose. [11] **The counsellor**: Isa. ix. 6. [12] **Salomon**: Prov. xx. 18. [13] **Agitation**: from the original meaning of "tossing to and fro," "discussing a question," the word has passed to its modern sense of a one-sided discussion--a strong movement for or against some question of the day. [20] **Ill counsel**: the counsel of the young men that Rehoboam followed. 1 Kings xii. 8. [23] **For the persons**: "as regards." [27] **Jupiter**: the myth comes from Hesiod's *Theogonia*. Modern mythologists explain how Pallas Athena, Ahanâ the Dawn, sprang from the forehead of the sky, or Zeus. Mr. Gladstone, who finds in Jupiter, Apollo, and Minerva a representation of the three Persons of the Trinity, is a true follower of Bacon. [56] **Of themselves**: "by themselves," without counsellors. [61] **Cabinet councils**: "The sovereign, on the most important occasions, resorted for advice to a small knot of leading ministers. The advantages of this course were early

pointed out by Bacon, with his usual judgment and sagacity; but it was not till after the Restoration that the interior council began to attract general notice." Macaulay, *Hist. of England*, i. 211. [69] **Plenus**: "I am full of chinks." Terence, *Eun.*, i. 2, 25; Parmeno's answer to the question, "Can he keep a secret?" [70] **Futile**: "leaky." [73] **Which will**: "secrecy can hardly be preserved," etc. [76] **Constantly**: "without a break." [78] **To grind with a hand-mill**: "to lend a hand himself," "to do his own work." [79] **Inward**: "intimate." [83] **Morton and Fox**. "About this time the king called unto his privy council John Morton and Richard Fox, the one Bishop of Ely, the other Bishop of Exeter, vigilant men and secret, and such as kept watch with him almost upon all men else." Bacon's *Hist. of Henry. VII.* Morton's Fork, the dilemma for extorting benevolences, is well known. [84] **The fable**: see l. 35. [87] **Dependencies**: "prerogatives." [93] **Non inveniet**: St. Luke xviii. 8. [94] **Nature of times**: "general characteristic of the age." [104] **Principis**: Mart, *Epigr.* viii. 15. "The highest quality in a sovereign is to know his people." [106] **Speculative**: L.V. *rimatores*, "prying into." [114] **Obnoxious**: "exposed." [123] **Secundum genera**: "by classes" as opposed to individuals. To argue about lawyers and statesmen as you would about virtue or circles. [128] **Optimi**: "The best counsellors are the dead." "Alonzo of Aragon was wont to say of himself that he was a great necromancer, for that he used to ask counsel of the dead, meaning books." Apophthegm 105. Cf. *Adv. of L.*, i. viii. 6. Milton, *Areopagitica ad init.* "For books are not absolutely dead things." [129] **Blanch**: blench, flinch. [131] **Actors**: Xenophon, Cæsar, Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Sir T. More, and Bacon himself are instances in point. [136] **Spoken to**: we still are "to speak to a question." [137] **In nocte**: "Night brings counsel," a Greek proverb. [138] **Union**. The whole business was concluded between October 29 and December 6, 1604. Bacon himself reviewed the articles and reduced them to form. See Spedding, *Life*, iii. 240. [143] **Hoc agere**: "keep to the matter in hand." [144] **Indifferent**: "unbiased." [156] **Tribunitious**: like the demagogic tribunes of the people. [157] **Clamour**: "deafen," "take by storm." [166] **Take the wind**: metaphor from a pack which follows the scent of the first hound. Johnson in his dictionary explains the passage wrongly, "have the upper hand." [167] **Placebo**: the first word of the vesper hymn for the dead. Ps. cxvi. 9. Wright happily quotes Chaucer, *Parson's Tale*, "Flatterers ben the develes chapeleyns that singen ay *placebo*."

NOTES TO ESSAY XXI.

[1] Cf. Shakespeare, *Julius Cæsar*, Act iv. sc. 3 :

“ There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune :
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.”

[3] Cf. *Adv. of L.*, ii. 23, 28, “ As Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of Sybilla’s books the treble price, when he mought have had all the three for the simple : ” and *Colours of Good and Evil*, 10, where Bacon varies slightly in the story. “ And therefore Sybilla, when she brought her three books, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, because the burning of that had been *gradus privationis*, and not *diminutionis* ” (if she had burned the third, she would not have lessened but wholly annihilated her merchandise). So Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act i. sc. 2, uses Sibylla as a proper name, “ If I live to be as old as Sibylla.” Elsewhere he uses the English form Sibyll. Sibyl is the correct spelling, as the word is derived from *Σίβυς* (Doric for *Δίος*) and *βουλή*. [6] From the proverb given in Dionysius Cato’s distichs, 17. :

“ Fronte capillata est, post est occasio calva.”

Cf. R. Southwell’s *Loss in Delays* :

“ Time weares all his locks before,
Take thou hold upon his forehead ;
When he flies he turns no more,
And behind his scalp is naked.”

(The whole poem may be profitably compared with this Essay).

[8] **No hold taken** : “ when no hold is taken.” Cf. Spenser’s description of the hag Occasion, *F. Q.*, ii. 4, 4.

Her locks that loathly were and hoarie grey,
Grew all afore, and loosely hong unrold ;
But all behind was bald and worne away,
That none thereof could ever taken hold.”

[11] **Onset** : now only the beginning of a combat, but here, as in Shakespeare, of taking the initiative generally. Cf. “ and for an onset, Titus, to advance thy name, Lavinia will I make my spouse.” *Titus Andronicus*, i. 2, 38. [13] **Deceived** : taken men unawares than overpowered them with their eyes open. [15] **Nothing** : ad-

verb. So frequently in Shakespeare, "nothing altered," "nothing afear'd," "nothing benefit," etc. [19] **Moon**: probably a general illustration, at any rate the particular reference is not known. [22] **Buckling**: to invite dangers by premature preparations. Metaphor from buckling on armour. [26] **Argus**: probably symbolized the peacock. See Ovid, *Met.*, ii. 533. [27] **Briareus**:

"Him with the hundred hands,
 . . . Whom the gods call Briareus, men
 Ægeon."

CHAPMAN'S *Homer*, *Il.*, i. 396.

[28] **Helmet**: *Cf.*

"She snatched the scourge up and the reins, and shut her heavenly look
 In Hell's vast helm from Mars's eyes."

Ibid., *Il.*, v. 842.

(Where Hell = Hades, identified with the Latin Pluto). Similar myths are the ring of Gyges in Pluto's Republic, and the tarn kappe, or cloak of darkness, in the *Nibelungen Lied*. [29] **Politie**: the politician. We preserve the original meaning in the phrase "the body politic." [33] **As**: *cf.* Essay, *Of Marriage and Single Life*, "which are so sensible of every restraint, as they will goe neare to think," etc.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXII.

[1] Cunning and wisdom (from the old English *cunnan* and *witan*, both meaning "to know") must originally have been nearly synonyms. It is not difficult to see how cunning acquired its sinister meaning: *cf.* Gr. *σοφός*, Latin *callidus*, Germ. *klug*, French *fin*. We still retain the original meaning in the phrases "a cunning workman," etc. [5] **Pack cards**: "cheat." *Cf.*:

"She, Eros, hath
 Packt cards with Cæsar and false-played my glory."
 SHAKESPEARE, *Ant. and Cleop.*, iv. 14, 18

"The judge shall job, the bishop bite the town,
 And mighty dukes pack cards for half-a-crown."
 POPE.

[6] **Canvasses**: "intrigues." The French version has *pratiques*. [11] **Of business**: *i.e.* business, like the appositional genitive, *vox voluptatis*. [12] **Books**: *cf.* Essay, *Of Studies*. "To

make judgment wholly by their rule is the humour of a scholar." [14] Mr. Wright supposes the figure to be taken from the game of bowls, and the aim which follows is in favour of this meaning, but it may simply represent the French *allée*, walk in life; or, as we say colloquially, "in their own line." So the Latin version "in viis quas sæpe contriverunt." [16] **Mitte**: "Turn both adrift among strangers, and you'll see the difference." A saying of Aristippus, the Cyrenaic philosopher, b. B.C. 435. [18] **Because**: refers to what follows; we should use "seeing that." **Haberdasher**: in Bacon's time the word meant a seller of any small wares, a pedlar. It is derived from the old French *hapertas*, a sort of felt. Cotgrave gives *mercerot*, a pedlar, a paltrie haberdasher. [19] Their stock in trade. [20] **Wait upon**: watch. [21] **Your eye**: "And therefore a number of subtle persons, whose eyes doe dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, doe well know the advantage of this observation, as being most part of their abilitie." *Adv. of L.*, ii. 9, 2 (quoted by Wright). [23] As Apuleius says, *Hominem liberum et magnificum debere, si queat, in primori fronte animum gestare*: "a gentleman ought to wear his heart on his forehead." *Mought*, past sub. of may, mighte or moughte in Chaucer. *Cf. Of Studie*, l. 23. [24] **Would**: = should, *passim*. [27] **That you entertain**: we should use the infinitive. [34] Used as in the technical sense of moving a Bill in Parliament. [36] So Shakespeare, *Much Ado*, Act i. sc. 1:

"I am possessed of that is mine."

In modern English this use is not admissible after a preposition. [37] **Doubts**: "suspects." *Cf.* the French "se douter." [42] Notice "he" referring to "one," a construction hardly allowable in modern English. [50] Nehemiah ii. 1. Hardly an instance of cunning. [53] **Tender**: "delicate." [55] **Voice**: "utterance," like the Latin *vox*. [56] **He**: is loosely constructed, the subject being implied in "the more weighty voice." [57] **Narcissus**: Tacitus, *Annals*, xi. 29: "Narcissus, by money and promises, induced some courtesans of the Emperor to undertake the information against Messalina. Calpurnia, one of these women, being admitted in secret to the Emperor, fell on her knees and cried out, "Messalina has married Silius." At the same time she asked her accomplice Cleopatra, who was standing near on purpose, whether she had heard it. She answered that she had, and thereupon Calpurnia asked that "Narcissus should be summoned." [69] **Go forth**: expatiate on other matters. [75] **Apposed**: questioned. "The word is not now in use, except that in some schools, to put grammatical

questions to a boy is called to *pose* him." Johnson's Dictionary. A meaning, I take it, not quite obsolete in the year of grace, 1884. Cf. Apposition Day at St. Paul's School. [82] "Mr. Spedding has suggested to me that probably the two competitors for the office of Secretary, here alluded to, were Sir Robert Cecil and Sir Thomas Bodley." Wright's Notes. **Kept quarter**: To keep one's proper place, and so be on good terms with another:

"So he would keep fair quarter with his bed."

Comedy of Errors, ii. i, 108.

[91] **Was told**: indicative, because it expresses the actual result.

[95] **The turning of the cat in the pan**: a proverbial expression, of which the origin is very obscure. "Lord Bacon defines it as if it meant turning the tables upon a man or reversing the truth. It does not seem to have originally implied *perfidy*, but merely an interesting change of character.¹ In the old play of the *Marriage of Witt and Wisdom*, Idleness says:

"I am as very a turncote, as the wethercoke of Poles:

For now I will call my name Due Disporte.

So, so finely I can *turne the catt in the pane*."

So in the famous old song of the *Vicar of Bray*:

"When George in pudding-time came o'er,

And moderate men looked big, sirs,

I turned a cat-in-pan once more,

And so became a Whig, sirs."

NARES' *Glossary*.

Cat is a corruption of cate (*cf.* cates in the sense of delicacies: pan-cate is a provincialism for pancake), and the phrase arises from the dexterity of the cook required to turn the cate in the pan. **When that**: attributes to another a remark which really originated with the first speaker. [103] **This I**: *I* is emphatic. Tacitus, *Annals*, xiv. 57, probably quoted from memory. The original is "non se, ut Burrum, diversas spes sed solam incolumitatem Neronis spectare;" where the omitted words, *ut Burrum*, somewhat spoil Bacon's point. Translate "He was no trimmer like Burrhus, but had a single eye to Nero's safety." [197] **A tale**: of this the Parables are an excellent example *in bonam partem*; so too Abraham Lincoln's stories. [115] **Fetch about**: properly a nautical metaphor. Cf.

¹ Rather versatility of character.

"to fetch a compass." Here probably of stalking game, as *beat over* is of beating a cover. [122] **Paul's**: "The body of old St. Paul's church in London was a constant place of resort for business and amusement. Advertisements were fixed up there, bargains made, servants hired, politics discussed," etc. Nares' *Glossary*. [120] **Like to**: a loosely constructed sentence. Bacon begins it as if intending to use a passive verb, and then changes to an active. [129] **Resorts and falls**: the general sense is clear,—“the ups and downs,” the fluctuations of business; but the exact meaning of the words is very obscure. Wright explains “resorts” as “springs or fountains,” quoting from Fuller, *Holy State*, xxv., “Mr. Perkins was born the first and died the last year of Elizabeth, so that his life streamed in equal length with her reign, and they both had their *fountains and falls* together.” In that case the source and downward course of the stream is contrasted with *the main*, the ocean. But no parallel to this sense of *resort* is forthcoming, and elsewhere Bacon uses the word as an equivalent for the French *ressort*, the spring of a machine. (“Such histories do rather set forth the point of business than the true and inward resorts thereof.” *Adv. of L.*, ii. 2, 4.) *Ressort* is also given in Cotgrave as the appeal to a superior court, or the jurisdiction of a superior court. Hence I am inclined to take it here in the sense of “rise.” If so, the main will mean the principal part, the principles, as we say “in the main.” [132] If my interpretation of “resorts and falls” be right, the whole sentence will mean: “Some cunning men are well up in the machinery of business; these can pull the wires, and profit by the ups and downs of fortune, but they have never really mastered the subject. To use a familiar illustration, there are a hundred successful stock-jobbers for one Walter Bagehot. [138] **Looses**: solutions for concluding or solving the difficulty; like a boy who can find the right answer to a sum, but cannot explain the process. Cf. “fine deliveries,” Essay 19. Elsewhere *loose* is used for the discharging of an arrow, and so Abbott compares here the colloquial “taking a shot,” but this seems less likely. **But are**: the grammar halts. [142] **Abusing**: “deceiving.” Cf. “they do abuse the king that flatter.” Shakespeare, *Pericles*, Act i. sc. 2. [143] **Putting tricks**: the phrase was apparently modern. It occurs in Shakespeare, *Tempest*, ii. 2, 60. [144] **Salomon**: Prov. xiv. 15. The E. V. is somewhat different. Bacon quotes as usual from the Vulgate.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXIII.

[2] **Shrewd** : properly the past part. of to *shrew*, "to curse," (Cf. Shakespeare's "beshrew me"). A *shrewid* generation is Wiclif's translation of Acts ii. 40 (E.V. an untoward generation); Trevisa translates Higden's *mures nocentissimi* by "wel *schrewid* mys." Cf. the parallel passage in *Adv. of L.*, ii. 23, 8. "Like ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very *hurtful* for the garden." Bacon is mistaken as to the fact. Ants may, it is true, disfigure a lawn, but they do no injury to flowers, living chiefly on the secretion of the aphides of rose-trees, etc. [4] **Self-love** : is to be distinguished from *wisdom for a man's self*, the latter being nearly equivalent to *selfishness*. *Self-love* is a regard for self irrespectively of others, but not necessarily, as in the case of selfishness, at the expense of others. As Whately remarks, self-love may exist on a desert island. With the sentiment of Pope's—

"The secret rare between the extremes to move
Of mad good-nature and of mean self-love."

Selfishness is a word of later date than Bacon, who uses once or twice *Philautia* for it. It is first found in the works of Puritan divines about 1650. See Trench, *English Past and Present*, p. 154. [5] **So** : limitative, like one of the uses of *ita . . . ut*. There is a remarkable resemblance to Polonius' speech in *Hamlet*, Act i. sc. 3—

"To thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."

But the resemblance is more verbal than real. Bacon says, "Pursue self-love providing it does not clash with your duty to your neighbour." Shakespeare says, like Pope, that "true self-love and social are the same." [7] **It is**, etc. : notice the rhetorical force of the inverted order, as in the French, *C'est un misérable foyer de ses actions que soi même*. [8] **Right earth** : L.V. *recte terrestrem naturam sapit*, "it is exactly of the nature of the earth." The secondary meaning, earthly nature, is suggested. **For that**, etc. : Bacon accepted the Ptolemaic or geocentric system of the universe, and scoffed at the Copernicans, though Copernicus had published his *De Revolutionibus orbium Coelestium* in 1543. At times, however, he speaks hesitatingly, as if his faith in the old system was shaken. See Whewell, *Hist. of the Ind. Sciences*, i. pp. 295 and 388; and cf. Essay 15, l. 55.

Only : "alone." [10] **Move upon** : as on a pivot. [14] **Is at the peril** : "involves," implies good as well as evil. [18] **Crooketh** : "perverts." "St. Augustine sayeth himself that images be of more force to *crooke* an unhappye soule than to teach and instruct him." *Homilies*. (Quoted by Whately.) [19] **Eccentric to** : "not coinciding with," properly "having a slightly different centre." See Essay 17. *Bias* is the lead let into one side of a bowl to divert it from the straight course. In *King John*, ii. 2, commodity is called the *bias* of the world. See also *Richard II.*, Act iii. sc. 4. [34] **After the model** : "proportionate in magnitude to." [38] **And it were** : "and," = "if," is the same word as the copulative conjunction, and the hypothetical meaning is really contained not in the *and*, but in the conjunctive mood that follows. The shortened form *an* was confined to this subordinate use and as the original form was lost an *if* (*and if*, *an if*) was added. [44] **Thereof** : one of the "clumsy and antiquated contrivances," in the interregnum between *his*, *her*, and *its*. Cf. Jeremy Taylor, *Pisgah Sight of Palestine*, p. 401 (of Solomon's temple) : "twice was it pillaged by foreign foes, and four times by *her* own friends before the final destruction *thereof*." Quoted by Trench, *English Past and Present*, p. 163. [48] **Crocodiles** : a superstition at least as old as Pliny. Cf. *The lover dreading to move*—

"Accursed crocodile most cruelly can tole

With truthlesse tears unto his death the silly pittieng soule."

[50] **Cicero** : *Ep. ad Quint. Frat.*, iii. 8. "Lovers of themselves without a rival." Cf. Essay 10.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXIV.

[2] **Innovations** : generally in Elizabethans, as now, used *in malam partem*. Cf. Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, "a traitorous innovator." Bacon uses it in a neutral sense. [3] **Those that first** : repeated from Essay 14. [6] **Attained** : "equalled in excellence." [7] **For ill** : "For in fallen human nature there is a natural inclination to evil which gathers force with age, whereas good is like an external force, which soon spends itself." [9] **Surely** : the connection is "as human nature naturally deteriorates, if left to itself, innovations are a necessity." [12] **Of course** : *L.V. decursu suo*, "by simply running its course." Notice it is only by a figure of speech that time is called an agent. [16] **Fit** : "expedient." See Essay 10. [17] **Confederate**, etc. : to use a colloquialism, "have shaken down." [20] **Inconformity** : "by not dovetailing with the present." **Like strangers** : "like foreigners,

more stared at and less liked than natives." [23] **Froward**: "perverse," "obstinate." [29] **Otherwise**: "generally speaking;" the Latin gives *illud enim pro certo habeas*. [31] **Pairs**: "impairs," from Latin *pejorare*. [38] **Pretendeth**: "makes a pretext of." [40] **Suspect**: generally "a suspicion," but here "a suspected person," as in the modern legal sense. [41] **The Scripture**, etc.: Jer. vi. 16.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXV.

[1] **Affected dispatch**: "a love of dispatch for its own sake." Cf. "I have seen an affectation of dispatch turn utterly to delay and length." *Life*, vi. 190.¹ [11] **For the time**: "for the moment;" this seems simpler than the L.V., *ut brevi tempore multum confecisse videantur*, i.e. "in respect of time." [12] **False periods**: "conclusions which are no conclusions." [13] **Because**: "in order that." [17] **A wise man**: Sir Amyas Paulet, as we learn from Apophthegm 76. [23] **Hand**: "rate," "out of hand," "second hand," are analogous uses, but I know of no exact parallel. Shakespeare uses "at any hand," for "at any rate." [24] **The Spartans**: the contrast between Athenian dispatch and Lacedæmonian tardiness is a commonplace with Thucydides. So Livy, xlv. 23, speaks of *Lacedæmoniorum populum cunctatorem*. [36] **Moderator**: "president," or "chairman." Cf. "How does Philopolis seasonably commit the opponent with the respondent like a long-practised moderator!"—Sir T. More. Oxford and Cambridge *moderators* go back to the days when degrees were conferred for disputations. [37] **Actor**: L.V. *oratorem*. [41] **Curious**: "ornate," "elaborate." [43] **Passages**: L.V. *transitiones bellæ* "the connecting links of a speech." May not the word mean the *loci communes*? The expression, "passage of a book," seems later than Bacon, but passage is often used by him and Shakespeare to denote a single act or transaction, and so I should take it here of a rhetorical commonplace disconnected with the matter in hand. [44] **Excusations**: "personal apologies." [46] **Bravery**: "ostentation." The really modest man says nothing of himself. [47] **Material**: "matter-of-fact." So in *As you like it*, "a material fool" is one full of matter, of wise saws. [62] **Conceived**: "drawn up," like the Latin *concupere verba*, *jus-jurandum*, etc. [65] **Ashes**: wood ashes are still used as a manure for pastures.

¹ Quoted by Abbott, who seems, however, to doubt whether *affectation* is used in the same sense as *affected*. I think there can be no question that it is. *Affectation* is used by Shakespeare for *affection* and the two words were not yet desynonymized.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXVI.

[1] **The French.** Cf. *Aurora Leigh*, sixth book :

“ The English have a scornful, insular way
Of calling the French light. The levity
Is in the judgment only.”

[5] **The apostle** : 2 Tim. iii. 5. [7] **Sufficiency** : “ capacity,” “ ability.” [8] **Magno** : Terence, *Heaut.*, iii. 5, 8, “ With mighty travail produce trifles.” [10] **Formalists** : “ pedants,” “ precisians.” [11] **Prospectives** : glasses which produce an optical delusion, like the modern stereoscope. Cf. Shakespeare, *Richard II.*, Act ii. sc. 2, 18. “ Like perspectives, which, rightly gazed upon, show nothing but confusion, eyed awry, distinguish form.” [20] **Cicero**. In *Pisonem*, 6, “ You answer with one eyebrow raised to your forehead and the other depressed to your chin, that you are no friend to this cruelty.” [24] **Bear it** : “ to carry their point.” Cf. Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, Act ii. sc. 3, 227, “ A’ should not bear it so, a’ should out swords first ; shall pride carry it ?” [26] **By admittance** : “ as granted.” [29] **Curious** : “ quibbling,” “ trifling.” [31] **A difference** : “ a nice distinction.” [32] **Blanch** : “ shirk the real question.” See Essay 20. [33] **Hominem** : “ a dotard who fritters away weighty realities with petty choppings of logic.” The exact words are not found, and Bacon seems to have mixed up a passage in Aulus Gellius, xii. 2, reflecting on Seneca’s style as subtle and sententious, with another on the same subject in Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.*, x. 1 : “ *Si rerum pondera minutissimis sententiis non fregisset, consensu potius eruditorum quam puerorum amore comprobaretur.*” “ He would have commanded the general approval of learned men, not, as is now the case, the enthusiasm of boys.” [34] **Plato** : *Protagoras*, A. 337. Prodicus distinguishes between “ dispute” and “ quarrel,” “ delighted” and “ pleased,” etc. [38] **To be** : “ in being” as “ to object” “ in objecting.” [45] **Inward beggar** : “ secret,” “ who conceals his poverty.” **Has, their** : notice the faulty grammar. [48] **Opinion** : “ credit.” [49] **You were better** : originally an impersonal “ it would have been better for you ;” but the construction was forgotten, so Shakespeare has “ she were better love a dream.” [50] **Absurd** : properly, “ ill-sounding,” so “ brusque.”

NOTES TO ESSAY XXVII.

[2] Aristotle’s *Politics*, i. 2, 14, “ He who cannot form one of a community, or has no need so to do, by reason of being self-sufficient, is no part of a state, and therefore is either a wild

beast or a god," *i.e.* of a higher or lower nature than men. And in the *Ethics* Aristotle says that a man may withdraw himself from civic life for the sake of contemplation. From this it will be seen that the last part of Bacon's comment is hardly justified. [7] **Should have**: contrasted with *hath*. Should, like the German *soll*, gives an indirect statement or opinion. [10] **Sequester**: to withdraw, a use of the word now obsolete except in the participle. See note 18, "Of Travel." [11] **Conversation**: "manner of life." *Cf.* "Octavia is of a holy, cold, and still conversation." *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act ii. sc. 6, 131. [12] **Falsely**, etc.: to have been falsely feigned in the case, etc. [13] **Candian**: Candia, the ancient name of Crete. Of *Epimenides*, a contemporary of Solon, endless fabulous stories were told. He was said to have lived three hundred years, to have slept for fifty in a cavern. St. Paul quotes a verse of Epimenides (Tit. i. 12), "The Cretans are always liars," etc.; whence the well-known logical puzzle. **Numa**: *Cf.* Statius, *Sylva*, 3, 289, "*Sic sacra Numae ritusque colendos mitis Aricino dictabat nymphe sub antro*," sc. Egeria. Empedocles of Agrigentum flourished towards the middle of the fifth century B.C. He is said to have leapt into the crater of *Ætna*, in order to conceal his death and pass for a god. [14] **Apollonius**: a philosopher and thaumaturgist, born at Tyana in Cappadocia a few years after Christ. He was a great traveller, in philosophy a Pythagorean. He performed miracles of healing, which were by heathen apologists said to rival those of Christ. He lived for nearly a century. See Essay 19. [17] **A crowd**: compare the famous saying of Scipio Africanus quoted by Cicero, *Rep.*, i. 17, 27, "*Se nunquam minus solum esse quam cum solus esset*." [19] **Cymbal**: 1 Cor. xiii. 1. This is one of those splendid sentences not infrequent in Bacon, which contain the very essence of true poetry. [20] **Meeteth with**: "is apposite." [21] A pun on the name of the city Megalopolis. The original of the saying is *Ἐρημία μεγάλη σὲν ἡ μεγάλη πόλις*. [25] **Mere**: absolute. "But there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in nature." *Adv. of L.*, ii. 5, 2. [30] **Humanity**: "human nature." [36] **Sarza**: Sarsaparilla (the meaning of *parilla* is unknown), from the Spanish *zarza*, a bramble, the root of a shrub of the smilacæ order, species of which are found in Jamaica, Brazil, and Mexico. The medicine is still used as a tonic or alterative. [37] **Flower**: *flower* and *flour* are doublets. For the difference of signification, *cf.* travail and travel, Essay 18, note 1. "The name of flowers was given in chemistry to the fine mealy matter which in sublimation is carried to the head of the still, and adheres in the form of a fine powder." Bailey's Dictionary. [38] **Castoreum**: a drug taken from the

beaver. For the strange superstition which prevailed in ancient times concerning it, see Juvenal, *Sat.* xii. 34. [42] **Shrift**: one of the ecclesiastical words introduced before the Norman conquest, from the Latin *scribere*, "to trace out a line of action," "to enjoin," properly applied to the injunctions of the priest who confessed. *Civil* generally in Bacon means "citizen-like," "orderly," "tranquil;" here it seems to mean *lay*, as opposed to *ghostly* confession. [45] **As**; equals "that," *passim*. [48] **Servants**: "ministers," meaning "a favourite." [52] **Sorteth to**: "results in." "Therefore it sorted with them accordingly; for they grew to the greatest monarchy." Essay 29. [54] **Privado**: a Spanish word. "The Duchess of Burgundy sent Perkin Warbeck into Portugal with some Privado of her own to have an eye upon him." Bacon, *Hist. of Hen. VII.* [55] **Graoe**, etc.: by favour, or for the sake of intercourse. [57] **Participes**: the exact phrase has not been traced, but it would be applicable to Agrippa, Mæcenæ, Tiberius, Sejanus, who were, to use a modern phrase, the prime ministers of the first emperors. [59] **Passionate**: "emotional," "sentimental." [70] **That**: "when," like the French *que*. [72] Exactly the French *en effet*. [73] **For that**, etc.: from Plutarch's *Life of Pompey*. "Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla first and after him by Tiberius: *Plures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem vel meridianum.*" *Adv. of L.*, ii. 23, 6.

"Let others hail the rising sun,
I bow to that whose course is run.

GARRICK.

[76] **His nephew**: Octavius, afterwards the Emperor Augustus. [80] Plutarch, *Life of Julius Cæsar*, 64. "But if any one should go and tell them now they have taken their places they must go home again, and return when Calpurnia has better dreams, what room would your enemies have to launch out against you?" [86] **Venefica**: *Cic. Phil.* xiii. 11. The Philippics of Cicero were fourteen in number, delivered against Marcus Antonius, so called from the still more famous speeches of Demosthenes. [90] **Mæcenæ**: the story is from Dion Cassius, liv. 6. [96] **Hæc**: *Tac. Ann.*, iv. 40. "These things, in consideration of our friendship, I have not hidden." [97] **Altar**: *Tac. Ann.*, iv. 74. "Senatus . . . aram amicitiae effigiesque circum Cæsaris ac Sejani censuere." [100] **Plantianus**: "The first prefect who enjoyed and abused this immense power (in the office of Prætorian Prefect) was Plautianus, the favourite minister of Severus. His reign lasted above ten years, till the marriage of his daughter (Plautilla) with the eldest son of the emperor (Caracalla), which seemed to assure his fortune, proved the occasion of his ruin."

Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*. [104] **I love**: Dion Cassius, lxxv. 15. [109] **Lovers of themselves**: see Essay 23, note 1. [112] **Half-piece**: from the scarcity of small coins, silver pennies were often cut in half. [117] **Communeus**: Philippe de Comines, *Liv.* i. c. 4. His *Mémoires* are the most valuable documents we possess for the reigns of Louis XI. and Charles VIII. [118] **Charles**: Charles le Téméraire, Duc de Bourgogne, whose service he left for that of Louis XI. [123] **Perish**. Cf. Beaumont and Fletcher, *Maid's Tragedy*, Act iv. sc. 1.

“Let not my sins perish your noble youth.”

[126] **Parable**: proverb. So *παροιμία* and *παραβολή* are confused in the LXX. See Trench *On the Parables*, p. 7. [127] **Cor**: from Plutarch, *De Educ. Puer.* 17. Cf. the Homeric phrase *θυμὸν ἔδοντες*, eating one's heart, i.e. wasting away with trouble and sorrow. [128] **Hard phrase**: Cicero, *Laelius*, vii. 29, “quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt:” = to use a bolder expression. [130] **Cannibals**: from the Caribs, the original inhabitants of the West India islands. “The Caribes I learned to be men-eaters or cannibals.” Hackluyt. The change from Caribal to cannibal is due to a false etymology, as if the word meant “savage as a dog.” [134] **Redoubleth**, etc.: Cf.

“Well chosen friendship, the most noble
Of virtues, all our joys makes double,
And into halves divides our trouble.”

DENHAM.

[140] The philosopher's stone was said not only to convert all metals to gold, but to cure all diseases. [142] **Praying in aid of**: a legal term, meaning “to call in,” as an advocate.

“And you shall find
A conqueror that will pray in aid for kindness
When he for grace is kneeled to.”

SHAKESPEARE, *Ant. and Cleop.*, Act v. sc. 2.

[149] **Sovereign**: is only another form of “supreme.” The spelling came from a mistaken etymology, as if the word was connected with reign. Milton more correctly spells it *sovrain*. The word is especially applied to remedies. “The most sovereign prescription in Galen is but empiricuteic.” Shakespeare, *Coriol.* ii. 1. 128. [158] **Clarify and break up**: two different metaphors, the last taken from something frozen or stagnant. [159] **Tosseth**: L.V. *agitatur et in omnes partes versatur*, “His wits are nimbler, quicker.” [162] Like the Greek idiom *σοφώτερος*

ἐαυτοῦ. "Wiser than his usual or former self." [164] Plutarch, *Life of Themistocles*, 29. [165] **Cloth of arras**: an anachronism such as we commonly find in Chapman and the other Elizabethan translators. Cloth of arras, or arras, is from the town of Arras or Atrecht, in the department of the Pas de Calais. [166] **In figure**: "as a figure, or complete picture." [173] From Horace, *Ars Poet.*, 304.

"Fungar vice cotis, acutum
Reddere quæ ferrum valet, exsors ipsa secandi."

"I shall act as the whetstone which sharpens steel though itself it cannot cut." [174] **Were better**: "It would be better for a man to," etc. An idiom common in Shakespeare. See Abbott's *S. Grammar*, par. 230, and compare the Greek ἀξίως εἶμι, δίκαιός εἶμι. **Statua**: the Latin form of the word shews that it was not yet fully naturalized in the language. Shakespeare uses both forms. [180] **Heraclitus**: one of the Ionic school of philosophers, or the Physicists. He was called ὁ σκοτεινός, the obscure, on account of his dark sayings. [181] A favourite quotation of Bacon. Stobæus, among others, gives it thus: αἰὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη. The "dry soul" is that which partakes of the divine fire, that is, pure wisdom. The "moist soul" (ὕγρη ψυχὴ) is that which is weighed down by the senses, or, as Bacon elsewhere expresses it, "flooded by the affections." [185] **Infused**: In apophthegm 258 it is "wet and, as it were, blooded by the affections." [190] Cf. Essay 10. "It hath been well said by Plutarch, that the arch-flatterer, with whom all the petty flatterers have intelligence, is a man's self." [193] **Manners**: "*Mores*," "morals." [206] **That look**: James i. 23. For "favour," see Essay 39, l. 5. [210] The Irish form of this old proverb is, "The man on the dyke sees the most of the hurling." [212] **Twenty-four letters**: I and J, U and V, are not discriminated. The same expression occurs in Essay 38. [213] **Rest**: the fire-lock which did away with the necessity of a rest was invented in France. about 1635, and was generally used in the parliamentary wars. [214] **Fond**: The line in Chaucer, "To fonne and dote in love," explains the transition to the present meaning. The *d* is the termination of the past participle. **High**: "conceited." **To think himself all in all** is in apposition to imaginations. The singular would seem more natural. We should rather reverse the order of the whole sentence, as thus: Nothing can prevent a man, if he is so foolish, from thinking himself self-sufficient, any more than from believing any other absurdity, as that two eyes, etc. [215] **When all is done**: "when all else that is possible is done," or it may mean nothing more than "after all." The L.V. makes

for the latter interpretation, "Verum quicquid dici potest in contrarium." [225] **Bowed**: bent, perverted. **Of**: in this sense is now confined to *adjectives* of fulness or the contrary, but in old English it is found with verbs as well. [228] **Mixed**, etc.: partly pernicious and partly salutary. [245] **To life**: "to the life," "vividly." **Cast**: "cast up," "reckon." [248] **Sparing**: "temperate." [249] **A friend**: Aristotle, *Eudem. Ethics*, vii. 12, and elsewhere. [251] **In desire**: in the midst of their desire, *i.e.* without accomplishing. [252] **Bestowing**: in marriage. [262] **Allege**: affirm or maintain. [267] **A man's person**: a man in his personal relations. **Proper**: "peculiar," "special." [270] **On terms**: "with all proper formalities."

NOTES TO ESSAY XXVIII.

[3] **Limited**: explained by what follows "limited and governed with due regard to," etc.; "defined by." [11] **Of even hand**: *cf.* North's *Plutarch*, p. 999, "The battell was as yet of even hand." [22] **It behoveth him**: the construction is changed. [23] **To turn all to certainties**: the L.V. has *quæ computationi subjacent in certos redditus atque etiam sumptusvertere convenit*, "it behoves him to make all that admits of computation a certainty, both as regards incomings and also outgoings." [29] **In clearing**: the L.V. has "*in perplexa et obærata re familiari liberanda*," "in realizing an encumbered estate." [40] **Charges which . . . matters that**: Bacon did not observe the distinction which modern grammarians have sought to establish between the two relatives *which* and *that*; their respective use is determined as much by the sound as the sense.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXIX.

[1] **The speech**: Plutarch, *Themistocles*, ii. Plutarch calls it a somewhat arrogant remark. [4] **Censure**: "opinion." [7] **Holpen**, etc.: "which may be transferred by an easy metaphor to politicians." [25] **Negotiis pares**: "equal to business." **Manage**: used in the proper sense, "to hold in, manage a horse." [32] **Argument**: "subject," as in Milton, "that to the height of this great argument." [36] **Fearful**: "timorous." [38] **Fall under measure**: L.V. *mensuræ subjicitur*, is reducible to measurement. [40] **Musters**: "censuses." The regular decennial census is only as old as the century. [41] **Cards**: "charts." See Essay 18. [59] **Courage**: (from *cor* with suffix *aticum*) "heart,"

"disposition," a neutral word. Cf. Shakespeare, *Timon*, iii. 3, 24, "I'd such a courage to do him good;" and Chaucer "with devout courage." **Virgil**: *Eclogue* vii. 51. [61] **Arbela**: a town of Assyria east of Nineveh, which gave its name to the battle-field on which Alexander defeated Darius, B.C. 331. The story is from Plutarch, *Alex.* 31. [66] **Tigranes**: defeated by Lucullus, B.C. 68. Plutarch, *Lucullus*, 27. [74] **Odds**: from the context, "the odds in favour of courage over numbers." [78] **Trivially**: "commonly." Bacon borrows the story from Machiavelli, *Disc. Sopr. Liv.*, ii. 10. [92] **Mew**: moult, French, *muer*, Latin, *mutare*. [93] **The blessing**, etc.: Genesis xlix. 9, 14. [100] **Excises**: a corruption of "accises," = assises, from the Dutch *aksys*; properly the sitting of a court; then, the contribution imposed by such a court. For the fact Wright quotes Howell's *Familiar Letters*. "'Twere cheap living here (at Amsterdam) were it not for the monstrous accises which are imposed upon all sort of commodities, both for belly and back. . . . Nor doth any murmur at it, because it goes not to any favourite or private purse, but to preserve them from the the Spaniard, their common enemy." Letter, dated May 1, 1609. [101] **Subsidies**: a subsidy was a tax of 4s. in the pound on the annual value of land, and a property tax of 2s. 8d. in the pound upon the actual value of goods. [101] **Heart**: a synonym of "courage." [111] **Driven out of heart**: "discouraged," "dispirited." [113] **Staddles**: young trees left standing after a copse has been thinned. [117] **Hundred poll**: in edition of 1612 "the hundreth pole." [124] **In regard**: "because." [126] **The device**, etc. The statute is given in Bacon's *Henry VII.*, "All houses of husbandry that are used with twenty acres of ground and upwards shall be maintained and kept up for ever; together with competent proportion of land to be used and occupied with them." It was an attempt to maintain the number of yeomen or small farmers, who were disappearing owing to the conversion of arable land into pastures. [135] **Terra**: *Æn.* i. 531. "A land strong in arms and in fatness of soil." [139] **Free servants**, etc.: the number of retainers of the nobles led to the law against maintenance, 1487. [145] **Doth conduce**: the singular because of the preceding "received into custom," the logical subject being "the established custom of, etc." [150] **Tree**: borrowed from Machiavelli, *Disc. Sopr. Liv.*, ii. 3. Bacon adds the pictorial touch, "*Nebuchadnezzar's*" tree, from Daniel iv. 10. [155] **Naturalization**: Bacon was thinking chiefly of Rome, but advocating indirectly the naturalization of the Scots. [158] **It may hold**: *it* refers to the clause "that a handful," not to "to think." [159] **Spartans**: the exclusive policy of Sparta is constantly dwelt upon by Thucydides. **Compass**: "limits."

[163] **Windfall**: notice the primary sense of the word, now quite obsolete. [170] **Jus**, etc.: "The right of trading, of marriage, of leaving and receiving property by will, of voting, of holding public office." It was not till the reign of Caracalla that the freedom of the city was bestowed on all free Roman subjects. Before this it was a favour granted to distinguished individuals, families, or states. Thus *jus commercii* was conferred on the twelve municipia which stood firm against Hannibal. [172] **Singular persons**: "individuals." [174] **Colonies**: "Wherever the Roman conquers, he inhabits," says Seneca. But Roman colonies, unlike Greek and English, were mostly military outposts. The most convenient situation was occupied by the veterans. Thus in Britain, London, Lincoln, Colchester, Bath, Gloucester, and Chester, were all Roman colonies. [181] **Contain**: "embrace," "keep together." [189] **Highest commands**: Bourbon, Egmont, Piccolomini, Spinola, are given as examples by Mr. Ellis. [191] **Pragmatical sanction**: the royal decrees of Philip IV., A.D. 1622, which gave certain privileges to persons who married, and to those who had six children. The phrase is borrowed from Roman law. A pragmatical sanction was a special rescript or edict of the emperor, as opposed to an answer written on the border of a petition. **Now**: strictly, a year ago. The *De Augmentis*, in which this Essay was incorporated, was published in 1623. [201] **Rid**: "get rid of," "relieve them from." [205] **Easily**: "readily." [213] **Habilitation**, etc.: "natural aptitude without deliberate study and practice." [215] **Romulus**: Plutarch, *Rom.*, 28. **Sent a present**: the message he sent through Julius Proculus. **Intend**: "devote themselves to." [221] **A flash**: "an instant." As we say, "a flash in the pan." [223] **Turks**: it was in the sixteenth century that the Turks won from the Venetians many of their possessions, both in the islands and on the mainland of Greece, that Suleiman, the last great sultan, besieged Vienna, and that Cyprus was ceded to them. [226] **Profiteth**: "makes progress." [228] **Stood upon**: "insisted on." [231] **Oracle of time**: "solemn truth taught us by experience." [236] **Which maintained**: "the antecedent of "which" is "greatness," not "age." Bacon asserts, with little show of reason, that when we find a peaceful State prosperous, that prosperity is due not to peaceful arts, but to the momentum it acquired when it was a military power. [237] **Hath grown**: singular, because the compound subject forms one whole. Cf. "Wherein doth sit the fear and dread of kings." [240] **Them**: refers to a "state," a sense construction. [241] **Pretended**: "which may be put forward as the occasion requires." [245] **Quarrels**: "causes." See Essay 8, l. 55. [253] **Sensible of**: "sensitive to," like the French *sensible*. [254] **Politie**: "public." [255] **Prest**:

"prompt," French *prêt*. [263] **A kind of party**, etc. : either to support a pretended party (as the Romans supported the Achaian League against Macedonia and Ætolia), or to conform all mode of government to their own (as Athens established democracies and Sparta oligarchies). **Tacit**: "implied." *Cf.* "As there are formal and written leagues respective to certain enemies, so is there a natural and *tacit* confederation amongst all men against pirates," Bacon, *Holy War*. [281] **It maketh**: "it is profitable to be almost always," etc. [283] **Chargeable**: "costly." [284] **The law**: "the upper hand," short for "the right to lay down the law." [289] **Abridgment**: "the very essence." So South calls idolatry "the *abridgment* and sum total of all absurdities." [290] **Cicero**: *ad Att.*, x. 8. "Pompey's plan is the genuine Themistoclean policy; he holds that mastery of the sea is mastery of everything." The letter is dated B.C. 49, the year that Cæsar crossed the Rubicon. The "wooden walls" of Themistocles has passed into a proverb. [296] **Actium**: Augustus defeated Antony B.C. 31. [297] **Lepanto**: The Christian fleet, under Don John of Austria, defeated the Turks A.D. 1571. The L.V. has "put a hook in the nostrils of the Turks." Cervantes was wounded in this battle. [300] **Set up their rest**: "stood to win or lose all," a metaphor from cards. At the game of primero, as at loo, the player looked at his cards, and either *passed* or "set up his rest," that is, backed his cards to be better than those of the others. [324] **Garlands personal**: as the *corona civica*, conferred like the Victoria Cross, for personal bravery in preserving the life of a fellow soldier; the *corona muralis* for the first man who scaled the wall of a besieged town. [325] **Emperor**: the title originally conferred by acclamation on a victorious general by his soldiers. [329] **That of the Triumph**: supply "institution" from what follows. [330] **Gaudery**: "finery," "empty show." [344] **Model**: "copy." Man's body is the microcosm, a copy in miniature of the world. *Cf.* Shakespeare, *2 Richard III.*, ii. 153, "That small model of the barren earth, which serves as paste and cover to our bones." [346] **Estates**: "parliaments."

NOTES TO ESSAY XXX.

Compare *Advancement of Learning*, ii. x. 2-10.

- [1] **In this**: may refer to the title of this Essay (so the Latin takes it), but more probably to the sentence that follows. [2] **What he finds**, etc. An objective adjunct of the verbal noun *observation*. [8] **Owing**: the excesses of youth are like a debt which falls due in old age. [13] **State**: "government." [21] **Particularly**: "for the individual." [24] **Long lasting**:

longevity. [25] **Studies**: like Latin *studia*, desires. [42] **Action**: activity, active exercise. **Put their bodies to endure**: "suffer hardness," "vigorously exercise their bodies." [44] **Only**: modern English would require "with diet and tendering (nursing) alone." [45] **Celsus**: A. Cornelius Celsus, an encyclopædic writer early in the first century A.D. The quotation is from the beginning of his work on medicine. [53] **Taught masteries**: "taught how to master its diseases," "indulged and yet not pampered." The L.V. has *robur acquirit*. [54] **Pleasing**: complaisant.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXXI.

[4] **Guarded**: "kept in check." [5] **Check with**: "interfere with." See Essay, 10, l. 55. [9] **Heart**: "courage," as "stoutest" (below) shows. Henry VII. is described in Bacon's *History* as "stout without and apprehensive within." [19] **To keep**: depends on *should*. "To" is inserted because of the intervening clause. [27] **As if**: "so that if." [31] **Artificially**: L.V. *externo artificio*, "by the arts of others." [39] **Would not**: "should not." [42] **Sospetto**: "Suspicion discharges fidelity." **Give a passport**: "set it free," "relieve a man from all obligations of friendship." [43] **But it**, etc.: "but suspicion ought rather to urge faith (the true friend) to rid himself of the suspicion." The man who suspects a friend ought to tell him of his suspicion, and give him an opportunity of clearing himself.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXXII.

[5] **What should be thought**: a just estimate of the case. [6] **Themes**: set subjects. [9] **Give the occasion**: "throw out some remark," and so "set people talking." [10] **Moderate**: "control," "check," when enough has been said. [13] **Present occasion**: "matters of immediate interest," "topics of the day" are to be interchanged with "arguments;" discussion of abstract principles. [16] **Jade**: "to treat like a jade," "to spurn," so "to over-drive," as we speak of riding a hobby to death. Cf. Shakespeare, *Anthony and Cleopatra*, Act iii. sc. 1, 34—

"The ne'er yet beaten horse of Parthia,
We have *jaded* out of the field."

The word, it would seem, savoured of slang in Bacon's time. [23] **Would**: "requires to be." **Parce**: *Ovid. Met.*, ii. 127, "Spare the spur, boy, and pull harder at the reins." [25]

Saltness : like the Latin *sales*, of piquant witticism. [26] **So he** : the redundant *he* because of the intervening sentence. [29] **Content** : "please," the proverbially good listener. **Apply** : "suit." [34] **Poser** : "examiner." See Essay 22. [38] **Galliards** : the *gaillarde* was an old French dance of a lively character. [39] **If you dissemble**, etc.. Bacon here counsels Socratic irony, affectation of ignorance, though with a different object to Socrates. Socrates would take the conceit out of his hearers. Bacon would raise the estimation of the speaker. [49] **Speech of touch** : "which touches closely others," "home thrusts." [55] **Dry blow** : "hard," "severe."

"For hard dry bastings used to prove
The readiest remedies of love,
Next a dry diet."

Hudibras.

[60] **Agreeably** : "suitably." [62] **A good continued**, etc. The last paragraph refers rather to forensic or parliamentary oratory, than to "discourse" in the sense of conversation. A great orator (like Mr. Bright), who is unmatched in a settled speech, is contrasted with a debater (like Lord Palmerston), who was unmatched in a speech of interlocution. [68] **Circumstances** : introductory remarks.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXXIII

[1] **Plantations** : the usual name in Bacon's time for *colonies*, though the latter word was then in use, being found in Spenser's *Present State of Ireland*. [4] **For I may**, etc. : there are fewer colonies now than in old times ; therefore nations are less prolific. The fact is more than doubtful for the time when Bacon wrote, and since then the population of the world has increased at a greater rate than ever before. [6] **Pure soil** : "an unoccupied country." [19] **The scum of people**. The first distinct mention of transportation is in 18 Charles II. (1666), by which statute judges were empowered to sentence offenders to transportation to any of his Majesty's dominions in North America ; but banishment was from the earliest times a recognized punishment, and in 1619 a hundred dissolute persons were sent out to Virginia by an order of the King. The system has gradually died out by reason of the refusal of the colonies to receive convicts. [23] **Certify** : "send information." [33] **Esculent things**. It would seem, from the context, that the word applied rather to vegetables than wild fruits. [36] **Hierusalem** : a curious corruption of

girasole, "sunflower," to which family the artichoke belongs; hence, too, Palestine soup, the invention of some philological chef. [48] **Certain**: "fixed." [53] **Manure**: "till;" French, *manœuvre*. Cf. *ure* in Essay 6, l. 14. **Private**: a substantive, as in Ben Jonson, Shakespeare, etc. [58] **Tobacco**: the very streets of Jamestown (the capital so named after the King) were sown with tobacco. [62] **Brave**: "excellent." Thus, till the opening out of the great coal fields, iron was produced mainly in the well-wooded counties of Kent and Sussex. [63] **Bay salt**: salt obtained by evaporation, as distinguished from rock-salt. **Would**: "should." [64] **Growing silk**: the produce of the *bombyx ceiba*, or silk cotton tree, whose seeds are surrounded by a cottony matter, still used for stuffing cushions, etc. [67] **Soap ashes**: the alkalis produced by burning certain vegetable substances. [69] **Underground**: Raleigh and all the early colonists were deluded by their dreams of an El Dorado. [72] **In the hands of one**, etc. Thus Jamestown, the first English settlement on the main land, was founded by Lord de la Warr; Nova Scotia was settled by Sir H. Boswell; Maryland by Lord Baltimore. The first governors of the States were appointed by the Crown, and in the same position as the Governor-General of Canada is now. [75] **That . . . as**: the restrictive use of *as*, like the Latin *ita, ut*, "provided always that," etc. [79] **Undertakers**: one who takes a business in hand," often implies meddling, as in Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act iii. sc. 4, 349. [83] **Freedoms from custom**: had this wise policy been continued Boston harbour would not have been "black with unexpected tea." [92] **Surcharge**: "unduly increasing the number of colonists." [95] **Marish**: the older form of "marsh," the adjective of "mere." Tennyson has "marish-mosses," "marish-flowers." **Gingles**: "jingles," "rattles." [106] **It is not amiss**: refers to "win their favour by helping them." [107] **And send**, etc. The policy adopted in the case of Cetewayo. [114] **Destitute**: "desert." Bacon doubtless refers to the two settlements of Roanoake, by Sir R. Greville and White, both of which perished to a man.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXXIV.

[8] **Conceit**: "conception of the mind," hence, an idle fancy. [9] **Salomon**: Eccl. v. 11. [12] **To feel**: "to enjoy the actual use," as opposed to "the conceit" of riches. [15] **Feigned**: "fictitious," cf. "a fancy price." **Because**: "in order that." [19] **Salomon**: Prov. xviii. 11. [23] **Sold**: "betrayed." [25] **Proud riches**: "which serve only for pride." [27] **Abstract**:

"separate from the particular cases ;" so "theoretical," "philosophic." [28] **Cicero** : *Pro Rabirio Postumo*, 2 (not of *R. P.*, but of his father) : "In his pursuit of riches it was clear that his object was, not to sate his avarice, but to provide means for satisfying his generous instincts." [32] **Qui** : Prov. xxviii. 20. [33] **The poets feign** : probably Bacon himself, like "the judicious poet" in Trevelyan's *Life of Macaulay*. [40] **Mought** : cf. Essay 22, l. 23. [43] **Upon speed** : "speedily ;" cf. "on purpose." [44] **Enrich** : "to grow rich." [52] **Audits** : properly, "the examination of accounts ;" thus, the rent-roll itself. [56] **Husbandry** : industry generally ; not confined, as now, to agriculture. [58] **Himself** : the speaker. "Him" might have referred to the nobleman. [61] **Expect the prime** : "wait for that state of the market which suits him best." [62] **Overcome** : "make," with the additional sense of difficulty, greatness. [69] **Shall wait** : the future, because the proposition is general ; expressed in the L.V. by a subjunctive. **Broke** : "negotiate," "do business." A broker is properly a go-between, a middle-man. [71] **Chapmen** : "buyers." "Cheap" in Old English is a substantive meaning "bargain," "price." Hence "chap-books," "Cheapside," the schoolboy's "to chop." German, *kaufen*, *Kaufmann*. [74] **Grindeth** : as we speak of a grinding tyranny, or Prospero's goblins that "grind the joints with dry convulsions." [76] **Sharings** : "partnerships." [77] **Usury**. See on Essay 41. [81] **Scriveners** : properly "a notary," French, *écrivain*. Scriveners in Bacon's time combined the occupations of attorneys and money-lenders. [82] **Value** : "make out to be men of substance." [83] **Invention** : any new line of business. [86] **The Canaries** : were finally subjugated by Spain at the beginning of the sixteenth century. About the same time the sugar-cane was introduced and sugar imported thence by British merchants. [87] **Logician** : Bacon assigns four arts to logic, those of Invention, Judging, Retaining, Transmitting, *Works*, iv. 407 (Abbott's notes). [93] **Monopolies** : such as the sale of wine, the manufacture of gold lace, etc. A standing cause of dispute between the Crown and the Commons. By 21 James I. c. 3, passed in 1623, all monopolies with the exception of patents were declared void. [94] **Co-emption**, etc. : the engrossing of Essay 15. [97] **Riches** : "To grow rich by service is one of the best ways of advancement, but if this service implies mean flattery, it is among the worst ways." So the L.V. *dignitatem quamdam habet*, but most editions explain "rise" as "source," "origin." "It" refers not to "riches," but to the getting of riches. [102] **Tacitus** : *Annals*, xiii. 42. Where Suilius upbraids Seneca for amassing within four years of royal favour a fortune of two millions and a half sterling, and adds, "The legacies of the childless fall, as it were, into his nets." [107] **And none worse** : interpreted by the

L.V. *neque invenias usquam tenaciores*, "nor will you find any stick more closely to them." [108] **Be not**, etc.: the connection is, "Be not penny-wise, for though it is true that riches are easily lost—take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of themselves—yet it is also true that you cannot make money without risking something." [116] **The better**: the comparison is between the attack and defence, the lures of the parasites and the years and judgment of the heir. [117] **Glorious gifts**: "ostentatious," like the French *glorieux*. The comparison is repeated in Bacon's *Advice to the King touching Mr. Sutton's Estate*, "This act of Mr. Sutton [the foundation of the Charter-house] seemeth to me as a sacrifice without salt, having the materials of a good intention, but not powdered with any such ordinances or institutions as may preserve the same from turning corrupt, or at least from becoming unsavoury and of little use." [120] **Advancements**: "what you advance," "your gifts or bequests." Bacon sees clearly the evils of charitable foundations, but his counsel that they should be moderate is superficial. That charity in the shape of doles does more good than harm, and that the State should undertake the inspection and, if necessary, the revision of all charitable endowments, are truisms to-day, but would have seemed paradoxes to Bacon's age.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXXV.

[1] **Divine prophecies**: discussed by Bacon in *Advancement of Learning*, ii. 3, 2. [2] **Natural predictions**: as of eclipses and comets, or the numerous prognostications of the French Revolution. [3] **Of certain memory**: "historical," opposed to "traditional." [4] **Pythonissa** or Pythoness: properly the priestess of Apollo at Delphi; so, generally, a witch. The quotation is from 1 Sam. xxviii. 19. [6] **Homer** (Abbott reads "Virgil hath these verses from Homer"): Virgil, *Æneid*, iii. 97, an adaptation from *Iliad*, xx. 307:

"Νῦν δὲ δὴ Αἰνείας βίη Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει,
Καὶ παίδων παῖδες τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται."

"Hereafter the great Æneas shall rule over the Trojans,
And his children's children, whoever are born after him."

[8] **Seneca**: *Medea*, ii. 374: "In far-off years the times shall come when men shall loosen the bounds of the universe, and a vast continent shall be opened, and Tiphys discover new worlds, nor shall Thule be the limit of the earth." Tiphys, the helmsman of the Argo, is the type of the maritime discoverer. [10] **Poly-**

orates: the story of his ring is known to all, from Herodotus or Schiller. His daughter's dream was fulfilled by the conspiracy of Oroetes, the Satrap of Sardis, B.C. 522. *Herod.*, iii. 124. [14] **Philip**: from Plutarch, *Alexander*. Bacon misses half the point, viz. that it was sealed up with a lion. [19] **Brutus**: from North's *Plutarch*, p. 830. See Shakespeare, *Julius Cæsar*. [20] **Tiberius**: from Tacitus, *Ann.*, vi. 20, "Thou, too, Galba, shalt have a taste of empire." [21] **In Vespasian's**: Tacitus, *Histories*, v. 13, "*Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis sacerdotum litteris contineri, fore ut valesceret oriens, et Judæa profecti rerum potirentur.*" "Most [of the Jews] were convinced that in the ancient books of their priests there existed a prophecy that the East would wax strong, and that rulers of the world would spring from Judæa." [26] **Domitian**: from Suetonius, *Domitian*, 23. Instead of "head" Suetonius has "hump" (*gibbam*). [29] **Henry VI.**: from Hall's Chronicle. So Shakespeare, 3 *Henry VI.*, Act. iv. sc. 6, 68:

"Come hither, England's hope. If secret powers
Suggest but truth to my divining thoughts,
This pretty lad will prove our country's bliss."

[34] **The queen mother**: Catherine de Medici, wife of Henry II., who died from the effects of a wound received when tilting at a tournament with the Count of Montgomery in 1559. [41] **Trivial**: "common." See Essay 3, l. 1. [52] **Baugh**: the Bass Rock; **the May**, the isle of May, both in the Frith of Forth. *Cf.*:

"Quhen the Bas, and the Ile of May,
Beis set upon the Mont Sinay."

LYNDSAY, *The Complaynt*.

The interpretation of this prophecy is due to Canon Daniel. [56] **Regiomontanus**: Johann Müller (b. 1436, d. 1476), who took his Latin name from his birthplace, Königsberg. The first two lines of this prophecy (uttered A.D. 1475) mean "after 1500 years from the birth of Christ." The latter part prophesies the end of the world or great calamities. 1588 is of course the date of the Spanish Armada. [60] **Cleon's dream**: from Aristophanes, *Knights*, 195:

"Moreover, when the eagle in his pride,
With crooked talons and a leather hide,
Shall seize the black and blood-devouring snake,
Then shall the woeful tanpits quake and quake."

Bacon's "I think" is charmingly *naïf*. [72] **Laws**: as 5 Elizabeth, cap. 15; an act against fond and fantastical prophecies. [75]

Men mark when they hit: a typical *Idolon tribus*. He might have added they count reds as bull's-eyes. Thus, if death happens within a day or two of a dream portending the death, the two events will certainly be reported as simultaneous. [81] **Collect:** "gather by inference or induction." [85] **Plato:** *Timaeus*, p. 25, and *Critias* (which has in the Latin translation the sub-title *Atlanticus*), p. 113, where is described the famous island of Atlantis, which lay over against the pillars of Hercules and was swallowed up by the sea. Plato invented the fiction, which is the prototype of endless romances from Swift's *Gulliver* to Butler's *Erewhon*, with the purpose of representing his ideal state engaged in a patriotic struggle. Bacon's *New Atlantis* portrays the march of science and discovery.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXXVI.

[1] **Choler:** one of the four humours or animal fluids which were supposed to determine a man's temperament, making him choleric; phlegmatic, melancholy, or sanguine, as choler, phlegm, black bile or blood respectively predominated. [4] **His:** the possessive *its* was only just winning its way into the English language in Bacon's time. It occurs (counting in doubtful instances) ten times in Shakespeare, in Milton only thrice. It is never found either in Bacon or in the English Bible (save once, by a misprint in modern editions). **Adust:** a technical word in medicine for a feverish temperament. Latin, *adustus*, burnt up.

"Ay ful of yre of malys and rancour,
Drye and adust and a gret wastour."

LYDGATE, *Misc. Poems*, 1430.

"The same adust complexion has impelled
Charles to the convent, Philip to the field.

POPE.

[13] **Handle it:** cf. "lord it," "trip it," etc. [17] **Take order:** "take measures," "I will take such order that thy friends," etc. Shakespeare, 2 *Henry IV.*, iii. 2, 198. [22] **Be they never.** The sentence might be expressed, "No matter how ambitious they are." Hence the superfluous negative. [24] **Dispenseth with:** "condones." Cf. Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, Act iii. sc. 1, 135. "Nature dispenses with the deed so far that it becomes a virtue." [25] **Spurs:** cf. Milton, *Lycidas*, l. 70, "Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise," etc. [28] **Seeled:** "with closed eyes," a term of falconry. Cf. Shake-

speare, *Macbeth*, Act iii. sc. 2, 46. "Come, seeling night, scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day." It was a popular superstition that a seeled dove would "tower" as described. [32] **Macro**: *Dion Cassius*, lviii. 9. [35] **There is less danger**, etc. : contrast by way of examples, Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell, the two Cecils, Mazarin, Richelieu, Guizot, Thiers, with Burleigh, Strafford, the two Pitts, Mirabeau. [41] **Favourites**: obviously glances at Buckingham. Personal bias will explain how Bacon came to prefer the rule of Buckingham to that of William Cecil. [49] **Inure**: "habituate," see note, Essay 33, l. 53. Cf. the doublets, "manceuvre," and "manure." [41] **Obnoxious**: "liable to," as in Latin. [55] **That**: substituted instead of repeating *if*. Cf. Essay 1. [58] **In a wood**: "in a maze." Cf. Shakespeare, *Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act ii. sc. 1, 192, "wood within the wood." "Wood" = mad, and "wood" = forest, are wholly distinct words, but perhaps the phrase, "in a wood," was a conscious play on the double meaning. [64] **Dependencies**: "dependants," "followers." L.V. *qui gratia et clientelis pollet*. [68] **Decay**: "ruin," used actively. [69] **Vantage-ground**: cf. Essay 11. "But power to do good is the true and lawful end of aspiring." [72] **The best**: of course, the first mentioned. [77] **Upon conscience**: "as a matter of duty rather than for ostentation." Cf. "upon speed," Essay 34; "upon facility," Essay 51.

NOTES TO ESSAY XXXVII.

[1] **Toys**: "toy" is an abbreviation of "play-toy," German, *Spielzeug*. [4] **Daubed**: "daub," French, *dauber*; Latin, *dealbare*, to whitewash; the word is used here with special reference to scenic decorations. [7] **Broken music**: "music on stringed instruments." Chappell explains, "The term originated probably from harps, lutes, and such other stringed instruments as were played without a bow, not having the capability to sustain a long note to its full duration of time." [8] **Ditty**. French, *dicté, ditté*, the words of a song, and hence the song itself. The music must suit the main idea. **Device**: cf. Shakespeare, *Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act v. sc. 1, 50. "The riot of the tipsy Bacchanals, that is an old *device*, and it was played when I from Thebes came last a conqueror." [10] **Not dancing**: *i.e.* not dancing, where the dancer himself sings or acts. "Dancing to song" in l. 5 is the ballet pure and simple. [12] **Would** = "should." [13] **No treble**: Rosencrantz in *Hamlet* expresses the same objection to trebles, "the aery of children that cry out on the top of the question." [13] **Nice**: "sentimental," "finnikin." [15] **Anthem-wise**: like the *Decani* and *Cantoris* in a cathedral.

Anthem is corruption of *antiphon*. [16] **Figure**: such dancers as Thompson describes, "mix'd and involved a thousand sprightly ways." [19] **Take the sense**: "captivate the judgment," "attract men of taste." [26] **Are to come down from the scene**: this would seem to mean, "descend from the stage, the state or dais at one end of the hall, into the body of the hall;" and if we bear in mind that the masque had always some personal reference, generally a compliment to the sovereign or some noble person, and that the masquers were persons of quality, this is quite possible. If this is so, they are instructed to engage in dumb-show or pantomime on the stage, in order to excite curiosity, before they descend to speak their parts face to face with the great personage. Thus, in Ben Jonson's introduction to the *Masque of Darkness*, we read, "In front were placed six Tritons in moving and sprightly action." Perhaps, however, the "come down" should not be pressed, and the meaning may simply be that the actors, after some preliminary dumb-show, are to advance and speak their parts in front of the scene, *i.e.* the set device. [31] **The music**: Bacon had not a cultivated ear for music, and preferred singing in unison to part singing. He writes to Sir R. Cecil, "In music I ever loved easy airs that go full, all the parts together; and not those strange points of accord and discord" (quoted by Abbott). [34] **Oes**: "stars," "spangles." D'Ewes in his *Journal*, mentions a patent for making Oes and spangles of gold.

"Fair Helena, who more engilds the night,
Than all yon fairy oes and eyes of light."

SHAKESPEARE, *Midsummer Night's Dream*, iii. 2, 188:

[40] **Anti-masques**: called also by Ben Jonson a foil or false masque, was a performance of an opposite character to the principal masque. The masque was serious, the anti-masque was grotesque. It was generally performed by hired actors and, as the Essay shows, admitted the wildest extravagances. [42] **Antiques**: first of anything ancient; then specially of old-fashioned dances, written "antic;" hence, as also in Shakespeare, of a clown or merry andrew. [43] **Turquets**: defined by Wright, "a puppet dressed as a Turk," but nothing is known of the word. [55] **Justs**, or "jousts," are mock fights between single horsemen. **Tourneys**, or "tournaments," the same between rival parties of knights. **Barriers** (short for "fights at barriers"), when the rival parties tilted with a bar or railing separating them. [59] **Devices of their entrance**: a good example is the stage directions in Jonson's *Love's Triumph*: "The scene opens and discovers a prospect of the sea. The triumph is first

seen afar off, and led in by Amphitrite, the wife of Oceanus, with four sea-gods attending her. The triumph consists of fifteen lovers, and as many cupids, who rank themselves seven and seven aside, with each a cupid before him, with a lighted torch, and the middle person (which is his Majesty) placed in the centre."

NOTES TO ESSAY XXXVIII.

[3] **The return**: the reaction against constraint. "*Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret*" (Horace). **Doctrine and discourse**: "teaching and preaching." The two substantives form one idea, hence the verb in the singular. [4] **Importune**: "importunate," "uncontrollable;" Essay 9, l. 174. [5] **Custom**, etc. According to the proverb "Habit is a second nature." [8] **Often**: for adjectival use *cf.* "use a little wine for . . . thine often infirmities," 1 Tim. v. 23; Shakespeare, Sonnets xiv. 8, "By oft predict that I in heaven find;" *As You Like It*, Act iv. sc. 1, 19, "My often rumination." Compare the use of the Greek adverb with the article. [9] **Proceed**: Shakespeare has the word once, *Taming of the Shrew*, Act iv. sc. 2, 11. [11] **Bladders**. So Shakespeare, *Henry VIII.*, Act iii. sc. 2, 359, "Like little wanton boys that swim on bladders;" and *Adv. of L.*, ii. 19, 2, "For it is one method to practice swimming with bladders, and another to practice dancing with heavy shoes." [18] **Letters**: like Tattycoram in Dickens's *Little Dorrit*, who counted, or failed to count, five and twenty. I and J, U and V, count each pair as a single letter. [23] **Optimus**: from Ovid, *Rem. Am.*, 293 (where *fruit* stands for *animi*)—

"He is the freeman, he who once for all
Snaps his soul's fetters and so ends his thrall."

[25] **Contrary extreme**: according to the Aristotelian advice. *Ethics*, ii. 9, 5. The metaphor is borrowed from Plato, *Protag.*, p. 325, D. The spendthrift must aim at niggardliness short of vice, the niggard must aim at prodigality. [26] **Understanding it**: "with this proviso." As to the syntax, we may say that "understanding" is passing into the prepositional use, just as "notwithstanding" is completely a preposition. [32] **Practise his errors**: *cf.* *Adv. of L.*, ii. 19, 2, "The ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or help; for, as it is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults, and get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a great judgment to be had

In the continuance and intermission of exercises." [36] **Lay**: for a parallel we must go to the famous line in *Childe Harold*, "And dashest him again to earth: there let him lay." The confusion arose from the identical form of the present of the weak verb with the past of the strong verb. [38] **Æsop's damosel**: Babrius (Fable 30) to whom modern critics assign the fables. [43] **Privateness**: "private life." [47] **Sort with**: "match"; Essay 6, l. 6. [48] **Multum**: Psalm cxx. 6 (from the Vulgate), "My soul hath long been a sojourner." A favourite quotation of Bacon's, to express his distaste for a political life. [49] **Converse**: "are engaged in." Cf. "for our conversation is in heaven," Phil. iii. 20. [50] **Whatsoever**: a loose construction = "in whatever" or "as to whatever." [54] **Spaces**: "intervals."

NOTES TO ESSAY XXXIX.

[1] **Men's thoughts**: more tersely expressed in the Latin of Bacon's antitheta, *Cogitamus secundum naturam; loquimur secundum praecepta; sed agimus secundum consuetudinem*. [2] **Inclination**: "natural bent," not "pleasure." [3] **Infused**: "derived from others," opposed to "innate." [4] **After**: "according" as in "neither reward us after our iniquities," "thy complexion shifts after the moon." [5] **Machiavel**: *Discorsi Sopra Livio*, iii. 6. "There is no man, however resolute and bloody, but must be surprised and decomposed in such cases as these. Wherefore for such exploits tried men and such as are used to such affairs are to be chosen, and no others, be they never so stout." [6] **Evil-favoured**: "ugly," and so "immoral." So in Shakespeare a "tart favour" is a sour countenance, and the meaning still survives in provincial English—"he favours (is like) his mother." [7] **Bravery**: cf. *Hamlet*, v. 2, 19. "The bravery (ostentation) of his grief did put me into a towering passion." [8] **Corroborate**: the *d* of the past participle is commonly dropped in words ending in a dental. **Custom**. Bacon often uses *custom*, where we should speak of *habit*. *Custom* is objective, *habit* subjective. Repeated acts constitute custom; habit is the resulting disposition. The difference is well brought out in Shakespeare's line "How use (= custom) doth breed a habit in a man." [13] **Friar Clement**: a Dominican, who assassinated Henry III. of France in 1589. **Ravallac**: a mad monk who stabbed Henry IV. of France in 1610. [14] **Jaureguy**, the servant of an Antwerp shopkeeper, who, at the instigation of Spain, attempted the life of William of Nassau, Prince of Orange, in 1582. The Prince was shot, two years

afterwards, by the fanatic Balthazar Gerard. The L.V. adds *aut Guidone Faulxio*. [15] **Nature**: the first "nor" omitted; an idiom still in use in poetry, common in Latin and Greek.

"Sigh nor word nor struggling breath
Heralded his way to death."

BYRON, *Siege of Corinth*, 27.

There follows, as is common in Bacon, a superfluous negative. [17] The Latin translator has made a curious mistake, rendering "men of the first blood" by *primæ classis sicarii*, instead of "men who are committing their first murder." [18] The resolution of men bound by a vow, of devotees or fanatics. An allusion to the Gunpowder Plot, which happened seven years before the first edition of this Essay, 1612. [23] **Give great words**: solemnly swear they will not do something. Notice the climax. [24] **Engines**, etc.: automata, as we should say. [27] **The Indians**, etc.: the first three of the following examples are taken almost word for word from Cicero, *Tusc. v. 27*, "Spartan boys utter no sound when tortured (and lacerated with the scourge. . . . Where is a land more barbarous and savage than India? Yet among the Indians those whom they call their wise men live in nakedness, and endure the snows of Caucasus and the frosts of winter without wincing; and laying themselves on the fire, let themselves be burnt without a groan." Spartan boys were publicly flogged at the altar of Artemis Orthia on passing from boyhood to manhood, to test their courage and endurance. The Gymnosophists (hence Cicero's "*nudi ætatem agunt*") were a sect of Brahmins more properly priests than philosophers. Cicero in the same passage continues: "Indian wives, when the husband of any one has died (each man has generally several wives), undergo trial and examination to determine which was the favourite. The one who wins advances, with a crowd of friends following her, and ascends the pyre on which her husband is laid: the others, who are beaten, depart in sorrow. Custom (he concludes) could never conquer nature, for nature is invincible. The custom of *Suttee* here alluded to (from the Sanscrit *sati*, properly, a good wife) was finally abolished by law in 1829 by Lord W. Bentinck, then Governor-general of India. Professor Müller has shown, from the word *vidhavâ*, widow, that it could not have existed in the early times of the Aryan race (Essay on "Comparative Mythology"); and Professor Wilson proved that the authority for the rite rested on a falsification of the text of the Rigveda, the words "the mothers may go first to the altar" having been altered to "the mothers may go first to the womb

fire." [33] **Queeching**: Johnson gives "to queck, to shrink, to shew pain." Quech, quich, and quince are all the same word, meaning to move, to flinch. Spenser, in *A View of the Present State of Ireland*, has, "And thereupon to bestowe all my soldiours in such sorte as I have done, that noe part of all that realme shall be able or dare soe much as to quince." *Cwacian* is A.S. for to quake, whence the causative *cweccan*, to shake. [34] The Irish rebel is probably Brian O'Rourke, who was executed in 1597, though, if this is so, Bacon is mistaken as to the time. O'Rourke had taken part in the rebellion of the Earl of Tyrone, which broke out in 1595. [36] **Withe**: or withy, first an osier or willow, then a cord of osiers, connected with the Latin *viteo*, to twine, *vimen*, an osier. It was with "green withs" that the Philistines bound Samson, Judges xvi. 7. **Not in a halter**: so Lord Ferrers is said to have asserted his privilege as a peer of being hanged with a silken rope. [39] **Engaged**: "bound." French, *engager*, Italian, *ingaggiare*, to put in pledge. To engage in war is in meaning and derivation the same as to wage war. [42] So Goethe speaks of "was uns alle bändigt, das Gemeine," "Custom, to whom we are all in bondage." [50] **Fly**: "bend," "bias." The verb is used in the same sense in the "Remedy of Love," 1600:

"Behold the apple bough how it doth ply,
And stoope with store of fruit that doth abound.

[57] I do not know of another instance of "collegiate" used, as here, in its original sense. Notice the force of the alliterations in this passage. [58] **Comforteth**: "strengthens." Cf. Wicklif's translation of Isaiah xli. 7. "And he coumfortide hym with nailes." So "the Comforter," the Paraclete, is the Strengtheners. [60] In parties, societies, clubs, etc., the force of custom is seen in its fullest force. **In his exaltation**: an astrological term. "Astrologers tell us that the sun receives his exaltation in the sign Aries," Dryden.

"And for hir (their) divers disposition
Each falleth in others exaltation,
As thus, God wote, Mercury is desolat
In Pisces, wher Venus is exaltat."

CHAUCER, *Wife of Bathes, Prologue*, 6283.

[65] **The misery is**, etc.: probably a hit at the Jesuits.

NOTES TO ESSAY XL.

[1] **But**: "that." Exactly parallel to the Latin *quin in negari non potest quin*. Cf. "It must not be denied but I am a plain-dealing villain," Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act. i. sc. 3, 33. The idiom may be explained thus, "No one can gainsay me except by saying," etc. [5] **The poet**: the parallel passage in the *Advancement of Learning* has, "This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: *Nam pol sapiens* (saith the comical poet) *fingit fortunam sibi*; and it grew to an adage, *Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ*." The line here misquoted is from Plautus *Trinummus* ii. 2, 87, "*Nam sapiens quidem pol ipse fingit fortunam sibi*." [8] **Serpens**: "Serpent must swallow serpent to become a dragon;" an anonymous Greek proverb. [12] **Deliveries**: ways of acting or speaking with natural ease or grace. Cf. Sidney, *Arcadia*, "Musidorus could not perform any action on horse or foot more strongly, or *deliver* that strength more nimbly, or become the *delivery* more gracefully." In Essay 19 the word is used in a slightly different sense. [13] **Disemboltura**: *versatile*, from *dis*, *negative*, and *involto* = *involutus*, entangled. [14] **Stonds**: cf. "The removal of the *stonds* and impediments of the mind, that often clears the passage and current to a man's fortune," Bacon, *Letter to Sir H. Temple*. [15] **That**: = "when." Cf. Essay 15, l. 46, and 36, l. 55. [17] Livy xxxix. 40 loosely quoted, as usual: "*In hoc viro tanta vis animi ingenique fuit, ut quocunque loco natus est, fortunam sibi ipse facturum fuisse videretur*." "So great was his natural force of character and intellect that we may be certain he would have won his way, even had he sprung from the lowest ranks." [21] **Versatile ingenium**: Livy continues, "So versatile was he that whatever he undertook seemed the one thing for which nature had fitted him." [24] **Milken way**: see Antitheta. [32] **Poco di matto**: "A little of the fool" is the one touch of nature that makes the whole world kin. Men are shy and suspicious of the man without a foible; he seems to belong to another race. Moreover, the man who never makes mistakes is generally the man who has no strong passion, who keeps to the beaten way, and never scales the heights. [35] **Lovers of their country**: The word "patriot" is as old as Bacon, but it signified not "a lover of his country," but "a fellow-countryman." [40] **Remuant**: Cotgrave gives "*remuant*: often moving, stirring, figging; lively, nimble, quick; often removing, ever flitting, never still, or standing;" and "*remueur*: a remover." [41] **Exercised**: "tried and proved," "won by endurance." Cf. *Couleurs of Good and Evil*, 9, "In the good winds of fortune we

have no state or certainty, in our endeavours or abilities, we have." [42] **And** cf. Essay 23, l. 38. [46] **Decline**: "shrink from," "elude." Compare the Greek dread of Nemesis, as in the story of Polycrates and his ring. [51] **Cæsarem**: from Plutarch, *Cæsar*, 38. Cæsar was attempting to cross from Apollonia to Brundisium disguised as a slave, and in a boat of twelve oars. When the boat was struggling in the surf, and the master was about to turn back, "Cæsar upon this discovers himself, and taking the man by the hand, who was surprised to find him there, said, 'Go on, my friend, fear nothing; you carry Cæsar and his fortune in your boat.'" [54] **End infortunate**: cf. Essay 4, 48. [55] **Timotheus**: from Plutarch, *Sylla*, 34, "Nor did this fortune make the same kind of impression on Sylla as it made on Timotheus, the son of Conon, the Athenian . . . who on one occasion at his return from the war said to the people, 'In this, ye men of Athens, fortune has no part.'" A piece of boyish petulance which the deity, we are told, played back upon Timotheus, who from that time was never able to achieve any worthy thing. Compare *Advancement*, iii. 23, 11. [61] **Slide**: "smoothness." In the *Couleurs of Good and Evil*, 9, it is, "like Homer's verses, they ran so easily and so well." [63] **Timoleon's**: from Plutarch, *Timoleon*, 36, "Like as in Homer's verses, besides the passing workmanship and singular grace in them, a man findeth at the first sight that they were easily made and without great pain; even so in like manner whosoever will compare the painful, bloody wars and battles of Epaminondas and Agesilaus with the wars of Timoleon, in the which, besides equity and justice, there is also great care and quietness—he shall find, weighing things indifferently, that they have not been Fortune's doings simply, but that they came of a most noble and fortunate courage. Yet he himself doth wisely impute it unto his good tact and favourable fortune." [65] **It is much in a man's self**: cf. the song in Tennyson's *Elaine*, "Turn Fortune,"—"For man is man and master of his fate."

NOTES TO ESSAY XLI.

[3] **Tithe**. By 37 Henry VIII. cap. 6, in 1545, the rate of interest had been restricted to 10 per cent. This act, abolished in Edward VI.'s reign, was revived by 13 Elizabeth in 1571. [6] **Virgil**: *Georg.* iv. 168, "That idle swarm the drones they banish from their pale." [8] **In sudore**: Gen. iii. 19 (Vulgate). [10] **Orange-tawny**: so Scott, in *Ivanhoe*, chap v. describes Isaac of York—"He wore a high square yellow cap of a peculiar fashion

assigned to his nation, to distinguish them from Christians.”

[12] **Money to beget money**: this objection to usury is founded on the Greek word for interest, *τόκος*, a begetting. Aristotle (*Politics*, i. 3, 23) says that usury is unnatural, because money was devised for the sake of exchange, whereas usury multiplies it. Hence it has received the name of *τόκος*, or “begetting,” for whatever is begotten resembles its parents. [13] **Concessum**: Matt. xix. 8. [17] **Suspicious**: “to be regarded with suspicion,” “unsound.” **Banks**: probably a reference to “a Bill for the establishment of seven banks, to be known by the name of ‘Banks for the relief of common necessity,’ and to lend money on pledges or pawn at the rate of 6 per cent.,” introduced in 1571. So S. H. Reynolds. The Bank of Amsterdam was founded in 1607. The first English bank was Child’s, founded in 1663. Merchants in Bacon’s time deposited their money for safety at the Mint, in the Tower of London. **Discovery**, etc.: a proposal that all merchants’ books and accounts should be examined by commissioners, in order to ascertain their profits for the purposes of taxation; and also to discover whether these profits had been made by usury. [21] **Weighed out or culled out**: in L. V. *vel ponderetur vel separetur*, either weighed against the evil, and seen to preponderate, or (better still) be separated as grain from chaff. [23] **Make forth**: in L. V. *ne dum foenore feramur in melius*, while we try to improve matters by regulating usury. [26] **This lazy trade**, etc.: too patent a fallacy to need exposing, and seemingly inconsistent (as Dr. Abbott points out) with l. 52. But here Bacon regards usury only from the point of view of the usurer. He sits at home and lets his money breed, while the merchant increases wealth by the active exchange of commodities. [29] **Vena porta**: see Essay 19, l. 155. [31] **Sit**: “be settled,” “hold his farm at” a high rent. [40] **Spread**: according to Mr. Bettenham’s saying, quoted several times by Bacon, that “riches were, like muck.” [43] **Purchasing**: in L. V. *praediorum coemptiones*, land-grabbing. *Purchase*, in Chaucer, is still used for “to prosecute,” like the French *pourschasser*. [46] **Slug**: hindrance. Spenser has the verb “to slug,” and *slack*, *slake*, *slag* are cognate. [60] **Under foot**: “below par.” [64] **Without use**: “without interest.” The argument is, the mortgagee will either exact interest, in other words be a usurer, or he will foreclose, which is worse. [78] **Utopia**: a special reference to More’s *Utopia*, published 1516 (first English translation 1551). The Utopians use gold and silver whereof money is made, so that “none of them doth more esteem it, than the very nature of the thing deserveth.” They put it to vile uses for common vessels, make chains of it for their bondmen, and load their criminals with earrings and necklaces of gold. [76] **Reiglement**:

"regulation." [81] **The tooth**, etc. : cf. Bacon's letter to Secretary Conway, March 29, 1623. "Some short papers of mine touching usury, how to grind the teeth of it, yet to make it grind to his Majesty's mill." [88] **To seek** : "in want." Cf. Milton, *Comus*, 366,

"I do not think my sister so to seek."

[98] **To take** : "from taking." [106] **Edge** : "egg on," "stimulate." [120] **Answered** : "compensated by." The usurer *responds* to the state licence by paying. [121] **The rest** : in L.V. *religuum lucri*. [130] **To colour other people's moneys** : "to give to other people's money the appearance of being their own," i.e. to act as brokers and invest other people's money. [137] **Declaration** : "open recognition."

NOTES TO ESSAY XLII.

[1] Cf. Shakespeare, *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, ii. 4 :

"His years are young, but his experience old ;
His head unmellowed, but his judgment ripe."

[4] **The second** : according to the Greek proverb, αἱ δεύτεραι φροντίδες ἀρισταί. [8] **More divinely** : like Wordsworth's "Heaven lies about us in our infancy." [12] **Julius Cæsar** : his youthful extravagances were, however, mostly affected in order to throw dust in the eyes of the aristocracy. Hence Sulla's advice to "beware of that young trifler." **Septimius Severus** : Emperor from A.D. 193-211. The quotation, "his youth was full of mistakes, or rather of madness," is from Spartianus. It is not borne out by the *Hist. August.* thus summarized by Gibbon, chap. v. : "Septimius Severus, a native of Africa, who, in the gradual ascent of private honours, had conceded his daring ambition, which was never diverted from its steady course by the allurements of pleasure, the apprehensions of danger, or the feelings of humanity." [14] **The ablest emperor** : the arch which bears his name in Rome commemorates his victory over the Parthians, and the remains of the Roman wall from the Frith of Forth to the Clyde his repulse of the northern tribes of Britain. [16] **Cosmus** : Cosmo de Medici, elected chief of the city of Florence, in 1537, on the murder of Duke Alessandro. His selfish, calculating ambition answers to Bacon's "reposed natures." [17] **Gaston de Foix** : Duke of Nemours, and nephew of Louis XII. Born 1489, died 1512. By his deeds of valour at the head of the army of Italy, he gained the surname of *le foudre d'Italie*. It is probably on account of his cool courage, that he is classed with Augustus

and Cosmo. [19] **In composition**: "temperament." Cf. Essay 31, l. 13. [23] **Them**: refers to old men, implied in "age." [24] **Abuseth**: "deceives." Cf. Essay 49: "Suitors are so distasted with delays and *abuses*, that plain dealing," etc. [26] **The errors of aged men**, etc. Bacon; writing *anno aetatis* 52, rather favours the old. The errors of over-caution or procrastination may be just as fatal as those of rashness or hasty innovation. [32] **Absurdly**: qualifies "pursue," not "chanced upon;" so the L.V. **Care not to innovate**: "are not careful about innovating," "innovate recklessly." Cf. *Macbeth*, iv. 2, 70: "To fright you thus, methinks, I am too savage." [39] **Period**: "completion." Cf. Shakespeare *Antony and Cleopatra*, iv. 2, "Maybe it is the period of your duty." [49] **A certain Rabbīn**: Abravanel, a Portuguese Jew, who wrote a commentary on the Old Testament and the Mishna. [55] **Age doth profit**, etc.: Cf. Wordsworth—

"So is it still in our decay;
And yet the wiser mind
Grieves less for what age takes away
Than what it leaves behind."

[60] **Brittle wits**: cf. Ascham's *Schoolmaster* (p. 19, Mayor's edition): "Such a wit as is quick without lightness, sharp without brittleness." [61] **Hermogenes**: a Greek statesman, flourished at the end of the second century A.D. According to Suidas he was famous as a rhetorician at fifteen, published, at seventeen, a treatise on rhetoric, and at twenty-five lost his memory and fell into dotage. [67] **Hortensius**: Cicero (*Brutus*, 95) says of his oratory that it was fiery and brilliant, "but when his rank in the state and the weight and dignity of advancing years called for a graver style, *remanebat idem, nec decebat idem*. **Livy**: xxxviii. 53. *Memorabilior prima pars vitae quam postrema fuit*; but Livy gives a different reason, "because as a young man he was constantly engaged in wars; in his old age the commonwealth was declining, and he found no scope for his genius."

NOTES TO ESSAY XLIII.

[3] **Virtue is best**, etc.: cf. Virgil, *Æn.* v. 344,

"*Gratior et pulcho veniens in corpore virtus.*"

[5] **Almost**: "generally." [9] **Great spirit**: "lofty minds," in L.V., *excelsior spiritus*. [10] **Augustus Cæsar**: Suetonius (*Vita Aug.* 79) says, "he was of remarkable beauty, and every stage of

life became him. His countenance, whether he was talking or silent, was so tranquil and serene that a Gallic chieftain confessed to his tribesmen that after gaining admittance to him as he was passing the Alps, with the purpose of hurling him over the precipice, he had been turned from his purpose and melted at his aspect." **Titus Vespasianus** : Suetonius says that his appearance was as graceful as it was imposing, notwithstanding that he was of middle stature and inclined to *embonpoint*. [11] **Philip le Bel** : Philip IV. of France came to the throne 1285. **Edward IV.** : "Tall in stature and of singular beauty, his winning manners and gay carelessness of bearing secured him a popularity which had been denied to nobler kings. But his indolence and gaiety were mere veils beneath which Edward shrouded a profound political ability" (J. R. Green). [12] **Alcibiades** : "It is not, perhaps, material to say anything of the beauty of Alcibiades, save that it bloomed with him in all the ages of his life, in his infancy, in his youth, in his manhood ; and, in the peculiar character belonging to each of these periods, gave him in every one of them a grace and a charm" (Plutarch, *Alcibiades*). **Ismael** : Sophy or Sultan of Persia, A.D. 1502-1523. "A certain priest of Armenia . . . found so great hopes of his excellent graces and perfections, clearly appearing by the lineaments of his face and body, that he took all the pains and care he could to bring him up" (North's *Plutarch*, edition 1656, p. 27, quoted by Abbott). [15] **Favour** : "face," "lineaments." [21] **Apelles** : the story referred to is found in Cicero, *De Invent.* ii. 1, 1. The artist, wishing to paint an ideal woman, a Helen, for the temple of Venus, at Crotona, picked out five of the most beautiful maidens, and combined the fairest features of each in his picture. The artist, however, was not Apelles, but Zeuxis. **Albert Durer** : born 1471, wrote a treatise, *De symmetria partium humani corporis*. **More** : "greater," as in Shakespeare, *passim*. [35] **Pulchrorum** : "The autumn of beauty is beautiful." Bacon probably takes the proverb from North's Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, where it is attributed to Euripides. [36] **By pardon** : "by making allowances." As Cicero says he cannot properly praise a boy, "*non enim res est sed spes*." [41] **If it light well** : "if it fall on a worthy person." Beauty sets off virtues, and makes its possessor blush at vices and therefore fly them. Others understand, "makes vice in others look ugly and blush," but even the epigrammatic form could hardly justify such ambiguity. Reynolds suggests a third interpretation, taking "virtue's blush" as an independent sentence, "beauty is in the nature of a disgrace to the vicious." This is borne out by the antitheta, "*Quod vestis lauta deformi, hoc forma improbo*."


NOTES TO ESSAY XLIV.

Chamberlain, in a letter to Sir Dudley Carleton, written Dec. 17, 1612, soon after the publication of the second edition of the Essays, says, "Sir Francis Bacon hath set out new essays, where, in a chapter of *Deformity*, the world takes notice that he paints out his little cousin to the life" (Wright). The little cousin was Robert, first Earl of Salisbury, of whom his biographer quaintly says, "upon his crooked little body he carried a head and a head-piece of a vast content." Whether the world was right we cannot determine with any certainty. Robert Cecil died on the 24th of May, 1612, and the second edition of the Essays was entered at Stationers' Hall on the 12th of October. Cecil was deformed, bold, industrious, and observant of the weakness of others, at least Bacon would have thought him so in his own case. There was no love lost between the cousins, as his letter to the King, May 31, 1612, proves: "He was a fit man to keep things from growing worse, but no very fit man to reduce things to be much better. For he loved to have the eyes of all Israel a little too much upon himself, and to have all business still under the hammer like clay in the hands of the potter, to mould it as he thought good; so that he was more *in operatione* than *in opere*." On the other hand, though it was Bacon's foible to adore the rising sun, or to turn other men's weaknesses to his account, there is no trace of petty spite or malice in his nature, such as this essay would imply if we construe it as a covert attack on Cecil. [4] **Void**, etc.: ἀστοργοί of Rom. i. 31, and 2 Tim. iii. 3. [5] **Revenge of nature**: cf. Richard III's, "I am determined to prove a villain." [7] **Ventureth in the other**: "runs a risk of the mind being deformed also," and so, carrying on the preceding figure, Nature will have the worst of it. [11] **The stars**, etc.: man's natural inclination, which is determined by his bodily frame or temperament, is overpowered by the superior force of education, as starlight is by sunlight. There is a further reference to astrology in "the stars." [13] **Which is more deceivable**: "for this way of looking at it is more likely to lead astray." The antecedent is the clause. [16] **Fixed**: as opposed to a passing disfigurement or infirmity. [24] **To repay**: "to retaliate with." [30] **Upon the matter**: "as a point of fact." The edition of 1812 has "upon the whole matter." [34] **Obnoxious**: "subject to," "submissive to." See Essay 20, l. 114. [35] **Officious**: "ready to serve," in a good sense, like the Latin *officiosus*. [36] **Spials**: "spies." [38] **The reason of**: "the case with." **Still**: "always," "as in the other case." [43] **Agesilaus**: see Essay 9, l. 53. **Zanger**: a son of Solymán II., named the

Magnificent, who is said to have died of grief at the execution of his brother Mustapha by Solyman. **Æsop**: a Greek fabulist of the sixth century before Christ. The stories of his deformity are the invention of some stupid monk, who, according to Lessing (*Laocöon*, ch. xxiii.), wished to give a fresh point to the fables that went by his name. **Gasca**: Pedro de la Gasca, a Spanish diplomatist, born A.D. 1485, sent to England in 1542 to engage Henry VIII. in an alliance with Spain against Francis I. By his tact and address he nipped in the bud the rebellion of Gonzales Pizarro, in 1547, and on his return from Peru, in 1549, was made Bishop of Palencia by Charles V. I can find no evidence of his deformity, though he is said to have been of a feeble constitution. [44] **Socrates**: Bacon hesitates about including Socrates, because his ugliness of feature would hardly be said to amount to deformity. As later instances of deformity we may add Macaulay's "hump-backed dwarf and asthmatic skeleton," and among writers, Pope, Byron, and Scarron.

NOTES TO ESSAY XLV.

On Elizabethan domestic architecture see Green, *History of the English People*, p. 389. "The strength of the mediæval fortress gave way to the pomp and grace of the Elizabethan hall, Knowle, Longleat, Burleigh and Hatfield, Hardwick and Audley End are familiar instances of the social as well as architectural change which covered England with buildings where the thought of defence was abandoned for that of domestic comfort and refinement. We still gaze with pleasure on their picturesque line of gables, their fretted fronts, their gilded turrets, and fanciful vanes; their castellated gateways, the jutting oriels from which the great noble looked down on his new Italian garden, its stately terraces and broad flights of steps, its vases and fountains, its quaint mazes, its formal walks, its lines of yew cut into grotesque shapes in hopeless rivalry of the cypress avenues of the South. It was the Italian refinement of life which remodelled the interior of such houses, raised the principal apartments to an upper floor—a change to which we owe the grand staircases of the time—surrounded the quiet courts by long 'galleries of the presence,' crowned the rude hearth with huge chimney-pieces adorned with fauns and cupids, with quaintly interlaced monograms and fantastic arabesques, hung tapestries on the walls, and crowded each chamber with quaintly carved chairs and costly cabinets." The accompanying block plan will give a better notion of Bacon's ideal house than any verbal



annotations. His description is wonderfully full and accurate, as far as it goes, though it does not enable us to work out the elevations; and such all-important details, from the architect's point of view, as staircases and passages are left to conjecture. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the real plan would doubtless have been diversified by bay windows, and other projections, of which the bare outline of the essay affords no hint. [2] **Uniformity**: "regularity," "symmetry." In the L.V. *pulchritudo*. [6] **Seat**: "site." [10] **Knap**: "knoll." *Knapweed* is the plant with a knobby flower. Except for purposes of defence our ancestors preferred to build on the low lands. [16] **Momus**: the god of fault-finding blamed the house Athena built because it had no wheels to carry it away from ill neighbours. *Æsop Fable*, 275. [22] **Too near the sea**: a substantial clause = "the fact of being too near the sea," subject of "makes an ill seat." So, if required, we must analyze the sentence, but Bacon purposely uses a loose construction. **Having the commodity**: as Bacon is enumerating wants, editors have proposed to read "not having the commodity," or "having no commodity," but the confusion is similar to the looseness of construction above noticed. The L.V. has *commoditas nulla fluxiorum*. [26] **Lurcheth**: "sucks up," "absorbs." A lurcher is a poacher's dog which springs on game. [27] **Where a man**, etc.: it is an advantage to have your house in the centre of your landed property. The sense is clear, but the editors who stick at "commodity" should amend this too. [33] **Lucullus**: From Plutarch, *Lucullus*, 39. [44] **Perfection**: "carrying out," practice as opposed to theory. [47] **Vatican**: the building is said to have been begun by Symmachus, A.D. 498. It was added to and embellished by different Popes, especially Nicholas V., Paul II. and III., Sixtus IV., Leo X., Clement XIX., and now contains, according to Murray, 4422 rooms. **Escurial**: the palace and monastery built by Philip II. A.D. 1563-84, in memory of the victory of St. Quentin, and in the form of a gridiron in honour of St. Lawrence, on whose day the battle was fought. It comprises a palace, a monastery, a college, a library, a picture gallery, and contains seventeen courts. **Several**: "distinct." [51] **Hester**: Esther i. 5. [53] **Triumphs**: cf. Essay 37. [54] **Returns**: "sides," the part of the house which turns *back* from the front. The word is still in common use with architects. "I intend this division on which I insist to be carried out not only in the wings, but also in the front." [63] **At the first**: "to start with," "as the primary division." The parlours are a secondary matter. [71] **Eighteen foot high**, etc.: this would make the tower ninety-two feet high (lower rooms sixteen feet, banqueting hall forty feet). [75]

Newel: the post that stops the hand-rail wherever there is a break or stop in the staircase. "Fair and open" really qualifies, not the newel itself, but the newel staircase. The Latin is more explicit: "I would have the steps of the tower open and winding round and round; with a landing for every six." [76] **Cast into a brass colour**: "modelled and painted to resemble bronze." [78] **Point**: "appoint." [88] **Cast into turrets on the outside**: projecting on the inside of the court. [94] **To graze**: laid down in grass. [108] **Become**: a strengthened form of "come." Cf. Green, *l. c.*, "Long lines of windows stretched over the front of the new manor halls. Every merchant's house had its oriel. The prodigal use of light and sunshine was a mark of the temper of the age." Hardwick Hall has more glass than wall. [109] **Embowed windows**: "bay." [122] **A grotto**: a colonnade, like that in Neville's Court of Trinity College, Cambridge, which looks on the "backs," except that in this case the inner side is walled in. [123] **Estivation**: for sunning oneself. Cf. *aprici senes*. [133] **Antecamera**: "ante-room," "lobby." Bacon spells *anticamera*. **Recamera**: "inner chamber," possibly guard-ropes, which were just then coming into fashion. [134] **Upon the ground story**: this refers to the end of the court only, not the sides, which have been already disposed of. In the Latin version the "grotto" in l. 122 is confined to the two sides, leaving the end unaccounted for. [138] **By way of return**: that is, as part of the sides. [144] **Avoidances**: "spouts," "gargoyles."

NOTES TO ESSAY XLVI.

[5] **Handyworks**: the coarse works of men's hands, contrasted with the beauties of nature. [6] **Civility**: "civilization." So in *Cymbeline*, Act iii. sc. 6, 23, "civil" is opposed to "savage." [16] **Germander**: probably *Teucrium chamaedrys*, or wall germander. [18] **Warm set**: "grown in a hotbed." [19] **Mezerion tree**: *Daphne Mezereum*, a shrub with pink flowers and scarlet berries; flowers in March. [22] **Chamaïris**: one of the dwarf irises, identified by Wright with the *Iris pumilla*. Gerard gives *chamaïris angustifolia*, the narrow-leaved flower-de-luce; and *chamaïris tenuifolia*, the grass flower-de-luce. [22] **Fretellaria**: *Fritillaria meleagris*, common fritillary, or snake's-head lily. [25] **Cornelian tree**: *Cornus sanguinea*, cornel tree or dogwood. [27] **Stock-gillflower**: the common stock. [28] **Flower-de-lices**: fleur-de-lis or iris. Which of the many sorts cannot be determined. [31] **Damascene**: damson. Spenser supplies the

intermediate form "damsine." From "Damascus" whence we get also damask rose; damask (the cloth). [36] **Flos Africanus**: the African marigold. [37] **Ribes**: perhaps *Ribes grossularia* or gooseberry, not likely to be *ribes rubrum* or red currant (so Wright), as this is mentioned later on. The common *Ribes* of our shrubberies come from North West America. **Rasps**: raspberries, the fruit gets its name from its rough appearance. [38] **Satyrian**: an orchis, probably *habenaria chlorantha*, or butterfly orchis. [39] **Herba muscaria**: the grape hyacinth. **Lilium convallium**: lily of the valley. [42] **Ginnittings**: early apples. **Quadlins**: another kind of apple. In Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act i. sc. 5, 167, it means unripe apples. [44] **Apri-cocks**: the older form of "apricot." For the different derivations of the two words see Skeat. **Musk melons**: our common melon. [46] **Melocotones**: Cotgrave has "*mirecoton, mirelicoton*; the delicate yellow peach, called a Melicotonie." [47] **Cornelians**: the fruit of the cornet tree, see l. 25. **Wardens**: Cotgrave has "*poire de garde*, a warden or winter peare, a peare which may be kept verie long." But it seems more probable that the French name is a corruption of the English, and that the pear had its origin and its name from Wardon Abbey near Bedford, a Cistercian foundation of the twelfth century. These warden pears appear in the armorial bearings of the abbey. [48] **Services**: either *pyrus torminalis* or *pyrus domestica*, the wild or domestic service tree. [50] **Hollyoaks**: the correct spelling is hollyhock, from A.S. *hoc*, a mallow. They are said to have been brought from the Holy Land. [52] **Ver perpetuum**: from Virgil, *Georg.* ii. 149, "*Hic ver assiduum atque alienis mensibus aestas*." **Bartholomew-tide**: August 24th. [67] **Strawberry leaves dying**: Mrs. Gaskell, in her novel *My Lady Ludlow*, makes excellent play with this remark. Old Lady Ludlow asserts that the Hanburys can always smell this excellent cordial odour, and bids the heroine try the experiment to prove that she has Hanbury blood in her veins. The heroine fails—as we too have failed—to smell anything good or bad. **Which yield**: the ed. of 1625 reads *which* (omitting *yield*), altered in 1629 to *with*. [69] **Bent**: called by Gerard *gramen harundinaceum*, or reed grass. "With it," he writes, "we in London do adorn our chimneys in summer time, and we commonly call the bundles of it, handsomely made up for our use, by the name of *bents*." [74] **Matted pink**: is described by Parkinson (1629) as "the smallest both for leaf and flower of all other pinks that are nourished in gardens" (quoted by Wright); but it is impossible to identify the species with any certainty. **Clove gilliflower**: carnation. Called in Gerard *caryophyllus maximus multiplex*. [80] **Burnet**: *Pim-*

pinella hortensis. Gerard says, "the whole plant both smell something like a melon or cucumber." [95] **In front upon:** "facing." The "hedge" or arched fencing is described later on. [103] **Knots:** "garden beds," here of earth, not flowers. Shakespeare has "curious-knotted gardens," *Love's Labour Lost*, Act i. sc. 1. [120] **Slope:** an adjective formed from the past part of "slip." [122] **To leave:** depends on "I understand:" = "there should be left." [127] **For letting:** "because of letting," "lest you hinder." [134] **Busy:** L.V. *curiosa*, "elaborate." [137] **Welts:** L.V. *fimbriarum*, "borders," "fringe." [144] **Perfect circles:** the walks are to be spirals without breastworks or projections. [146] **Banqueting-house:** note the loose style. "At the top," or something similar, must be supplied. [147] **Chimneys:** "fireplaces," still a luxury in Elizabeth's reign. **Cast:** "continued," "made." [150] **Receipt:** "receptacle." [175] **Equality of bores:** "pipes of equal bore." [195] **Bear's-foot:** *helleborus fatidus*, or stinking hellebore. So the L.V. *helleboro flore purpureo*, though it is strange to find it among "sweet and sightly flowers." [197] **Pricked:** "planted." [211] **Going wet:** "wetting your feet." [214] **Would:** "should." [217] **Deceive:** in L.V. *succo defraudent*. [227] **Rest upon:** "depend upon." [239] **Platform:** "plan." [244] **No less cost:** than if they followed my plan. [246] **Nothing to:** "not adding to." With Bacon's list of flowers should be compared the famous list in the *Winter's Tale*, Act iv. sc. 4. Shakespeare's flowers are:—(1) Winter flowers: rosemary, rue. (2) Spring flowers: daffodils, primroses, oxlips, crown imperial, lilies of all kinds, the flower-de-luce being one. (3) Early summer flowers: carnations, gillyvors (= gilliflowers). (4) Midsummer flowers: lavender, mints, savory, marjoram, marigold. It will be seen that of the fifteen, eleven are identical with Bacon's. The date of the production of the *Winter's Tale* is 1610-11; the Essay of *Gardens* first appeared in the edition of 1625. It is quite possible that Bacon may have seen the play or read it in the first folio of 1623, but the flowers named are so common that the lists may be quite independent.

NOTES TO ESSAY XLVII.

[6] **It may be danger:** "there may be danger of being," etc. [9] **Tender:** "delicate." See Essay 15, l. 37. [13] **To disavow or to expound:** "to draw back from what you have said or to go on and expose your meaning further." [17] **Success:** "the issue," used in a neutral sense, as in Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*,

Act i. sc. 4, 89, "I'll send him certain word of my success." [19] **Help**: "put a better face on." [20] **Satisfaction sake**: *sc.* of their employers. For the form compare, "for conscience' sake." **Affect**: *cf.* Essay I, l. 4. [25] **Absurd**: *cf.* Essay 6, l. 75. Here it seems to mean "deaf to reason," "pig-headed." **Doth not well bear out itself**: "cannot be defended," in L.V. *quae aliquid iniqui habent*. [29] **Prescription**: "prestige." Their former success has given them, as it were, a prescriptive right to success. [34] **If a man deal**, etc. A concrete case will make the meaning quite clear. The governors of a school wish to get rid of their head-master, and hint that if he resigns they will procure him a living. They may say (1) you cannot reasonably demand the presentation till you have resigned your mastership. (2) If you take this living, we will use our influence to get you a deanery. (3) You can trust the word of noblemen and gentlemen like us. [42] **Practice**: in L.V. *negotatio*. The word generally implies plotting, like our "sharp practice." [45] **Work**: "work upon," "influence."

NOTES TO ESSAY XLVIII.

[2] **Train**: The metaphor is from a peacock. [5] **Importune**: "importunate." *Cf.* Essay 38, l. 3. [11] **Ill intelligence**: "misunderstanding." [13] **Glorious**: "boastful." See Essay 34, l. 117. [19] **Espials**: "spies." *Cf.* "spials" in Essay 44. **Inquire**, etc.: *cf.* *Juvenal*, iii. 72, *viscera magnarum domuum dominique futuri*. [22] **Officious**: *cf.* Essay 44, l. 35. [23] **Estates**: "professions," "ranks." [26] **Civil**: "citizen-like," hence, "orderly," "becoming." [28] **Popularity**: "courting of popular favour." "Popular" is always used in a bad sense by Bacon. *Cf.* *Life*, iii. 103, "The things which I shall speak spring out of no vein of popularity, ostentation, or any the like leaven." [29] **Apprehendeth**: "takes on himself." [31] **Where there is**, etc.: "If there is no marked pre-eminence in one would-be follower over another, it is better to engage the common-place rather than the slightly abler candidate." So the L.V. understands "passable," rendering it by *mediocribus*. It may, however, mean the man who suits the particular post. [35] **Virtuous**: seemingly used almost as a synonym of "able" above. *Cf.* Essay 14, l. 39. The L.V., however, renders *quam vere virtute præditi*. [35] **In government**, etc.: In the lower grades of the civil service there is much to be said for Bacon's counsel, though it may be argued on the other side that to be able to claim promotion as a due is to lose all motives for energy; but in the case of

higher offices the advice is obviously inapplicable. [39] **In favour**: "in cases of private patronage." [44] **Proportion**: *sc.* between the services rendered and the rewards received. [48] **Immediately**: the opposite of indirectly. [51] **Of the last impression**: "swayed by the last adviser;" ἐστὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, as Sophocles phrases it. In *Adv. of Learning*, ii. 22, 4, we have *huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione*. [53] **Lookers-on**, etc.: a catch phrase of Bacon's. *Cf. Life*, iii. 103, "But finding that it is many times seen that a man that standeth off, and somewhat removed from a plot of ground, doth better survey it and discover it than those which are upon it, I thought it not impossible but that I, as a looker-on, might cast mine eyes upon some things which the actors themselves did not or would not see." [54] **The vale**, etc.: In *Adv. of Learning*, ii. 21, 7, this is termed "a proverb more arrogant than sound" because "men can write best and most really and materially in their own profession;" but there the contrast is between speculative men and men of experience; here, between the interested party and the disinterested adviser. [56] **Which was wont**, etc.: So Aristotle, *Ethics*, viii. 7, insists that equality is of the essence of friendship, and Cicero *De Amicitia*, xix. 69, "*Sed maximum est in amicitia parem esse inferiori.*"

NOTES TO ESSAY XLIX.

[1] **Undertaken**: "taken up" by the patron or *suitee* (if we may coin the word). [7] **By some other mean**: this is the emphatic clause. [8] **Thank**: used in the singular, *Ecclus.*, xx. 16, "I have no thank for all my good deeds." **Second**: "incidental." [12] **To make an information** = "to lay an information," but not in the strict legal sense. [15] **Entertainment**: "a way of entertaining or engaging others," an introduction. [21] **Suit of petition**: a private, as opposed to a legal, suit. [23] **Compound**: "compromise." [26] **Depraving**: "slandering." So Shakespeare, *Troilus*, Act v. sc. 2, 132, "Critics apt, without a cause, for depravation." **Disabling**: "disparaging." *As you like it*, Act v. sc. 4, 40, "He disabled my judgment." [32] **Distasted**: "disgusted." [34] **Reporting**, etc.: "stating plainly the issue of the suit." *Cf. Essay 47*, l. 17. [36] **Gracious**: "deserving of thanks." **The first coming**: In L.V. *prima petitionis oblatio nullius debet esse momenti*. [38] **Of his trust**: "Of the confidence that he (the first comer) has shown by referring the matter to you." [40] **The note**: "the fact he has notified to you," "his information." [41] **The party**: as opposed

to the other suitors in the case. [46] **Voicing**, etc. : "proclaiming that they are progressing favourably." [51] **His mean** : "his agent." [53] **Deal in certain things**, etc. : "the specialist rather than the general practitioner." [54] **The reparation**, etc. : "To gain a second suit, by more insistence or adroitness (this is implied in "reparation"), after a suit has been refused, is sometimes as good as gaining a suit off-hand." [56] **Iniquum** : ask for too much to get enough. [59] **Rise in his suit** : begin by asking a little. [66] **General contrivers** : those who have no special definite suit to urge, but give general testimonials, letters of commendation, etc.

NOTES TO ESSAY L.

[1] The L.V. *Studia et lectiones librorum* shows that Bacon is using the word in the restricted meaning of the study of books. **For ability** : "to make men able." L.V. *negotiorum subsidio*. [2] **Privateness and retiring** : "privacy and retirement." [5] **Expert men** : men who have learned from experience only, without any knowledge of theory. The modern "expert" has a different connotation. [7] **Plots** : "planning," "contriving." [8] **To spend**, etc. : a paradox, or we might call it an oxymoron, like Horace's *strenua inertia*. [10] **Affectation** : "vanity," "idle display." [11] **Humour** : "peculiar temper or characteristic;" here = "the foible." [12] **They perfect**, etc. : the sense is clear, but for the sake of the epigrammatic form Bacon in the coordinate sentence lets "studies" stand for the mind trained by studies. [14] **Proyning** : "pruning." Bacon might have continued the simile by adding "manuring," but he insists here on the corrective discipline of studies to balance the corresponding statement about experience. The parallel is somewhat forced. Books are, as it were, bottled experience, though it is quite true that the student when he comes to put his book knowledge into practice finds much to modify, much that will not "work;" but he enlarges even more than he "prunes" and corrects his theoretical knowledge. [16] **Crafty men** : "men of practical ability," almost synonymous with the "expert men" above. [17] **Simple men** : include both the ignorant herd who like Goldsmith's villagers stand agape at the schoolmaster's learning and the pedant whose world is his library. [25] **Chewed** : cf. Collect for Second Sunday in Advent, "Read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest." [27] **Curiously** : "carefully." [30] **Would** : "should." [32] **Flashy** : "tasteless;" Mr. H. Bradley suggests from *flash*, a shallow pool—a different word from "flashy" in the sense of

glittering. "The tastes that most offend in fruits, herbs, and roots, are bitter, harsh, sour, waterish, or flashy" (Bacon, *Natural History*). The L.V. has *insipidi*. [33] **Reading**, etc.: cf. Matt. xiii. 52, of the householder "who bringeth out of his treasure things new and old." [34] **Writing**: not in the sense of original composition, but of taking notes, making analyses, etc. The L.V. has "but writing and collecting notes impresses and fixes more deeply on the mind what is read." Niebuhr, who from trusting wholly to his memory, prodigious as that memory was, was constantly falling into inaccuracies, is a good instance in point. [36] **Present wit**: presence of mind, or a ready wit. [39] **Witty**: Bacon uses *witty* in a much wider sense than it now bears: = ingenious, imaginative. Cf. Prior,

"In gentle verse the witty told their flame,
And graced their choicest songs with Emma's name."

[41] **Abeunt**: studies pass into character, *i.e.* characters are moulded by studies, from Ovid, *Heroides*, xv. 85. Ovid says he is soft-hearted either because he was born so, or by training, "*Sive abeunt studia in mores, artesque magistra.*" [42] **Stond**: let, hindrance, an archaic form of stand. "When there be not stands nor restiveness" (*i.e.* stationariness) "in a man's nature" (Essay 40). [45] **Shooting**: in L.V. "*sagittatio.*" [48] **Mathematics**: cf. *Adv. of L.* ii. 19, 2, "If a child be bird-witted, that is, have not the facultie of attention, the *Mathematiques* [notice the different spelling] giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them if the witte be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin." [51] **The Schoole-men**: see Essay 17, l. 28. [52] Cf. *Adv. of L.* i. 7, 7. Speaking of Antoninus Pius, Bacon says, "He was called *Cymini sector*, a carver or a divider of cummin seed, which is one of the least seeds; such a patience he had and settled spirit, to enter into the least and most exact differences of causes." Lord Macaulay, *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 425, says of the passage beginning "Crafty men" to "Logic and Rhetoric able to Contend," "We do not believe that Thucydides himself has anywhere compressed so much thought into so small a space." He proceeds to contrast the richer and fuller style of his later Essays.¹ [53] **Beat over**: to take a wide sweep of the field of knowledge; a metaphor from beating a cover. Cf. Essay 22, l. 117.

¹ Dr. Abbott, in his "Francis Bacon," p. 447, refutes this hasty generalization of Macaulay.

NOTES TO ESSAY LI.

[6] **Ordering**: "administrating wisely." **General**: "common to all" and, as is implied by the context, "for the common good of all." [7] **Nevertheless**: "notwithstanding their differences in other respects." [8] **With correspondence to**: "so as to adapt one's self to." [10] **Mean**: "low-born." [11] **Adhere**: "join a party." Cf. Essay 11, l. 115. "It is good to side a man's self whilst he is in the rising." [14] **As**: "that." [15] **Passable**: "on good terms," not at daggers drawn. **Giveth best way**: in modern slang "pays best." A nautical metaphor. [21] **Lucullus**: see Liddell's *History of Rome*, p. 536. [38] **Placed**: "raised to office." Lord Beaconsfield and Mr. Gladstone are striking instances to the contrary, and it would be difficult to adduce any modern English statesmen in support of Bacon's dictum. [41] **Purchase**: "gain." In L.V. "for gaining new friends." [42] **Goeth away with it**: "gets the best of it." [44] **Casteth them**: "turns the scale;" cf. "the casting vote." [46] **Trueness to a man's self**: "consistent selfishness." Note the different meaning of Shakespeare's "to thine own self be true." [49] **They**: seemingly refers to the Italians, not to the Popes. So the L.V., but the sense is much the same whether we understand that the Popes are always speaking of themselves as *Padre Commune*, or getting themselves to be so spoke of. [55] **Paramount to**: "which overrides." [58] **The League**: explained in Essay 15, l. 38 *seq.* [65] **Primum mobile**: see Essay 15, l. 54, where for "proper motions" we have "their own motion."

NOTES TO ESSAY LII.

Respects: "deportment." In L.V. *de decoro*. [1] **Only real**: cf. "Truth is a naked and open daylight" of Essay 1. [3] **Without foil**: cf. Milton, *Lycidas* 79, "Nor in the glistening foil set off to the world," and Essay 43, l. 1. [23] **Again**: "in return." [25] **Formal**: cf. Shakespeare, *Taming of the Shrew*, Act iv. sc. 2. 64. "Formal in apparel, in gait and countenance surely like a father." [26] **Above the moon**: contrast Shakespeare, *Henry VIII.*, Act iii. sc. 2, 134, "His thinkings are below the moon" = earthly, commonplace. [29] **Effectual and imprinting passages**: L.V. *artificiosae cujusdam insinuationes*. [36] **He that is too much in anything**: the modern bore. The same moral is conveyed in the French proverb "glissez n'appuyez pas." [38] **To apply one's self**: "to pay attention." So

it be, etc. "If you make it clear that his attentions are prompted by special regard for the person and not by mere good nature." [41] **Seconding**: The context shows that the word had a wider meaning in Bacon's time than now. [44] **Allow**: "approve." Cf. Essay 18, l. 6, and 26, l. 41. [47] **Sufficient**: "perfect." [50] **Too full of respects**: "too punctilious and deferential." In the parallel passage (*vide infra*) it is "an overcurious observance of decency." [52] **Salomon**: Eccles. xi. 4. [55] **Men's behaviour**: the substance of this passage is transferred from the *Adv. of L.* ii. 23, 2. [56] **Point device**: a shortened form of "at point device" = up to the point devised, conceived as the best possible. Skeat says it is a translation of the old French *à point devis*, but I have failed to find the phrase. It would seem rather to represent *à point devisé*. In *As You Like It*, Act iii. sc. 2, 350, Rosalind describes Orlando as point-device in his accoutrements, in contrast with the careless desolation of a lover.

NOTES TO ESSAY LIII.

[1] **It is as**, etc. Praise varies with the reflecting medium. It may distort the features like a concave mirror. [4] **Naught**: "worthless," as in Shakespeare *passim*. [10] **Species**, etc. Tac. *Annals*, xv. 48; "shams." [11] **Fame is like a river**: see *Antitheta* and *Novum Organum*. *Aph.* lxxi. where "Time" is substituted for "Fame." We might invert the metaphor with at least equal truth—Fame is like a river which bears away the straws and froth and preserves in its bed the solid gold. [13] **Of quality**: "of high birth" as in the vulgar phrase "the quality." [14] **Nomen**: Eccles. vii. 1. [19] **A suspect**: cf. Essay 24 *ad fin.* [21] **Common attributes**: "he will have a stock of commonplaces to suit every character." **The arch flatterer**. Cf. Essay 10, l. 30. [28] **Spreta conscientia**: "in spite of the flattered person's consciousness of demerit." [31] **Laudando præcipere**: "to instruct in praising." A counsel that Bacon carried out to perfection in his dealings with James. [35] **Pessimum**: etc. Tacitus *Agric.* xli. "At that period Agricola was constantly accused to Domitian in his absence and acquitted in his absence. His peril lay not in any indictment or complaint that he had injured any, but in an emperor who was a foe to virtue and in that worst kind of enemies, the men who praise." [37] **Push**: Cotgrave has "*Bubette*—a little wheale, push, or blister." The reference is to Theocritus, *Idylls*, xii. 24, but there the pimple is the punishment of the false praiser. [41] **Solomon**: Prov. xxvii. 14. [46] **To praise . . . he may do it**. A slight anacoluthon. The sentence begins as if "to praise" were to be the subject, as in the previous sentence. [49] **The cardinals**.

The connection is, "Thus the cardinals extol their own office by disparaging lay employments." **With a kind of magnanimity:** because he implies that his greatness is more due to his office than to his personal merits. [50] **Theologues:** Dryden uses the same form—

"A theologue more by need than genial bent,
Int'rest in all his actions was discerned."

[54] **Sbirrerie:** Sbirro (French, *sbire*) is an under-officer of police.

[57] **St. Paul:** 2 Cor. xi. 23, and Rom. xi. 13.

NOTES TO ESSAY LIV.

[1] **Æsop:** cf. Phædrus iii. 6; La Fontaine, vii. 9. *Le coche et la mouche*. [4] **Moveth upon greater means:** is effected by persons of greater influence than themselves. Cf. Lowell *Biglow Papers*,

"Fer John P.
Robinson he,

Sez the world 'll go right, ef he hollers out gee!"

[6] **Carry it:** "carry the day," "are the chief agents." [7] **Glorious:** a synonym of "vain." All bravery, or boasting, implies setting one's self up against others. [10] **Not effectual:** cannot be effectual. [13] **Civil:** opposed to "military," l. 26. [16] **Livius**, xxxv. 12. Thoas, the chief of the Ætolians persuaded Antiochus to cross over into Greece by extolling the power of the Greek states and showing their readiness to revolt from Rome, and at the same time excited the Greek states to rebellion by setting forth the power of Antiochus. The rebellion was crushed by the battle of Magnesia, B.C. 190. [25] **Somewhat:** Playing on the axiom *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Cf. "Good commanders in the wars must be taken, be they never so ambitious . . . to take a soldier without ambition is to pull off his spurs." Essay 36. [29] **Iron:** Prov. xxvii. 17. [31] **Upon charge:** "involving expense and risk." **Composition:** "a combination;" in other words, if the army or the staff consist of boasters. [36] **Qui:** from Cicero, *Tusculans*, i. 15, "The authors of books on the duty of despising fame are careful to let their names appear on the title-page." [37] **Socrates**, etc. It is hardly necessary to inquire how far there is any foundation for Bacon's jibe. The three here mentioned differ widely in character, conduct, and doctrine, but they are classed together by Bacon as not hiding their light under a bushel. **Galen** (a Greek physician born at Pergamus, A.D. 130) was doubtless vain-glorious, and his

attempt to place medical science on a psychological basis by studying the affections of the body in connection with those of the soul, his doctrine of primary or elemental and secondary or mixed causes made him distasteful to Bacon, but he was at the same time no mean experimentalist, and by his dissections of animals, and probably of human subjects also, he laid the foundation on which Vesalius, and the long line of modern anatomists and physiologists have built. [40] **Virtue**, etc.: "Virtue could never depend on men in general for getting at second-hand, *i.e.* from any other than its possessor, its due meed of praise." **Beholding**: beholden. See on Essay 10, l. 1. [41] **His**. Note that virtue is masculine, fame feminine. The gender is determined partly by the Latin, partly by the sense, sterner and ruder qualities being as a rule masculine, milder qualities feminine. [42] **Seneca**: It is perhaps idle to discuss why Bacon fixes the charge of vanity on Seneca. Probably because his high discourses on virtue (see Essay 5) were contradicted by his luxurious life. Seneca, though weak, was by no means vain either in his conduct or writings, rather modest and unassuming. **Plinius Secundus**: nephew of the elder Pliny, and known to us chiefly by his letters. They show us a polished gentleman proud of his soldiering, proud of his civic honours, which, he is careful to remind us, rival Cicero's, but prouder still of his bad verses; a clever, amiable *littérateur*. **Borne her age**: "lasted." [45] **Ceilings** (spelt by Bacon **seelings**): to *seel* or *syle* is properly to cover with a canopy; hence *ceiling*, originally a canopy, was extended to side-hangings, wainscoting, and even to flooring. [48] **Omnium**: Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 80. "In all he said and did he had the art of displaying himself to advantage." Mucianus was an intriguing general in the reigns of Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian. [49] **That**: *sc.* kind of vain-glory, here used *in bonam partem* of the useful arts of ostentation. [52] **Cessions**: "concessions." **Well governed**: "if not allowed to go so far as self-effacement or real humility." [57] **Pliny**: *Letters*, vi. 17. Pliny is expressing to a friend his indignation at the cold silence with which a clique of critics had received the recitation of an excellent composition by one of Pliny's friends. [63] **Glorious men**, etc.: a wonderful instance of Bacon's terseness.

NOTES TO ESSAY LV.

[1] **The winning**, etc. : in other words a man's reputation is generally a fair standard of his worth, if only he does himself justice. The MS. has "The true winning of honour." [2] **Without disadvantage**: The L.V. has "the revealing of a man's virtue dexterously and without hindrance." [3] **Affect**: in L.V. *venatores sunt*, "hunt after." [20] **Gained and broken upon another**: "gained over others by collision, by the friction of competition." This bold phrase keeps up the metaphor of diamond cutting diamond. [25] **Omnis**, etc. : Q. Cicero, *De petitione consulatus*, v. 17. "All one's reputation comes from one's immediate acquaintances." Cicero's exact words are "*nam fere omnis sermo ad forensem famam a domesticis emanat auctoribus.*" [27] **Declaring**: "making it clear." In L.V. *si quis id sibi praestituere videatur*, "if a man is seen to set before him as his object." [29] **Providence**, etc. : cf. Essay 40, l. 46. [32] **Are**: because the logical subject is "degrees of honour truly marshalled." [34] **Ottoman**, or Othman : born A.D. 1259, died A.D. 1326, founded the empire of the Ottoman Turks. [35] **Ismael**: or Chah Ismael founded the dynasty of the Sophis of Persia; entered Bagdad 1509. [39] **Eadgar**: "Edgar, the Saxon King, collected the laws of this kingdom and gave them the strength of a faggot bound, which formerly were dispersed." Bacon, *Proposition touching the amendment of laws*. His legislation was an attempt to put Anglo-Saxons and Danes on an equality before the law. The laws of Eadgar are given in Thorpe, *Ancient Laws and Institutions*. **Alphonsus of Castile**: surnamed the Wise, published the digest of laws A.D. 1260 named *las siete partidas*, the seven parts. He was also an astronomer, and the saying is attributed to him that if he had been consulted at the creation the world would have been better ordained. [41] **Compound**: "settle," like Latin *componere*. [44] **Vespasian**: Emperor A.D. 69, "compounded" the civil wars that followed the death of Nero. **Aurelianus**: Emperor A.D. 270, defeated the Goths, Sarmatians, Marcomanni, Vandals, and conquered Zenobia. "He died regretted by the army, detested by the senate, but universally acknowledged as a warlike and fortunate prince, the useful though severe reformer of a degenerate state" (Gibbon, chap. xi.). **Theodoricus**: King of the Ostrogoths, liberated Italy from the domination of Odoacer, A.D. 493, the greatest of the barbarian invaders of Italy. [50] **Patres patriae**: an honorary title conferred at Rome on Cicero and other distinguished citizens, and, later on, as a matter of form on the emperor. [59] **Favourites**. In Essay 36 Bacon defends

favourites as the best remedy against ambitious great men. Here they occupy the lowest rank but one. Dr. Abbott well points out that Buckingham could not possibly have taken this as a reflection on himself, as he would take the first rank as a *particeps curarum*. [67] **Decii**. Before the battle with the Latins near Vesuvius B.C. 340, the two consuls, P. Decius Mus and T. Manlius Torquatus, being warned in a dream that of the two hosts one was destined to destruction and the general of the other, agreed that whichever of them should see his wing give way should devote himself. The son, P. Decius Mus, followed his father's example in a battle with the Samnites and Gauls at Sentinum B.C. 295.¹

NOTES TO ESSAY LVI.

[6] **Pronounce** : as judges *ex cathedra*. [9] **Plausible** : In L.V. *gratiosum*, "courting applause;" elsewhere the word is used in a good sense, "praiseworthy." See Essay 9, l. 159. **Advised** : "deliberative," "cautious." [11] **Cursed** : Deut. xxvii. 17. Cf. Bacon's *Speech to Justice Hutton*, "That you contain the jurisdiction of the court within the ancient mere stones, without removing the mark." [12] **Mere stone** : "boundary stone." Cotgrave has "*Borne*, a bound, limit, meere, marck." [18] **Solomon** : Prov. xxv. 26. [25] **Scripture** : Amos v. 7. [29] **Whereof**, etc. It is hard to see the pertinence of this observation. Force *ex vi termini* is open, fraud close and disguised. [39] **Qui**, etc. : Prov. xxx. 33. The wringing of the nose bringeth forth blood. [48] **Pluet** : Ps. xi. 6. He shall rain snares upon them. A very favourite quotation of Bacon in this forced sense. [53] **Judicis** : Ovid, *Trist* i. 1, 37. "'Tis the part of a judge to investigate not only the case, but the circumstances of the case." [60] **Over-speaking** : implies both garrulity and brow-beating. [63] **Quickness of conceit**, etc. : cf. Bacon, *Speech to Justice Hutton*, "That you affect not the opinion of pregnancy and expedition by an impatient and catching bearing of the counsellors at the bar." [64] **Prevent** : "forestal." [66] **Direct the evidence** : "rule what is legal evidence and what is not." [71] **Glory** : "vanity." [76] **Represseth**, etc. : Jas. iv. 6. [83] **Obtaineth** : "wins." [85] **Conceit** : "his belief in the goodness of his cause." here in the modern sense. [86] **Civil** : In L.V. *moderata*. [90] **Chop** : "bandy words." [98] **Foot-pace** : "landing," "vestibule." So Johnson, quoting Moxon. Nares without authority gives "mat." [99] **Purprise** : from the French *pourpris*. Cotgrave gives "a close or enclosure. *Pourpris d'un manoir* comprehends all the outrooms, courts, gardens, etc.,

lying round about or neere to it." [104] **Polling**: "to poll" is "to shear," so "to rob." [108] **Quarrels of jurisdiction**: such as the famous quarrel in 1615-17 between the Chancery and the King's Bench when presided over by Ellesmere and Coke respectively. See Bacon, *Life*, v. 245 *seq.* [127] **Salus**, etc.: "The safety of the people is the supreme law." Not from the Twelve Tables, but from Cicero, *De Legibus*, iii. 3, 8. [131] **Consult with judges**: Spedding (*Life of Bacon*, v. 114) holds that in Bacon's time an extra-judicial consultation of the judges before trying a case was not considered at all out of order. Coke, in opposition to Bacon, laid down that the judges ought not, at any rate individually, to deliver their opinions beforehand of any criminal case which might come before them judicially. Whether Bacon's or Coke's law was the better, our sympathies must be all with Coke. [138] **The reason**: "the principle involved. **Trench to**: "trench on." A reference to the famous case *De rege inconsulto*. By this writ the Common Law judges were forbidden to deal with matters in which the interests of the Crown were involved, without having first gained the permission of the Court of Chancery. See Spedding, *Life of Bacon*, vol. v. p. 233; Gardiner, *History*, vol. ii. p. 7. [145] **That**, etc.: "that move one (moves) with the other." [146] **Salomon's throne**: 1 Kings x. 19. Cf. Bacon's *Speech to Justice Hutton*, "Remember with yourself that the twelve judges of the realm are as the twelve lions under Salomon's throne; they must be lions, but yet lions under the throne; they must show their stoutness in elevating and bearing up the throne." [154] **Nos scimus**: 1 Tim. i. 8.

NOTES TO ESSAY LVII.

[2] **Bravery**: "an ostentatious boast." **Stoics**: a particular application of the Stoical doctrine ἀταραξία, or imperturbability. Cicero quotes "Sapiens numquam irascitur" as a Stoical precept. **Oracles**: So St. Paul (Rom. iii. 2) speaks of the Scriptures as the oracles of God (Eph. iv. 26). Fuller's comment on the text is worth quoting for its quaintness, "Let not the sun go down on your wrath to carry wars to the antipodes in another world of thy revengeful nature. Yet let us take the apostle's meaning rather than his words, with all possible speed to depose our passion; not understanding him so literally that we may take leave to be angry till sunset; thus might our wrath lengthen with the days, and men in Greenland, where day lasts above a quarter of a year, have plentiful scope of revenge." [5] **Race**: "course," "progress," "extent." Cf. "the prosecution and race of the war," Bacon, *History of Henry VII.* [15] Seneca, *De Ira*, i. 1.

Ruin: in the Latin sense of the thing that falls; and "falls" is used in the active sense, as the Latin *super id quod oppressere* shows. [16] **Scripture**: Luke xxi. 19. [19] **Animasque**: Vergil, *Georg.* iv. 238. "And perish as they wound." [21] **Anger**, etc.: The passionateness of children, the irritability of women, the querulousness of old men, and the fretfulness of invalids, may all be classed under the general term "anger," as proceeding from want of self-control in the subject who seeks to avenge his annoyance on others. See *Annotations*. [22] **Only men**: the connection is not obvious. If *men* (as opposed to women, children, etc.) must be angry—and Bacon allows that they must—they should show that they are not afraid of, but scorn, those with whom they are angry. [26] **Give law to himself**: Anger, according to Bacon, is to be regulated, not suppressed. [27] **The causes**: In more modern language the causes of anger are: (1) Over-sensitiveness, or touchiness; (2) the consciousness of an intended affront; (3) punctiliousness, or an over-scrupulous regard for one's reputation. [39] **Touch**: "a belief that one's reputation is being touched or assailed." Cf. "Speech of Touch," Essay 32. Wright is mistaken in explaining "touch" as sensitiveness. [42] **Consalvo** (or Gonsalvo, as his name is generally spelt), surnamed the Great, was a Spanish general born near Cordova, 1443. He began his career by taking Granada from the Moors. In 1501 he was appointed by Ferdinand to conduct an expedition against the kingdom of Naples, which Louis XII. of France had lately seized. He beat the French in several battles, and secured Naples for Spain. He was appointed constable of the kingdom, but afterwards fell into disgrace, and ended his days in retirement at Granada, 1515. Bacon, in his "Speech against Duels," thus translates the phrase, "A gentleman's honour should be *De tela crassiore*, of a good strong warp or web, that every little thing should not catch in it, when as now it seems they are of cobweb lawn or such light stuff." So we, using a similar metaphor, talk of pachydermatous persons. [48] **Contain**: to restrain, a sense we still preserve in "to contain one's self." [51] **Aculeate**: a word, seemingly, of Bacon's coining. Cicero has "*aculeatæ literæ*" for a stinging letter. **Proper**: appropriate, personal. [53] **Reveal**, etc.: a reminiscence of Horace, *Sat.* i. 4, 74—

"Commissa tacere

Qui nequit, hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto."

[58] It is characteristic that Bacon should think it necessary to instruct us how we are to make another angry. [66] To prevent a man from construing the wrong done him as a sign of contempt for himself.

NOTES TO ESSAY LVIII.

[1] **Salomon**: Eccles. i. 9. [2] **Plato**: the famous doctrine of Anamnesis, expounded in the *Phaedo* and the *Meno*. [4] **Sentence**: like the Latin, *sententia dia Catonis*. **Astrologer**: the L.V. adds "*et parum notus*." [12] **The matter**: see on Essay I, l. 48. [16] **Merely**: "utterly." [17] **Phaeton's car**: the L.V. is more matter of fact. "The fable of Phaeton represents the short duration of conflagration, lasting but the space of a day." [18] **Elias**: 1 Kings xvii., xviii. [19] **Particular**: "partial." [22] **Deluge**: Wright quotes Acosta (*Natural History of the Indies*, published in Spanish, 1590) for the tradition of a deluge among the West Indians. Acosta himself thinks the deluge was "particular," like that in Plato, not the universal deluge of Noah. [33] **Atlantis**: Plato, *Timaeus* 25 D. "But afterwards extraordinary earthquakes and deluges occurred, and in the space of one terrible day and night, all your military forces were buried beneath the earth, and the island of Atlantis was likewise swallowed up beneath the sea. Thus even to this day the sea about that part is impassable and not to be explored by reason of the deep mud caused by sinking of the island." [36] **On the other side**: "on the other hand." [38] **Andes**: as a fact many summits of the Himalayas attain greater altitudes, but the Andes range is by far the longest and of the greatest general elevation of any on the globe. [42] **Machiavel**: *Disc. Sopr. Liv.* ii. 5. [44] **Gregory the Great**: "it is commonly believed that Pope Gregory the First attacked the temples and mutilated the statues of the city; that, by the command of the barbarian, the Palatine library was reduced to ashes, and that the history of Livy was the peculiar mark of his absurd and mischievous fanaticism. The writings of Gregory himself reveal his implacable aversion to the monuments of classic genius. . . . But the evidence of his destructive genius is doubtful and recent." (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. xlv.). [48] **Sabinian**: succeeded Gregory as Pope A.D. 604. "The populace listened greedily to the charge first said to have been made by Sabinianus, of the wanton destruction made by the late pope of the public buildings and other monuments of the city. The revenge suggested by the malice of Sabinianus was the public destruction of the works of Gregory. . . . Thrice Gregory appeared to rebuke Sabinianus, and thrice he appeared in vain; the fourth time the spirit struck the pontiff a violent blow on the head of which he died." (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 309.) [50] **Superior globe**: "the heavens." [52] **Great year**: ὁ τέλεος ἐνιαυτός of Plato, the *magnus annus* of Cicero, the space of time in which

all the planets and fixed stars will have returned to the same place as they were at the beginning of the world. The lowest calculation is put at 12,954 years. [54] **Like individuals**: "the same individuals as were alive at the corresponding time in the last cycle." **Fume**: cf. Bacon, *War with Spain*: "To lay aside all that may seem to have a shew of *fumes* and fancies, and to speak solids, a war with Spain is a mighty work." [55] **Accurate**: "exact," "in detail." [62] **Version**: "direction." [65] **Toy**: in L.V. *leviculum*. "Some lady trifles, immoment toys," Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, v. 2, 166. [66] **Waited upon**: "observed." [72] **The prime**: seemingly the lowest turn in the calculation, just as a prime number is one that cannot be broken up into factors. [78] **Orbs**: "spheres," carrying on the metaphor of stellar influences. [85] **Holiness of the professors**: cf. what is said of "scandal of priests," in Essay 16. [87] **Be**: Abbot says that "be" is used owing to the greater distance of "be" from "when," and the consequent necessity of showing that it is a hypothesis, not a statement of fact. We may compare the French "Si la religion *est* déchirée et que le siècle *soit* stupide." [88] **Doubt**: "suspect." [91] **If a new sect**, etc.: Bacon's diagnosis of the origin of sects is ludicrously inadequate. More have arisen from a craving for greater strictness than of greater laxity. In his double division he is probably thinking of the Antinomians and of the Mahomedans. Mahomet till this century was generally regarded as a rank impostor who sought only personal power and self-indulgence. [97] **Arminians**: took their name from James Arminius (or Harmensen) a protestant divine of Leyden, A.D. 1560-1609. They protested against the Calvinists, and especially the doctrine of predestination; their doctrines were condemned by the Protestant synod of Dort in 1619. James I. favoured the Arminian doctrine. **Civil occasions**: "political events." [116] **Stages**: "theatre." [121] **The Gauls**; the Gauls or Celts are one branch of the Aryan race, but being one of the earliest settlements in Europe were driven into the extreme West by the pressure of Teutonic and other tribes. About the third century B.C., a Celtic colony founded Galatia or Gallo-Græcia, and their language at the time of St. Jerome was still Celtic. The Gallic chieftain Brennus conquered Rome, B.C. 390. [123] **East and West**: seeing that east and west are relative terms—the Chinese, from the American point of view, would be a western nation—there can be no fixed law as to eastern or western races being the more warlike. [126] **North and South**: the Arab invasions are a notable exception to Bacon's induction, which nevertheless generally holds good. [137] The L.V. adds, "as is clear in the case of the Araucarians, who being situated in the remote South far surpass in

bravery all the Peruvians." It would almost seem as if the Latin translator had forestalled the natural cavil that Bacon had overlooked the existence of a South pole. [144] **They become a prey:** Bacon overlooks the alternative of the national spirit reviving and reasserting itself, as has happened recently in the partial overthrow of the Turkish empire. [146] **Charles the Great:** Charles's empire was, it is true, divided among his grandsons, but it was not till a century later that Rollo invaded Normandy, and the empire, to a limited extent "became a prey." [157] **Shoals of people:** *cf. Paradise Lost*, i. 351—

"A multitude like which the populous north
Poured never from her frozen loins, to pass
Rhene or the Danaw, when her barbarous sons
Came like a deluge on the south."

[172] **Oxidrakes:** the L.V. adds "in the time of Alexander the Great." The Oxidracæ, a tribe in the Punjab in whose capital Alexander was wounded. But it has not been discovered where Bacon found any reference to their ordnance. [177] **Fetching:** "striking," "carrying." The original meaning of "fetch" is "to go to find," "to go for." [186] **Did put:** the auxiliary is used because of the ambiguity arising from the identical forms of the present and past times. [187] **Pointing:** "appointing." [195] **In the youth,** etc. : the analogy between the life of a state and the life of an individual has been a favourite theme with essayists. It is worked out fully in Lessing's *Education of the Human Race*, and popularized in *Essays and Reviews* (Bishop Temple's *Education of the World*). [196] **Both of them together:** *cf. Adv. of L.* i. 2, 2, "And this concurrence [of learning and arms] is yet more visible in times than in persons, by how much an age is a greater object than a man. For both in Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Græcia, and Rome, the same times that are most renowned for arms are likewise most admired for learning." [198] **Learning,** etc. : *cf. Adv. of L.* ii. 10, 13. "For as it hath been well observed that the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth are military, and while virtue is in state are liberal, and while virtue is in declination are voluptuary; so I doubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon the descent of the wheel." [202] **Reduced:** "reduced to shape," "trained," the opposite of "luxuriant." The L.V. has "more exact." [205] **Philology:** "critical history," "philosophy." [For Bacon's view of human progress see Annotations and Hints on Essays 24 and 29. Bacon believes in cycles rather than in constant development.]

NOTES TO FRAGMENT OF ESSAY OF FAME.

[3] **Sententiously**: "pithily," "with a pregnant meaning." **They say**: Vergil, *Æn.* iv. 175-190. [7] **A flourish**: "a piece of fanciful rhetoric." [19] **Masculine**: *cf.* Essay 15, l. 17. [21] **Fly**: *cf.* Shakespeare, 2 *Henry VI.*, ii. 1, 1. "Flying at the brook" = "hawking at water-fowl." [24] **Sad**: *cf.* Shakespeare, *Lucrece*, 277, "Sad pause and deep regard beseem the sage." [25] **The politics**: τὰ πολιτικά, as Aristotle's work, which bears this title. **A place**: "a topic." [35] **Mucianus**: Tacitus, *Histories*, ii. 80. [39] **Cæsar**: from Plutarch, *Julius Cæsar*. "The officer who brought them [Cæsar's soldiers] back to Pompey, spread among the people no very fair or favourable report of Cæsar, and flattered Pompey himself with false suggestions that he was wished for by Cæsar's army, . . . and that if they once crossed into Italy, they would presently declare for Pompey, so weary were they of Cæsar's endless expeditions." [45] **Livia**: Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 5. [48] **Bashaws**: Pashas, a Persian word. [52] **Themistocles**: Herodotus, viii. 108, 109.

APPENDIX.



EXAMINATION PAPERS ON BACON'S ESSAYS.

OXFORD LOCAL EXAMINATIONS, 1864.

1. Define "essay." Has the word changed its meaning since Bacon's time?
2. Enumerate the "fruits" and the "manifold uses" of friendship.
3. What are your author's views of the causes of atheism? Does he appear to have omitted some?
4. Where are the following persons mentioned in the Essays :—Pythagoras, Prodicus, Cyrus, Justinian, Apollonius of Tyana, Albert Durer, Cosmo Duke of Florence, Louis XI. ? And how are their names introduced?
5. Give Bacon's chief directions to planters.
6. Give the substance of the Essays on *Delays*, *Innovations*, and the *Regimen of Health*.
7. "The causes and motives of seditions are" . . . Go on, if you can, with the proposition.
8. What is your author's advice to Travellers?
9. "Tell a lie and find a troth."
"Abeunt studia in mores."
"Fortune is like the market."
"The blessing of Judah and Issachar will never meet."
"When hempe is spun,
England's done."

Comment on these ; and say where they occur.

10. "Better have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of Him." How does your author make out this?

11. "If the hill will not come to Mahomet, Mahomet will go to the hill." What use does he make of the story referred to?

EXAMINATION OF WOMEN, 1881.

SECOND EXAMINATION. HONOURS.

(Essays on *Advancement of Learning*.)

1. State Bacon's views and arguments with regard to religious toleration.

2. Collect and illustrate from the Essays Bacon's views as to the constitution of a State.

3. What does Bacon regard as the chief things necessary to secure the greatness of kingdoms?

4. Explain these passages, showing their connection with the arguments of which they are parts :—

(1) The modern language gives unto such persons the name of favourites or privadoes, as if it were matter of grace or conversation, but the Roman name attaineth the true use and cause thereof, naming them "*Participes curarum*," for it is that which tieth the knot.

(2) The wars of later ages seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honour which reflected upon men from the wars of ancient times.

(3) Cram not in people by sending them too fast company after company, but rather hearken how they waste, and send supplies proportionably, but so as the number may live well in the plantation, and not by surcharge be in penury.

(4) It was truly observed by one that himself came very hardly to a little riches and very easily to great riches.

(5) Only superstition is now so well advanced that men are as firm as butchers by occupation, and votary resolution is made equipollent to custom even in matter of blood.

(6) Nay, if there be any that would reign and take up all the time, let him find means to take them off, and to bring others on, as musicians use to do with those that dance too long galliards.

5. What does Bacon conclude to be the most divine attainment open to man? and by what steps does he arrive at his conclusion?

6. Collect the opinions of Bacon in *The Advancement of Learning*.

Learning upon the advantages and disadvantages of history relatively to other studies, and of the relative advantages of various sorts of history.

7. State, with illustrations, the three fallacies against which Bacon conceives that the cautions of logic were altogether deficient.

8. Paraphrase the following passage, and explain what Bacon means by "*philosophia prima* :"—

"Which science whether I should report as deficient or not, I stand doubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody of natural theology and of divers parts of logic ; and of that part of natural philosophy which concerneth the principles ; and of that other part of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit ; all these strangely commixed and confused : but being examined it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than anything solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current that the same things are handled but in several respects. As for example that logic considereth of many things as they are in notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature ; the one in appearance, the other in existence ; but I find this difference better made than pursued."

9. Explain these phrases and sentences :—

(1) "*Ignorance severally disguised.*"

(2) "*A kind of conveying of effectual and imprinting passages amongst compliments.*"

(3) "*For as to the confections of sale which are in the shop, they are for readiness, and not for propriety.*"

(4) "*Let men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them.*"

10. What remarkable senses do any of the following words bear in the writings of Bacon?—curiosity, plantation, observation, quarrel, impertinencies, sad, bravery, respects, affection, invention, politics, estate, indifferent, plausible, casual, morality.

EXAMINATION OF WOMEN, 1882.

SECOND EXAMINATION. HONOURS.

(Nine questions only are to be attempted.)

1. State and interpret Bacon's definition of an Essay, and examine any one of his own essays with the view of testing its soundness. What is the conception of Bacon's character that your study of these writings has led you to form?

4. What does Bacon affirm to be (1) the sovereign good of human nature, (2) the lawful end of aspiring, (3) the four pillars of government, (4) the causes of superstition, and (5) the characteristic faults of young men and of men of age? How far do his *Essays of Love* and *of Friendship* seem to you to support the charge of coldness of heart that has been brought against him?

7. Expound at some length the metaphor that underlies the following passages:—

(1) "Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in Providence, and turn upon the poles of *truth*."

(2) "But superstition has been the confusion of many states; and bringeth in a new *Primum Mobile*, that ravisheth all the spheres of government."

(3) "It is a poor centre of a man's action, *himself*. It is right earth."

And explain these:—

(1) "There is a cunning which we in England call *the turning of the cat in the pan*."

(2) "They that are envious towards all men are more obnoxious and officious towards one."

(3) "In beauty that of favour is more than that of colour; and that of decent and gracious motion more than that of favour."

(4) "If affection lead a man to favour the less worthy in desert, let him do so without depraving or disabling the better deserver."

(5) "Let my death come from Spain."

OXFORD LOCAL EXAMINATION PAPER, 1858.

SENIOR CANDIDATES.

11. When were Lord Bacon's *Essays* first published? Give some account of the different editions which were issued in his lifetime.

12. Are the *Essays* to be counted among Lord Bacon's earlier or later works? Can you recollect any instances in the *Essays* of his alluding to his own writings?

13. What does Lord Bacon mean by usury? How does he balance its advantages and disadvantages?

14. What instances of excellency in beautiful persons does Lord Bacon mention? And what instances in deformed persons?

15. Describe a perfect palace according to Lord Bacon's ideas. What are his remarks on the subject of windows?

16. Give any instances which you remember of ordinary words used by Lord Bacon in the Essays in a sense now unusual.

17. Write down the substance, so far as you remember it, of the Essays of *Adversity* and of *Studies*.

18. In what Essay does Lord Bacon treat of Colonization? Name any particulars in which his views on the subject have been confirmed by recent experience.

19. Who are the persons alluded to in the following passages?—

(a) The poet that beautified the sect that was otherwise inferior to the rest.

(b) A master of scoffing, that in his catalogue of books of a feigned library, sets down this title of a book: "The Morris-dance of Heretics."

(c) *Omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset* (one whom all would have considered fit for rule, if he had not ruled).

20. Explain the following proverbs:—

"Tell a lie and find a truth."

"Let my death come from Spain."

"Eat not the heart."

21. Mention some of the fanciful applications of heathen mythology made by Lord Bacon in his Essays.

22. Mention any mistakes which you think that you have observed in Lord Bacon's Essays.

23. Quote any short passages from Lord Bacon's Essays which seem to you especially remarkable for profundity, practical wisdom, or happiness of expression.

OXFORD LOCAL EXAMINATION, 1871.

SENIOR CANDIDATES.

1. The purpose and character of his Essays as conceived by Bacon.

2. Examine the following statements:—"It is characteristic of Bacon's philosophical writings that they have in them a spirit of movement, a perpetual reference to what a man is to do, in order to an end, rather than to his mere speculation upon what is. In his Essays this is naturally still more prominent. His Essays are more often political than moral; they deal with

mankind not in their general faculties or habits, but in their external strife, their endeavours to rule others, or to avoid their rule."

3. What should you say are the chief defects in Bacon's literary style?

4. What were Bacon's views (1) as to the political influence in states of an aristocratic class; (2) as to the effects of war on national character?

5. State briefly the legends referred to by Bacon in connection with Plutus, Briareus, and Epimetheus. For what purpose does he employ them respectively?

6. What are the allusions in the following passages?—

"Let that be left to the Anabaptists and other furies."

"Envy is as an ostracism."

"Sibylla's offer."

OXFORD LOCAL EXAMINATION PAPER, 1872.

SENIOR CANDIDATES.

1. The views of Shakespeare and Bacon concerning *Usury*. What were their points of agreement and difference?

2. Write out the substance of any *one* (not more) of the following essays:—*Travel, Anger, Judicature*.

3. *Boldness* as an element of character. How did Bacon regard it?

4. What is the meaning of *seeled dove, sbirrerie, catchpole, gingles, queching, epicycles, puling*.

5. How does Bacon comment on the following?—

"Whoever is delighted in solitude is either a beast or a god."

"Speech is like cloth of Arras opened and put abroad."

6. In what connection are the following sayings quoted by Bacon?—

"Light gains make heavy purses."

"*Beaucoup de bruit, peu de fruit*."

"There is no new thing upon the earth."

7. Name some of the authors most commonly cited by Bacon, and state the countries to which they belonged, the titles of their principal writings, and the periods at which they lived.

OXFORD LOCAL EXAMINATION PAPER, 1877.

SENIOR CANDIDATES.

1. Indicate with dates the successive steps in the publication of the Essays. What does Bacon seem to have meant by the term "Essay"? And what special character or value did he claim for his own?

2. "Bacon . . . the *meanest* of mankind." Do the Essays contain any traces of those defects in Bacon's character on which this judgment seems to have been grounded?

3. Give an abstract of *one* only of the following Essays:—

(1) *On the true Greatness of Kingdoms.*

(2) *On the Vicissitudes of Things.*

4. Explain:—(1) a new *Primum Mobile*, which ravisheth all the spheres of Government; (2) astronomers did feign, to save the phenomena; (3) multum incola fuit anima mea; (4) Isle of Atlantis; (5) dry light is ever best.

5. Paraphrase, and state the context of:—

(1) "So far forth consideration may be had of his trust, that if intelligence of the matter could not otherwise have been had but by him, advantage be not taken of the note, but by the party left to his other means, and in some sort recompensed for his discovery."

(2) "Yet even in beginners, to adhere so moderately, as he be a man of one faction which is most palpable with the other, commonly giveth best way."

6. Give instances of Bacon's method of quoting and applying Scripture; and compare it with that of Shakespeare in *As You Like It*.

OXFORD LOCAL EXAMINATION PAPERS, 1878.

SENIOR CANDIDATES.

1. Mention any inferences as to the writer's moral character which might be drawn from the Essays on *Negotiation, Followers and Friends, Boldness, Youth and Age*.

2. Explain indicating context: sbirrerie, proyning, knee-timber, turning of the cat in the pan, staddles, antimasque, votary resolution made equipollent to custom, mere-stone, newel, vena porta.

3. Illustrate from the Essays (1) the author's aptitude for

“recognizing similarities ;” (2) his power of condensed expression ; (3) his love of tracing allegory in myths ; (4) his fondness for certain games of skill.

4. Explain :—(1) the four pillars of government ; (2) if the league of Christians were in the two cross-clauses thereof soundly expounded ; (3) brief notes set down rather significantly than curiously ; (4) beware how in making the portraiture thou breakest the pattern ; (5) they will hardly be able to colour other people’s money in the country.

5. Whom should you name as (1) Bacon’s favourite Latin author ; (2) his favourite English sovereign ? Prove and suggest reasons for the preference in each case.

6. Illustrate from Bacon’s Essays the following expressions in the *Merchant of Venice* :—

(1) “ The reason is, your *spirits* are attentive.”

(2) “ . . . when did friendship take a *breed for barren metal* of his friend ? ”

INDEX I.

ON THE TEXT, ANNOTATIONS, AND HINTS.

A

- Absolutism**, Bacon's defence of, 163 ; corrected evils of feudalism, 162, 163 ; Hobbes' advocacy of, 163 ; how far useful or necessary, 161, 162, 164, 165. *See* **Empire**.
- Adversity**, Aristotle's views on, 34 ; attitude of Socrates and Socratic schools to, 33, 34 ; Essay on, 31-33 ; Greek ideas on, 33 ; ill effects of, 36, 37 ; value of, 36, 37 ; value of, scarcely recognized by Mosaic dispensation, 33
- Adam Smith**, condemns State control of private expenditure, 301
- Æthel**, meaning of the term, 107
- Æstheticism**, 209
- Age**, essay on youth and, 358-360 ; suspicion and, 274
- Agnosticism**, 137, 261
- Ambition**, Bacon's estimate of, 320 ; compared with enthusiasm, 319 ; with humility, 317 ; with philanthropy, 318 ; with quietism, 318 ; dangers to princes from, 320 ; effects of, on the ambitious, 320 ; envy first cousin to, 318 ; Essay on, 314-316 ; good works of, not spontaneous, 319 ; highest form of, 317 ; the love of fame and, 319 ; a motive to action, 317 ; objections to, 317-319 ; selfishness of, 317, 318 ; value of, 317 ; worst types of, 318
- America**, executive in, 179 ; money worship in, 301 ; official patronage in, 406 ; politics in, 303 ; public life distasteful to best men in, 85, 86
- Anger**, a natural emotion, 442 ; causes of, 443 ; compared with hatred, 443 ; described and defined, 442, 443 ; Essay on, 440-442 ; righteous, 443 ; value of, 442. *See also* **Revenge**.
- Antimasques**, 324, 327
- Aristocracy of Commerce**, 113, 130. *See* **Nobility**.
- Aristotle**, on adversity, 34 ; on anger, 443 ; on courage, 90 ; on death, 8 ; on development, 255 ; on dissimulation, 44
- Art**, and beauty, 362-365 ; the garden the child of, 385 ; patronage of, by the wealthy, 300 ; the renaissance in, 209 ; the truthful in, 8. *See* **Beauty**.
- Asceticism**, an aspect of pessimism, 261 ; relation to health, 266. *See* **Adversity**, **Love**, **Marriage**.

- Atheism**, arguments against, 136 ; Carlyle on, 135, 136 ; compared with superstition, 137, 138 ; dogmatic and practical, compared, 134, 137 ; Essay on, 130-134 ; French Revolution and, 135 ; influences favourable to, 134, 135 ; misery of, 136, 137 ; Montaigne on, 137 ; pantheism dangerously near to, 135, 136 ; Richter on, 137
- Authority**, parental, 50-53 ; in politics, 258, 259 ; in religion, 23, 24, 25

B

- Bacon**, absolute monarchy, ideal of, 165, 404 ; ambition, how conceived by, 320 ; anger analyzed by, 442, 443 ; beauty, personal, undervalued by, 365 ; church unity seemed possible to, 23, 25 ; commerce underrated by, 254, 255 ; connection of, with masques, 325 ; death, physical view of, taken by, 16 ; duelling condemned by, 29, 30 ; envy materialized by, 69 ; essay, meaning of term to, 362 ; expense, advice on, given by, 242 ; extravagance of, 305, 399 ; faction regarded as useful to the monarch by, 419 ; friendship, unideal treatment of, by, 237 ; garden of, at Gorhambury, 389, 390 ; health of, 269 ; heredity hardly recognized by, 205 ; judicature, regarded as dependent on the crown by, 439 ; long-deferred promotion of, 87 ; love materialized by, 74 ; love, prudential treatment of, by, 78 ; marriage of, 60, 61 ; marriage undervalued by, 60 ; money unscrupulously acquired by, 305 ; moral courage wanting in, 94 ; morality and politics confused by, 47, 48 ; moral standpoint of, low, 47, 48 ; moral theory of, 101 ; nobility sensibly estimated by, 115 ; persecution tolerated by, 25 ; political *métier* of, 404, 405 ; prerogative, royal, defended by, 165 ; progress, how conceived by, 254 ; Protestantism of, 22, 24 ; riches, how estimated by, 305 ; science in the time of, 4, 5 ; studies, advice of, concerning, 408, 409 ; studies, restricted meaning given to, by, 409 ; superstition condemned by, 138, 145 ; suspicion regarded as useful by, 271 ; theory of government held by, 179, 180 ; travel, advice concerning, given by, 149 ; truth and truthfulness hardly distinguished by, 4, 5 ; truth, royal road to, conceived by, 5 ; truthfulness undervalued by, 8 ; usury, views of, on, 357 ; war regarded as a national benefit by, 165, 166, 254
- Banks**, establishment promotes industrial enterprise, 303 ; rise of, 354, 357 ; unfavourable judgment of Bacon on large, 357
- Beauty**, Bacon's estimate of, 362, 365 ; chief theories of, 366, 367 ; different phenomena of, 362-365 ; essay on, 360, 361 ; indefinable, 362, *et seq.* ; not identical with the pleasurable, 363 ; of expression, 365, 366 ; of painting, 364, 365 ; of sculpture, 365 ; philosophy of, 362 ; the sense of, not easily analyzable, 363, 364
- Boldness**, advantages and disadvantages of, 91 ; analysis of, 90, 91 ; Antitheta on, 89 ; Bacon's estimate of, 93 ; Bacon wanting in, 93 ; compared with courage, 92, 93 ; Essay on, 87, 89 ; Greek estimate of, 90 ; value in public life, 91 ; wanting in moral value, 92, 93 ; when especially hurtful, 91

Botany, scientific, 385, 387, 388

Building, Essay on, 368-373

Bureaucracy, discouraged in America, 406; evils of, 180; weakens personal influence, 86. *See* **Office**.

Burns, effects of adversity on, 37, 38

Business, civil, Essay on, 393-395

C

Cabinet, history of the English, 177-179; responsibility of, to the legislature, 180. *See* **Council**, **Ministers**, **Office**, **Executive**.

Candour, excessive, 6, 7, 44, 45, 47, 221; value of, 193, 194

Carlyle, on adversity, 36, 37, 38; on atheism, 135, 136; on dispatch, 217; on envy, 68; on equivocation, etc., 46; on form, 425, 426; on fortune, 345, 346; on imposture, 220; on selfishness, 98; on silence, 283; on utilitarianism, 100; pessimism of, 261; the prophet of truth, 7

Casuistry and truth, 6; defined, 46; mistake of, 47; rival schools of, 44, 45. *Cf.* **Equivocation**.

Caucus, advantages and disadvantages of the, 419

Caution. *See* **Delay**, **Cunning**, **Suspicion**, **Boldness**.

Centralization, tendency of, to neglect local and special interests, 179

Ceremony, Antitheta on, 422; based on the recognition of superiority, 423; Carlyle on forms and, 425, 426; decreases as other forms of control increase, 424, 425; the earliest control of conduct, 422, 423; Essay on, 420-422; etiquette a phrase of, 425; how far necessary, 424-426; implies submission and absence of progressiveness, 423, 424; politeness the modern equivalent of, 425; primitive society and, 423; protest of genius against, 425; Selden on forms and, 424, 425; value of, 424-426; women protected by, 436

Chance, Mill's analysis of, 342, 343. *See* **Fortune**.

Chauvinism, 165

Children, protected by Christianity, 51. *See* **Parents**.

Chivalry, love and, 75; nobility of merit introduced by, 110; position of women improved by, 58, 59, 426

Christianity, estimate taken of adversity, 35; of death, 14, 15; of friendship, 235, 236; of infanticide, 52; of love, 74; of marriage, 58; of suicide, 14; of usury, 335; ethical system of, 13, 14, 29, 34, 35, 97, 98, 317; superstitions of mediæval, 142

Church, attacks usury, 355; and State, 24, 25

Circumstances, force of, 345, 346; value of, in education, 335. *See* **Fortune**.

Clubs, in Athens, 414; growth of modern political, 418, 419; in Rome, 414. *Cf.* **Faction**.

Colonies, ancient compared with modern, 288, 289; arguments for and against the retention of, 290-292; civilizing influences

- of, 292 ; commerce and, 290, 291 ; connection with national greatness, 291, 292 ; criminal, 294 ; demands of English, moderate, 294 ; difficulties of taxation of, really slight, 293 ; difficulties of the retention of, 291 ; English, compared with those of other nations, 290 ; Essay on, 285-288 ; federation of English, 291-293 ; Greek, 289 ; geographical difficulties of federation of English, 291, 292 ; imperial taxation should fall on the, 291 ; in the Middle Ages, 289 ; modern, objects of, 289 ; of France, 289, 290 ; of, Spain, 289, 290 ; properly so called, 290 ; require protection, 290 ; Roman, 288, 289 ; schemes to promote connection with the mother country, 292, 293 ; small desire for separation shown by English, 291 ; spread of Christianity through, 293 ; value of for emigration, 290, 292 ; various kinds of, 289, 290 ; wrongly distorted on the rack of home politics, 292
- Commerce**, and colonization, 290, 291 ; aristocracy of, 130, 303 ; antagonistic to friendship, 235 ; democratic and peaceful, 130 ; modern, speculative, 301 ; not sufficiently recognized by Bacon, 254, 255 ; rapid growth of, in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 302 ; war and, 166. *See* **Riches, Wealth, Industrialism, Progress.**
- Commons, House of**, position of in the English constitution, 114 ; practical common sense alone required for a seat in, 304 ; riches a title to a seat in, 304 ; refusal to accept a seat in, 304. *See* **Representation.**
- Competition**, *versus* patronage, 402, 405, 406 ; principle of, requires modification, 301. *See* **Patronage, Office.**
- Conservatism**, Roman, 207. *See* **Innovation, Reform, Delay, Progress.**
- Consistency**, not a virtue, 7
- Consumption**, productive and unproductive, 239 ; selfishness of unproductive, 241
- Contract**, freedom of, a modern idea, 353
- Conversation**, compared with oratory, 279 ; literary, 278 ; types of, 277 ; value and defects of, 277, *et seq.* *See* **Discourse.**
- Council**, Bacon's conception of a, 179, 180 ; Privy, 177-180 ; Cabinet, 178-180. *See* **Cabinet.**
- Counsel**, Essay on, 170-175 ; the oligarchical principle, 175, 176. *See* **Council, Counsellor.**
- Counsellor**, compared with the warrior, 176, 177 ; early forms of the, 175, 176, 194, 195 ; feudal, 176, 177 ; in England, 177 ; in the Middle Ages, 176, 177 ; in private life, 180, 181 ; under the Roman emperors, 176. *See* **Diplomacy**, and *cf.* **Cunning** ; *see also* **Council, Counsel, Cabinet.**
- Courage**, Bacon deficient in, 94 ; compared with boldness, 92, 93 ; analysis of, 93 ; of opinions, 93 ; moral, 6, 93 ; varies with circumstances, 93
- Credit**, influence of, on investments and the acquisition of wealth, 303
- Cromwell**, the man of silence, 283
- Crown.** *See* **Monarchy.**

- Crusades**, give impulse to travel, 150
- Cunning**, analysis of, 192, 193; compared with wisdom, 192, 193; disadvantages of, 193, 194; Essay on, 188-192; diplomacy and, 193; Dr. Newman on, 193, 194; a sign of weakness and ignorance, 193; a temporary necessity in a primitive or military age, 194, 195. *See* **Counsel, Diplomacy, Truth, Hypocrisy, etc.**
- Custom**, Antitheta on, 331; difficulties of, 335; Essay on, 329; habits formed by, 334, *et seq.*; fashion an aspect of, 335. *See* **Innovation, Education, Reform, Nature.**

D

- Death**, analysis of fear of, 11, 14, 15; Antitheta on, 10; Aristotle on, 12; authorities on, 11; Bacon's attitude towards, 16; Christianity revolutionizes ideas on, 14, 15; comic side of, 14; Essay on, 8-10; fear of, masters other emotions, 11; Greek views on, 11; life a preparation for, 13; modern writers on, 15, 16; Mr. Badman and, 15; pagan view of, 11, 12, 13; Platonic view of, 12; Roman views on, 12, 13; Socratic view of, 11, 12; Stoic views on, 13; when most painful, 15. *See* **Immortality.**
- Debtor**, mortgage of the body of, 352, 354. *See* **Usury.**
- Deformity**, Essay on, 367, 368
- Delay**, analysis of causes of, 183-187; Antitheta on, 182, 183; dangers of, 186, 187; Essay on, 181, 182; in every-day life, 186, 187; in reform, 211; legal, 187; moral, 185; political, 184, 185; proverbs connected with, 184, 185. *See* **Dispatch.**
- Delegacy**, of financial authority, 242; representation reduced to, 84, 85, 304
- Democracy**, absolutism and, compared, 163, 165, 167-170; ancient and modern compared, 161; ancient without ministerial guidance, 176; commercial and unseditious, 130; defects of, 168; defects of Greek, 161; Mill on, 164; and patronage, 405, 406; Rousseau and, 164; tendency to level of, 84-86. *See* **Sedition, Faction, Empire.**
- Dependency**, benefits derived from and by a, 290; position of a, 289
- Design**, argument from, 133
- Despotism**, arguments for, 164-168; Bacon's dislike to, how limited, 163; democracy and, compared, 167-170; defined, 161; Greek antagonism to, 161; necessary in primitive society, 161; objections to, 168-170; Oriental, 162; a resistance to local despotism, 164, 165; superseded by oligarchy or democracy in Greece, 161, 162; where valuable in modern times, 165. *Cf.* **Abolutism, Empire, Monarchy.**
- Dickens**, Charles, on excessive candour, 221; on hypocrisy, 221, 222; on revenge on society, 31; on truth, 6
- Diderot**, and adversity, 37; and atheism, 137
- Diplomacy**, decay of, 86; defects of, 6; not English, 47; rests

- on cunning, 193; rise of importance of, 176, 177, 194, 195; value of, exaggerated, 47
- Discourse**, antagonism of some minds to, 281-283; Carlyle's dislike of, 283; causes of decrease of, 271-283; conditions favourable to, 278; different types of, 277; decrease of in modern life, 281-283; Essay on, 274-276; a French accomplishment, 280, 281; Heine on, 280; in England, 279-281; not necessarily a mark of the highest genius, 278, 279; takes place of literature in some conditions of society, 279; value of, 281, 284; written thought compared with, 277, 278. *See* **Conversation**.
- Dispatch**, antitheta on, 215; Bacon's advice relative to, 217; Carlyle on, 217; delay and, contrasted, 215-217; difficulties of, 183-187; Essay on, 212-214; excessive praise of, 91, 92; how secured, 217, 218; often implies prevision, 215, 216; overcomes obstacles which would increase with delay, 216, 217; runs a race with nature; 215, 216; value of, in politics, 91, 216
- Dissimulation**, Antitheta on, 42, 43; Bacon's estimate of, 47; Carlyle on, 46; Essay on, 38-42; how far necessary, 44, 221; simulation and, compared, 44; value and limits of, 44. *See* **Truth, Diplomacy, Hypocrisy, Simulation**.
- Duelling**, a survival, 29, 30. *See* **Revenge**.

E

- Ealdorman**, an official noble, 107, 108; the title earl adopted by the, 108
- Earl, Eorl**, 107, 108; compared with the feudal lord, 108; nobility of, 107, 108; origin of the term, 107, *note*; thegns and, compared, 107, 108
- Eclectic**, advantages and disadvantages, 8, 209-212; 413, 414
- Economy**, limits of, 242; selfish theory of political, 301; value of, 238-241. *See* **Extravagance**.
- Education**, Antitheta on, 331; Essay on, 329-331; heredity and, 333-337; health and, 266, 267; 333, 336, 337; limits of, 334-336; in Greece, 56, 57; in Rome, 57; morality and, 101, 337-339; physical, 333, 334; private, 56, 57, 101, 336; the problem of, 101, 333; public, 56, 57, 101, 336; unconscious, through play of circumstance, 335. *See also* **Studies, Health, Goodness, Nature, Custom**.
- Emerson**, on friendship, 233; on love, 77, 78; on truth, 7
- Emigration**, colonies and, 290, 292-294; defence of, 294; free trade in, 291; objections to, 293, 294; opportunities for, 294; a substitute for, 293
- Empire**, advantages of, 161, 164-168; Antitheta on, 160, 161; Bacon's conception of, 165, 166; becomes unwieldy, 291; conditions of, 165-168; condemned, 164, 165, 168-170; democracy and, compared, 168-170; definition of, 161; Greek dislike to, 161; Holy Roman, 162, 163; Indian, 166, 167; Macedonian,

162, 163; military conditions of, 165, 166; Mill on, 164, 165, 169; necessity for, 161, 164, 165; oriental, 162; presupposes an ideal autocrat, 168-170; promotes and rests on passive type of character, 169; the will of the people may sanction, 168. *Cf.*

Despotism, Great Place, Office, Monarchy, Absolutism.

Emulation, compared with envy, 67

England, colonies of, 291; constitution of, 177, 179; conversation in, 279-281; feudalism weak in, 109, 110, 177; gardening in, 387-393; nobility in, 113-115; truth a virtue of, 7, 8

Enthusiasm, advantages of, 8, 209-212, 413-414; philanthropy and, 318, 319

Envy, analysis of, 67, 68, 69; Antitheta on, 67; Bacon's estimate of criticized, 69; Carlyle on, 68; defined, 67; depreciates and attacks greatness and goodness, 67-70; emulation and, 67; Essay on, 61-67; excessive prosperity and divine, 33, 67; feeds on the mind, 69, 70; Locke's estimate of, 67; materialized by the ancients and Bacon, 69; pernicious effects of, 68, 69, 70; perverted sympathy and, 68, 69; when most excusable, 68

Equality, and freedom, compared, 128; material, 129; political, 112, 167-170; social, 112, 128

Equivocation, defended, 44; condemned, 45, 193, 194. *See* **Hypocrisy, Simulation, Truth, Diplomacy.**

Etiquette, value of, 424. *See* **Ceremony.**

Evolution, Aristotle and the doctrine of, 255; examples of, 257; human, 256, 257; law of, 256, 257; national and social, 256, 259; in plant and animal life, 257; power of man to guide, 205-207. *See* **Progress, Innovation.**

Executive, appointed by the Crown, 177, 178; Bacon's conception of an, 179, 180; connection of, with the legislature, 178-180; the Crown and the, 180; in America, 179; in France, 180; in Germany, 180; Rousseau on the, 169. *See* **Monarchy, Council.**

Expense, Bacon on, 242; checks on, 240; delegated authority in, foolish, 242; Essay on, 237, 238; extravagant, selfish, and harmful, 238-241; fashion and, 241, 242; a form of bribery, 241; government interference in, foolish, 240, 241; lavish, not respected, 242; national, 239, 240; a relative term, 241; servants make, 242. *See* **Extravagance, Riches, Money, Price.**

F

Faction, causes of, 413; Essay on, 411-413; in Greece, 414; in Middle Ages, 415; value of, 413, 414. *See* **Party, Sedition, Enthusiasm.**

Faculty, how far capable of modification, 333, *et seq.*

Faith, implies individuality, 25; religion grasped by, 23-25. *See* **Religion; cf. Superstition.**

Fame, fragment of an Essay on, 450, 452

Fashion, bad influence of, 207; caprices of, 239; expense determined by, 241, 242; levelling tendencies of, 325; literature and art deteriorated by, 208, 209. *Cf.* **Custom**.

Fatalism, passive endurance of, 38

Federation, colonial, 291, 242, 243; strength and weakness of, 127, 291

Feudalism, Adam Smith's theory a reaction against ideas of, 300; characteristics of, 109, 110; disruptive influences of, 110; early decay of, in England, 109, 110; early traces of, 108; modified form of, in England, 109, 110, 177; monarchy, a check on, 164, 165; on the Continent, 109, 110; oppression of, 302; nobility of, 109, 110; rise of, 108, 109. *Cf.* **Nobility, Followers**.

Folkland, 106, 107

Followers, and friends, Essay on, 395-397; evils of excessive number of, 397-399; modern phases of, 399, 400; statutes relating to, 397-399

Form, necessity of, 425, 426; Carlyle on, 425, 426. *See* **Ceremony**.

Fortune, Antitheta on, 341, 342; Bacon on, 345; Carlyle on 345, 346; conterminous with ignorance, 343; an element of success, 344-346; Essay on, 339-341; folly of belief in, 343, 345; genius, how far independent of, 344, 345; how far to be eliminated from human affairs, 343-346; proverbial philosophy on, 346

France, colonial policy of, 289; conversation in, 280, 281; government difficulties of, in, 180, 210; influence of, on English literature, 152; nobility in, 108-111, 303; revolution in, atheistic, 135

Freedom, equality and, compared, 128; limits of human, 258, 338; necessary for development, 257

Friends, and followers, Essay on, 395-397

Friendship, Antitheta on, 232; artistic, 235; Bacon's treatment of, 237; based on social instincts, 233; between man and woman, 231; Christianity and, 234-236; commerce antagonistic to, 235; conditions of, 233, 234, 235, 236; definitions of, 232, 233; Emerson on, 233; Essay on, 223-232; in the Middle Ages, 235; literary, 236; love and, 77, 234; love identified by Greeks with, 234; marriage, a substitute for, 59; not selfish, 233; rare for the greatest minds, 233; when most possible, 235, 236; youth the age of, 233, 234. *See also* **Love, Marriage**.

G

Gardens, Bacon's at Gorhambury, 389, 390; Bacon's description of compared with Shakespeare's, 389; Botanic, at Chelsea, 388; the child of art, 385; Dutch, 386, 387; early English, 387; Essay on, 373, 381; of Elizabethan age, 387-389; flower, in England, 387-393; French, 385, 386; Greek, 384; healthy

- influence of, 384; hints for small, 392, 393; in Ireland, 388; in Scotland, 388; influence of increased civilization on, 385; Italian, 385; Johnson's antipathy to, 382; kitchen, in England, natural school of, 390-392; popularity of, 382, 383; Roman, 384, 385; scientific cultivation of, 385, 392; scientific value of, 383; summary of history of, 392; under the Stuarts, 387, 390; Walter Scott on, 385. *See* **Botany**.
- Gesithas**, 107; constitute nobility of service, 107
- Goethe**, on adversity, 38; on despatch, 215; on imposture, 220; on progress, 262
- Goodness**, Bacon tends to separate greatness and, 102; Bacon's estimate of, 97, 101; Christian idea of, compared with pagan, 97; education and, 101; Essay on, 94-97; expedient not obligatory, 99, 100; how connected with greatness, 101, 102; how developed in the individual, 101; obligatory not expedient, 99, 100; questions opened up by Essay on, 102; self-sacrifice identical with, 98, 99; subjective side of, not completely analyzable, 99, 100
- Government**, Bacon's conception of, 179, 180; difficulty of, in France, 180; in Germany, 180; final disappearance of, an ideal, 168; Guizot's theory of, 168; *Laissez-faire* theory of, 168, 205, etc.; Mill's theory of, 164; not a joint-stock machine for thrift, 261; Rousseau's theory of, 164. *See* **Monarchy, Despotism, Oligarchy, Democracy, Laissez-faire**.
- Greatness**, Bacon's ideas of national, 254, 255; Essay on national, 243-254; mediæval ideas of national, 254, 255; modern life unfavourable to, 84-86. *See* **Goodness, Great Place, Progress, Office**.
- Greece**, aristocracy in, 105, 106; colonies of, 289; commerce in, 353; democracy, defects of in, 161; despotism the *bête noire* of, 161; education in, 56, 57; friendship identified with love by, 234; gardening in, 384; ideas of progress in, 255; oratory in, 179; philosophy of, on death, 11; religion in, 142; sedition in small states of, 124; small states of, fall before Macedonian empire, 162; travel in, 149, 150; usury in, 353, 354
- Guilds**, a check on the mediæval nobility, 302

H

- Health**, ancient and modern compared, 265, 266; and nature, 267; Antitheta on, 265; Bacon on, 266; Essay on, 263, 264; effects of excessive care about, 267; importance of, 265; investigation of phenomena of, 266; main principles of legislation on, 267, 268; Locke on, 266; luxury and, 267; of Bacon, 269; of Elizabethan age, 266; of Greece, 265, 266; of Middle Ages, 266; of Rome, 265, 266; public and private, 266-268; relation of, to brain-work, 268, 269; self-help in, 267; science of, a branch of education, 266, 267; simple requirements for, 266-268; State interference in, 267, 268; study of, more necessary in modern times, 266; statistics on, 268; unfavourable conditions of modern life to, 267-269; value of, 268

- Heredity**, and its problems, 333 ; difficulty of, in education, 333, 334 ; difficulties of, in sanitary science, 266-268 ; nobility based on, 109, 110 ; of office, 110 ; progress, how connected with, 204, 205
- Honour**, and reputation, Essay on, 431-433 ; injuries to, dealt with by duelling, 29
- Hypocrisy**, affectation, a form of, 223 ; Carlyle on, 220 ; analysis of, 222 ; criticism of others leads to, 222 ; Dickens on, 221, 222 ; deceives itself, 221, 222 ; effects of, 221-223 ; Essay on, 218, 219 ; in knowledge, 222, 223 ; in society, 47, 221 ; La Rochefoucauld's definition of, 220 ; La Rochefoucauld's condemnation of, 221 ; Milton on, 222 ; Thackeray on female, 221 ; the world gives opportunities for, 220, 222 ; virtue easily counterfeited by, 222
- Humility**, a virtue of Christianity, 97, 317 ; compared with ambition, 317

I

Immortality, 12. *See* **Death**.

Imposture. *See* **Hypocrisy**.

India, a dependency, 166, 167 ; English rule in, 166, 167, 290 ; possession of, how far a benefit to governors and governed, 167, 290

Industrialism, Bacon's attitude to, 254, 255 ; growth of, 302, 303 ; feudalism and, 300 ; renders philanthropy possible, 357 ; undervalued by Bacon, 254, 255. *See* **Riches, Commerce, War, Democracy, Progress, Nobility**.

Infanticide, attitude of pagan morality to, 51, 52 ; Christianity represses, 52

Innovation, analogies from vegetable and animal life, 205 ; Antitheta on, 203, 204 ; constant necessity for, 206, *et seq.* ; Essay on, 202, 203. *See* **Reform, Progress, Evolution**.

Instinct, defined and explained, 332, 333 ; how far susceptible of modification, 333, 334

Interest, Mr. Ruskin's attack on, 356, 357 ; usury and, 351 ; when term first used, 357. *See* **Usury**.

Investment, influence of banking on, 303

Italy, influence of, on English literature, 151, 152 ; oligarchies of mediæval, 111, 112 ; republics of mediæval, 125, 127

J

Jesuits, dangers from to Protestantism, 22, 23 ; morality of, 44, 45

Judicature, Antitheta on, 439 ; Bacon's conception of, 439 ; entire severance from politics, 440 ; Essay on, 434-438 ; independence of, when secured, 440, 441 ; position of in Bacon's time, 439

K

King, executive and the, 170, 180 ; place in the English constitution, 178-180. *See* **Monarchy**, *cf.* **Empire**.

Knighthood, a burden in England, 110 ; for personal merit, 110 ; territorial, 110

L

Labour, division of, 258 ; disadvantages of, 258 ; a factor in progress, 258 ; modifies *laissez-faire* theory of government, religion, and morality, 258, 259

Laissez-faire, doctrine of, based on human selfishness, 198 ; failure of doctrine of, 168, 205 ; in daily life, 187 ; in politics 184, 205 ; specialization of functions and, 258, 259. *See* **Despotism**, **Monarchy**.

Land, difficulties connected with small holdings of, 352, 353 ; nobility dependent on tenure of, 105-111 ; wealth convertible with possession of, in antiquity 301, 302 ; value of unoccupied, in colonies, 289, 292, 294

Lander, on gardens, 382 ; on travel, 154

La Rochefoucauld, on death, 13 ; on friendship, 233 ; on hypocrisy, 220, 221

Law, compared with revenge, 29 ; lynch, 31 ; takes the place of revenge, 28-31

Legislation, checks on hasty, 114, 179 ; intricacy of, in modern times, 179, 184, 206, 207 ; local and special guidance necessary for, 179 ; simplicity of problems of early, 176

Legislature, connection of the executive, with, 177, 180

Leviathan, design of the, 163

Livery, abuses in connection with, 397, 398 ; effects of statutes against, 399. *See* **Maintenance**, **Followers**.

Lords, House of, advantages and disadvantages of the, 113-115 ; Bagehot on the, 114 ; a check on hasty legislation, 179 ; position of in the English Constitution, 113-115. *See* **Nobility**.

Love, Antitheta on, 72, 73 ; Bacon underrates, 78 ; Christianity spiritualizes but weakens, 74 ; Emerson on, 77, 78 ; Essay on, 70-72 ; friendship and, compared, 76, 77 ; Greek conception of, 74 ; intellectual side of, 73, 74, 77, 78 ; material explanation of, 73 ; Puritanism deepens, 76 ; Shakespeare's treatment of, 75, 76 ; utilitarian view of, 77 ; various types of, 77

Luxury, checks on, 240 ; evils of, 239, 240, 267

Lynch, law, 31

M

Machiavelli, Cæsar Borgia and, 176 ; on diplomacy, 176 ; on hypocrisy, 220 ; on nobility, 115 ; on the selection of ministers, 177

Machinery, over-belief in social and political, 199

Malthus, arguments of in favour of war, 165 ; pessimism of, 261

Manners, compared with ceremony, 425 ; necessary for human intercourse, 425 ; peerage, the English, and, 113, 114

- Marriage**, Antitheta on, 55 ; Bacon's estimate of, 60, 61 ; compared with friendship, 60 ; different forms of modern, 77 ; English laws of, survivals, 60 ; Essay on, 53-55 ; Germanic, 58 ; Greek conception of, 56 ; how regarded by chivalry, 59 ; by mediæval Christianity, 58 ; by Puritanism, 59 ; primitive, 55 ; laws of, criticised, 57, 60 ; relation to genius, 59, 60 ; value of, for the State and individual, 50, 52, 60. *See also* **Love, Parents, Women.**
- Masque**, antimasques, the, 324, 327 ; Bacon's connection with, 325 ; Ben Jonson as a writer of, 324 ; compared with moralities, 322, 323 ; description of, and triumphs, 322 ; Essay on, 320-322 ; final phase of, 326, 327 ; Milton, as a composer of, 326 ; rise of, 322, 323 ; Shakespeare as a composer of, 324 ; various composers of, 325, 326
- Maintenance**, Bacon's account of, 398, 399 ; causes of, 397 ; evils of, 397, 399 ; Essay on, *see* **Followers** ; in Bacon's time, 399 ; history of, 397-399 ; modern equivalents of, 399-400 ; statutes against, 397-399
- Mechanism**, danger of, 336, 338 ; in thought and action, 332 ; extent of, 337 ; obstacles from, in education, 336-338
- Method**, comparative, discovery and application of, to human life, 184, 256, 257, 259
- Middle Ages**, colonization in the, 289. *See passim.*
- Mill**, John Stuart, on monarchy, 164, 165 ; on representation, 169
- Milton**, composes *Comus*, 326
- Ministers**, Bacon's conception of, 179, 180, 404, 505 ; Machiavelli, on the selection of, 177 ; relation to the Crown, 178 ; to the legislature, 179
- Ministry**, difficulties of, in France, 180. *See* **Ministers.**
- Minority**, rights of a, 180 ; value of a, 180
- Monarchy**, Bacon advocates absolute, 163 ; Bacon's conception of, 439 ; a check on feudalism, 162 ; character of early, 423 ; disappearance of before oligarchy, 105, 106 ; Hobbes upholds absolute, 163 ; ministers in English, 176-179 ; often nominal, 170 ; place of king in English, 176-179 ; regarded by Mill as a transitional and often necessary stage of political development, 164, 165 ; relations of, with judicature, 439 ; Rousseau accepts, under protest for large states, 164. *See also* **Empire.**
- Money**, complication and delicacy, of problems connected with, 355, 356 ; false ideas concerning, 303 ; place of, in political economy, 299 ; protective restraints on free trade in, 303. *See* **Riches, Wealth, Usury, Commerce.**
- Monopolies**, unjustly made and used, 301
- Montaigne**, on atheism, 137 ; on great place, 83 ; on friendship, 60 ; on marriage, 60 ; on travel, 151, 152
- Moralities**, compared with masques, 322, 323

N

- Napoleon**, I., cold etiquette of the court of, 281 ; ideas of, permanently injurious, 166 not a free agent, 84, 85 ; III., *pléviscite* of, 168

Nature, analysis of human, 332, *et seq.*; and health, 267; Antitheta on, 331; corruption of human, 14, 35; Essay on, 327-329; perfectibility of human, 13; relation of human agency to, 204, *et seq.*; tendency of, to degenerate, 206-207; various meanings of the term, 332; various theories concerning human, 163, 164; various problems connected with human, 333-339. *See* **Education, Evolution.**

Negotiating, Essay on, 393, 395

Newman, John Henry, on dissimulation, 45, 193, 194; on straightforwardness, 45, 193, 194

Nihilism, increase of, 261

Nobility, advantages of a, 112, *et seq.*; ancient compared with modern, 111, 112; anomalous position of in England, 114, 115; Antitheta on, 104; as an *ex officio* part of the legislature, 113-115; Bacon's views on, 115; by tenure, 108-110; degradation of, at Florence, 302; disadvantages of a, 112, 113; Essay on, 102-104; feudal, 108-110; Machiavelli's estimate of, 115; of birth, 105-115; of Greece, 105, 106; of Italy, 111, 112, 302; of merit, 107, 110; of office, 106, 108, 111, 115; of Rome, 105, 106; of Scotland, 111; of wealth, 111, 113, 303; Teutonic, 107, 108; under despotism, 105

O

Office, advantages and disadvantages of high, 84, 85; Antitheta on, 83; Bacon's long-continued failure to obtain, 87; modern aspects of, 84, 85; refusal to accept, 85, 86; restraints implied by, 84, 85. *See* **Great Place, Counsel, Council, Patronage, Suitors, Bureaucracy, Nobility.**

Officialism, evils of, 180; rise of, non-military, 177. *See* **Office.**

Oligarchy, ancient and mediæval, 105, 106, 111, 112, 124, *et seq.*, 161, 162; defects of, in Greece and Rome, 162; importance of rise of, 176; in conflict with despotism, 175. *See also* **Nobility.**

Onesidedness, Matthew Arnold on, 8. *See* **Enthusiasm, Reform, Trimmer.**

Opposition, a check on hasty legislation, 179; a modern idea, 179. *See* **Party.**

Oratory, compared with conversation, 279; defects of, 277, 281-284; effects of, on conversation, 279-281; increase of, in England, 279, 281; Romans trained in, 279; value of, to communicate ideas, 277-279. *See also* **Discourse, Conversation.**

P

Paganism, infanticide and, 51, 52; moral systems of, 97, 98, 317, 13, 14, 34, 35; views of, on death, 11-13; on revenge, 29. *See* **Adversity, Marriage, Parents, Self-Love, Virtue; etc.**

- Pantheism**, democracy inclined to, 136; grandeur of, 136; theism and, compared, 135, 136
- Papacy**, dangers from, to England, 22-23; Bacon's attitude to, 22-23; effects of, on a military age, 176; German emperors, a check on, 162; infallibility of, 23, 24
- Parents**, Essay on, 48-50; how regarded by Christianity, 52; legal position of, in Greece, 50, 51; in Rome, 51, 52; relation of, to children, the basis of primitive political society, 50, 51; value of the relation of, to children in modern times, 52; tendency of modern civilization to lessen the authority of, 52; tie between children and, strong in France, 52
- Patronage**, advantages of, as compared with competition, 405, 406; after the Restoration in England, 405; Bacon's ideas on, 404, 405; democracy and, 405, 406; disappearance of official, with the first Reform Bill, 405, 406; early aspects of, 402, 403; in America, 406; in Bacon's time, 402; in the Church, 404; in feudal society, 403; monarch fountain of political, 404. *See* **Office, Council, Minister.**
- Party**, advantages and disadvantages of government by, 413, 414; analysis of party spirit, 416, 417; caucus applied to government by, 419; compromise not incompatible with, 417, 418; growth of a popular, 415, 416; limits of, 417, 418; growth of government by, 304, secession from political, 417; Tory, 416; value of party spirit, 413, 414; weakness of party spirit, 413, 414; Whig, 416. *See* **Faction.**
- Pauperism**, promoted by poor laws in England, 211; rapid increase of, in England, 260, 261
- Persecution**, religious, must be thorough to be successful, 25
- Pessimism**, causes of, 259-261; folly of, 261, 262; of Carlyle, 261; of Leopardi, 261; often a mark of an abject and indolent type of character, 261; remedies for, 261, 262
- Philanthropy**, compared with ambition, 318; how possible, 86, 87, 351. *See* **Ambition, Virtue.**
- Philosophy**, proverbial, 187
- Place, great**, Anthitheta on, 83; Bacon's continued failure to obtain, 87; disadvantages of, 84, 85; does not imply freedom, 84, 85; Essay on, 79-82; how far a platform for great work, 318; modern progress tends to dispense with, 85, 86; refusal to accept, 85, 86. *See* **Office, Patronage.**
- Plantations**, *see* **Colonies**; Essay on, 285-288
- Plato**, on death, 12; on the immortality of the soul, 12; on love and friendship, 74, 234, 236
- Platonic**, love, 236
- Politeness**, a modern virtue, 425; a form of ceremony, 425
- Politics**, a career for the wealthy, 305; complexity of problems of, 184, 206, 258; a monopoly in the hands of great houses, 184; party, 304, 416-419; principles of modern, 210-212; value of boldness in, 91; value of delay in, 184, 206; value of despatch in, 215, 216
- Polygamy**, 55

- Preparation**, Antitheta on, 341, 342. *See* **Delay**, **Fortune**.
- Price**, how determined, 241, 242
- Protestantism**, the new learning and, 22; position of in Bacon's time, 23, 24. *See* **Religion**.
- Proverbs**, value and defects of, 187; standpoint of, 23, 24, 25
- Puritanism**, attitude to marriage, 59; to love, 76; Bacon and, 23, 24; religious standpoint of, 22, 23, 24
- Praise**, Antitheta on, 429; Essay on, 427, 428
- Progress**, Bacon's ideas on, 254, 255; belief in, the sign of a great mind, 262; comparative method applied to, 256, 257; convertible with the growth of reason, 256-259; dark side of, 260, 261; dangers of, 258, 259; doubt raised as to the fact of, 255, 256-262; Greek ideas on, 255; idea of, first grasped definitely by Vico, 255, 256; in the Elizabethan age, 255; insoluble element in, 259; laws of, 259; limits of, 257; mediæval ideas on, 255; a modern idea, 255; morality and religion inseparable from, 257, 258; necessary conditions of, 257; obscured by back eddies, 262; pessimism and, 259-262; problems of, difficult, 259; Roman ideas on, 255; specialization of function in, 256. *See also* **Evolution**, **Greatness**.
- Propagandism**, limits of, 6, 44
- Prophecy**, ambiguous language of, 310; analysis of, 309; Bacon's sensible treatment of, 313; based on ignorance, 309, 310; causes of too ready belief in, 309-313; claim to power of, how supported, 313, 314; dangers from, 313; Essay on, 305-309; excesses of, 311, 312, 313; falseness of pretensions to, 310, *et seq.*; how far possible, 309; in religious matters, hard to expose, 312, 313; phrases of, in present day, 313, 314; pseudo-scientific jargon of, 311; scientific hypothesis, a, 309; superior knowledge seems to be, 309; various kinds of, 310-313; vanity of over-belief in, 314
- Prophets**, celebrated, 310, *et seq.*; dangers from, 313. *See* **Prophecy**.

Q

Quietism, and ambition, 318; ideal of, 222

R

Reform, artistic and literary, 208, 209; cannot be resisted, 212; compromise often impossible in, 209, 210, 211; exposed to criticism from two extremes, 210; must be organic, 210; never final, 208; parliamentary, 211, 212; radical, 207; revolution and, 211, 212; strong feeling and unselfishness necessary for, 319; three elements or factors implied by, 209, 210. *See* **Innovation**, **Progress**, **Evolution**.

- Religion**, an affair of faith, 24, 25; Bacon's attitude to, 22, 23, 138, 145, 146; Essay on unity in, 17-22; Greek and Roman, compared, 142; a growth, 8; imposture in, hard to expose, 312, 313; inherent in man, 135, 136; morality and, 24, 137; national, 22; natural, weakness of, 23; persecution in, 25; perversions of, 143, 144; primitive forms of, 141, 142; progressive, 142, 257; reason and, 25, 135; the reformed, 22, 23; the reformed, and the new learning, 22; signs of disruption of, in England, 23; unity in, how possible, 23-25; value of unity in, 23; various standpoints of, 23-25. *See also*, **Superstition**, **Atheism**, **Death**, **Christianity**.
- Renaissance**, the, 209
- Reputation**, and honour, Essay on, 431-433
- Representation**, government by expensive, 168; government by, weakness of, 167, 168; no idea of, in antiquity; Mill's admiration for, 164, 165; right to, how far connected with a share of the public burdens, 198, 303, 304; reduced to delegacy, 304; Rousseau's condemnation of, 164. *See* **Commons**, **House of**.
- Revenge**, analysis of, 28; Antitheta on, 27; based on fear, 31; Christianity and, 29; duelling a survival of, 29, 30; Essay on, 26, 27; falls into excess, 31; law and, compared, 28-30; lynch law a form of, 31; noble, 30; sets law in motion, 30; superseded by law, 28-31; utilitarian view of, 28, 29; value of, in a primitive age, 28
- Revolution**, followed by reaction, 208; when unavoidable, 208, 210, 212. *See* **Reform**.
- Riches**, allow leisure for politics, 304; Antitheta on, 299; Bacon's estimate of, 305; Bacon's modes of acquiring, 305; causes of growth of, 303; a competency and, compared, 300; dangers of, 300, 301; degradation and danger of the worship of, 301; doubtful methods of acquiring, 301; Essay on, 295-298; history of growth of, 301-303; in America, 303; manhood suffrage a protest against connecting franchise with, 303; originally land, 301, 302; patronage of art, 300; political power and, 301-304; in America, 303; position of, in England, 302, 303, 304; poverty and, compared, 304, 305; a practical test of merit, 301, 302; value of those who amass, 300; Wordsworth on, 304. *See* **Wealth**, **Expense**, **Money**, **Usury**, **Progress**, **Commerce**, **Adversity**.
- Richter**, on adversity, 36; on atheism, 137
- Rome**, absorption of the ancient world by, 255; agrarian distress at, 126; clubs worked elections at, 414; colonies of, 288, 289; commerce of, 353; degradation of imperial, 13, 35; early legislation at, revengeful, 58; education private at, 57; empire of, 126, 127, 162; family tie strong at, 57; fearlessness about death at, 12, 13; gardening at, 384; Grecian states conquered by, 56; health at, 265, 266; infanticide at, 52; love healthier at, than in Greece, 74; marriage at, 57, 58, 74; materialism of imperial, 35; monarchy at, 161, 162; nobility of, 106, 107; oligarchy at, 161,

162, 175, 176; oratory cultivated at, 279; parental authority at, 50, 51, 57; position of women at, 57, 58, 74; progress how conceived by, 255; reform unsatisfactory at, 207; religion of, 142; representation unknown at, 162; sedition rare at, 126, 127; travel to and from, 150; usury at, 352, 353; virtue, types of, at, 57
Rousseau, on adversity, 38; on government, 164; on representation, 164; reduces the executive to a delegacy, 169; on the state of nature, 164, 332

S

Sacrifice of self, the Christian ideal, 29, 97, 98; evolution of the idea of, 98, 99; not explained satisfactorily by utilitarianism, 99, 100. *See Selfishness.*

Sanitary, science and legislation. *See Health.*

Satire, political, in France, 281; travel, object of, in England, 152

Scotland, nobility in, 111

Seditions, Aristotle's account of, 124; causes of, 125, 126, *et seq.*; comparative immunity of England from, 128; of Rome from, 126, 127; dangerous signs of, in England, 129; Essay on, 116-124; feudalism checked popular forms of, 127; in mediæval Italy, 125; in the Middle Ages, 127; isolated examples of, in England, 128; modern forms of, 128, 129; preventives of, 128-130; small state system production of, 125, 126; Sparta fairly free from, 125

Selfish, advantages of a selfish theory of morality, 201

Selfishness, analysis of moral obligation into, 98-100, 197, *et seq.*; Carlyle on, 198; dilemma of, 201; disruptive tendencies of, 197-199; enlightened, 197-199; liable to deceive and to be deceived, 198; a meeting-point for all vice, 272; political economy and, 199, 200; a practical guide for action, 201; where preferable to sentimentalism, 201. *Cf. Sacrifice of self, Virtue.*

Self-love. *See Selfishness.*

Sentiment, a cause of delay, 185; in politics, 201; Ruskin and, 185; science and, 8, 185

Silence, Carlyle on, 283; carried to excess, 284; Cromwell, a man of, 283; modern admiration of, 281-284; philosophy of, 281-284; where valuable, 284. *See Discourse.*

Simulation, necessity for, exaggerated, 45-47; social, 47; when allowable, 47. *See Dissimulation, Truth, Hypocrisy.*

Slavery, in America, 130; in Greece, 24

Shakespeare, and masques, 324; on death, 16; on delay, 185; on evil, 360; on gardens, 388, 389; on love, 73, 75, 76

Socialism, causes of, 300, 301; fallacy of, 129. *See Sedition.*

Society, deceits of, 47; forms of, 424, 426; origin of, 50, 198, 163, 164; phenomena of, complex, 206, 207

Spiritualism, physical basis of, 332

Spinoza, on death, 13 *note.*

Stael, Madame de, on truth, 7

State, and Church, 24, 25

Statistics, misuse of, 268; value of in sanitary science, 268

Stoics, attitude of, towards adversity, 34, 35; towards death, 13; towards suicide, 13, 14

Straightforwardness. *See Candour.*

Studies, Bacon's treatment of, criticised, 409; classical compared with modern, 411; Essay on, 406, 408; limited by the inclinations of individuals, 410; necessary conditions of, 409, 410; necessity of a definite aim in, 410; second-hand knowledge a part of, 410, 411; special compared with various, 409-411; supplemented by experience and observation, 409

Suicide, 13, 14, 15

Suitors, Essay on, 400-402. *See Patronage.*

Suffrage, manhood, 303; property and the, 303, 304

Superstition, Antitheta on, 140, 141; atheism and, compared, 145, 146; Bacon's condemnation of, 145, 146; causes of, 144, 145; Essay on, 138-140; gradual decrease of, 142; great men and, 143; leads to inaction, 168; misrepresents the deity, 143, 144; a necessity of human weakness, 143; primitive religion full of, 142; where a characteristic of all religion, 140, 141, 143

Suspicion, Antitheta on, 271; Bacon's estimate of criticised, 271, 273; cause of, 272; caution and, compared, 271, 272; creates the danger which it fears, 273; cruelty of, 272; detects wickedness, 273; engendered by and engenders vice, 273; excesses of, 272-274; Essay on 269-271; hard to remove, 272; ignorance breeds, 272; Montaigne on, 273; provides itself with victims, 272; secret government promotes, 272; selfishness of, 272; strong passion and, 274; tyranny promotes, 272; useful for defence rather than offence 274; worst in the young, 274

Symbolism, necessity and value of, 425, 426. *Cf. Ceremony, Form.*

T

Tennyson, on change, 205; on death, 15, 16; on love, 77, 78; on progress, 205, 254, 262; on selfishness, 200; on war, 166

Thackeray, on adversity, 37; on hypocrisy, 221

Thegn, growing power of the, 108; noble by service, 107; possession of land implied by title, 108; rise of the, 107

Theism, compared with atheism, 135, 136; with pantheism, 135; vagueness and impracticability of, 135

Theology, natural, 23, 135-137. *See Religion.*

Thrift, government not a joint-stock machine for, 261; value of, in individuals and nations, 241. *See Expense, Riches, Economy, Extravagance, Luxury.*

Trade, Bacon's attitude to, 254, 305; free, bearings of on colonial question, 261; growth of, 302, 303, 354; in Greece and Rome, 351-353. *Cf. Expense, Riches.*

Travel, ancient history suffers from absence of, 149, 150; condemned by Carlyle, Johnson, Landor, etc., 152, 153; effects of on English literature and manners, 151, 152; Essay on, 146, 149;

impulse given by crusades to, 151; increase of, in reign of Henry VIII., 151; increased facilities for, towards end of Roman republic, 150; letters on, attributed to Essex, 149; Montaigne on, 151, 152; object of satire and caricature, 152; Shakespeare on, 151; value of, 153, 154; substitutes for, in modern times, 153; where useless or mischievous, 154

Trimmers, dangers from, 8, 211. *See Eclecticism.*

Triumphs, and masques, Essay on, 320-322

Troubadours, love poetry of the, 75; refining influence of the, 75

Truth, and casuistry, 6; analysis of, 4, 5, 6; Antitheta on, 4; Bacon's conception of, 4, 5, 8; Carlyle on, 7; confused with candour, 7, 8; with consistency, 7; with obstinacy, 8; definition of, 5; emotionalism a hindrance to, 8; in art, 8; in history, 6, 7; in religion, 8; limits of, 6; moral and scientific, compared, 4-7; scientific, in Bacon's time, 4, 5; Stael, Madame de, on, 7; truthfulness and, distinguished, 4, 5, 7. *See Cunning, Diplomacy, Dissimulation, Truthfulness.*

Truthfulness, analyzed, 5, 6, 7; definition of, 5; a Teutonic virtue, 7. *See Truth.*

U

Usury, attacked by the Church, 355; by Dante, 355; by Mr. Ruskin, 356, 357; Bacon's attitude to, marks a transition stage, 357; Bentham's defence of, 356; causes of excessive, in early society, 351-354; Essay on, 347-351; forbidden or discouraged in early society, 353, 354; legislation in England against, 355-357; modern aspects of, 357; not different in kind from interest, 351; reduced debtor to slavery in early society, 353, 354; repeal of usury laws, 356; restrictions on, bad effects of, 353, *et seq.*; rise of demand for money at, 354; Solon's legislation on, 354

Utilitarianism, arguments for and against, 99, 100; on love, 77; on revenge, 28, 29. *See Sacrifice of self, Selfishness, Self-love, Goodness, Virtue.*

V

Vain-glory, Essay on, 429-431

Value, how determined, 241, 242

Vicissitude, of things, Essay on, 443-450

Virtue, ancient and modern compared, 13, 14, 29, 34, 35, 97, 98, 317. *See Sacrifice of self, Selfishness, Goodness.*

W

War, of all against all, 163; Bacon regards war as a national necessity, 165, 166; decay of spirit of, 86; evils of, 166, 167; supposed value of, 116, 166, 167

Wealth, not money, 299 ; a relative term, 299 ; unequal distribution of, 241. *See* **Riches, Equality, Commerce, Usury, Progress, Expense.**

Women, position of, in Greece, 56, 57 ; in Rome, 57 ; in the Middle Ages, 58, 59 ; protected by chivalry, 58, 59, 426

Wordsworth, on courage, 93 ; on riches, 304

Y

Youth, and age, Essay on, 358-360 ; the season for friendship, 233, 234 ; suspicion doubly bad in, 274

INDEX TO THE NOTES.

The Roman numerals indicate the number of the Essay, the Arabic numerals the line. F.E.F. stands for "Fragment of Essay on Fame."

A

Abridgment, xxix. 289
 Abstract, xxxiv. 27
 Absurd, vi. 75 ; xlvii. 25
 Abuse, xxii. 142 ; xlii. 24
 Above the moon, lii. 26
 Accurate, lviii. 55
 Action, xii. 4 ; xxx. 42
 Aculeate, lvii. 51
 Adamant, xviii. 53
 Adhere, li. 11
 Adjective, for adverb, i. 21 ;
 iv. 48 ; v. 20 ; xii. 15
 Adust, xxxvi. 1
 Advancements, xxxiv. 120
 Advised, xviii. 82
 Advoutress, xix. 102
 Aequinoctia, xv. 4
 Affect, i. 4 ; xiii. 1 ; xlviii. 20 ;
 lv. 3
 Affectation, l. 10
 Affection, vii. 51
 After, xxxix. 4
 Aim, to take an, xvii. 42
 Alarum, vi. 95
 Alcoran, the, xvi. 2

Alley, xxii. 14
 Allow, xviii. 6 ; xxvi. 41 ; lii.
 44
 Alloy, i. 69
 Almost, xliii. 5
 Anabaptists, iii. 142
 Anacoluthon. *See* Construction.
 And = "if" xxiii. 38 ; xl. 42
 Anti-masques, xxxvii. 40
 Antiques, xxxvii. 42
 Appose, xxii. 75
 Approaches, xix. 73
 Apricocks, xlvi. 44
 Argument, xxix. 32
 Arminians, lviii. 97
 Antecamera, xlv. 133
 Architecture, Elizabethan, xlv.
 1, 108
 Arras, xxvii. 165
 Article, use of definite, i. 48 ;
 lviii. 12 ; F.E.F., 25
 Arts, xiv. 42
 As, for "that," iii. 103 ; v. 15 ;
 vii. 42 ; xi. 3 ; xxi. 33 ; xxxi.
 27 ; li. 14
 As (restrictive), lxxxiii. 75
 Assured, xv. 248
 Astrology, xlv. 11

Astronomy, Bacon's views, xv.
 55; xvii. 31; xxiii. 8
 Avoidances, xlv. 144

B

Balance of trade, xv. 123
 Band, iii. 1
 Banks, xli. 17
 Bashaw, F.E.F., 48
 Baugh, xxxv. 52
 Be, lviii. 87
 Bear it, xxvi. 24
 Beat over, l. 53
 Because, xxii. 18; xxv. 13
 Become, xlv. 108
 Beholding, x. 1; liv. 40
 Better, you were, xxvi. 49;
 xxvii. 174
 Blacks, ii. 19
 Blanch, xx. 129; xxvi. 32
 Bowed, xxvii. 225
 Brave, xxxiii. 62
 Brave (verb), x. 26; xv. 202
 Bravery, xi. 55; xv. 182; xxv.
 46; xxxix. 7; lvii. 2
 Brittle, xlii. 60
 Broken music, xxxvii. 7
 Buckingham, allusion to, xxxvi.
 41
 Buckling, xxi. 22
 Busy, xiii. 8; xlvi. 134
 But, after "deny," xl. 1

C

Cabinet councils, xx. 61
 Can, to, xi. 34
 Canibal, xxvii. 130
 Canvass, xxii. 6
 Card, xxix. 41; xviii. 47
 Cast (verb), li. 44
 Cast into, xlv. 76
 Castoreum, xxvii. 38
 Cat in the pan, xxii. 95
 Cecil, Robert, xlv. 1

Ceilings, liv. 45
 Celibacy of clergy, viii. 30
 Censure, xxix. 4
 Cession, liv. 52
 Chapman, xxxiv. 71
 Character, xiii. 7
 Chargeable, xxix. 283
 Check with, x. 55; xxxi. 5
 Childless men, list of, vii. 10;
 viii. 3
 Cholera, xxxvi. 1
 Chop, lvi. 90
 Civil, xvii. 20; xxxii. 42; xlviii.
 26; liv. 13; lvi. 86; lviii. 97
 Civility, xlv. 6
 Clamour (verb), xx. 157
 Close, xi. 91
 Coemption, xxxiv. 94
 Collegiate, xxxix. 57
 Colonies, Roman in England,
 xxix. 174
 Colour (verb), xli. 130
 Comfort, xxxix. 58
 Compass, xxix. 159
 Composition, xlii. 19
 Conceit, vi. 110; xxxiv. 8; lvi.
 85
 Conceived, xxv. 62
 Conscience, xi. 41
 Construction, absolute, xi. 90;
 xxi. 8
 Constructions, confused, viii. 17;
 xx. 6; xxii. 120, 138; li. 49
 — loose, ix. 32; viii. 11;
 xxix. 145, 158, 240; xxxviii.
 50; xlv. 22; xlvi. 146; l. xii.
 liii. 46
 — mixed, ix. 106; xxvi. 45;
 xxviii. 22
 Consultation of judges, lvi. 131
 Contain, xxix. 181; lvii. 48;
 Converse (verb), xxxviii. 49
 Convince, xvi. 4
 Cosmo de' Medici, iv. 32
 Courage, xxix. 59
 Creature, i. 44

Crook (verb), xxiii. 18
 Crossness, xiii. 66
 Cunning, xxii. 1
 Curious, ix. 12 ; xxv. 41 ; xxvi.
 29
 Curiously, l. 27
 Custom, for "habit," xxxix. 8

D

Damson, xlv. 31
 Declare, lv. 27
 Deformed persons, ix. 45
 Deliveries, xl. 12 ; xix. 48
 Dependencies, xx. 84 ; xxxvi.
 64
 Depraving, xlix. 26
 Derive, ix. 139
 Despatch, ii. 46
 Desperate, iv. 32
 Destitute (verb), xxxiii. 114
 Device, xxxvii. 8, 59
 Diet (verb), xviii. 55
 Difficileness, xiii. 61
 Disabling, xlix. 26
 Discoursing, i. 7
 Discover, v. 42
 Disemboltura, xl. 13
 Dispense with, xxxvi. 24
 Dissimulation, vi. 1
 Distasted, xlix. 32
 Distastes, v. 34
 Ditty, xxxvii. 8
 Doubt (verb), xxii. 37 ; lviii. 88
 — (construction of verb), i. 29
 Dry, xxxii. 55

E

Eccentrics, xvii. 30
 Edge, xli. 106
 Ejaculation, ix. 11
 Embowed, xlv. 109
 Employed men, xviii. 65
 Engaged, xxxix. 39
 Engines of orbs, xvii. 30
 Engrossing, ix. 112 ; xv. 161

Enrich (neuter), xxxiv. 44
 Entertainment, xlix. 15
 Envy, the passion, xiv. 49
 Epicure, iii. 137
 Escurial, xlv. 47
 Espials, xlviii. 19
 Estivation, xlv. 123
 Estates, ix. 165 ; xiv. 2 ; xxix.
 346 ; xlviii. 23
 Even hand, to come at, ix. 29
 Exaltation, xxxix. 60
 Excises, xxix. 100
 Excusations, xxv. 44
 Exercised, xl. 41
 Exhaust, viii. 42
 Expert, l. 5

F

Facility, xi. 95
 Facts, iii. 157
 Fair (adverb), vi. 101
 Fame, xi. 2
 Fascination, ix. 2
 Favour, xliii. 15
 Fearful, xxix. 36
 Feigned, xxxiv. 15
 Fetch, lviii. 177
 — about, xxii. 115
 Fifth essence, xvi. 17
 Flash, a, xxix. 221
 Flashy, l. 32
 Flowers, Shakespeare's and
 Bacon's, xlv. 246
 Fly, F.E.F. 21
 Folk and "folks," vii. 39
 Fond, xxvii. 214
 Foot-pace, lvi. 98
 Formal, lii. 25
 Formalist, xxvi. 10
 Foundations, vii. 9
 Freewill, i. 4
 Fume, lviii. 54
 Froward, xxiv. 23
 Futile, vi. 58 ; xx. 70

G

- Galliard, xxxii. 38
 Garland personal, xxix. 324
 Gaudery, xxix. 330
 General contrivers, xlix. 66
 Generally, vi. 22
 Giddiness, i. 3
 Globe, xi. 48
 Glorious, xxxiv. 117 ; xlviii. 13 ;
 liv. 7
 Go forth, xxii. 69
 Gracious, xlix. 36
 Graze, xlv. 94
 Great place, xi. 1
 — year, lviii. 52
 Green wound, iv. 41
 Griefs, xv. 94
 Growing silk, xxxiii. 64
 Guard, xxxi. 4

H

- Haberdasher, xxii. 18
 Habilitation, xxix. 213
 Half-piece, xxvii. 112
 Hand, xxv. 23
 — of even, xxviii. 11
 Heart, xxix. 101 ; xxxi. 9
 Hierusalem artichokes, xxxiii.
 34
 His, for "its," xix. 97 ; liv. 41
 Hooded, xviii. 12
 Humanity, xiii. 3 ; xxvii. 30
 Humour, l. 11
 Humorous viii. 23
 Husbandry, xxxiv. 56

I

- Idol, x. 22
 Importune (adjective), ix. 174 ;
 xxxviii. 4
 Impose, i. 11
 Imposthumations, xv. 185
 In regard, xxix. 124
 Incensed, v. 41

- Indians of the West, xvi. 49
 Indifferent, xx. 144 ; xiv. 18
 Infamed, xix. 94
 Infinitive, used gerundically, ii.
 35 ; iii. 121 ; xxvi. 38 ; xxxiv.
 12 ; xli. 98 ; xlii. 32
 Influences, ix. 9
 Innovations, xxiv. 2
 Intelligence, to have, x. 31
 Intend, xxix. 215
 Interested, iii. 165
 Interest, rate of, xli. 3
 Inure, xxxvi. 49
 Inward, xi. 90 ; xx. 79 ; xxvi.
 45

J

- Jade, xxxii. 18
 Janizaries, xix. 168
 Jesuits, allusion to, xxxix. 65
 Justs, xxxvii. 55

K

- Kalendars, xv. 2
 Keep quarter, xxii. 82
 Knap, xlv. 10
 Knee timber, xiii. 72
 Knots, xlvi. 103

L

- Latinisms, xi. 81 ; xxv. 1
 Lay, for "lie," xxxviii. 36
 League, the, xv. 38 ; li. 58
 Legend, the, xvi. 1
 Loading, part. xiii. 64
 Looses, xxii. 138
 Lurch, xlv. 26
 Lying and fiction confounded, i.
 22, 37

M

- Macaulay on Bacon's style, l. 5
 Mainly, xv. 65
 Make for, i. 16 ; xvi. 27

Maketh, it, xxix. 281
 Manage, vi. 29 ; xxix. 25
 Manure, xxxiii. 53
 Marish, xxxiii. 95
 Masteries, to try, xix. 51
 Mate (verb), ii. 22 ; xv. 99
 Material, xxv. 47
 Mean, in a, v. 23
 Mere, xiii. 62 : xxvii. 25
 Mere stone, lvi. 12
 Merely, iii. 71 ; iv. 18
 Merely, lviii. 16
 Mew, xxix. 92
 Misanthropy, xiii. 67
 Misquotations, ii. 50 ; iii. 33,
 161 ; iv. 30 ; xi. 44 ; xv. 22 ;
 xv. 80 ; xix. 57
 Model, xxix. 344
 ——— after the, xxiii. 34
 Moderator, xxv. 36
 Monopolies, xxxiv. 93
 More, xliii. 15
 Morris dance, iii. 43
 Mortification, ii. 9
 Mought, xv. 186 ; xxii. 23 ;
 xxxiv. 40
 Move (verb), xxii. 34
 Munite, iii. 114
 Music, Bacon's taste in, xxxvii.
 31
 Musters, xxix. 40
 Mystery, v. 16
 Myths, B.'s interpretation of, v.
 20 ; xx. 27 ; xxi. 26 ; lviii. 17

N

Natural magic, ix. 2
 Naught, liii. 4
 Negative, double, vii. 3 ; xi. 111
 Never, be he never so, xxxvi. 22
 Newel, xlv. 75
 Nice, xxvii. 13
 Niceness, ii. 32
 Nor (omitted), xxxix. 15

Not (superfluous), iii. 96
 Nothing (adverb), xxi. 15
 Nourish, xix. 157

O

Obnoxious, xx. 114 ; xxxvi. 41 ;
 xliv. 34
 Obsequies, ii. 20
 Obtain, vi. 21
 Oes, xxxvii. 34
 Of, definitive, xv. 68 ; xxii. 11
 ——— = "about," xvi. 68
 Of, with verb of filling, xxvii.
 225
 Of course, xxiv. 12
 Officious, xlv. 33 ; xlviii. 22
 Often (adjective), xxxviii. 8
 On terms, xxvii. 270
 Only, xxiii. 8
 Onset, xxi. 13
 Opinion, xxvi. 48
 Oraculous, vi. 78
 Orange-tawny, xli. 10
 Other, an adverb, iv. 20

P

Pack cards, xxii. 5
 Pair (verb), xxiv. 31
 Parable, xxvii. 126
 Particular, lviii. 19
 Particularly, xxxi. 21
 Party, iv. 26
 Passable, li. 15
 Passages, xxv. 43
 Passionate, xxvii. 59
Patres patriae, lv. 50
 Patriot, xl. 35
 Paul's, xxii. 122
 Peal, i. 84
 Perfection, xlv. 44
 Perish (action), xxvii. 123
 Philanthropic, xiii. 3
 Philology, lviii. 205

Philosophy, i. 40
 Place, a, F.E.F., 25
 Placebo, xx. 167
 Plantations, xxxiii. 1
 Platform, xlvi. 239
 Plausible, ix. 159; lvi. 9
 Pleasing, xxx. 54
 Plural for singular verb, lv. 32
 Poesy, v. 11
 Poetry, "wine of devils," i. 33
 Point, xlv. 78
 Point (verb), lviii. 187
 Point device, lii. 56
 Politic, iii. 46; xiii. 71; xxi. 29; xxix. 254
 Poll, lvi. 104
 Popular, xii. 23; xv. 249
 Popularity, xlviii. 28
 Poser, xxxii. 34
 Pragmatical sanction, xxix. 191
 Pray in aid, xxvii. 142
 Prest, xxix. 255
 Pretend, xxix. 241
 Prick in, xviii. 85
 Pricked, xlvi. 197
 Prime, the, xxxiv. 61: lviii. 72
Primum mobile, xv. 54; xvii. 22; li. 65
 Privado, xxvii. 54
 Private (substantive), xxxiii. 53
 Privateness, xi. 15; l. 2
 Proceeder, xxxviii. 9
 Profit, xix. 23; xxix. 226
 Proof, vii. 31
 Proper, xxvii. 267; lvii. 51
 Propriety, iii. 31
 Prospectives, xxvi. 11
 Proyn, l. 14
 Public revenges, iv. 42
 Purchase, xli. 43; li. 41
 Purprise, lvi. 99
 Push, xliii. 37
 Put tricks, xxii. 143
 Puzzle, xi. 28

Q

Quarrel, viii. 55; xxix. 245
 Quarrels of jurisdiction, lvi. 108
 Quarter, to keep, x. 54; xxii. 82
 Queech, xxxix. 33
 Quotations from Æsop, xxxviii. 38; xlv. 16; liv. 1
 — Apollodorus, v. 14
 — Aristophanes, xxxv. 6
 — Aristotle, xxvii. 2, 249
 — Bernard, St., iii. 82; xvi. 69
 — Celsus, xxx. 45
 — Cicero, viii. 47; xi. 12; xvi. 95; xxiii. 50; xxvi. 20; xxvii. 86; xxix. 290; xxxiv. 28; xxxix. 27; xlii. 67; liv. 36; lv. 25; lvi. 127
 — Dio Cassius, ii. 26; xxvii. 80, 104; xxxvi. 32
 — Diogenes Laertius, xvi. 45
 — Dionysius Cato, xxi. 6
 — Horace, ii. 61; xxvii. 173; lvii. 53
 — Juvenal, ii. 50
 — Livy, xl. 17; xlii. 67; liv. 16
 — Lucan, xv. 80
 — Lucian, i. 13
 — Lucretius, i. 53; iii. 134
 — Machiavelli, xiii. 27; xv. 38; xxix. 150; xxxix. 5; lviii. 42
 — Martial, xx. 104
 — Montaigne, i. 75
 — New Testament, i. 86; ii. 4; iii. 26, 33, 100, 161; ix. 183; xiii. 49, 86; xix. 8; xx. 93; xxvi. 5; xxvii. 19, 206; xli. 13; liii. 57; lvi. 154; lvii. 16
 — Old Testament, iii. 57; iv. 37; vii. 22; xi. 44, 98; xv. 63; xvi. 22; xx. 11, 12; xxii. 50, 144; xxiv. 41;

- xxxiv. 9, 19, 32; xxxv. 4;
xxxviii. 48; xli. 8; xlv. 51;
liii. 14, 41; liv. 29; lvi. 11,
18, 25, 39, 48, 76; lvi. 146;
lviii. 1, 18
—— Ovid, xv. 151; xxxii. 23;
xxxviii. 23; l. 41; lvi. 53
—— Plato, xxvi. 34; xxxv. 85;
lviii. 2, 33
—— Plautus, ix. 39; xl. 5
—— Pliny, xv. 97; liv. 57
—— Plutarch, vii. 53; x. 30;
xiii. 68; xxvii. 73, 80, 127,
164; xxix. 1, 215; xxxv. 14,
19; xl. 51, 55, 63; xlii. 35;
xlv. 33; F.E.F., 39
—— Publius Syrus, x. 35
—— Quintilian, xxvi. 33
—— Rabelais, iii. 41
—— Sallust, xix. 57
—— Seneca, ii. 17, 32; v. 1;
xi. 30; xxxv. 8; lvii. 15
—— Spartianus, xlii. 12
—— Suetonius, ii. 40, 43; xv.
225; xxxv. 26
—— Tacitus, ii. 28, 44; v. 6,
10; xi. 104, 105; xv. 22, 31,
59, 228, 245; xxii. 57, 103;
xxvii. 96, 97; xxxiv. 102;
xxxv. 21; xliii. 35; liv. 48;
F.E.F., 46
—— Terence, xx. 69; xxvi. 8
—— Vergil, xv. 8, 14; xxix.
135; xxxv. 6; xlvi. 52; lvii.
19; F.E.F., 3
Quotations misapplied, i. 86;
ii. 26; xiii. 27

R

- Race, lvii. 5
Ravish, xvii. 22
Recamera, xlv. 133
Receipt, xlvi. 150
Reciproque, x. 38
Reduced, lviii. 202

- Reiglement, xli. 76
Relative, free use of, iv. 1; xi.
108; xxii. 26; xxix. 236;
xliv. 13; lvii. 15
—— ambiguous use of, v. 27
—— “which” and “that,”
xxviii. 40
Religious, ii. 5
Remembrance, vii. 5
Remove the lot, ix. 136
Remuant, xl. 40
Representations, xix. 5
Resorts and falls, xxii. 129
Respected, vii. 23
Respects, xi. 97; xiv. 15; lii. 1,
50
Rest (of musket), xxvii. 213
Retiring, l. 2
Returns, xlv. 54
Right, xxiii. 8
Round, i. 68; vi. 108
Ruin, lvii. 15

S

- Sad, v. 36; F.E.F., 24
St. Bartholomew's Day, iii. 136
Saltness, xxii. 25
Sarza, xxvii. 36
Save the phenomena, to, xvii. 31
Sbirrerie, liii. 54
Sceptics, i. 5
Schoolmen, xvii. 28; l. 51
Scriveners, xxxiv. 81
Seat, xlv. 6
Second (verb), lii. 41
—— causes, xvi. 9
Secure, xv. 101
Security, v. 9
Seeds, xvi. 19
Seeled, xxxvi. 28
Self-love, xxiii. 4
Sensible, xi. 122; xxix. 253
Sentence, lviii. 4
Sententiously, F.E.F., 3
Sequester, xxvii. 10

Set up their rest, xxix. 300
 Several, vi. 14; xix. 170
 Shakespeare's flower, xlv. 246
 Shall for "will," ii. 8
 Should, xxvii. 7
 Shrewd, xxiii. 2
 Shrift, xxvii. 42
 Sibylla, xxi. 1
 Side (verb), xi. 115
 Singular, xxix. 172
 — for plural verb, xv. 164;
 xxix. 237; xxxviii. 3
 Sit, xli. 31
 Slide, xl. 61
 — a better, xiv. 53
 Slight (verb), xii. 4
 Slope (adjective), xlv. 120
 Slug, xli. 46
 So (limitative), xxiii. 5
 Solecism, xix. 59
 Solution of continuity, iii. 21
 Sort (the verb), vi. 6; vii. 29,
 36; xxxviii. 47
 — to, xxvii. 52
 Sovereign, xxvii. 149
 Speak to, xx. 136
 Spial, xlv. 36
 Spirits, the, ix. 16
 Staddles, xxix. 113
 Stages, lviii. 116
 Stand at a stay, xii. 54
 Stand upon, xxix. 228
 Stars, the, xlv. 11
 States, ix. 169; xii. 23; xix.
 133; xxx. 13
 Statua, xxvii. 174
 Steal, xi. 89
 Still (adverb), xi. 17
 Stirps, xiv. 9
 Stoics, ii. 47; lvii. 2
 Stond, xl. 14; l. 42
 Strawberry leaves, odour of,
 xlv. 67
 Studies, xxx. 25
 Study, l. 1
 Subsidies, xxix. 101

Success, xlvii. 17
 Sufficiency, xi. 107; xxvi. 7
 Sufficient, lii. 47
 Sumptuary laws, xv. 126
 Suspect (substantive), xxiv. 40;
 liii. 19
 Suspicious, xli. 17

T

Take order, xxxvi. 17
 Take the wind, xx. 166
 Talmud, the, xvi. 2
 Tax (verb), xi. 53
 Teach masteries, xxx. 53
 Temper, xix. 34
 Tender, xv. 37, 234; xlvii. 9
 Thank (substantive) xlix. 8
 That, for repeated "when,"
 etc., xv. 46; xxvii. 70; xxxvi.
 55; xl. 15
 That (superfluous) xv. 25
 Theologue, liii. 50
 Thereof, for "its," xxiii. 44
 To life, xxvii. 245
 Tobacco, xxxiii. 58
 Top, xxvii. 159
 Touch (substantive) lvii. 39
 — speech of, xxxii. 49
 Toy, xxxvii. 1; lviii. 65
 Tracts, vi. 65
 Transcendencies, v. 12
 Transferred epithet, xv. 5
 Transportation, xxxiii. 19
 Trash, xiii. 86
 Travel, xviii. 1
 Trench to, lvi. 138
 Trent, Council of, xvii. 27
 Triumphs, i. 21
 Trivial, xii. 1
 Trivially, xxix. 78
 Truth, i. 1, 39, 42
 — of civil business, i. 66
 Turquet, xxxvii. 43
 Twenty-four letters, xxvii. 122

U

Under foot, xli. 60
Undertakers, xxxiii. 79
Undertaking, ix. 144
Uniformity, xlv. 2
Union of England and Scotland,
xx. 138
Unworthy, vii. 20
Upon charge, liv. 31
—— conscience, xxxvi. 77
—— speed, xxxiv. 43
—— the matter, xlv. 30
Ure, vi. 91
Utopia, xli. 75

V

Vain, vi. 59
Vatican, xlv. 47
Vein, i. 7 ; ix. 65
Vena porta, xix. 155
Very (adjective), xiii. 70
Virtuous, xiv. 39 ; xlviii. 35

Voice, xxii. 55
—— (verb), xi. 67 ; xlix. 46
Vouched, iii. 40

W

Wait upon, xxii. 20 ; lviii. 66
Wanton, vii. 24
Wardens, xlv. 47
Warm set, xlv. 18
Welts, xlv. 137
Which, for "who," iii. 91
Wit, vi. 2
Witchcraft, iv. 47
Withe, xxxix. 36
Witty, iii. 62 ; l. 39
Word, in a, xxxvi. 58
Would, for "should," iii. 160
xvii. 55 ; xxxi. 39 ; xxxii. 16,
23 ; xxxvii. 12 ; l. 30
Writers who have been makers
of history, xx. 131.

Z

Zelants, iii. 56

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
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